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Ich muss doch als Eltern bittschön
auch ohne Farbänderung erkennen,
ob mein Kind erhöhte Temperatur hat.1
Writing this dissertation at the University of Göttingen has been an interesting
experience for two reasons.
First, I thought I would write a short, very technical dissertation about a well-
delineated topic, preferably involving modality. The thesis I actually wrote definitely
involves modality, and one might say that it is somewhat technical. What cannot be
said about my thesis, not even charitably, is that it is short, and that its topic is well-
delineated. Nevertheless—and that was quite a surprise for me—I had a lot of fun
working on a topic which started with one natural language example read to me by
Viola Schmitt on some afternoon in our “office” in Vienna, but which over the years
more or less spun out of control the more data and insights on the data I gathered.
Most of the data that I collected over the years has found its way into this thesis, and
it is one of my favourite parts of this work.
The second reason is that I never actively considered moving to Germany, let alone
Göttingen. Frankly, I first learned the approximate geographic location of Göttingen
six months after moving there, and it’s fair to say that I didn’t like the town at all at
first. But Göttingen very slowly creeps up on you, and suddenly you don’t mind sitting
in a smallish university town somewhere in the middle of Germany since, actually, it’s
not about where you are, but who is there with you. The people I met in the last
three years, both colleagues from Göttingen and guests from all over the world, made
Göttingen a good place to live and work in. These people contributed either indirectly
or directly to this work and I want to thank them for that.
I want to thank my advisor Magda Kaufmann for asking me to come to Göttingen,
and for allowing me the freedom to explore the data at my pace while being a very
strict and critical reviewer of my work. I learned a lot from her, and while it was not
always pain-free, it helped me find my way of working on a problem. Thanks also
go to Cleo Condoravdi for interesting conversations at various stages of my research
1http://www.best-practice-business.de/blog/?p=12309
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and Regine Eckardt, who also agreed to be on my committee. I’m very much looking
forward to defending this work in front of these exceptional researchers.
For interesting discussions on the data, I thank Jerra Busch, Eva Csipak, Michael
Job, Stefanie Simon, and Thomas Weskott. Additional, special thanks go to Thomas
Weskott for reading and commenting on the better part of this thesis (in both senses
of this expression). All remaining typos and mistakes are my own.
Over the years, I’ve also profited from discussions with Nicholas Asher, Rajesh Bhatt,
Fabrizio Cariani, Brady Clark, Irene Heim, Angelika Kratzer, Friederike Moltmann, E.
Allyn Smith, Malte Willer, and the audiences at various talks and workshops where I
presented stages of my work.
For moral support and a great learning experience, I also thank the girls and guys of
the semantics reading groups—most notably the “Kekslesegruppe”—that I regrettably
had to stop attending during the last two months of writing this thesis. Now that it’s
over, I’m looking forward to joining in again, and not just for the cookies.
Apart from various reading groups, I also had a great time at work-related, and
not-so-work-related events in the linguistics department, the German department, the
English department, and the Courant Research Center in Göttingen. These events
made my stay in Göttingen enjoyable not only professionally, but also personally.
As always, I want to thank my parents for the love and support, and for routinely
checking up on me every three weeks to see whether I’m still alive during the last six
months of writing. Thanks also go to my brother for being interested in the progress
of my “Diplomarbeit” (= MA Thesis), and for being sure that I will get an “Einser”
(= A). It is great to be part of such a supportive family who believe in your success. I
hope they are right.
Unfortunately, Chester the hamster, who is also featured in some of the examples in
this thesis, didn’t live to see his name in print. I hope I’m not misrepresenting him in
any way.
Göttingen, July 19, 2012
Now that the work I defended in 2012 has been revised, additional thanks are in
order. The last two years have been a very busy period for me, not only because
of moving to Tübingen to work at another great university in an even more smallish
university town. Needless to say, the experiences in these two years have shaped this
revised version considerably.
I want to thank my colleagues at the German Department of the University of Tübin-
gen for providing a comfortable and genial work environment. My esteemed colleagues
Sebastian Bücking and Patrick Grosz deserve additional thanks for finding time in
their busy schedules to discuss data and theoretical issues with me. This work profited
considerably from their expertise.
I’m also indepted to my advisors Magdalena Kaufmann, Cleo Condoravdi, and
Regine Eckardt for their continued advice and support.
Further thanks go to people who continued to provide technical and moral support,
as well as great friendship over the years. Jerra Busch, Dirk Buschbon, Eva Csipak,
and Dolf Rami—you are the best! Big thanks also go to Thomas Weskott, who again
excelled at the hard task of the spontaneous proof-reader. In my most impartial opin-
ion, however, Thomas, you deserve the biggest thanks and a cornucopia of everything
that is good just for being the way you are!
And lastly, of course, I want to thank my brother and my parents—especially for
not caring that it took nearly two more years until this thing was done.
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Personal pronouns, among them especially first and second person singular pronouns
like German ich (Engl. ‘I’) and du (Engl. ‘you’), occur abundantly in every day com-
munication. Whenever two people talk to each other, these two expressions will sooner
or later be used in a sentence—provided they communicate facts about themselves.
Consider the dialogue in (1).





























B: Thanks! I bought that in Vienna last week.
Example (1) illustrates the predominant “referential use” of first and second person
singular pronouns. This use is in fact so prevalent that if you ask people what ich and
du mean, they will tell you that ich always refers to the speaker, and du to the person
that is addressed. When asked if ich and du could be used otherwise as well, people
tend to perceive it as a trick question: after all, what else could ich and du refer to?2


























































‘A team’s wish to win simply has to be greater than that of the opponent.’4
2This, in fact, mirrors many conversations with friends and family in which I tried to explain the







Neither (2) nor (3) can be sensibly understood as a statement “about” the speaker or
the addressee, respectively. In fact, both examples are naturally understood as general
statements: about bridal couples in the case of (2) and about teams in the case of (3).
But if ich and du usually refer to very specific individuals, i.e. the current speaker and
the current addressee, how does this reading come about?
The topic of this thesis is to investigate this puzzle. To give it an official name,
I call personal pronouns that are used as exemplified by ich and du in (2) and (3)
“impersonally interpreted personal pronouns”.
More precisely, the aim of this thesis is to examine the semantic and pragmatic
aspects connected to these impersonal uses, to give an account of how these uses come
to be interpreted in the way illustrated above, and to address the connection between
the impersonal use and the predominant referential use.
This investigation is carried out using the example of German first person singular
ich and second person singular du. But throughout the discussions in the following
chapters, I also appeal to work on impersonally interpreted personal pronouns in other
languages.
Results from the literature make it pretty obvious that the impersonal use of second
person singular pronouns illustrated in (3) is by no means an idiosyncrasy of Ger-
man. Impersonally interpreted second person singular pronouns have been observed
and discussed for many languages from different language families. The following is a
non-exhaustive list of attested impersonal uses of second person singular pronouns in
various Indoeuropean languages that were discussed in recent formal and descriptive
literature (e.g. Alonso-Ovalle 2000, 2002; Bennis 2004; Egerland 2003; Gruber 2011;
Kluge 2012; Malamud 2006, 2007, 2012; Siewierska 2004; Zeijlstra 2008).5
• English: impersonal second person you
(4) In those days, you (imp.) could marry your cousin.
(Malamud 2006:84)





























‘If you (imp.) are allergic to dogs, then you are not automatically also
allergic to cats.’
(Gruber 2011:351)
5Whenever “(imp.)” is added after you in the English translation, the intended interpretation
involves an impersonal use of a second person (singular) pronoun.
6Dutch also has a strong variant for the second person singular pronoun, i.e. jij, which cannot be
used impersonally (cf. Gruber 2011).
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‘If they rely on you (imp.), you must not disappoint them.’
(Egerland 2003:22)



















‘When you (imp.) travel, you feel very liberated at that place.’7





















‘I think that you (imp.) hurt yourself often doing this job.’
(Gruber 2011:351)

















‘In that department you (imp.) work like a slave.’
(Alonso-Ovalle 2000:4)
In addition to the languages given here, Siewierska (2004) and Gruber (2011) list e.g.
Afrikaans, Romanian, Greek, Mandarin Chinese, Indonesian, Cree, Godi, Gulf Arabic,
Hindi, Kashmiri, Koromfe, Koyra Chin, and Kurdish (among others) as languages
that allow an impersonal use for second person singular pronouns. So it seems that
impersonally used second person singular pronouns are a cross-linguistically pervasive
phenomenon.
In contrast, the impersonal use of first person singular pronouns, which can be ob-
served for German ich in (2), seems to be cross-linguistically quite rare. It is important
to stress “seems” in the previous sentence since to my knowledge impersonal uses of
first person singular pronouns have not yet been investigated in much detail, even for
German. At least for English and French, impersonal uses of first person singular pro-
nouns have been argued to exist as well. The relevant examples are given in (10) and
(11).
For the English example in (10), Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990) claim that I is used
“impersonally”, and suggest that this use is restricted to hypothetical contexts that
apply to people in general.
7Taken from C-ORAL-Rom (Cresti and Moneglia 2005). I thank Bettina Kluge (p.c.) for sharing
this example with me.
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(10) We form a frame or script for this kind of situation. . . . Thus, in order to be
able to take the subway in New York I simply need a ‘taking the subway’ script
or frame, if I have one, and supply now relevant specific information about the
situation.
(Kitagawa and Lehrer 1990:741, shortened)
As noted by Kitagawa and Lehrer, I in (10) occurs in a hypothetical context that is
introduced by a “vague use” of we (cf. Kitagawa and Lehrer 1990). To my mind, this
suggests an alternative way to account for (10): We introduces a vague group of people
associated with the speaker (e.g. by sharing a common property). With the subsequent
use of I, the speaker refers to himself, but presents himself as a representative of the
group. That is, any property that is true of the speaker, is true of the entire group of
people.
For the occurrences of French first person singular je occurring in (11), Kluge (p.c.)
reasons that they must be impersonal uses since they could be substituted by the
impersonal pronoun on, and the sentence in which they occur is part of a general
discussion about morticians.
Context: Interview with a mortician. The interviewer asks whether one has to be



































Available: ‘No, absolutely not. If I start to tell myself that death is a matter
of course, that it’s just like that, I commit suicide.’
Available: ‘No, absolutely not. If one starts to tell oneself that death is a
matter of course, that it’s just like that, one commits suicide.’8
Note that in (11), je is also part of a conditional, i.e. it occurs in a similar environment
as English I in (10). Even though I do not have native speaker intuitions about
either English or French, (11), to my mind, does not unambiguously point towards an
impersonal use of je. Since in the given context, the speaker-referential interpretation
is both possible and plausible, a similar explanation as for (10) might be given here, as
well.
It is important to note that with my discussions of (10) and (11), I do not want to
argue against the possibility of an impersonal use of first person singular pronouns in
English and French by trying to explain away the data. The point I want to make is
that some sentences that contain occurrences of first (and also second) person singular
8Example taken from the C-ORAL-Rom corpus containing tagged transcripts of spoken communi-
cation in French, Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese (Cresti and Moneglia 2005).
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pronouns might share properties with sentences containing impersonal uses. Regardless
of this fact, these pronouns may not be genuine impersonal uses in the sense that I
want to make precise now.
I propose the following two diagnostics to check whether an occurrence of a first
or second person singular pronoun constitutes an impersonal use of the form that is
investigated in this thesis:
• Question 1: Is the pronoun used in an explicit, hypothetical context in which the
referent of the pronoun is taken as an example for the application of a general
rule, or is used to illustrate a certain role?
If one of the these is answered positively, the pronoun is most probably not used
impersonally. In genuine impersonal uses, the pronoun never refers to the speaker
and addressee with their actual properties. In case an utterance has one of the
properties queried above, the first or second person singular pronoun contained
therein in fact does not have to refer to the speaker and addressee with their
actual properties. In this context, the pronoun could also refer to hypothetical
versions of the speaker and addressee with potentially different sets of properties;
but note that this would nevertheless constitute a referential use.
• Question 2: Can the sentence containing the pronoun be uttered in the exact
same form by someone to whom the statement does not apply if the pronoun
were interpreted referentially? Or similarly, can it be addressed to a person to
whom the general statement does not apply?
If the answer is “yes”, this is a sign that the pronoun is used impersonally. In
these cases, the sentence cannot express the validity of a generalization for the
speaker or the addressee (maybe as members of a specific group), but has to state
a generalization proper.
For impersonally used German ich and du, as exemplified in (2) and (3), the first
question is answered negatively, and the second positively. Whether the pronouns in the
English and French examples pass these tests is at the moment still an open question.
As stated above, further investigations are needed to determine whether English and
French allow for genuine impersonal uses, or whether (10) and (11) exemplify a different
type of occurrence of first and second person pronouns.
Up until now, I have not addressed third person singular pronouns. The question
to ask is obviously: Do third person singular pronouns also have an impersonal use?
It seems to be the case that this question has to be answered negatively. Potential
candidates for impersonal uses of third person singular pronouns are some instances
of Elbourne’s (2005) “Voldemort Phrases”, i.e. third person singular pronouns that are
modified by a restrictive relative clause. For instance at first glance, the personal
pronoun he in (12-a) seems to be interpreted impersonally.
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(12) a. He who hesitates is lost.
Available: People that hesitate are lost.
b. He is lost.
Unavailable: People are lost.
However, the availability of such an interpretation seems to crucially hinge on the
presence of a relative clause. That is, if the relative clause in (12-a) is removed, as
in (12-b), the impersonal-like reading becomes unavailable. As will be discussed in
Chapter 1, the impersonal uses of first and second person singular pronouns, in contrast,
do not depend on any specific co-occurring material.
This observation motivates one further diagnostic for the impersonal uses:
• Question 3: Can specific material be found that has to necessarily co-occur with
the pronoun such that the sentence can used to express a general statement?
If this question is answered positively, the pronoun is most probably not used
impersonally. Genuine impersonal uses do not depend on the presence of any
specific co-occurring material.
Note as well that there is no direct, literal translation of (12-a) into German. To
express the same general statement, either a free relative clause, as in (13-a), or the
expression derjenige instead of the simple third person singular pronoun er (Engl. ‘he’)
















‘He who hesitates loses.’
Given these results on English and German, I ignore third person singular pronouns
from now on, and assume that they do not have genuine impersonal uses.9
For independent reasons, I also set aside plural pronouns. For one, the semantics of
plurality brings in further issues independent of the semantics of personal pronouns,
which would further complicate matters, and which would add an additional level
of complexity to the issues discussed in this thesis that I want to avoid. A much
stronger reason to set aside plural pronouns is given in Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990),
who observe that for English plural you, we, and they, “only” vague uses can be found.
These vague uses, Kitagawa and Lehrer argue, differ from genuine impersonal uses in
various respects. For instance, they cannot be replaced by impersonal pronouns, e.g.
9A possible counter-example to this claim are third person singular pronouns that are anaphoric
to a noun phrase inside a generic sentence. I thank Magdalena Kaufmann (p.c.) for bringing these
examples to my attention.
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English one, which is generally an option for impersonally used personal pronouns (cf.
Section 1.2). For further details on the vague use of (plural) personal pronouns, I refer
the reader to Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990).
Given the seemingly clear-cut pre-theoretical distinction between the impersonal
and referential uses of personal pronouns described above, one might wonder what
makes the impersonal use a phenomenon worthwhile of a whole dissertation. As the
discussion in the following chapters will show, the problem of the impersonal use of
personal pronouns lies at the intersection of formal semantics and pragmatics; at the
end of Chapter 4, I hope to have convinced the reader that impersonally interpreted
personal pronouns are context-sensitive expressions which contribute content to both
the at-issue content, i.e. the truth-conditional content, and the not-at-issue content,
i.e. content that conveys additional comments on the at-issue content, of a sentence.
The investigation leading up to this final result also yields results that bear on formal
treatments of first and second person singular pronouns, which aim to capture the
connection between form, meaning, and pragmatic function of these expressions in all
of their available uses. From a theoretical point of view, the availability of an impersonal
use of first and second person singular pronouns is surprising. Ever since Kaplan’s (1978
[1989]) work on indexicality, both types of personal pronouns, but especially first person
singular pronouns, have been considered prime examples for“indexical”expressions, i.e.
referential expressions that “pick out” their referents from the utterance context, and
contribute them directly to the truth-conditions of the sentence that contains them.
Prima facie, it seems hard to consolidate this view with the availability of an impersonal
use.
Another line of investigation that is touched by the results of this thesis are accounts
of pronominal expressions that assume a one-to-one link between morphosyntactic be-
havior/form and meaning, i.e. that the morphosyntactic form of a pronoun strictly
determines both the phonological form, as well as the meaning of personal pronouns
(cf. Chapter 1). Since the impersonal and referential uses of first and second person sin-
gular pronouns do not differ morphologically, this raises the question whether a unified
semantic account for all uses of these pronouns can be given, or whether the referential
use and the impersonal use have to be accounted for separately.
In addition to the topics that are directly connected to impersonally used personal
pronouns, further areas of research might benefit from the results of this thesis. For
instance, investigations on diverse classes of expressions that show referential and non-
referential uses. Apart from personal pronouns, this class contains e.g. demonstratives,
proper names, and impersonal pronouns.
• The two main uses of demonstratives, which are traditionally discussed in the
literature are the spatio-temporal deictic use and the anaphoric, discourse deictic
use (cf. Lakoff 1974; Kaplan 1978 [1989]; Elbourne 2008). In addition, a third
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use has been reported, which Lakoff (1974) calls “emotional deixis”, and Davis
and Potts (2010) call “affective demonstratives”. The primary function of this
use seems to be to communicate the speaker’s emotional involvement, and to try
to achive camaraderie between the speaker and the addressee, see (14).
(14) a. He kissed her with this unbelievable passion.
(Lakoff 1974:347)
b. If gangrene sets in, you’ll lose that nose.
(Lakoff 1974:352)
• The standard assumption in the literature on proper names is that they directly
refer to their bearers (cf. Kripke 1980). Proper names, however, may also be used
non-referentially. In this use they behave similar to common nouns (cf. Quine
1960; Burge 1973; Matushansky 2008), see (15).
(15) a. There are relatively few Alfreds in Princeton.
b. Every John Smith hates his name.
(Matushansky 2008:593)
• In some languages, such as French and some dialects of German, the converse
behavior to that of personal pronouns has been observed for impersonal pronouns.
In some cases, French on and German man seem to show referential behavior,
i.e. they can be used similarly to the respective first person plural pronouns (cf.















































‘It was completely clear that we would never see each other again.’
(Kratzer 1997:3)
If the impersonal uses of first and second person singular pronouns are examples
of a more general tendency regarding the availability of non-referential uses of what
has been thought as “referential expressions”, this thesis may contribute insights on
the expressions listed above, and in addition highlight the link between semantics and
pragmatics and their interaction in the domain of prototypically individual denoting
expressions.
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The structure of this thesis
Chapter 1 provides a detailed data discussion of the impersonal uses of German
first and second person singular pronouns ich and du. In Sections 1.2–1.4, the mor-
phosyntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties of the respective impersonal uses
are reviewed. Furthermore, they are compared to the corresponding referential uses
and the impersonal uses of second person singular pronouns in other languages—with
a focus on the work done on impersonally used English you. The central properties
highlighted in these sections:
• On the morphosyntactic level: the impersonal and the referential uses behave
exactly the same
• On the semantic level: impersonally used personal pronouns and impersonal
pronouns are truth-conditionally equivalent, and they exclusively occur in generic
sentences
• On the pragmatic level: the impersonal uses induce pragmatic effects that can be
linked to their referential uses
Section 1.5 presents a summary of traditional and recent work on the meaning of
personal pronouns as expressions that contribute individual variables or definite de-
scriptions in the case of third person singular pronouns, and context coordinates in the
case of first and second person singular pronouns. And lastly, in Section 1.6, I argue
against an account of sentences containing an impersonal use of ich or du in which
they are analyzed as underlyingly counterfactual statements about the speaker or the
addressee, respectively. The overall result of this chapter is that according to the data,
the impersonal uses are independent from the referential uses of these pronouns on
a semantic level. That is, the impersonal use does not arise from the interaction of
referentially used pronouns with co-occurring material.
The aim for Chapter 2 is to propose a first account for German first person singular
ich and second person singular du that treats the referential and the impersonal use of
the two pronouns in a unified manner. In this account, the referential uses are assim-
ilated to the impersonal uses, which in turn are analyzed in analogy to accounts for
impersonal pronouns, like German man and English one. In Section 2.2, I summarize
previous works on the morphosyntactic and semantic behavior of impersonal pronouns,
and discuss previous semantic analyses that differ in their assumptions whether imper-
sonal pronouns are definite or indefinite expressions. In Section 2.3, I review two
analyses of impersonally interpreted personal pronouns proposed by Malamud (2006,
2007) and Alonso-Ovalle (2000, 2002), who also differ in their respective stance with
respect to the (in)definiteness of the impersonal uses. Section 2.4 revists the question
whether impersonal pronouns and/or impersonally used personal pronouns need to be
analyzed as definite or indefinite expressions. I argue that because these expressions
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occur only in generic sentences, this question cannot be answered directly. However,
comparisons with full (in)definite noun phrases in generic sentences suggest that an-
alyzing them as indefinite expressions is the better option. Section 2.5 introduces an
alternative account for the meaning of pronouns put forth in Nunberg (1993) and its
formalization in Elbourne (2008). The unified account built up in this section is based
on these two texts. The general idea of this unified account is that the link between the
impersonal and referential uses are pragmatic effects, which can be modelled in an un-
derspecified manner which allows to capture the referential uses, as well. In proposing
this idea, the account is similar to the proposal in Malamud (2006, 2007). In Section
2.6, I discuss various problems that arise for the account: (i) problems that arise for
the analysis of the impersonal and referential uses directly, and (ii) problems that arise
in combination with a certain analysis of the generic operator Gen.
In Chapter 3, the second class of problems are addressed and the intensional senten-
tial contexts of the impersonal uses are investigated in detail. The aim is to provide
an adequate analysis of the generalizations expressed by sentences containing imper-
sonally interpreted personal pronouns, but which also accounts for the behavior of
the co-occurring overt modals found in the data. Section 3.2 provides the theoretical
background for the interpretation of modal expessions, in particular for German modal
verbs. In Section 3.3, the semantics of generic sentences is addressed. I review three
proposals for the semantics of the generic operator Gen put forth in Krifka et al. (1995),
Drewery (1998), and Greenberg (2007), and adopt an adapted version of the second
account. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 address the interaction of modal verbs, restricted to the
flavors found in the data, with the generic operator. The result of these sections is
that in sentences containing impersonally interpreted ich and du, the modal verbs are
always interpreted in the scope of the generic operator. Furthermore, it is shown that
a simple combination of the accounts for modal verbs and Gen proposed in Sections
3.2 and 3.3, respectively, does not result in adequate truth-conditions. I argue that in a
certain sense, the interpretation of the modal also depends on the world of evaluation,
and the components of Gen and the modal verbs interact. This interaction is analyzed
in detail in Section 3.5.
In Chapter 4, I discard the unified account proposed in Chapter 2, and propose a
more pragmatically oriented account for the impersonal uses of ich and du. In Section
4.2, I first combine the results of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 to show with a critical
evaluation of the resulting account based on Section 2.6 that the way in which the
pragmatic effects of impersonally interpreted ich and du are modelled is inadequate.
That is, even though the pragmatic effects seem to link the impersonal and referential
uses, this link cannot be put at the truth-conditional level. For the rest of Chapter 4, I
give up on a unified account for the impersonal and referential uses, and turn to giving
an analysis of the impersonal uses only that adequately captures their pragmatic effects.
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Section 4.3 discusses and evaluates the treatment of the English impersonal pronoun
one by Moltmann (2006, 2010a,b). Moltmann places her analysis of the meaning of one
on its pragmatic effects, which, I argue, are shared by German man and impersonally
used ich and du. In light of the results in Section 4.3, I give a brief overview of the
traditional and recent literature on “not-at-issue content” in Section 4.4. In Section
4.5, I take a look at whether the intuition that the pragmatic effects of impersonally
interpreted ich and du and of the impersonal pronoun man result from not-at-issue
meaning. Based on these results, I put forth a new proposal for the specific not-
at-issue content contributed by these pronouns. In Section 4.6, I briefly address the
connection between the referential and the impersonal uses given the proposal in 4.5,
and discuss two possible ways in which the uses might be linked—or not.
The Conclusion summarizes the main results of this thesis, and addresses some im-
mediate open questions and further issues.
In addition to the main content of this thesis, the three sections in the Appendix
provide discussions (i) on the syntactic and semantic behavior of German nominal
als-phrases, (ii) on insights that may or may not be provided by German discourse
particles on which contexts of use are preferred by ich and du, and (iii) on a possible
extension of the modal account proposed in Chapter 3 to those examples in the data
that have a conditional sentence structure. This material was put into the Appendix
for two reasons: (i) it would have steered the reader too far off the main path, and (ii)
the discussions in the Appendices only provide some initial considerations on the topics
listed above that are needed to better understand the data. None of these discussions
can be seen as comprehensive accounts of these topics, and are also not intended as
such.
A note on the data discussed in this thesis
Most of the data given throughout this thesis are real life examples taken from the
internet. The need for real life data presented itself early on in my work. No detailed
data discussions exist for the impersonal use of ich that I could have relied on, and
consequently no comparisons with impersonally used du and the impersonal use of
man were available either. In the course of my investigations, I assembled a small data
collection for the impersonal readings of ich and du by searching for certain target
strings, e.g. “ich muss als” (Engl. ‘I must as’), “ich kann doch als” (Engl. ‘I can prt
as’), and variations thereof. Given this style of looking for data, only a specific subset of
naturally occurring examples have been targeted and collected, though. Two artifacts
of this method, for instance, are that the data contains only the modals können (Engl.
‘can’) and müssen (Engl. ‘must’), and that in fact nearly all of the examples that
were collected contain one of these modals. Hence, any observations on the basis of
the collected data needs to be made with the following caution kept in mind: Neither
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claims about relative frequency, nor negative or universal claims about the data can
and should be made from the collected material.
Corpus queries in any of the standard corpora of German were not an option for two
specific reasons. First, the impersonal uses of ich and du belong to an informal register,
and are predominantly employed in spoken language. Most texts in standard German
corpora are taken from high standard written texts, i.e. newspaper articles, fictional
texts, manuals, and specialized texts. A detailed analysis of the examples found by
internet searches showed that most of these examples can be found in written texts that
are close to spoken language, i.e. forum discussions, comments on newspaper articles,
and transcribed interviews. Second, for ich and du the specific usages, i.e. referential
vs. impersonal, are not encoded in the tag-sets used for standard corpora. This means
that for every occurrence of these pronouns, the specific reading has to be determined
independently in its context. Since the personal pronouns ich and du are two of the
most frequent lexical items in German, and most of their occurrences are referential
uses, a corpus would not have facilitated the search for real life data. Accordingly, I
decided against working with standard corpora.
For each item collected from the internet, I give its source, i.e. its URL, in a foot-
note. Unless otherwise indicated as for one or two exceptional cases, all examples are
accessible at the time of writing.
A note on the formal system
In this thesis, I adopt a possible worlds semantic framework with explicit world vari-
ables as standardly employed in the work on modality (cf. von Fintel and Heim 2011).
In addition, I adopt Kaplanian contexts to model the coordinates of the utterance con-
text, i.e. a Kaplanian context models a “possible occasion of use” which has a speaker,
an addressee, a time, a location, and a possible world (cf. Kaplan 1978 [1989]).
To formalize the meanings of natural language expressions, I use the standard typed
λ-language with functional λ-terms of the following form (cf. Heim and Kratzer 1998).
(18) λxα : φ.ψ
where φ restricts the domain of the variable x of type α, and ψ specifies the
value assigned to x
The set of types T as defined in (19).
(19) a. Basic types: e (individuals), t (truth-values) ∈ T
b. Functional types: for α, β ∈ T , 〈α, β〉 ∈ T
c. Intensional types: for α ∈ T , 〈s, α〉 ∈ T
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The model M is as defined in (20).10
(20) The model M is a tuple 〈W,D,C, J·K, g〉 for which
a. W is the set of worlds
b. D is the set of individuals
c. C is the set of contexts
d. g is a variable assignment, i.e. a function g : N→ D
e. J·K is the interpretation function
The domain of expressions of type α ∈ T , Dα, is as defined in (21).
(21) a. De := D, the set of individuals in M
b. Dt := {0, 1}, a set of truth-values
c. D〈α,β〉 := D
Dα
β , the set of functions from Dα to Dβ
d. D〈s,α〉 := D
W
α , the set of functions from W to Dα
In the Kaplanian tradition, a context c ∈ C is standardly defined as in (22).11
(22) For all contexts c ∈ C, c is a quintuple 〈cS, cA, cT , cL, cW 〉
The elements cS and cA are in De, and model the speaker and the addressee, respec-
tively. The element cT models the utterance time, cL the utterance location, and cW
the world of the utterance. Since I will not deal with temporal and spatial semantics,
no set of times/intervals or set of locations is introduced. Hence, for the purpose of
this thesis, and unless otherwise indicated, contexts are defined as follows.
(23) For all c ∈ C, c = 〈cS, cA, cW 〉 ∈ De ×De ×W
The interpretation function J·K is relativized to the assignment function g, a world of
evaluation w, and an utterance context c. It is also implicitly understood as restricted
to the specific natural language that is interpreted at a given time.
10sI assume that there is only one adequate model, i.e. I do not assume that there is a class of
models that differ with respect to the sets W , D, and C that are chosen. Cf. Zimmermann (2011b).
11In the original proposal by Kaplan (1978 [1989]), contexts are defined as tuples containing an
individual, a time, a location, and a possible world.

Chapter 1
Data discussion and preliminary
issues
1.1 Introduction
The central issue addressed in this thesis is the question of how to account for the
semantic and pragmatic properties of “impersonal uses” of first and second person


















































Understood as: ‘A woman can also have standards that not every man
meets.’3
In the semantic and pragmatic literature, first and second person singular pronouns are
usually addressed in the context of “deictic”—following Kaplan (1978 [1989]), “directly
referential”—expressions, and are hence standardly analyzed as directly referring to the
1Following other researchers working on corresponding readings of pronouns in other languages,
I call the interpretation of occurrences of ich and du as in (1), the “impersonal reading” or the
“impersonal use” of ich and du. Sometimes, the name “generic reading” or “generic use” are used,








speaker and the addressee, respectively. Given this point of view, the behavior of ich
and du in (1) is unexpected, and calls for an explanation.
The main aim for this section is to build a foundation for the rest of this thesis by
describing various aspects of the data that seem to be characteristic of occurrences
of first and second person singular pronouns as in (1). This is complemented by an
introduction of the standard assumptions on the semantics of personal pronouns, and
by dismissing an intuitively appealing analysis of the impersonal uses, which invokes
counterfactual conditionals as underlying representations.
In the first part of this chapter (Sections 1.2–1.4), I discuss three central aspects of
German impersonally used first person singular ich and second person singular du: their
semantic behaviour, possible interactions with other material in the sentence, and their
distinct pragmatic effects and contextual requirements. I connect these observations
made for the German pronouns to previous observations in the literature for impersonal
uses of English personal pronouns (Kitagawa and Lehrer 1990; Malamud 2006, 2007,
2012). In addition, the impersonal uses of ich and du are contrasted with the German
dedicated impersonal pronoun man and the referential uses of ich and du.
The conclusion to be drawn from these three sections is (i) that the impersonal uses
and referential uses of ich and du make distinct semantic contributions to the truth-
conditions of a sentence, (ii) that impersonal uses are truth-conditionally equivalent to
the impersonal pronoun man, and (iii) that impersonally used ich, du, and man differ
in their pragmatic effects and contextual requirements.
Section 1.5 is then dedicated to a brief overview of semantic accounts for personal
pronouns proposed in the literature. It is shown that the accounts that are currently on
offer cannot be easily adapted to capture the semantic contribution of the impersonal
uses of ich and du.
In the last section of this chapter, Section 1.6, I discuss and dismiss an analysis of
sentences containing impersonally used ich and du based on the common first intuition
to assume that sentences containing impersonal uses express counterfactual statements
regarding the speaker and the addressee, respectively.
Sections 1.5 and 1.6 together with the preceding data discussion suggests that the
impersonal use of first and second person pronouns constitutes an independent use
which cannot be reduced straightforwardly to the referential use of the pronouns.
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1.2 Data discussion – part I: The semantics of the
impersonal use
1.2.1 The impersonal use and its connection to genericity







































































































































‘If a trader wants buys a vehicle from someone, and wants to resell it, then he
has to let it get checked beforehand.’8
The crucial observation for (2)–(5) is that even though first and second person singular
pronouns occur in these examples, they do not express statements about the speaker
or the addressee, respectively. Instead, they express general statements about people
sharing a certain property: example (2) talks about bridal couples in general, example
4The following data discussion nearly exclusively discusses impersonal readings of first and second
person singular pronouns in declarative sentences. Impersonal readings that occur in questions and
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(3) about teams in general, example (4) about women in general, and example (5)
about traders in general.
The aim of this entire section is to get an understanding of the semantic contribution
of the impersonal use of ich and du by comparing the impersonal uses to the impersonal
pronoun man and the corresponding referential uses. The following discussion also
includes observations and insights from Gruber (2011) and Malamud (2007, 2012),
who also investigate impersonally used German second person singular du, and from
Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990) and Malamud (2006, 2007, 2012) on English impersonally
used you.9
The function of sentences containing impersonally used first and second person sin-
gular pronouns is to express specific kinds of statements, i.e. generalizations, rules,
norms, regulations, and other general statements about a individuals with a certain
common property. In other words, sentences of this form intuitively express generic
statements; this is reflected in the translations of (2)–(5).
This intuition is supported primarily by the observation that sentences containing
impersonally interpreted personal pronouns show all of the characteristic properties
that have been identified for generic sentences. The three central properties of generic
sentences are (i) that they are used to express generalizations of various kinds, (ii) that
they allow for exceptions to the generalization, and (iii) that they support inferences
to “appropriate counterfactuals” (cf. Chapter 3).
It has already been established above that sentences containing impersonally inter-
preted personal pronouns fit the first central property of generic sentences. They also
comply with the second central property—allowing for exceptions—since the speaker









‘Only supermodels can do that, if at all.’
With this follow-up, the speaker would state that he considers supermodels to be
legitimate exceptions to the rule that he expresses in (4). The role of exceptions in
generic sentences is further elaborated in Chapter 3.
The third characteristic property can be used as an easy test for genericity since it
differentiates between generic sentences and sentences expressing“accidental generaliza-
9Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990) provide a detailed data discussion and a descriptive analysis of the
non-referential uses of the English first and second person pronouns I, you, and we. They distinguish
two types of non-referential uses: an impersonal use and a vague use. Personal pronouns that have
an impersonal use, they argue, include you (singular), we, and I (see comments below). This use is
restricted to sentences that express generalizations on people. The availability of a vague use does not
coincide with the availability of an impersonal use. Vague uses can be found with you (plural), we,
and they, and thus seem to be connected to semantic plurality.
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tions”. For instance, from the generic sentence about lions in (7-a), the counterfactual
in (7-b) can be inferred.
(7) a. Lions have bushy tails.
b. If Chester the hamster were a lion, he would have a bushy tail.
In contrast, generalizations expressed by universal quantification over actual individuals
do not have this property; (8-b) cannot be inferred from (8-a).
(8) a. Every student in this class has blond hair.
b. If Peter were a student in this class, he would have blond hair.
Universal quantification over actual individuals expresses accidental generalizations.
For accidental generalizations, the fact that a predicate applies to all individuals of
a certain set is not the result of an underlying rule or norm. In other words, things
might have been different (cf. Drewery 1998). This clashes with the possibility to infer
appropriate counterfactuals.
Sentences containing impersonally used ich and du express generalizations that sup-




























































































‘A woman can’t expect every guy to chase after her.’12
10Gruber (2011) shows that counterfactual inferences that are supported by sentences containing
impersonally used du are available for the addressee, and concludes that there is still a hypothetical
connection to the addressee in this use. However, as example (10-b) shows, availability of counterfac-
tual inferences for the addressee is part of a more general property of generic sentences. The special






































‘If Peter were a woman, he also could not expect that every guy chases
after him.’
The connection with genericity has also been noted for impersonally used second
person singular pronouns in other languages, cf. e.g. Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990) and
Malamud (2006, 2007) for English impersonally used you, as illustrated in (11).
(11) Two hundred years ago, you used to go into the forest when you wanted fire-
wood for yourself.
(Kitagawa and Lehrer 1990:744)
Example (11) is most naturally interpreted as involving an impersonal use of you:
‘Two hundred years prior, people in general used to go collect firewood’. That is,
the sentence expresses a general statement about people that lived two hundred years
before. It can be easily checked that also (11) allows for exceptions, and supports
appropriate counterfactuals.
The strict link between the impersonal readings of personal pronouns and generic
sentences places clear restrictions on the availability of impersonal readings: sentences
containing an impersonally interpreted personal pronoun cannot report singular, spe-
cific incidents, actions, situations, or circumstances. That is, these sentences cannot
express episodic statements. Consequently, in episodic statements only the referen-
tial use of personal pronouns is available.13 Consider example (12) for German, and


































Only available: ‘Yesterday at six o’clock, you (addr.) milked your cows.’
(13) Yesterday at six o’clock, you milked your cows. (only addr.)
Note that German verbal morphology does not distinguish episodic statements from
generic statements.14
13In the translations, I give the intended interpretation of second person you in parentheses. The
referential reading is marked by postposed ‘(addr.)’, and the impersonal reading is marked by ‘(imp.)’.
14Cf. Dahl (1995) for a cross-linguistic investigation of temporal and aspectual marking of episodic
statements in contrast to generic statements.















Example (14-a) can be used to describe a current, single situation in which Peter is
eating pickles. But it can also be understood as a general statement about Peter, i.e.
that Peter has the habit of eating pickles, or that he does not object to eating pickles.
The same can be observed for the variant for which essen (Engl. ‘eat’) is in perfect
tense in example (14-b). This sentence can be used to state that there was a particular
situation in which Peter was eating pickles in the past. But it can again also express
that Peter had the habit of eating pickles, or did not object to eat pickles at some point
in the past.
Hence for German, looking at the verb form alone is insufficient for spotting imper-
sonal uses. Certain linguistic material may tip the scale in one or the other direction,
e.g. temporal and spatial expressions denoting specific times and places, cf. Section 1.3.
For sentences without overt modifiers, as (14-a) and (14-b), however, it can only be de-
termined contextually whether they express episodic or generic statements. Regarding
specific data, this means that sometimes the only possibility to classify an occurrence
of first or second person singular pronouns as impersonal or referential is to rely on
speaker intuitions regarding the intended use.
One final note has to be made regarding impersonal readings of first person singular
pronouns. As discussed in the Introduction, Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990) argue for
an impersonal reading for English first person singular I. This is a surprising claim
since it is usually assumed that English I is a pure indexical in the sense of Kaplan
(1978 [1989]), i.e. that no other reading apart from the speaker-referential reading exist.
Kitagawa and Lehrer give the following example to support their claim.
(15) We form a frame of script for this kind of situation. . . . Thus, in order to be
able to take the subway in New York I simply need a ‘taking the subway’ script
or frame, if I have one, and supply now relevant specific information about the
situation.
(Kitagawa and Lehrer 1990:741, shortened)
If this example indeed illustrates a genuine impersonal use for English I, it is much
more restricted and rare than the impersonal use of German first person singular ich.
For any of the German examples it seems to be the case that when they are translated
literally into English, the translations come out as uniformly speaker referential. In fact,
Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990:741f) suggest that impersonally used I is only available in
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very specific contexts, i.e. in hypothetical contexts such as the one in (15).15 Given its
unclear status, I leave aside the potential impersonal reading of I throughout this thesis,
and focus mainly on German impersonally used ich and du and English impersonally
used you.
To summarize the central points of this subsection: Sentences containing imperson-
ally used ich and du express general statements, rules, norms, and generalizations of
other kinds. They share this property with sentences containing impersonally used
personal pronouns in other languages. Since sentences of this kind not only allow for
exceptions, but also support inferences to appropriate counterfactuals, they need to be
grouped with and analyzed as generic sentences.
1.2.2 Truth-conditional equivalence and impersonal pronouns
In this section, I argue that in their impersonal readings, ich and du are truth-
conditionally equivalent not only to each other, but also to the dedicated impersonal
pronoun man (Engl. ‘one’).
The truth-conditional equivalence of impersonally used ich and du is illustrated by







































‘If a team wants to win, it has to fight.’
This observation can be extended to the German impersonal pronoun man. Replacing
the personal pronouns in the above statement with man does not change the truth-



















‘If a team wants to win, it has to fight.’
In fact, man can be substituted salva veritate for the impersonally interpreted personal
pronouns in all of the German examples given in this thesis. This means that the
contribution of the impersonal readings of ich and du to the truth-conditions of the
entire sentence has to be the same as the contribution of the impersonal pronoun
15Note, that the introductory sentence in the example contains an impersonal and/or vague use of
first person plural we. Therefore, the first person singular pronouns could be dependent on we, and
the example might be a case of modal subordination (cf. Roberts 1987). However, a detailed analysis
of this example is beyond the scope of this discussion.
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man.16 This claim is further supported by observations (i) regarding the actual use of
the impersonal readings, and (ii) regarding shared semantic properties.
The first observation, which is already discussed in Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990), is
that it is possible for a speaker to switch between impersonal uses of different personal
pronouns intending them to co-refer.17







































































‘If a trader buys trash, he has to expect a situation like this.[. . . ] If a trader









































‘There are no specific tricks that a beginner has to learn. As a beginner, you







































































Available: ’But wait, honestly, if an employer places a job ad, then he has to
double-check online whether the ad is fine. At least, if one is an employer, I
want to work for as an employee.’
16Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990) already note that the impersonal reading of English you is truth-
conditionally equivalent with the English impersonal pronoun one. Specifically, they state that you
and one are interchangeable, and that they are “informationally equivalent”.
17Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990) do not give an example for this, but they state: “Although person
shifts (we, you, one) within a text or utterance are considered stylistically inelegant, they do in fact
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In example (18), the speaker switches between impersonally used first person ich and
second person du while elaborating on his point about traders; in example (19), the
speaker switches from man to impersonally used du to talk about beginners in pen-
spinning; and in example (20), the speaker switches from impersonally used ich to man
to talk about employers.
The second observation concerns a restriction on the set of individuals for which
impersonal uses of ich and du can be used. For the impersonal reading of English
you, it is claimed in the literature that it can only be used to express generalizations
about people, i.e. humans (Kitagawa and Lehrer 1990; Malamud 2006, 2007). While
this restriction might be too strict even for impersonally used you, it is decidedly too
strict for German ich and du. See (21) and (22), which suggest that German ich and























































































‘If you, a cat, did something bad then see to it very quickly that it looks as
though it was the dog’s fault.’21
For some native speakers, statements about animals, like (21) and (22), feel slightly
strained since they feel that in these examples animals are treated on a par with
humans. Still, these examples are strictly better than using impersonally interpreted

















‘A screw-driver can screw screws of various sizes.’
Sentences like (23) imply that the speaker assigns potential agenthood and the abil-
ity of conscious thought to these objects. Therefore, impersonal readings of personal
pronouns—at least in German—require that the individuals for which the general-
























































‘A screw-driver can screw screws of various sizes.’
The third observation grouping impersonally used ich and du with man is that imper-
sonally used personal pronouns, as well as impersonal pronouns show quantificational
variability effects with adverbs of quantification (cf. Malamud 2006, 2012). Quantifica-
tional variability effects are first discussed in Lewis (1975) for indefinite noun phrases
in the scope of adverbs of quantification, see (25).
(25) In those days, a person usually/rarely lived to be 60.
While usually and rarely are standardly analyzed as quantifying over times, occasions,
or situations, interpreting example (25) in this light results in a nonsensical statement:
Some time in the past, it was a usual/rare occurrence for a (particular) person to
live to be 60. That is, a particular person lived (and died) multiple times and of
those times many/few were such that the person lived to be 60. Example (25) is most
naturally interpreted with a different domain of quantification for the adverb, i.e. with
the adverbs usually and rarely quantifying over individuals alive in those days. This
reading can be paraphrased by using the nominal quantifiers most and few as in (26).
(26) In those days, most/few people lived to be 60.
This interpretational variability regarding the quantificational domain of usually and
seldom seems to be restricted to sentences containing indefinite DPs, like a person in
(25). The same effect cannot be observed with definite noun phrases and other referen-
tial expressions, which do not seem to provide an alternative domain of quantification
for adverbs of quantification.23
(27) a. #In those days, Peter usually/rarely lived to be 60.
b. #In those days, the man usually/rarely lived to be 60.
c. #In those days, he usually/rarely lived to be 60.
22https://www.das.de/de/rechtsportal/verbraucherinformation/auf-den-hund-
gekommen.aspx
23Hinterwimmer (2005) shows that in certain contexts quantificational-variability-like effects may
also occur with definite singular noun phrases. I briefly review his discussion in Chapter 2.
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Regarding quantificational variability effects, English one and German man need to be
grouped with indefinite noun phrases, as the following examples illustrate.24
(28) In those days, one usually/rarely lived to be 60.

















Available reading: ’In those days, one usually/rarely lived to be 60.’
(based on Malamud 2007:6)
The impersonal readings of ich and du, analogously to impersonal man, also show









































Examples (30) and (31) both have an interpretation involving quantificational variabil-
ity, which can be paraphrased by nominal quantification: ‘Most/few farmers have to
own more than three cows’. And since the availability of quantificational variability
effects is connected to the semantic make up of the noun phrase, this parallel further
supports the truth-conditional equivalence of impersonally used ich, du, and man.
However, certain restrictions seem to be in place for ich and du: native speakers
perceive the quantificational variability interpretation for selten (Engl. ‘seldom’) in (30)
and (31) as odd (pace Malamud 2006, 2007). In the course of this thesis, quantificational
variability effects only play a secondary role. As a result, I leave this contrast for further
research.25
Note that quantificational variability effects do not arise obligatorily. Examples (30),
(31), and (32) can be interpreted with impersonally or referentially interpreted ich
or du and impersonally interpreted man, respectively, without having normalerweise






















The impersonal interpretation shared by (30), (31), and (32) can be paraphrased as
24In fact, quantificational variability effects are observed for impersonal pronouns cross-linguistically.
Cf. e.g. Chierchia (1995b) for Italian si and Alonso-Ovalle (2000, 2002) for Spanish se.
25This in some sense fits observations made for Spanish in Alonso-Ovalle (2000, 2002). He argues
that the impersonal reading of second person singular pro does not show quantificational variability
effects, while the Spanish impersonal pronoun se does.
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‘For farmers it is usually/rarely the case that they have the obligation to have more
than three cows’.26
To summarize this subsection, there seems to be good evidence that the impersonal
use of ich and du and the impersonal pronoun man are truth-conditionally equivalent.
This assumption is further supported by the possibility to switch between pronominal
forms, by their shared restriction regarding generalizations about animate individuals,
and by their nearly parallel behavior regarding quantificational variability effects. The
truth-conditional equivalence between the impersonal use of ich and du and the im-
personal pronoun man will be used as a starting point for a formal analysis of these
readings in Chapter 2.
1.2.3 Impersonally vs. referentially used ich and du
While the impersonal uses of ich and du behave semantically like the impersonal pro-
noun man, on the surface, i.e. morphosyntactically, they are indistinguishable from
referentially used occurrences. One of the immediate consequences of this is that any
example that illustrates an impersonal use in principle also allows for an interpretation



















Impersonal use: ‘As a player, one can’t simply transfer to Minneapolis!’























Impersonal use: ‘Back then, one could be a good person, and nevertheless win
elections.’
Referential use: ‘Back then, you (addr) could be a good person, and neverthe-
less win elections.’
(Malamud 2012:10)
The same is true for the impersonal use of English you. Example (35) (repeated from
above) allows you to be interpreted referentially; however, this results in the implausible
interpretation that the addressee lived two hundred years ago, and went into the forest
to get firewood then.
26The interpretations of (30) and (31) with referentially used ich and du can be translated as ‘As
a farmer, I usually/rarely have the obligation to have more than three cows’ and ‘As a farmer, you
(addr.) usually/rarely have the obligation to have more than three cows’, respectively.
27http://www.footballforum.de/community/brett-farve-der-naechste-versuch-t4671-
s360.html
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(35) Two hundred years ago, you used to go into the forest when you wanted firewood
for yourself.
(Kitagawa and Lehrer 1990:744)
Regardless of the implausibility of the referential interpretation, the crucial observation
is that both readings are available, which means that also for English you, the two uses
are not distinguished on the level of morphosyntactic form.
As should have be evident from the preceding subsection, their morphosyntactic form
is the only aspect in which the impersonal and the referential uses are alike. The strong
intuition that they contribute different truth-conditional content is reflected in their
divergent behavior in the following three observations.
First, in indirect speech, the form of an impersonally used pronoun does not have to
be shifted (cf. Kitagawa and Lehrer 1990). Note that in (36-b) and (37-b), Mary can
report Peter’s statement—containing you and du, respectively—verbatim.
(36) a. Peter to Mary: Two hundred years ago, you used to go into the forest
when you wanted firewood for yourself.
b. Mary reporting to Paul: Peter said that, two hundred years ago, you used























































‘Peter said that two hundred years ago you went into the forest to get
firewood.’ (e.g. Mary reporting to Paul)
For the referential uses of first and second person singular pronouns, it is a well-known
fact that when they are reported in indirect speech, the pronouns have to be replaced
with different referential expressions to refer to the same individual as in the original
utterance.
(38) a. Peter to Mary: I like you.
b. Mary reporting to Paul: Peter said that #I/he likes me.
Whenever the referential readings are forced either by context, or from being embedded
under verbs of saying to change their referents, the impersonal pronouns are immune
to a shift in reference. This suggests that the semantic contribution of the impersonal
Chapter 1. Data discussion and preliminary issues 29
uses is not as strictly context-dependent, as the contribution of the referential uses.
The semantic contribution of the referential readings will be discussed in Section 1.5.
The second observation is that the referential uses do not share the possibility to
freely substitute pronominal forms, as was discussed for the impersonal uses in Section
























Means: ‘I was shopping yesterday. You bought a new skirt.’
Cannot mean: ‘I was shopping yesterday. I bought a new skirt.’
The final, third difference between the impersonal and referential uses is that the
referential uses behave like definite noun phrases and other refential expressions with
respect to quantificational variability effects (cf. Section 1.2.2). Examples (40) and (41)






























’You (addr.) usually/rarely lived to be 60.’
The divergent behavior of the impersonal and refential uses observed above suggests not
only that the two uses contribute different semantic content, but that the refential uses
pattern with definite noun phrases while the impersonal uses pattern with indefinite
noun phrases. This observation plays a crucial role in analyzing the contribution of the
impersonal uses in Chapters 2 and 4.
Up until this point, the impersonal use and the referential use of first and second
person singular pronouns have been presented as if they exhaust the spectrum of uses
that can be found for these pronouns. However, Bennis (2004), Zeijlstra (2008), and
Gruber (2011) discuss cases of second person singular pronouns which they analyze
as neither standardly referential, nor impersonal, but as a distinct, third type of use.
Gruber (2011) gives the following example.28
(42) A journalist asks Kate Winslet how she felt when she received the Oscar. She
says: You are just completely overwhelmed, you can’t believe that this is actually
happening to you, and you are simply very grateful.
(Gruber 2011:355)
28Bennis (2004) and Zeijlstra (2008) discuss these readings for the weak second person singular je
in Dutch. Gruber (2011) reports finding this reading in “a number of languages”.
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The characteristic property of these cases is that the speaker uses a second person
singular pronoun to report subjective experiences, i.e. to talk about herself. Hence,
Bennis, Gruber, and Zeijlstra argue that these examples involve shifted directly refential
uses of second person singular pronouns: instead of referring to the addressee, the
second person pronoun directly refers to the speaker.
I do not agree with this analysis. Even though Kate Winslet clearly reports her
subjective feelings and experiences, she does not use the second person singular pro-
noun referentially. It seems to me that this use of you should also be analyzed as an
impersonal use: Kate Winslet reports her subjective experiences as if it were a general
observation applicable to all individuals in the same position as herself (e.g. other Oscar
winners). This is supported by the infelicity of the continuation in (43).
(43) #. . . But this is only how I felt. Others don’t feel this way, of course.
The same observation can be made for dedicated impersonal pronouns, e.g. German
man and English one, which are also frequently used to present a subjective experi-
ence as a general observation (cf. Sections 2.2 and 4.3). So, to sum up, even though
impersonally used ich and du are morphologically indistinguishable from their refer-
ential uses, there are good reasons to assume that their semantic contributions differ
substantially. This should be reflected in any analysis of the two uses.
1.2.4 A note on non-declarative sentences
In the course of this thesis only declarative sentences containing impersonally inter-
preted ich or du that are used assertorically will be considered. This decision was
made to keep the discussion of the impersonal uses as simple as possible. Considering
other sentence or speech act types would complicate matters considerably. However,
this is not to say that impersonal uses do not occur in non-declarative sentences or
non-assertoric speech acts. Example (44) illustrates impersonally interpreted ich in an
interrogative sentence expressing a question, and example (45) illustrates impersonally























































‘What is the gain for a bridal couple to party at a location where one is alone,
but in turn may have to turn down the music at midnight?’29
29http://www.hochzeitsforum.de/hochzeit-plz-5/26779-kommandeursburg-wer-hat-dort-
gefeiert.html









































‘If you get into trouble as a cat, then see to it as fast as possible that it looks
as if the dog did it.’30
An in-depth investigation of examples like (44) and (45) requires a detailed look at the
semantics of interrogative and imperative sentences which is left for further research.
It has to be noted, however, that these kinds of examples are not rare exceptions, but
seem to occur nearly as frequently as examples of declarative sentences. Specifically,
the use of ich in “general questions” may be frequently found e.g. on internet sites






































‘What does one have to know as an addressee?’32
It could be argued that examples (46) and (47) do not really constitute examples of
impersonal uses of ich since the author could have formulated the question from the
point of view of an interested reader. Whether this is a viable analysis of this data
depends on how “expressing a statement from the point of view of another person” is
spelled out, and how the intuition is dealt with that the speaker—in formulating the
question from the point of view of another—did not have a specific individual in mind,
but possibly all potentially interested readers. A detailed investigation along these lines
is again left for further reasearch.
1.3 Data discussion – part II: Co-occurring linguis-
tic material
1.3.1 The effect of co-occurring linguistic material
In this part of the data discussion, the interaction of impersonal uses with co-occurring
linguistic material is addressed. Specifically, the data is reconsidered with respect to
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impersonal interpretation of ich and du, i.e. a supporting effect, and which material
has a negative effect, i.e. a blocking effect.
Let us first establish which linguistic material co-occurs frequently with impersonal
readings of ich and du. Considering the data discussed in Section 1.2, this concerns
als-phrases, discourse particles (e.g. doch and ja), and expressions inducing modal
sentential contexts (i.e. an overt modal or a conditional sentence structure).33 Consider,































































‘A woman can’t expect every guy to chase after her.’36
Given that als-phrases, discourse particles, and expressions inducing modal sentential
contexts appear so frequently in the naturally occurring examples in Section 1.2, it
could be assumed that they are necessary for the impersonal interpretation to arise at























‘Two hundred years ago, people simply cut down a tree to get firewood.’
33I use the phrase “modal sentential context” very naively in this case. It is supposed to cover only
overt modal material. The presence of a covert modal element, e.g. a covert modal as assumed by
Kratzer (1986), or a generic operator with a modal interpretation in the sense of e.g. Krifka et al.
(1995), is not taken into account at this point.
34All als-phrases in the examples found in this section are intended to be read without stress on the
associated noun phrase. When the noun phrase is focused, alternatives to the noun phrase are made
salient (cf. Rooth 1995, for an analysis of focus), and further affect which readings are available for





























‘Two hundred years ago, people simply cut down a tree to get firewood.’
Neither (50), nor (51) contains an als-phrase, a discourse particle, or overt material
inducing a modal sentential context. Nevertheless, it is possible to interpret ich and
du impersonally.37 The bias towards the impersonal interpretation of ich and du arises
because of the temporal adverbial vor zweihundert Jahren (Engl. ‘two hundred years
ago’). But, as (48), (49), and other examples in Section 1.2 show, temporal adverbials
are also not necessary for the impersonal interpretation to arise.
Nevertheless, what seems to be the case is that als-phrases, discourse particles, ad-
verbials etc. support the availability of the impersonal interpretation, and in some sense
bias the hearer (or reader) toward it. A possible explanation for this is that this ma-
terial restricts either the set of individuals, or the kind of circumstance for which the
generalization is claimed to hold. Since there are very few, if any, generalizations that
can be stated about animate individuals irrespective of any qualifying information, the
lack of restricting material may cause impersonal readings of ich and du to be either
strongly dispreferred, or even completely unavailable.
If that were indeed the case, one would expect that if a sentence contains no such
pointers, the general bias towards the referential interpretation of ich and du—the
referential uses by far outnumber the impersonal uses in written and spoken language—
blocks the impersonal interpretation. This is illustrated in (52).
Context: A and B walk along a street. They see someone knock over bikes for fun.











Available – A: ‘I don’t do that!’
Unavailable – A: ‘You don’t do that!’/ ‘One doesn’t do that!’
Another crucial observation regarding co-occurring material is that some expres-
sions may effectively block the availability of the impersonal use. In Section 1.2 it
was observed that in episodic statements, personal pronouns may only be interpreted
referentially. Those linguistic expressions that may block the impersonal interpretation
are those that have the potential to promote an episodic interpretation. Expressions
of this kind have in common that they restrict the content of a sentence “enough” to
suggest a description of a specific, single situation.
37The impersonal uses of ich and du are sensitive to perfect tense, and especially for ich the imper-
sonal interpretation seems to be less readily available. See the discussion on perfect tense below.
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(53) Generalization on blocking expressions :
An expression which restricts the content of a sentence to a specific situation
promotes an episodic interpretation of a sentence, and therefore promotes the
referential interpretation of personal pronouns, while blocking the impersonal
interpretation.
Expressions that contribute this kind of meaning are e.g. personal pronouns in their
referential interpretation and certain spatio-temporal adverbials. Note, however, that
no expressions may be taken as definitive signs for an episodic statement; no general
restriction against generalizations about specific places or points in time exists. Con-
versely, sentences which are intended as episodic statements may contain little to no
material which has specific reference, or explicitly locates the reported episodic event.38
The rest of this section aims at a more detailed discussion of the effect that the
following material (in the broadest sense) has on the availibility of the impersonal
interpretation of ich and du.
• spatial and temporal adverbials
• co-occurring referentially interpreted personal pronouns
• perfect tense and subjunctive marking on the verb
• focus/stress on the personal pronoun
• the argument position occupied by the personal pronoun (only: ich)
Als-phrases, discourse particles, and those co-occurring expressions inducing modal
sentential contexts are further discussed in later parts of this thesis. The modal sen-
tential contexts are the central topic of Chapter 3. The function and semantic contri-
bution of als-phrases, as well as the connection between the impersonal readings and
co-occurring discourse particles are discussed in the Appendix.
1.3.2 Spatial and temporal adverbials (and context)
Spatial and temporal adverbials can have both a negative and a positive impact on the
availability of impersonal readings, depending on their content.
In general, the native speakers that I consulted preferred an episodic reading for a
sentence if the adverbials contained in that sentence restricted the sentential content
to specific times or places. Intuitions are subtle, though, and it seems that with the
right kind of contextual support, a generic interpretation can be obtained for most
sentences, however implausible the intended interpretation may seem at first glance.
For practically all native speakers I consulted, temporal adverbials which denote a
specific time block an impersonal interpretation. In the following two examples, the
38It is sometimes assumed that for most utterances, the addressee pragmatically recovers material
from the discourse context which restricts a sentence to give an episodic statement. Cf. Recanati
(1989), Bach (1994).
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expressions heute (Engl. ‘today’) and um halb zwei (Engl. ‘at half past one’) together














































Only available: ‘Today at half past one, you (add.) cut down a tree to get
firewood.’
Even with strong contextual support, e.g. if the existence of a norm, rule, or tradition
is assumed which says that on a single, specific day people in general have to cut down
a tree for firewood at a specific time, the impersonal reading is not readily available.
If spatial or temporal adverbials refer to a sufficiently large amount of space or time,
they can have the opposite effect. Then they support the impersonal reading. For
example, (56-a) out-of-the-blue is only interpretable with a referentially interpreted ich




































Only available: ‘I cut down a tree to get firewood.’




































Only available: ‘You cut down a tree to get firewood.’
Alonso-Ovalle (2000) argues that the Spanish second person singular null pronoun pro2
always requires a locative expression to license its impersonal use, even if temporal and

















‘In that department you (imp.) work like a slave.’
(Alonso-Ovalle 2000:4)











Unavailable: ‘You (imp.) work like a slave.’
Available: ‘You (add.) work like a slave.’
(Alonso-Ovalle 2000:5)
For German, the restriction is not as strong. The following example again illustrates






















‘One doesn’t throw someone else’s puppy onto its back.’40
A similar supporting effect to that of adverbials can be observed for the linguistic and
extralinguistic context. Example (60) illustrates the effect observable for the linguistic
context: the part before the colon sets the topic to teams that want to be successful
and their rules. This biases the interpretation of the statement after the colon. Hence,
the impersonal interpretation for ich is available even though no material inside this






























‘The most important rule for teams that want to be successful: One enters the
field motivated.’
Impersonal interpretations are also more readily available for both pronouns when a
non-verbal preparatory context is provided. The extralinguistic context is not as pow-
erful as either adverbials, or the linguistic context, though. As was shown in Section
1.3.1, sentences in which a personal pronoun does not co-occur with overt, biasing
material cannot be interpreted impersonally, regardless of contextually given support-
ing material (cf. example (52)). However, the following context-utterance combination
allows for an impersonal interpretation of ich.
Context: A and B walk along a street. They see someone knock over bikes for fun.













A: ‘You can’t do that!’/ ‘One can’t do that!’
39If the verb is in perfect tense adverbials may be needed to counteract the blocking effect of perfect
tense marking. See example (56-b) and Section 1.3.4 below.
40Adapted from http://mylittleworld142.blogspot.de/2011/11/hundekenner.html
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In this example, the impersonal interpretation of ich is further supported by the modal
kann (Engl. ‘can’).
1.3.3 Co-occurring referentially interpreted personal pronouns
Similarly to spatial and temporal adverbials that restrict the sentential content to
specific confined times or places, referentially interpreted personal pronouns restrict
the content of a sentence to one or more specific situations, and promote an episodic
interpretation of that sentence. Example (62) illustrates the effect of second person
singular du co-occurring with first person singular mich (Engl. ‘me’) which is inter-
preted referentially. The most readily available interpretation for du is the referential











Available: ‘You (addr.) have to treat me well.’
Unavailable(?): ‘One should treat me well’
The effect is, again, not an absolute blocking of the impersonal interpretation of ich
and du: when I consulted native speakers whether sentences like (62) could also be
interpreted as general rules of conduct, they did not outright refuse, but stated that
they prefer the impersonal pronoun man instead of ich or du to express the intended
meaning.
The preference to exchange du with man disappears if the first person singular
pronoun is replaced by the bare plural Kinder (Engl. ‘children’), see (63). Here, the











Available: ‘You (addr.) have to treat children well.’
Available: ‘You (imp.) have to treat children well.’
Hence, it seems that general rules of conduct regarding specific, but arbitrary individ-
uals are exceptional—in the same way that generalizations and rules regarding specific
confined times or places are exceptional. This is supported by a comparable tendency
to prefer a referential interpretation for ich or du when a proper name co-occurs in
the sentence. In (64), the referentially interpreted personal pronoun of (62) has been
replaced with the proper name Maria, and as for (62), the sentence was intended as
a general rule of conduct regarding Maria. Yet, the native speakers that I consulted
again strongly preferred a referential interpretation for du.



















Available: ‘You (addr.) have to treat Mary well, else she gets sad.’
Unavailable(?): ‘You (imp.) have to treat Mary well, else she gets sad.’
To express the intended general rule of conduct, native speakers again preferred to
substitute du with man.
Even more support for the exceptionality of general rules of conduct regarding spe-
cific, but arbitrary individuals comes from the observation that sentences in which ich
or du co-occur with proper names of special single individuals who may have specific
















Available: ‘In the presence of Elizabeth II, you (addr.) must not eat a banana.’
Available: ‘In the presence of Elizabeth II, you (imp.) must not eat a banana.’
Another type of restriction exists for multiple occurrences of the same pronominal form
in the same clause. This restriction addresses which of the occurrences can be inter-
preted impersonally if the other occurrences are interpreted referentially: intuitively,














Available: ‘A student has to respect himself.’
Available: ‘I have to respect myself.’
Unavailable: *‘A student has to respect me.’
Unavailable: *‘As a student, I have to respect people in general.’
Curiously, though, possessive pronouns seem to behave differently with respect to this
restriction. Malamud (2007) observes the following pattern for the impersonal use of
you.
(67) In those days, you could marry your cousin.
a. Available: Addressee could marry addressee’s cousin
b. Available: One could marry one’s cousin
c. Unavailable: *Addressee could marry one’s cousin
d. Available: One could marry addressee’s cousin
(Malamud 2007:14)
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The availability of the first two interpretations, for which all occurrences of you are
interpreted in a uniform manner, is expected. Surprisingly, though, the fourth read-
ing, in which you in subject position is interpreted impersonally and the possessive is
interpreted referentially, is available as well.
The same pattern is observed for German, as well—although native speakers seem














Available: ‘You (addr.) can marry your cousin.’
Available: ‘One can marry one’s cousin.’
Unavailable: *‘You can marry one’s cousin.’
Available: ?? ‘One can marry your cousin.’
So far, only pronominal combinations occurring in the same clause were considered.
Crucially, the restrictions observed inside a single clause do not hold for multi-clausal













































‘Well, I don’t really know anything about finances, but a financial institution



















































‘I think this is an absolutely stupid argument! The bridal couple can’t expect
















































‘I found it really embarrassing and impolite that they treat their customers
like that. A service provider can’t ignore his customers in this way.’43
Examples (69)–(71) illustrate a “shift” from a referential use of first person singular ich
to an impersonal use: In the first sentence/clause of the examples, ich is used refer-
entially. In the second sentence, the speaker switches to the impersonal reading, and
all further occurrences of first person singular pronouns are interpreted impersonally.
These examples have in common, that the first sentences containing the referential use
express the speaker’s attitude regarding the situation under discussion: in (69) the
speaker states that he has limited knowledge regarding the topic under discussion, in
(70) the speaker comments on a previous utterance in the discussion, and in (71) the
speaker directly comments on the situation she is describing.
Similarly, impersonally interpreted ich and du may be embedded under attitude





























































‘I think this will never be fully clarified because a company can commission a





















‘I mean, one can’t always follow one’s child around.’45
The final observation regarding the interaction between impersonally and referen-
tially interpreted personal pronouns is similar, but not directly connected to the pre-
vious discussion: it seems to be the case that in an ongoing discourse, the impersonal
interpretation is unavailable if the subject matter is a particular issue regarding the
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Available: ‘It’s best for you (addr.) to order shrimps in this place.’
Unavailable: ‘In this place, it’s best if you (imp.) order shrimps.’


























Available: ‘It’s best for me to order shrimps in this kind of restaurant.’
Unavailable: ‘In this kind of restaurant, it’s best if one orders shrimps.’
Note that in case the impersonally used personal pronouns in B’s answers are substi-
tuted by the impersonal pronoun man, the B-examples can be interpreted as general-
izations, as intended.
1.3.4 Perfect tense and subjunctive marking on the verb
Further interactions can be observed between the availability of the impersonal inter-
pretations of ich and du and (i) perfect tense and (ii) subjunctive marking on the
verb.
When confronted with data in which ich or du are intended to be interpreted imper-
sonally, native speakers usually prefer present tense marking on the verb over perfect
tense marking. Whenever the verb is in perfect tense, the impersonal interpretation is
not strictly blocked, but the interpretation seems to require more supporting material

















Available: ‘I simply cut down a tree to get firewood.’























Available but odd: ‘Two hundred years ago, I simply cut down a tree to
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get firewood.’




























Available but odd: ‘Two hundred years ago, I just had to cut down a tree
to get firewood.’
































Available but odd: ‘Two hundred years ago, as a farmer, I just had to cut
down a tree to get firewood.’
Available: ‘Two hundred years ago, a farmer just had to cut down a tree
to get firewood.’
A general requirement for the availability of impersonal readings with perfect tense


























Available: ‘As a farmer, I just had to cut down a tree to get firewood.’
Unavailable: ‘A farmer just had to cut down a tree to get firewood.’
The two examples differ only with respect to the presence of the temporal adverbial vor
zweihundert Jahren (Engl. ‘two hundred years ago’). For ich in example (76-d), the im-
personal interpretations is available, while in contrast, the only available interpretation
for ich in (77) seems to be the referential interpretation.
A possible reason for the seemingly obligatory adverbial in examples with perfect
tense is connected to the interpretation of perfect tense in German. Von Stechow
(1999) argues that perfect tense marking in German does not express aspectual in-
formation, i.e. it is not specified for perfective or imperfective aspect.46 As observed
in the literature on generic sentences for languages that encode aspectual information
46I am aware that the analysis in von Stechow (1999) is controversial. His analysis, however, provides
a direct link to discussions about aspectual marking and dedicated impersonal pronouns. A detailed
discussion of the properties of the German perfect tense is beyond the scope of this thesis, though.
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morphologically, the availability of a generic/impersonal interpretation is connected to
imperfective marking on the verb (Dahl 1995; Cinque 1988; D’Alessandro and Alexi-
adou 2002). Given this observation, it might be the case for German that temporal
adverbials affect the aspectual interpretation of perfect tense in such a way that the
impersonal interpretation is more readily available.47
In contrast to perfect tense, subjunctive marking (i.e. Konjunktiv II) on the verb


















Available: ‘As an athlete, I drink a protein shake daily.’



















Available: ‘If I were an athlete, I would drink a protein-shake daily.’

















Available: ‘As an athlete, you drink a protein shake daily.’



















Available: ‘If I were an athlete, I would daily drink a protein-shake.’
Unavailable: ‘An athlete would drink a protein shake daily.’
For (78-b) and (79-b), ich and du can only be interpreted referentially.48
Note that the corresponding sentence in which ich/du are replaced by man does
have the intended reading.
(80) Man würde als Sportler täglich einen Proteinshake trinken.
one would as athlete daily a protein-shake drink
Available: ‘An athlete would drink a protein shake daily.’
Since subjunctive mood counts among the irrealis moods, one could assume that irrealis
moods, in general, disallow impersonal interpretations of ich and du. However—as
briefly discussed in Section 1.2, imperative sentences may contain impersonally used
du. Hence, if one counts imperative mood among irrealis moods, irrealis moods do not
block the impersonal use in general.
47I thank Magdalena Kaufmann (p.c.) for pointing this out to me.
48German als-phrases interact with the subjunctive. For the surface order where the subjunctive
precedes the als-phrase, the preferred interpretation for the als-phrase is as a restriction on the inter-
pretation of the subjunctive. Cf. Appendix A1.
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As far as I am aware, a possible interaction between impersonally interpreted English
you and the subjunctive has not yet been investigated. This interaction, as well as
the blocking effect of subjunctive marking in German are not investigated in detail
in this thesis for reasons of space, but are left for further research. The blocking
effect of subjunctive marking in German as such, though, plays a role in refuting a
counterfactuals-based analysis of the impersonal uses in Section 1.6.
1.3.5 Stressed ich and du
Intonation and stress patterns also have an influence on the available interpretations
of ich and du: stressing either of the two pronouns has the immediate and clear effect
of blocking the impersonal interpretation.
As discussed in the previous subsection, the unstressed versions of examples (81) and
(82) allow for an impersonal interpretation of ich and du. However, stressed ich and










































‘Two hundred years ago, you (addr.) cut down a tree to get firewood.’
The same sensitivity to stress is also observed for English you. In the following example,
stressed you can also only be interpreted referentially.
(83) If YOU leave the house in the winter, you have to put on a coat.
(Gruber 2011:349)
Gruber (2011) discusses the availability of impersonal readings for second person sin-
gular pronouns for various languages, including German and English. She observes
that the Bavarian dialects of German, which are pro-drop variants, only allow for an
impersonal interpretation when the pronoun is dropped. Overt second person pronouns

























Available: ‘If you (imp.) go out in winter, you have to wear something warm.’
Available: ‘If you (addr.) go out in winter, you have to wear something warm.’
(Gruber 2011:350)

























Unavailable: ‘If you (imp.) go out in winter, you have to wear something
warm.’
Available: ‘If you (addr.) go out in winter, you have to wear something warm.’
(Gruber 2011:350)
Alonso-Ovalle (2000) reports the same pattern for Spanish, which is also a pro-drop
language: Only the second person singular null pronoun pro2 may be interpreted
impersonally. Overtly realized second person singular tú has only a referential use.
This suggests that the restriction formulated above is not primarily connected to focus
or stress, but to relative phonological strength (Gruber 2011).
1.3.6 A restriction on possible argument positions for ich
For first person singular ich, there seems to be an additional syntactic restriction re-
garding the availability of the impersonal use. A first approximation of this restriction,
as suggested by the data, is that an impersonal interpretation is only available for ich

















Available but odd: ‘The coach has to treat me well, as a team.’
Unavailable(?): ‘A team has to be treated well by its coach.’
The impersonal interpretation of the accusative mich in (86) is judged to be unavailable
by native speakers. However, there seem to be counter-examples to the subject/nomi-















































‘A client-code is not at all interested in whether push back has to allocate
something. It puts its object at the end of the container, and that’s it.’50
49Even though example (87) unambiguously expresses a generic statement, it is problematic in that
it is used to state a generalization for inanimate entities (i.e. client codes). For impersonal uses of
personal pronouns, this is usually not considered well-formed, see discussion on animacy in Section
1.2. One possibility to deal with this animacy mismatch is to argue that for programs, the animacy
requirement is fulfilled since they can be considered “active processes”.
50http://www.c-plusplus.de/forum/282329-30

































‘A consumer is only interested in the Thunderbolt interface if low priced pe-
riphery is available for it.’51
A possible explanation for the availability of the impersonal interpretation for (87) and
(88) is that non-nominative experiencers of verbs like interessieren (Engl. ‘to be inter-
ested in’) behave syntactically like “external arguments”, i.e. like subjects of agentive
verbs (cf. Bayer 2004).
That non-nominative experiencers differ from direct objects of agentive verbs can be
shown by comparing their behavior regarding nominalization. Example (89) shows that
in nominalizations of a transitive agentive verb like suchen (Engl. ‘look for’), the direct
object die Kinder (Engl. ‘the children’, acc.) is converted to a genitive, or appears as











































In contrast, for nominalizations of interessieren, the accusative marked argument











































52Example (90) is adapted from an example in Bayer (2004:16).
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Consequently, examples (87) and (88) should probably be viewed as special cases of
the subject restriction instead of counter-examples. Example (91), however, is a true

















Available but odd: ‘My coach has to treat me well, as a team.’
Available: ‘A team has to be treated well by its coach.’
Example (91) is identical to example (86) above except that the definite article in the
subject noun phrase is subsituted by a first person singular possessive. Therefore, it
seems to suffice that some impersonally interpreted material is part of the subject of
the sentence for an impersonal interpretation to be available.
An alternative perspective on the restriction is to view the impersonal use of ich as
tied to the topic of the sentence. This analysis connects the syntactic restriction for
ich to the general restriction that impersonally interpreted personal pronouns may not
be focussed (cf. Section 1.3.5). A detailed investigation of this alternative is left for
further research.
The asymmetry that the restriction found with first person singular ich—however it
is analyzed—is not in place for second person singular du is illustrated by (92), which

















Available but odd: ‘The coach has to treat you (addr.) well, as a team.’
Available: ‘A team has to be treated well by its coach.’
Native speakers judge (92) as decidedly better than the corresponding example with
ich in (86). A reason for this asymmetry could be that the impersonal use of second
personal singular du is an older use, and is therefore better established than the im-
personal use of ich. As a result, impersonally used du is available in more contexts.
In Grimm and Grimm (1860)—the German dictionary by the brothers Grimm, the
impersonal use of second person singular du is already attested for the Bavarian di-
alects of German.53 For first person singular ich, they do not mention a corresponding
impersonal use, which suggests that impersonally used ich developed more recently.
53“[U]mgekehrt sagt der landmann östlich des Lechs du bist, du mainst, du kanst für man ist, man
meint, man kann.”(Grimm and Grimm 1860)
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1.4 Data discussion – part III: Pragmatic prefer-
ences and effects
1.4.1 A preliminary note
In Section 1.2 it was shown that the impersonal uses of ich and du and the impersonal
pronoun man are truth-conditionally equivalent, and that sentences containing these
pronouns exclusively express generic statements. An important question that arises at
this point is whether impersonally used ich and du differ from each other and from
man in any way, or whether they are simply morphological variants that serve one and
the same communicative function.
The aim of this section is to show that there are differences between impersonally used
ich, du, and impersonal man, and that the main differences are located on the pragmatic
level: First, impersonally interpreted ich and du, in contrast to man, each prefer a
certain type of context of use. Second, there are differences regarding the pronouns’
pragmatic effects. While the three pronouns as a class contrast with indefinite noun
phrases in “ordinary” generic sentences in expressing additional speaker-orientation,
the impersonal uses of ich and du furthermore convey that the speaker has a certain
stance towards other individuals in the context.
The differences briefly sketched here are made more precise in the following subsec-
tions. Nevertheless, the discussions about the contextual preferences and pragmatic
effects of the impersonal uses will take place on a rather informal and intuitive level,
and will at times be rather vague. Regarding the analysis and description of emotive
and expressive content and other pragmatic effects, the formal semantic and pragmatic
literature is still in its infancy, and for many intuitions no established terminology
exists, yet. I try to make the relevant intuitions regarding these points as clear as
possible, though.54
1.4.2 Preferences on discourse contexts
The impersonal uses of ich and du differ with respect to their preferred contexts of use.
In other words, when impersonally used ich and du occur in a sentence, the sentence
has a different contextual fit, and some contexts turn out to be“inadequate”contexts of
use. I argue that this effect is comparable to the “contextual fit” induced by discourse
particles (cf. Zimmermann 2011a). In this contextual requirement ich and du differ
from the impersonal pronoun man which has no preferences regarding its contexts of
use.
54All results presented in this section are based on native speakers’ judgements and my own intuitions
regarding the data.
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The impersonal use of ich prefers contexts in which the generalization, rule, law,
or norm that is expressed by the sentence containing the pronoun has been openly
violated, or contexts in which its validity is questioned. In other words, the actions
or opinions of another individual in the context are in conflict with the content of
the sentence containing impersonal ich. I call this a “negative context”. The context-
utterance-pair in (93) illustrates an impersonal reading of ich together with its negative
context.
Context: “How much money does one give as a present at a wedding?” - The initial
question is whether 100 euros is enough. One user argues that it is customary to
adjust the amount of money to the size and cost of the wedding party held by the



















































’I think this is an absolutely stupid argument! The bridal couple can’t expect
their guests to more or less pay for the party!’55
The speaker infers from the previous user’s post that this user thinks that a bridal
couple can, in fact, expect their guests to pay their party expenses. Thus, the speaker’s
opinion expressed in the second sentence in (93) is in conflict with the utterance of the
previous user. This conflict constitutes the negative context.
Non-verbal, extra-linguistic contexts may also qualify as negative contexts for the
impersonal reading of ich, see (94).
Context: A and B walk along a street. They see someone knock over bikes for fun.













A: ‘You (imp.) can’t do that!’/ ‘One can’t do that!’
The speaker’s exclamation is a direct reaction to the actions of the person knocking
over bikes. These actions openly violate the rule of conduct that underlies the speaker’s
exclamation in (94), i.e. the rule that one should respect the private property of others.
The preference for negative contexts is further supported by the discourse particles
that occur in (93) and (94). In both examples, the German particle doch occurs, which
55http://www.urbia.de/archiv/forum/th-2142726/Wieviel-Geld-zur-Hochzeit-
schenken.html
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signals a conflict between the sentence in which it occurs and an action or utterance
in the context (cf. Zimmermann 2011a and Appendix A2).
Note, however, that the negative contexts in (93) and (94) cannot be attributed to
the requirements of doch alone. Naturally occurring impersonal uses of ich can be
found in utterances that do not contain doch or any other discourse particles, but
appear in negative contexts. Consider example (95).
Context: A argues against the view held by others that only employers have to
care about further training for their employees, and states that employees have to be

























A: ‘An employee can not expect his employer to present him with everything.’56
The negative context for the utterance in (95) is given by the conflicting view sup-
ported by the other discourse participants that employers are fully responsible for their
employee’s further training. Since in example (95) neither doch nor any other discourse
particle is used, the negative context cannot have been required by a discourse particle.
Nevertheless, impersonally used ich and the discourse particle doch seem to have the
same preference for certain discourse contexts. Unfortunately, doch (and other Ger-
man discourse particles) cannot be used as an automatic diagnostic tool detecting the
required discourse contexts. This is argued for in Appendix A2.
In contrast to the preference for negative contexts, the impersonal use of ich is
inappropriate in positive contexts; in non-negative contexts, the use of impersonally
interpreted ich seems needlessly emotional and forceful, and is usually perceived as
pragmatically odd. Compare examples (96-a) and (96-b).
Context: Reporting the rules of football/soccer as established by the International
Football Association Board to an interested public.
(96) a. Ein Spieler, der vor Spielbeginn des Feldes verwiesen wird, kann nur
durch einen der gemeldeten Auswechselspieler ersetzt werden.
a player who before match-start the field expelled is can only by a of-the
registered substitute replaced get
‘A player who is expelled from the field before the start of the match can
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b. #Ich kann als Spieler, der vor Spielbeginn des Feldes verwiesen wird, nur
durch einen gemeldeten Auswechselspieler ersetzt werden.
I can as player who before match-start the field expelled am only by a
registered substitute replaced get
‘A player who is expelled from the field before the start of the match can
only be replaced by a registered substitute.’
In the context for (96-a) and (96-b), the speaker/author can assume—based on the
source—that the validity of the rules is not questioned by someone in the context, and
that no open violation of this specific rule is part of the discourse context. As (96-a)
shows, this context is perfectly compatible with the use of an ordinary generic sentence.
In contrast, uttering a sentence containing impersonally interpreted ich, i.e. example
(96-b), in the same context is pragmatically odd. I argue that this is the case since the
preference for a negative context is not fulfilled.58
Impersonally interpreted du, in contrast to ich, shares its preferred contexts of use
with impersonally used you. Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990) and Malamud (2007) describe
the contexts preferred by impersonally interpreted you as contexts in which the speaker
expects the hearer to readily share his opinion, and to subscribe to his statement. These
are contexts, I suggest, in which the validity of the opinion expressed by the speaker
has not been questioned, and nothing points towards a possible objection. I call these
contexts “positive contexts”. The context-utterance-pair in example (97) illustrates the
impersonal reading of du in a positive context.
Context: During an interview, the coach of the German ice hockey national team
talks about the frequent and regular occurrence of situations in which weaker teams
beat stonger teams in professional sports. He argues that these situations will continue
happening, and cannot be prevented. He says that in a match, being the stronger team























‘As a team your wish to win simply has to be greater than your opponent’s.’59
The utterance in (97) elaborates on the statement that being the stronger team is
not enough to win automatically, which is supported by ample evidence from all types
of professional sports. Hence, the speaker sees it as an established fact about teams
in general. The speaker treats his elaboration in (97) on the same level, i.e. as an
58Note that the impersonal use of du is possible in this context, but sounds less official. Cf. the
effects of the speaker- and participant oriented effects in Section 1.4.3.
59http://www.netzathleten.de/Sportmagazin/Star-Interviews/Interview-mit-Eishockey-
Bundestrainer-Uwe-Krupp-Besser-spielen-als-in-Bern/5761358233643659016/head
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established fact that neither the interviewer, nor anyone else is going to question. This
assumption provides the positive context for the impersonal reading of du.
For impersonally used du, the preference for positive contexts is not as strong as the
preference for negative contexts observable for impersonally used ich. Impersonally
interpreted du is compatible with a use in negative contexts; the invitational effect
can be used to appeal to the addressee to reconsider an opposing stance or opinion on
the subject matter. This is illustrated in the following dialogue, in which impersonally
interpreted ich and du are used contrastively to argue for two opposing points of view.
Context: Discussion about a news item: a 10-year-old Belgian girl is pregnant.

























































‘Sure, but as parents one has to notice, if one’s child already wondering
about these things.’60
Sentence (98) uttered by A contains an impersonal use of du, which communicates
that she expects B to agree with her statement that parents cannot follow their children
around all the time. Given that B openly blames the parents, the context is not a
positive context, as in example (97), but should be classified as a negative context.
However, A tries to change B’s mind by appealing to B’s empathy with the girl’s
parents. With her statement, A suggests that the pregnancy must have happened
when the parents could not supervise their daughter, and therefore were not able to
stop her. In her answer to A in (98), B concedes that, indeed, parents cannot follow
their children around all the time (B uses klar - Engl. ‘sure’). But in her continuation
she states that, in her eyes, parents already do not observe their duty of supervision
if they do not pay enough overall attention to their children. That is, B suggests that
parents who pay enough attention to their children notice if they start to be interested
in sex. Hence, the negative context for impersonally used ich in B’s statement is A’s
attempt to change B’s mind about the parents’ actions, which lead B to conclude that
A might believe that not paying enough overall attention to one’s children cannot be
seen as not observing one’s duty of supervision.
60http://de.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20070928054833AAl2RG0
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Note that given the two negative contexts, the pronouns in (98) and (98) can also
be interchanged.61 When they are exchanged for each other, the “roles” of the speakers
A and B are also swapped. That is, A is then perceived as distancing herself from B’s
accusations, and B is perceived as trying to change A’s mind about the validity of her
point of view, i.e. that the parents did not observe their duty of supervision.
So, in sum, the two impersonal uses differ with respect to their preferred contexts of
use, as well as the strength of their preferences. The impersonal reading of ich strictly
prefers negative contexts. The impersonal reading of du has a general preference for
positive contexts, but is also compatible with negative contexts.
1.4.3 Participant-oriented pragmatic effects
The pragmatic effects of impersonally used ich and du and of the impersonal pronoun
man can be divided into two distinct aspects: (i) a speaker-oriented aspect, shared
by the three pronouns, and (ii) a general participant-oriented aspect, which is only
observable—in different “flavors”— for ich and du.
Impersonally interpreted ich, du, and man have a common speaker-oriented core.
Moltmann (2006) and Zifonun (2000) observe for English one and German man, re-
spectively, that they can be used to express generalizations to which the speaker has a
personal connection of some sort: either (i) the speaker has personal experience which
supports the validity of the generalization in question, or from which he infers it, or
(ii) the speaker presents an established generalization for which he is certain that it
applies to him / would apply to him if he had the relevant properties.
The speaker-orientation contributed by English one and German man is best ob-
served in comparison with indefinite noun phrases in ordinary generic sentences, see
(99) and (100), which roughly translates example (99).
(99) a. One can see the picture from the entrance.
(Moltmann 2006:258)





































Moltmann (2006) argues that the connection to the speaker that is communicated by
one provides the epistemic grounds underlying the speaker’s assertion (i.e. why the
speaker believes that the generalization holds). That is, a speaker can utter One can
see the picture from the entrance after he saw the picture from the entrance himself,
61I thank Thomas Weskott (p.c.) for pointing this out to me.
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and generalized from his experience. In contrast, Moltmann argues that generalizing
from a subjective experience is not enough to utter People can see the picture from the
entrance, which requires “objective” evidence.
The same speaker-orientation is also observable for the impersonal uses of ich and









































Crucially, the examples in (100) and (101) only differ with respect to the additional
pragmatic effects. On the truth-conditional level, the ordinary generic sentence in
(100-b) expresses the same regularity with respect to visitors as (100-a) and the sen-
tences in (101): ‘Visitors can see the picture from the entrance’.
Example (102) illustrates the effect of the speaker-oriented component. Since man
automatically communicates that the speaker believes that he actually or presumably
































‘As a gentleman, one has to hold open the door for others. #But I, a gentle-
man, don’t have to.’
The effect persists if man is substituted by impersonally used ich and du. Presumably
English you also patterns with one in this respect; as Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990)
state, one of the functions of impersonally used you is to express assimilation on the
part of the speaker to a wider generality.
Note that the judgements for all of the examples in this section that test for pragmatic
oddness are subtle. To my mind, however, in all of these examples clear contrasts exist
between the sentences containing impersonally interpreted pronouns and simple generic
sentences formed with bare plurals.
For the impersonal uses of ich and du, additional pragmatic effects are observed,
which involve the creation of either distance or closeness between the speaker and
other people. These effects are independent of the shared speaker-orientation discussed
above. Impersonal man has no comparable, additional effects.
Concerning the additional participant-related effects, second person (singular) you
and du behave in the same way. The impersonal uses of both pronouns aim to cre-
62I thank Sebastian Bücking for discussing this effect with me.
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ate closeness or an informal camaraderie between the speaker and the addressee (cf.
Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990) and Malamud (2006, 2007) for English you). Malamud
suggests that the impersonal use of you is an invitation for the addressee to put himself
in the shoes of the individuals that the generalization is about, i.e. to empathize with
these individuals. Kitagawa and Lehrer, in turn, propose that one of the rhetorical
functions of the impersonal use is to induce “situational insertion” for the addressee.63
They further argue that the pragmatic addressee-orientation of the impersonal use of
you is connected to the observation that the speaker cannot explicitly exclude the ad-
dressee from a generalization that he stated with impersonal you.64 This is illustrated
in (103-b) for (103-a).
(103) a. But I have a gift for teaching . . . Plus, teaching fiction writing is a lot
like writing. You have to examine manuscripts, use your mind, come
up with possibilities, respond to characters in situations. In a lot of ways,
it’s like working on your own work.
(Kitagawa and Lehrer 1990:741)
b. *?You have to examine manuscripts — I don’t mean you personally — use
your mind.
(Kitagawa and Lehrer 1990:743)
The same oddness is observable for German du if, as in (104), the applicability to the







































‘As a childcare specialist, you (imp.) have to treat every child in the group
equally well. But that does not apply to you (the addressee) personally.’
Hence, for both impersonally used you and du an explicit exclusion of the addressee
clashes with the addressee-oriented presentation of the generalization.
A similar observation can be made for the presumed ready acceptance of the state-
ment by the addressee, which cannot be explicitly negated either, see (105).65
63Rojas (2011) reports a similar behavior for impersonally used second person singular pronouns in
Spanish as spoken in Chile. On the basis of a corpus study, she argues that the impersonal uses express
a special form of evidentiality: (i) most of the time, the source of the information is a generalization
made on the basis of the speaker’s own experiences, and (ii) the generalization is expressed in a
manner as to appeal to the addressee in an emotional fashion, and to convince them that they might
find themselves in a similar situation.
64The impersonal reading of you can be made explicit by denying a referential use through adding
the appositive not YOU you (upper case signals stress; p.c. E. Allyn Smith). Note that the denial
of the referential use, though, is not the same as denying applicability to the addressee. It “only”
mitigates a direct accusation which would result from the referential reading.
65The same note regarding the subtlety of the judgment applies for this example. In addition, it











































‘As a childcare specialist, you (imp.) have to interact well with children.
#But I am sure that you (add.) view matters differently from me.’
The participant-oriented effect of impersonally interpreted ich is in stark contrast to
the effect of impersonally used du. It signals distance between the speaker and other
people—but not necessarily other discourse participants. Impersonally used ich is most
often used to criticize or complain about the actions or opinions of others, or to state
“unpopular opinions” that the speaker aims to defend. In addition, the impersonal use
of ich seems to be connected to heightened emotional involvement on the part of the
speaker. That is, the speaker fully endorses the rule expressed by his statement.
In parallel to the participant-oriented effects of du, the speaker’s endorsement for
the generalization cannot be explicitly denied. As illustrated in (106), such an attempt

































‘As a farmer, one has to milk one’s cows (and I support this fully). #But for
all I care, farmers can do what they want.’
In addition, the speaker may signal various emotions with the use of ich, e.g. irri-
tation, anger, or incredulity. These additionally conveyed emotions are contextually
triggered, though, and not an integral part of the participant-related component of ich.



















































‘I think this is an absolutely stupid argument! The bridal couple can’t expect
their guests to more or less pay for the party!’66
In the first sentence of (107), the speaker explicitly states her attitude towards the
should be avoided to read the two sentences with a deliberate pause in between since (105) improves
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topic under discussion. The generalization in the second sentence is then uttered with
the same emotional coloring.
So in sum, impersonally interpreted ich and du and impersonal man induce addi-
tional pragmatic speaker-oriented effects that can be characterized as the speaker’s
belief that the generalization applies to him, or would apply to him if he had the rel-
evant properties. The additional effects that are associated only with the impersonal
uses of ich and du concern how the generalizations that are expressed are presented to
the addressee and other discourse participants. Impersonally interpreted ich is used to
signal full endorsement by the speaker, but induces a distancing effect with respect to
other individuals that do not share the speaker’s opinion. Impersonally interpreted du,
in contrast, mainly aims to build closeness between the speaker and the addressee.
One final observation in connection with the participant-oriented effects of imper-
sonally interpreted personal pronouns is presented in Malamud (2006, 2007). As a
consequence of the empathy invitation issued by the speaker, she observes what she
calls “empathy tracking effects”: Whenever the impersonal reading of you co-occurs
with another impersonally interpreted pronoun—in the case of English, the impersonal
pronoun one—the addressee’s empathy is directed towards those individuals that you
represents in the clause. Consider the following examples.
(108) a. One could have thrown you in jail for that. (empathy with object)
b. You could have thrown one in jail for that. (empathy with subject)
(Malamud 2007:11)
In the first example, impersonally interpreted you is in object position, and the ad-
dressee is invited to empathize with the people potentially thrown into jail. This
contrasts with the impersonal use of you in subject position in the second example.
There, the addressee’s empathy is directed towards the people who potentially throw
others into jail.
Analogous examples can be given in German for the impersonal use of du in contrast
with the impersonal pronoun man. The following examples are close translations of
the English examples above.67,68
67German man only has a nominative form. For all other cases the indefinite pronoun einer has to
be used. Cf. Chapter 2 for a discussion of impersonal pronouns in German and English.
68Malamud (2007) discusses the following examples to illustrate the empathy tracking effect for
German du. I adapted the examples to show the empathy tracking parallel to the English example
also because (i-b) contains subjunctive marking on the verb, which blocks the impersonal interpretation





















‘In those days, one would be thrown in jail for this kind of thing.’























































‘You could have thrown one in jail for that.’ (empathy with subject)
A similar empathy tracking effect can be observed for the impersonal reading of ich,
as well. In the following example, the impersonal reading of ich is contrasted with the



































































‘But wait, honestly, if an employer places a job ad, then he has to double-
check online whether the ad is fine. At least, if it’s an employer one wants to
work for.’ 69
In both sentences of example (110), the speaker uses ich impersonally for employers in
general. In the second sentence of (110), he additionally uses the impersonal pronoun
man to talk about employees in general. This difference in pronominal form regarding
employers and employees creates a different distribution of the speaker’s empathy. The
set of individuals the speaker focusses on is the set of employers; the entire text is
a complaint about negligent employers. Hence, the speaker’s heightened emotional
involvement concerns the rules of conduct for employers rather than for employees.
Since in German three impersonally used pronominal forms are available, there is
a third combination which could in principle occur, and produce empathy tracking
effects: ich and du. Given their restrictions and respective participant-oriented effects,
it seems unlikely to me that this combination should arise: Since ich is restricted to
subject(-like) positions (cf. Section 1.3), any well-formed utterance of this kind should
have ich in subject position and du in object position. Furthermore such an utterance
would have to express a statement that the speaker completely endorses for those
individuals that ich is used for, but for which he believes that someone does not share
his opinion. At the same time, the speaker would invite the addressee to empathize
‘In those days, you would be thrown in jail for this kind of thing.’
(empathise with the victim)
(Malamud 2007:12)
69http://www.mediengestalter.info/forum/47/mein-spruch-des-tages-39931-1124.html
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with those individuals du is used for, and would express that he expects the addressee to
readily accept the general statement regarding these individuals. I have to admit that
even though the existence of such a configuration cannot be excluded on the grounds
that the pragmatic effects of ich and du are simply incompatible, I cannot think of a
plausible example in which ich and du are clearly used impersonally. Hence at this
point, I am forced to leave this as an open issue for further research.
1.5 The semantics of personal pronouns
1.5.1 Introductory remarks
In Section 1.2, it was shown that in their impersonal uses, German first and second
person singular ich and du differ in their semantic behavior fundamentally from when
they are used referentially. Specifically, the impersonal and referential uses differ from
each other in three respects: in their impersonal readings, but not in their referential
readings . . .
• ich and du do not shift in indirect discourse.
• ich and du can be used interchangably, and pronominal forms may be mixed.
• ich and du show quantificational variability effects.
Having worked out these differences, it is instructive to consider how the semantic
contribution of the referential uses are standardly analyzed, and to see which aspects
of these analyses capture the noted behavior of the referential uses. Hence, this sec-
tion’s aim is to provide the necessary background on the grammatical properties of
referentially used singular personal pronouns, and to introduce the classical and re-
cent influential analyses of their semantic contribution (Kaplan 1978 [1989], Heim and
Kratzer 1998, and Kratzer 2009). The final point I address is that the popular propos-
als that are currently available to account for the refential uses of ich and du cannot be
adopted straightforwardly to capture the semantic behavior of their impersonal uses,
as suggested by their different semantic behavior.
1.5.2 1st/2nd vs. 3rd – syntactic and semantic properties
In traditional normative and descriptive grammars, pronouns in general and personal
pronouns in particular are characterized as proforms which “stand in” for full nominal
expressions, i.e. full or bare noun phrases.70
The morphological paradigm of personal pronouns is traditionally structured with
respect to the conceptually motivated grammatical categories of person, number, and
70Traditional grammars usually also distinguish personal pronouns from reflexive pronouns and
possessive pronouns. I group these two classes with the class of personal pronouns.
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gender. For German and English, the category of person is divided into first, second,
and third person. First and second person encode the two participant roles—speaker
and addressee—in contrast to non-participants, which are encoded by third person.
The category of number is divided into singular and plural, which encode single and
multiple referents across the category of person. The third category, gender, is only
distinguished in the third person singular, and is divided into the three subcategories
masculine, feminine, and neuter. Table 1.1 illustrates the pronominal paradigms of








third er, sie, es sie
Table 1.1: The systems of English and German personal pronouns in nominative case
Since the central topic of this thesis is the impersonal use of first and second per-
son singular pronouns, I restrict the following general overview to singular personal
pronouns only. A discussion of the additional syntactic and semantic idiosyncracies
of plural personal pronouns is beyond the scope of this thesis, but see e.g. Sauerland
(2008) and Rullmann (2010) for details.
The traditional way of presenting the paradigm of personal pronouns—indeed the
formation of a class of personal pronouns as such—already suggests that pronouns
of all persons and numbers are a uniform lexical class. Benveniste (1971[1958]) is
one of the first to criticize this view on personal pronouns. He argues that first and
second person pronouns need to be distinguished from third person pronouns based on
two fundamental semantic differences. First, the reference of first and second person
pronouns is strictly dependent on the utterance context. The reference of third person
pronouns, on the other hand, is not fixed automatically from the utterance context,
see (111).
(111) a. A to B: I like sushi.  A likes sushi.
b. A to B: You like sushi.  B likes sushi.
c. A to B: He/she likes sushi.
 X (whoever A intends to refer to) likes sushi.
In other words, the speaker can more or less freely choose the intended referent for
third person singular pronouns from the context (as long as it can be made clear who
he refers to). The speaker- and addressee-reference found with first and second person
71English personal pronouns are the only elements in the language which still distinguish between
nominative and accusative case. In German, the full case paradigms observable for nouns also exist
for pronouns.
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pronouns, on the other hand, depends entirely on the circumstances of utterance, and
cannot be influenced by the speaker’s intentions.
The second semantic difference is that only third person pronouns are“true proforms”
which can stand in and pick up the referent of any preceding (or following) nominal
expression. First and second person pronouns cannot be used in this way. Compare
examples (112) and (113).72
(112) a. Peter1 likes his1 mother.
b. *Peter1 likes my1/your1 mother.
(113) a. Peter1 likes sushi. He1 also likes sake.
b. *Peter1 likes sushi. I1/you1 also like sake.
Further differences arise when the behavior of first, second, and third person singular
pronouns with respect to syntactic and semantic binding is considered—one of the
central topics in the modern syntactic and semantic literature.73 There, four uses of
personal pronouns are generally distinguished (cf. Evans 1977, 1980; Elbourne 2008):
the referential use, the co-referential use, the bound use, and the so-called E-type use.74
In the referential use, a personal pronoun is used to make reference to an entity that
is present or somehow salient in the context of utterance. The intended referent can be,
but does not have to be made explicit with a pointing gesture (“ostension”), consider
(114) in the given context.
(114) Said of a man passing in the street: He’s up early.
(Evans 1980:337)
A co-referentially used personal pronoun shares its reference with a referential ex-
pression or pronoun occurring in the same sentence or previous discourse, which is
called its antecedent. For instance, in (115) the noun phrase Peter is the antecedent
for both occurrences of the pronoun he in (115-b) and (115-c), and in (116) John is
the antecedent of the possessive his.
72I use indices such as natural numbers or the letters i, j, k to indicate shared reference, and later on
to indiscriminately mark co-reference, binding, as well as E-type configurations. In case a referential
expression carries the same index as a personal pronoun, the two expressions are intended to co-refer.
Whenever a quantifying expression and a personal pronoun carry the same index, the quantifying
expression is assumed to bind or stand in an E-type configuration to the pronoun.
73This section only provides a brief overview of the semantic proposals for singular personal pro-
nouns. I do not discuss the literature on Binding Theory and the characteristics of personal pronouns
connected to the syntax-semantics interface. For an overview see Büring (2005, 2011) and Elbourne
(2008).
74Traditional grammar distinguishes two uses of personal pronouns: a deictic and an anaphoric use.
The deictic use corresponds to the referential use in the four-way distinction, and the anaphoric use
covers the three other uses.
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(115) a. A: Peter1 is nice.
b. B: Yes, he1 likes sushi.
c. A: And he1 likes sake.
(116) John1 loves his1 mother.
75 (Evans 1980:337)
In the bound use, the pronominal referent obligatorily depends on the reference of
another linguistic expression, or covaries with a quantifying expression. Reflexive pro-
nouns, for example, only have a bound use, see (117) and (118).
(117) a. Few congressmen1 admire only the people they1 know.
(Evans 1980:339)
b. Few congressmen1 admire only themselves1.
(118) a. He1/the man1 likes himself1.
b. She1/the woman1 likes herself1.
c. It1/the dog1 likes itself1.
A prerequisite for the bound use to arise is that the binding expression precedes the
bound pronoun, and stands in a c-command relation76 to it.
As for the bound use, the E-type use of a pronoun involves covariation of the pro-
noun’s referent with a quantifying expression, as well.77 The special characteristic
of the E-type use, however, is that the seemingly bound use of the pronoun arises
even though the quantifying expression and the pronoun do not stand in the required
75Note that there is evidence from so called strict and sloppy readings of verb phrase ellipsis that
the possessive pronoun in this example is ambiguous between a co-referential and a bound use. As
Williams (1977) and others show, ellipsis requires parallelism at the level of Logical Form between the
elided verb phrase and its antecedent verb phrase. Therefore, if the elided material is ambiguous the
parallelism requirement demands that the antecedent verb phrase be ambiguous, as well. For instance,
in John1 loves his1 mother, and Peter2 does too, the elided verb phrase may have two interpretations.
The possessive in the elided verb phrase, loves his mother, can be interpreted either as referring to
John, or as referring to Peter. In the first case, the possessive co-refers with the subject of the first
clause. Therefore, also the possessive in the first clause needs to have a co-referential reading. In
the second case, the possessive is bound by the subject of the second clause, i.e. Peter. Hence, the
possessive in the first clause also has to be bound by its antecedent.
76C-command is a structural relation between two nodes in a tree structure.
(i) In a tree structure, a node α c-commands a node β iff neither node dominates the other and
the node immediately dominating α dominates β.
77Originally, E-type uses were called “donkey pronouns”. This term was coined by Geach (1962)
who discusses sentences like (i-a). His example is usually considered together with the conditional
version in (i-b).
(i) a. Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
b. If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.
Kamp (1981) and Heim (1988 [1982]) treat donkey pronouns as bound by a quantifier scoping at
sentence level. Later on, donkey pronouns were re-analyzed, and renamed “E-type uses” of these
pronouns (cf. Heim 1990).
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syntactic configuration. That is, the quantifying expression does not c-command the
pronoun. Consider the examples in (119).
(119) a. Every congressman who admires a politician1 votes for him1.
b. If a congressman2 admires a politician1, he2 votes for him1.
c. Few congressmen1 admire Kennedy, and they1 are very junior.
(Evans 1980:339)
As (119-c) shows, E-type pronouns also do not get the same interpretation as true
bound variables. Their reference depends on the set of individuals quantified over, but
not on the quantificational force of the quantifying expression. If they in (119-c) were
logically bound by the quantifying expressions few congressmen, the pronoun would
be expected to be in the scope of the quantifier. If this were the case, the sentence
would be expected to have the following interpretation: ‘Few congressmen are such
that they admire Kennedy and are very junior’. This interpretation is not available for
the example above. Consequently, the semantic relation between the pronoun and the
quantifying expression in the E-type use is not the same as in the true bound use of
personal pronouns.
When the syntactic and semantic behavior of first and second person pronouns is
considered with respect to the last three uses, it is immediately clear that Benveniste’s
distinction between first and second person pronouns, on the one hand, and third
person pronouns, on the other hand, is reflected here, as well.78
Since first and second person pronouns cannot pick up the reference of referring ex-
pressions, it is unclear whether they have a co-referential use in the same sense as third
person pronouns. Furthermore with respect to previous occurrences of first and second
person pronouns, putative co-referentially used pronouns cannot be distinguished from
further referential uses of these pronouns, see (120).
(120) a. A: I like my mother.
b. A: I like sushi, and I also like sake.
The reference of I and my in (120-a) may be determined independently of the presence
of an antecedent, since I and my always refer to the speaker of the utterance. The same
is true for the two occurrences of I in (120-b). Therefore, no evidence for a genuine
co-referential use is available. The referential use and the co-referential use basically
coincide.
First and second person singular reflexives can only be bound by first and second
person pronouns, respectively, see (121).
78Crosslinguistically, first and second person pronouns are also distinguished from third person
pronouns by various morphosyntactic phenomena. Cf. Gruber (2011:336) for a non-exhaustive list.
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(121) a. I1/*you1/*he1/*the man1 like(s) myself1.
b. *I1/you1/*he1/*the man1 like(s) yourself1.
Also quantifying noun phrases are unable to bind first and second person singular
pronouns, see (122).
(122) a. *Every man1 likes my1/your1 mother.
b. *Every man1 likes myself1/yourself1.
It seems that, in general, non-reflexive first and second person pronouns cannot be
bound. However in some rare cases exemplified below, bound readings of these pro-
nouns do in fact occur (cf. Rullmann 2004; Heim 2005; Kratzer 2009).
(123) a. I’m the only one around here who can take care of my children.
(Kratzer 2009:188)
b. Only you eat what you cook.
(Kratzer 2009:188)
The preferred interpretation of the first sentence is that the speaker is the only person
who can take care of his or her children, and that all others are incapable of taking care
of their own children. Similarily, the second sentence is usually understood as saying
that the addressee is the only person who eats what he or she cooks, and that no one
else eats what they, themselves, cook. For these interpretations to be available, my
and you need to be bound by only.
The sentences in (123) also have dispreferred interpretations, which arise when the
possessive forms are interpreted as strictly referential. For the first sentence, the dis-
preferred reading is that the speaker is the only person who can take care of his or her
children, and that all others are incapable of taking care of the speaker’s children, and
for the second example, that the addressee is the only person who eats what he or she
cooks, and that no one else eats what the addressee cooks.
First and second person pronouns in their bound use are called “fake indexicals”
in the literature. This reflects the fact that regardless of their being morphologically
marked as first and second person pronouns, they behave exactly like bound third
person pronouns.
An analogous E-type use is unavailable for first and second person singular pronouns,
see (124).
(124) a. *If a speaker1 says a sentence, I1 usually mean it.
b. *Every speaker who offends an addressee1 will apologize to you1 later.
The ungrammaticality of (124) is, of course, connected to Benveniste’s observation that
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I and you cannot be anaphoric to other referential expressions even if these expressions
may denote the same individuals.
This discussion results in the following picture.
referential co-referential bound E-type
1st yes yes (restricted) no
2nd yes yes (restricted) no
3rd yes yes yes yes
Table 1.2: Availability of the four uses of personal pronouns
So in sum, even though personal pronouns are traditionally seen as a uniform lex-
ical class, their syntactic/semantic behavior is not uniform. Specifically, the above
discussion suggests that first and second person singular pronouns, on the one hand,
and third person singular pronouns, on the other hand, should be analyzed as distinct
classes.
1.5.3 “Standard” accounts of pronominal semantics
One formal analysis of personal pronouns which captures the referential, the co-referential,
and the bound use, is proposed in Heim and Kratzer (1998). They introduce a spe-
cific interpretational rule for pronouns, which introduces an individual variable as the
denotation of a pronominal expression, see (125).79
(125) Pronouns and traces rule:
If α is a pronoun or trace, i is an index, and g is a variable assignment whose
domain includes i, then JαiKg = g(i)
(Heim and Kratzer 1998:241)
This account is based on the traditional analysis of third person singular pronouns as
individual variables, which can already be found in Montague (1973) and Kamp and
Reyle (1993).
The variable contributed by a pronoun or trace is assigned its value by a variable
assignment g : N → De, i.e. a function from natural numbers (i.e. indices) to indi-
viduals. That is, the variable assignment models the determination of the pronominal
referent from discourse referents that were previously (contextually or linguistically)
introduced.
In the referential and co-referential use, the pronominal referent depends on the
linguistic and extra-linguistic context. Formally, it is assumed that if a variable assign-
ment reflects an appropriate context for a sentence containing referential pronouns,
79Heim and Kratzer analyze traces as obligatorily bound variables. Consequently, pronouns and
traces are covered by the same interpretational rule. Cf. Heim and Kratzer (1998:241).
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it contains the right index-individual pairs to assign the intended individuals to the
variables contributed by the pronouns.
In the bound uses, on the other hand, the referent of the pronoun covaries with the
individuals that the binding expression ranges over. To capture this behavior formally,
the variable assignment is manipulated by the particular rule of interpretation in (126)
to yield a co-varying interpretation.
(126) Predicate abstraction:
If α is a branching node with daughters β and γ, where β dominates only
a numerical index i. Then, for any variable assignment g, JαKg = λx ∈
D. JγKgx/i
(Heim and Kratzer 1998:186)
Person, gender, and number information for third person singular pronouns is con-
tributed by morphosyntactic features, which are interpreted as partial identity func-
tions that place presuppositions on the referent determined via the variable assignment.






(Heim and Kratzer 1998:244)
The presupposition introduced by the gender feature [feminine] filters out all non-female
individuals.80
(128) J[feminine]Kg = λx : x is female. x
(Heim and Kratzer 1998:244)
80Presuppositions are expressed in Heim and Kratzer (1998) as domain restrictions on the λ-
expression. The general form of a λ-term is as in (i).
(i) λx : φ. ψ
φ denotes a condition on the domain of x, while ψ denotes the value that the function assigns to x. A
mathematical example is λx : x ∈ N. x+ 1, which denotes a function that is only defined for natural
numbers (x ∈ N), and that returns the successor of that number.
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When this analysis is applied to German and English third person singular pronouns,
they come out as follows.
(129) a. Jer1/he1K
g = g(1), defined if g(1) is a single male individual
b. Jsie1/she1K
g = g(1), defined if g(1) is a single female individual
c. Jes1/it1K
g = g(1), defined if g(1) is a single thing
Since this account can handle the (co-)referential and bound readings of third per-
son singular pronouns, one could try to extend it to first and second person singular
pronouns. Such an analysis should also be able to capture the “fake indexical” cases.
To implement this idea, one has to introduce first and second person features that
restrict the admissibile values of the variable to the speaker or the addressee in c,
respectively, similar to the gender feature in (128), see (130).
(130) a. J[1st]Kg,c = λx : x is the speaker in c. x
b. J[2nd]Kg,c = λx : x is the addressee in c. x
Given this additional assumption, the first and second person singular pronouns in
German and English come out as follows.
(131) a. Jich1/I1K
g,c = g(1), defined if g(1) is a single individual and the speaker
in c
b. Jdu1/you1K
g,c = g(1), defined if g(1) is a single individual and the ad-
dressee in c
Kratzer (2009) shows that the extension of the formalization in Heim and Kratzer
(1998) to first and second person pronouns fails to capture the “fake indexical” cases for
first and second person singular pronouns. Since the potential values for the variables
are restricted to the speaker or addressee, i.e. a specific individual in the context,
the account cannot capture covariation. All non-speaker or non-addressee individuals
would be filtered out by the presupposition of the first and second person feature,
respectively.
The idea to interpret personal pronouns as individual variables also leads to problems
for the E-type uses of third person singular pronouns. Following Cooper (1979) and
Heim (1990), Heim and Kratzer (1998) therefore propose to interpret E-type uses as
covert definite descriptions of the following form.







(Heim and Kratzer 1998:292)
The seemingly bound reading of the E-type uses arises because the pronouns are inter-
preted as (covert) definite descriptions that refer to and vary with the various individu-
als that are quantified over. For each specific case, the relevant definite description that
is understood as the denotation of the pronoun depends on the quantifying expression
(i.e. the binder), the pronoun’s containing clause, and the discourse context. Formally,
this is captured by analyzing the descriptive part of the pronoun as a free predicate
variable, R7, for which the variable assignment g contextually assigns a fitting value.
In more recent analyses of the semantic contribution of third person singular pro-
nouns, their behavior in the E-type use, as well as their classification as definite ex-
pressions is taken as evidence and motivation to analyze them as definite descriptions
in all of their uses (cf. Elbourne 2005, 2008; Kratzer 2009). In the most elaborated
implementations of this idea, third person pronouns are definite descriptions with silent
descriptive content.
For first and second person singular pronouns, there is strong evidence against an-
alyzing them as definite descriptions with silent descriptive content (cf. Benveniste
1971[1958]; Kaplan 1978 [1989]; Nunberg 1993). Even though the referent of first or
second person singular pronouns can be referred to by definite descriptions of various
forms, e.g. ‘the speaker (of this utterance)’, ‘the addressee (of this utterance)’, the
pronouns’ semantic contribution to the truth-conditions of the sentence is fundamen-
tally different from the semantic contribution of definite descriptions. Hence, first and
second person singular pronouns cannot be freely interchanged with co-referring defi-
nite descriptions; such a substitution will always result in a change in truth-conditions.
Compare (133-a) and (133-b).
(133) a. Oh, it’s you!
b. ?Oh, it’s the addressee of this utterance!
(Nunberg 1993:1)
Depending on different possible contexts for (133-a), substituting you with other, more
contentful descriptions may be possible, e.g. the guy I saw on the bus. However definite
descriptions of this kind are inadequate to serve as or to represent the meaning of you
in general.
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A description which might be more adequate to serve as the contribution of you, the
person I intend to talk to, however, does not capture those cases, where the speaker
never planned, or intended to address the other person. Consider example (133-a), in
which the speaker surprised about the addressees sudden presence.
Following Kaplan (1978 [1989]), Nunberg (1993) notes that first and second per-
son singular pronouns directly contribute their referents to the truth-conditions of a
sentence. In this they contrast with definite descriptions, which first contribute the
description by which the referent is determined in a second step. Thus, the speaker of
(133-a) may be surprised about the presence of a person, and address the person with
you. In (133-b), though, the speaker’s surprise depends on the descriptive content of
the addressee (of this utterance).
The same strict context dependence holds for first person singular pronouns, as well.
If I were substitutable with a definite description of the form the speaker (of this
utterance), the sentence in (134) should come out as true.
(134) If no one were to utter this sentence, I would not exist.
(Kaplan 1978 [1989]:520)
Kaplan (1978 [1989]) proposes a formal account which captures both the strict utter-
ance dependence of first and second person singular pronouns and the direct contrib-
uton of the pronouns’ referents without postulating mediation by descriptive content.
He introduces two levels of meaning, the “character” and the “content” of a linguistic
expression. The character of an expression is a function from contexts to the content of
the expression. The content of an expression, in turn, is a function from circumstances
of evaluation (e.g. a world or situation of evaluation) to an extension, i.e. the intension
of the expression.
A Kaplanian context is a “possible occasion of use” which has a speaker, a time,
a location, a world, and sometimes an addressee. To model Kaplanian contexts, a
parameter c is usually introduced which tracks the speaker, the addressee, the time,
the location, and the world of a given utterance. Thus, formally a context can be seen
as a quintuple: c = 〈cS, cA, cT , cL, cW 〉.
First and second person singular pronouns, Kaplan argues, are “directly referential
expressions”, i.e. their referents are fully determined by their characters from the ut-
terance context, see (135). In addition, they are pure indexicals since they require no
demonstration of the intended referent.
(135) a. Jich/IKc = cS
b. Jdu/youKc = cA
Kaplan also classifies third person singular pronouns in their referential use as directly
referential expressions, but not as pure indexicals since they require an ostension (cf.
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the discussion of the referential use of third person pronouns in Section 1.5.2). He
ignores all other possible uses of third person singular pronouns, which he assumes
result from different, possibly homonymous lexical items. As is evident from the system
proposed in Heim and Kratzer (1998) and the brief introduction of Elbourne’s (2005;
2008) aim to analyze pronouns as definite descriptions, the homonymy assumption for
the different uses of third person pronouns is generally not shared in the linguistic
literature. Usually, a unified analysis that captures all uses is aimed for.
1.5.4 Kratzer (2009)
A recent account in which the main goal is not to find a unified account for all uses of
all (singular) personal pronouns is put forth in Kratzer (2009). Kratzer proposes that
bound uses of first, second, and third person pronouns need to be modelled separately
from their referential, co-referential, and E-type uses, and that also first and second
person pronouns differ in their semantic contribution from third person pronouns. The
first split between the bound use vs. the other uses is based on Rullmann’s (2004)
observation that in some cases binding is possible even though the morphological make-
up of the binder only partially coincides with the make-up of the bound pronoun, see
(136).
(136) Only you prepared a handout for our first appointment.
(Kratzer 2009:190)
This data, Rullmann argues, suggests that the semantic contribution of a pronoun is
built up from morphosyntactically manipulable parts. Kratzer agrees with Rullmann’s
analysis, and furthermore argues that the “fake indexical” data in general points in the
same direction.
Building on recent typological and syntactic research on the denotation of mor-
phosyntactic features, i.e. φ-features (cf. Harley and Ritter 2002, Harbour 2006), Kratzer
proposes that syntactically, personal pronouns only exist as hierarchically structured
sets of features, which can be manipulated in the syntax. The specific pronominal
forms are inserted at a later point in the derivation via vocabulary insertion rules.
They only spell out specific φ-feature combinations.81 For English singular personal
pronouns Kratzer proposes the vocabulary insertion rules in (137).
(137) [1st] [singular] → I
[2nd] → you
[female] [singular] → she
81Kratzer assumes a constraint on vocabulary insertion rules for pronouns: only φ-features are tar-
geted. This prevents combinatorial features, like [def], [group], and [sum] from featuring in these rules.
The constraint is motivated by an observation in Cysouw (2003), who notes that some combinations
of features are never explicitly spelled out in any language even though they are conceptually sound.
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[male] [singular] → he
[thing] [singular] → it
The vocabulary insertion rules for German differ from the ones for English only in the φ-
feature specification for the second person since German morphologically distinguishes
second person singular and plural.82
(138) [1st] [singular] → ich
[2nd] [singular] → du
[female] [singular] → sie
[male] [singular] → er
[thing] [singular] → es
At the level of Logical Form, the structured sets of features are interpreted compo-
sitionally. In all of their uses, all personal pronouns are individual-denoting nominal
expressions. The specific denotations differ for first and second vs. third person pro-
nouns, on the one hand, and (co-)referential and E-type uses vs. bound uses, on the
other hand.
The referential uses of first and second person singular pronouns are built up from
number-neutral, directly referring first and second person features, [1st] and [2nd], and
a singular feature, [singular].83
(139) a. J[1st]NK
g,c = the speaker(s) of c
b. J[2nd]NK
g,c = the addressee(s) of c
The singular number feature contributes a presupposition which filters out all plural
individuals.84
(140) J[singular]Kg,c = λx : x is an atom. x
82Kratzer’s proposal does not take into account that in contrast to English, the form of German
personal pronouns may depend on the grammatical gender of an expression or the natural gender of its
denotation. In (i), the third person singular female pronoun sie and the third person singular neuter
es may both be used to co-refer with das Mädchen (Engl. ‘the girl’; grammatical gender: neuter,





















‘The girl now has short hair. She had her hair done.’
83Note that (139) should not be read as [1st] or [2nd] being interpreted as definite descriptions. The
expressions the speaker(s) of c and the addressee(s) of c have the same status as Kaplan’s cS and cA.
84Plural is left unmarked. To form the associative plural needed for the first and second person
plural pronouns, Kratzer introduces a combinatorial [group] feature, which takes a participant feature
and returns the group associated with the given participant. She also introduces a combinatorial [sum]
feature and a φ-feature [dual] to deal with other pluralities pronouns can refer to. For details on dual
or plural forms see Kratzer (2009).
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Hence, the semantic contributions of the feature combinations for first and second
person singular pronouns come out as in (141).
(141) a. Jich/IKc,g = J[singular]Kg,c(J[1st]NK
g,c) =
the speaker(s) of c, defined if the speaker(s) of c is an atom
b. JduKc,g = J[singular]Kg,c(J[2nd]NK
g,c) =
the addressee(s) of c, defined if the addressee(s) of c is an atom
c. JyouKc,g = J[2nd]NK
g,c = the addressee(s) of c
In contrast, third person singular pronous in their (co-)referential and E-type uses
are definite descriptions built from descriptive (i.e. non-presuppositional), predicate
denoting gender features, the [singular] feature, and a definiteness feature.
(142) a. J[male]NK
g,c = λx. x is one or more males
b. J[female]NK
g,c = λx. x is one or more females
c. J[thing]NK
g,c = λx. x is one or more things
The definiteness feature is not part of the set of φ-features. It is part of a set of combi-
natorial features which link φ-features, or modify them to allow for a compositional in-
terpretation of feature sets. For example, the gender features and the [singular]-feature
cannot be combined, as such, because of their conflicting types: gender features are of
type 〈e, t〉 while the [singular]-feature has type 〈e, e〉. The definiteness feature can link
these two features since it is a silent version of the definite determiner.85
(143) J[def]DK
g,c = λP〈e,t〉. σxP (x)
When the gender features, the [singular] feature, and the definiteness feature are
combined, the following interpretations for non-bound uses of third person singular
pronouns in English and German are derived.
(144) a. Jer/heKc,g = J[singular]Kg,c(J[def]DK
g,c(J[male]NK
g,c)) =
the unique x such that x is one or more males, defined if x is the unique
male individual in c and x is an atom
b. Jsie/sheKc,g = J[singular]Kg,c(J[def]DK
g,c(J[female]NK
g,c)) =
the unique x such that x is one or more females, defined if x is the unique
female individual in c and x is an atom
85Since Kratzer (2009) also models plural personal pronouns, she adopts the denotation of the
plural definite determiner, which uses Link’s (1983) σ-operator. The σ-operator is the plural version
of the standard ι-operator that is used to define the denotation of the singular definite determiner
(cf. Chapter 2). In an expression of the form σxP (x), the σ-operator picks out the unique, maximal
plurality that satisfies the predicate P .
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c. Jes/itKc,g = J[singular]Kg,c(J[def]DK
g,c(J[thing]NK
g,c)) =
the unique x such that x is one or more things, defined if x is the unique
thing in c and x is an atom
So far, Kratzer’s account recreates the meaning proposed in Kaplan (1978 [1989]) for
the referential use of first and second person singular pronouns. For third person
singular pronouns, it builds up an Elbourne-style definite description account, which
captures their referential, co-referential, and E-type uses.
To account for the bound uses of first, second, and third person pronouns, Kratzer’s
main idea is that bound pronouns do not enter the syntax with a fully specified inherent
feature specification. They are “born” with a minimal, lexically specified pronominal
“base” consisting of a nominal numerical feature, see (145).
(145) J[n]NK
g,c = g(n)
Note that this numerical feature more or less corresponds to a numerical index put into
object language.
In addition to the numerical feature, a bound pronoun can enter the syntax with
limited additional φ-features. The full morphosyntactic feature make-up of bound
pronouns, though, is built up in the course of the syntactic derivation. The bound
pronouns usually acquire most of their features from their binders. These acquired
features are only visible to the vocabulary insertion rules, but are not interpreted at
logical form, which captures the behavior of “fake indexicals”. For full details on the
specifics of Kratzer’s account, I defer the reader to Kratzer (2009).
1.5.5 Problems: the impersonal use and deferred ostension
The proposals in Kaplan (1978 [1989]), Heim and Kratzer (1998), and Kratzer (2009)
attribute, more or less, the same meaning to the referential uses of first and second
person singular pronouns: referentially used ich and du directly refer to the speaker
and the addressee, respectively. Reference for the two pronouns is fixed automatically
and without mediation of descriptive content. This captures the three observations on
the syntactic/semantic behavior listed in Section 1.5.1: in their referential readings . . .
• ich and du have to shift in indirect discourse.
• ich and du cannot be used interchangably; pronominal forms may not be mixed
without a change in reference.
• ich and du do not show quantificational variability effects.
The first two properties are captured by the strict dependence on the utterance
context of referentially used ich and du. And the inability to show quantificational
variability effects falls out from the fact that the referential uses are directly referential
expressions, which of course pattern like any other referential expressions.
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The “fake indexical” uses of first and second person singular pronouns, which are
problematic for Kaplan’s and Heim and Kratzer’s proposal, are analyzed as a genuine,
independent phenomenon Kratzer (2009). “Fake indexicals” only look like true first
and second person pronouns, but are underlyingly simple individual variables.
Given the above result, the meaning proposed for first and second person singular
pronouns in Kaplan (1978 [1989]) and Kratzer (2009) clearly cannot be adopted to
account for the impersonal use. From the point of view of the impersonal uses, the
main“problem”is that direct reference to the speaker and addressee is hard-wired in the
lexical entries, which means that first and second person singular pronouns are expected
to only ever refer to the speaker or the addressee. This is, of course, incompatible with
these pronouns being involved in determining a set of people—which may or may not
contain the speaker or the addressee—about which a general statement is made. But
exactly this kind of denotation seems to be required to capture impersonally used ich
and du.
Apart from the impersonal uses, one further problematic case for the semantic anal-
ysis of the referential use is discussed in Nunberg (1993). Nunberg observes that index-
icals, in general, and referentially used first and second person pronouns, in particular,
allow for “deferred ostension”. Deferred ostension arises when first and second person
singular pronouns are used to refer to particular individuals other than the speaker or
the addressee, which stand in some salient relation to the speaker or the addressee.
Deferred ostension for first person singular I is illustrated in the following example.
(146) The condemned prisoner:
I am traditionally allowed to order whatever I like for my last meal.
(Nunberg 1993:20)
For the sentence in (146), Nunberg argues that the pronoun I does not refer to the
speaker since there can never be a tradition of last meals for one specific person.
Instead, the speaker of this utterance wants to convey that there is a tradition for
all condemned prisoners: ‘Traditionally, the condemned prisoner is allowed to order
whatever he likes for his last meal’. Since the speaker in (146) is a condemned prisoner,
the rule applies to him, and by this, the speaker also states something about himself.
Kratzer’s (2009) account—and as Nunberg notes, Kaplan’s (1978 [1989]) account—
cannot capture Nunberg’s examples. For the deferred ostension cases, the reference of
the first person singular pronoun is intuitively shifted to different particular individuals
or individual concepts which are contributed to the truth-conditions of the sentence.
This is impossible to implement if first and second person singular pronouns necessarily
refer to the speaker or the addressee, respectively. For instance in Kratzer’s system,
the [1st]-feature or [2nd]-feature are necessarily present at the level of Logical Form
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for referentially used I and you, respectively. Hence, it is unclear when the necessary
change in reference should occur in these accounts.
While I believe that the uses of first and second person singular pronouns found in
deferred ostension cases and the impersonal uses constitute different problems for a
strict directly referential account, I take the underlying idea of Nunberg’s solution to
the deferred ostension readings as the basis for a first account of the impersonal uses of
ich and du in Chapter 2. There Nunberg’s general criticism of direct-reference accounts
in the Kaplanian tradition is also discussed further.
However, before proposing a separate, independent use for impersonally interpreted
first and second person singular pronouns—be it as polysemy or homonymy, one could
attempt to analyze the impersonal uses as a result of an interaction of the usual ref-
erential interpretation with other lexical elements co-occurring in the sentence. One
such account, based on the “Counterfactual Hypothesis”, is discussed in the following
section.
1.6 Arguments against a counterfactual analysis
As discussed in Sections 1.2–1.4, the impersonal reading of personal pronouns is used to
express generalizations, norms, and rules that hold for animate individuals. These rules
can be further restricted with the use of adverbials and als-phrases that provide addi-
tional descriptive content. These observations conflict with a direct reference analysis
of the semantic contribution of first and second person singular pronouns, as discussed
in Section 1.5. The central puzzle is how to get from expressions that contribute a spe-
cific person, i.e. the speaker or the addressee, to truth-conditions that express a general
statement about individuals with a certain property, which the speaker or addressee
may or may not have.
Before a general revision of the meaning of first and second person singular pronouns
is attempted, or, less radically, before some form of lexical ambiguity is assumed for first
and second person singular pronouns, one might try to model the impersonal uses more
conservatively. One possibility is to assume that the meaning of sentences containing
impersonal uses arises from an interplay of the meanings of co-occurring material while
the directly referential meaning is retained for the pronouns. This idea is the basis for
the Counterfactual Hypothesis.
(147) Counterfactual Hypothesis:
Sentences with impersonally interpreted singular personal pronouns are inter-
preted as counterfactuals. That is, the sentences hypothesize what would hold
for the speaker/the addressee if he or she had the given relevant property.
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The Counterfactual Hypothesis is inspired by the behavior of personal pronouns in





















‘If I were you, I would look for someone else.’
In identity counterfactuals, the subject of the copula clause in the antecedent is assumed
to be (in the situation experienced by) another person. The consequent clause then
ascribes a property to the subject under this assumption. If the subject of the identity
counterfactual is a first person singular pronoun, the effect arises that the speaker“puts
herself in the shoes” of another person. In example (148), for instance, the speaker puts
herself in the shoes of the addressee, and states what she would do in the addressee’s
stead.86
In analogy to these identity counterfactuals, one might assume that when sentences
contain “impersonally used” ich or du, the speaker counterfactually assumes herself
to be a member of the group of individuals for which the generalization is stated.
For example, the sentences in (149-a) and (150-a) might express the counterfactual






































b. If you (add.) were a team and wanted to win, you would have to fight.
At least two reasons can be given for why the Counterfactual Hypothesis needs to
be discarded: First, the counterfactual paraphrases cannot be derived without either
violating compositionality, or discarding the Kaplanian semantics for the pronouns,
which would go against the initial motivation for the hypothesis. Second, the counter-
factual paraphrases do not capture the intuitive meaning of the data, and make false
predictions with respect to what can be expressed with sentences of this kind.87
The compositionality problem arises because there is no lexical material which, on
the one hand, obligatorily co-occurs with the impersonal readings of ich and du, and,
on the other hand, could be assumed to contribute the necessary meaning components
for a counterfactual interpretation.
86Malamud (2006) uses identity counterfactuals as inspiration for her account of the impersonal use
of English you. Her account is discussed in Chapter 2.
87Alonso-Ovalle (2000) argues against a similar analysis for impersonal second person singular in
Spanish. He states that looking at the most normal worlds in which the counterparts of the addressee
have the relevant properties is too weak to capture the generalization that is expressed with sentences
containing an impersonally used second person singular pronoun.
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The morphological marking found with the verbs in the collected data does not
support the Counterfactual Hypothesis since the verbal mood is consistently indica-
tive. Hence as far as morphological marking is concerned, attributing a counterfactual
semantics, which is exclusively connected to irrealis mood, to the data seems unmoti-
vated.
But even though this is not attested for actual counterfactual conditionals, let us
assume for the sake of the argument that the indicative mood in connection with
other lexical material may be interpreted just like an irrealis mood. Then another,
although relatively minor problem arises: impersonal readings occur in a range of
different sentences, not all of which have an overt conditional structure, or even contain


































‘A corporate group doesn’t just pay without expecting anything in return.’88
For examples with no overt conditonal structure as (151) and (152), the conditional
structure of the desired counterfactual interpretation has to be derivable in some way.
Since example (151) contains an overt modal, i.e. a quantificational operator, a so-
lution regarding the missing conditional structure might be found in the literature on
quantificational structures (cf. Partee 1992). A well-known observation is that some-
times, material is interpreted in the restrictor of a for which the surface order suggests
that it is in the scope of a quantificational expression even though the surface order
suggests that it is in the scope of that expression. The semantics of modal operators
proposed in Kratzer (1977, 1981a, 1991) would then relate the restrictor and the scope
of the modal in a conditional-like fashion.
For the appropriate identity counterfactuals to be derived, at least the als-phrase
needs to be interpreted in the restrictor of the modal. And indeed, one characteristic
property of German als-phrases is that they can be interpreted in the restrictor of a
sentential operator.89 To arrive at the relevant counterfactual for example (151), the
als-phrase, als Mannschaft (Engl. ‘as a team’), even seems to be the only material that
is needed in the restrictor, see (153).
(153) If I were a team, I would have to obey my coach.
Even though the als-phrase seems to be the missing link for the Counterfactual Hy-
88Shortened from http://www.spongeblog.de/567/2006/07/07/zeiss-of-jena/
89Cf. the discussion of German nominal als-phrases in Appendix A1.
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pothesis to work, there are three reasons for why the als-phrases do not provide the
solution: (i) als-phrases only restrict quantificational operators that co-occur with them
in a clause, (ii) they never directly modify the lexical meaning of the operators that
they restrict, and (iii) they are optional (cf. Section 1.3).
An example illustrating the first point is (152), which contains no overt quantifi-
cational operator. Since als-phrases are not indicators for the presence of a covert
quantificational operator if no overt operator is present—in contrast to if -clauses (cf.
Kratzer 1986)—it is unclear which operator the als-phrase would restrict to derive the
desired counterfactual interpretation in (154).
(154) If I were a corporate group, I wouldn’t just pay without expecting anything in
return.
The second counter-argument is illustrated by the following example.
Context: Maria occasionally takes on various part-time jobs on week-ends to earn




















A: ‘When Maria takes on a job as a waitress, she has to work eight hours with
no break.’
The als-phrase, als Kellnerin (Engl. ‘as a waitress’), can restrict the modal muss to
those week-ends where Maria is a waitress.90 It can never induce an irrealis interpreta-
tion of muss, though. If it were known that Maria never did any waitressing in her life,
the sentence above simply could not be used in this context. Example (155) simply
cannot express the following counterfactual statement.
(156) If Maria were a waitress, she would have to work eight hours with no break.
Other optional material that supports the impersonal reading of ich and du, and
that may be interpreted as restricting the domain of a modal operator behaves just like















‘When Maria is inside the school building, she has to take off her outdoor
shoes.’
The rule expressed in (157) implies the counterfactual statement in (158).
90Example (155) can also be interpreted with the als-phrase outside the restrictor or scope of müssen
(Engl. ‘must’). In this case, it should be translated as ‘Since she is a waitress, Maria has to work eight
hours with no break’.
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(158) If Mary were inside the school building, she would have to take off her shoes.
The examples in (158) and (157), however, do not express the same statement. For
instance, if Maria ceased to be a student, and her mother reminisces about the school
rules, then Maria’s mother could not use (157) to express the counterfactual in (158).
So neither als-phrases nor adverbials can induce the counterfactual interpretation by
restricting a modal in the indicative. The optionally co-occurring discourse particles
(e.g. ja, doch, wohl, . . . ) are even more implausible candidates to modify verbal mood.
It is a well-known fact that the central function of discourse particles is of a pragmatic
nature, and usually involves commenting on the semantic content of the utterance
in the specific discourse context (cf. Zimmermann 2011a and Appendix A2). If it is
assumed that a covert subjunctive modal provides the necessary ingredient for the
counterfactual interpretation, another problem arises: one would have to explain why
the impersonal readings only occur with the covert subjunctive operator, but overt
irrealis marking on the verb blocks the impersonal interpretation (cf. Section 1.3).
In sum, no overt lexical material present in the data can contribute the meaning
components that are needed to make up the presumed meaning of the sentences under
the Counterfactual Hypothesis.
The second, even stronger reason to discard the Counterfactual Hypothesis is simply
that the counterfactual paraphrases do not capture the intuitive meaning expressed by
the data. Specifically, it predicts certain restrictions on the use of sentences containing
impersonally used ich and du which are not observed.
One central characteristic of identity counterfactuals is that certain parts and aspects
of the subject are retained. In example (148), the point of view and the character of
the speaker, picked out by the referential use of ich/I, still remain her point of view and
character in the hypothetical situation of her being (in the situation experienced by)
the addressee. That is, the sentence does not express that the speaker is completely
identical to the addressee. If the latter were the case, it would be incoherent to state
that the speaker would act differently in the first place. The observation that individ-
uals retain their own point of view, character, and special characteristic properties is
true for counterfactuals in general. Consider the following example.
Context: Speaker A is a linguist. He is also a great hobby athlete, and his special
talent is long distance sprinting. In fact, he can catch anyone who attempts to run



















A: ‘If I were a police officer, I would be able to catch the fugitives at chases.’
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B: ‘If you were a police officer, you would be able to catch the fugitives at
chases.’
In case of impersonally used ich and du, the personality and personal characteristics
of the speaker and the addressee are completely inaccessible, though. That is, even
though A and his friend are aware of A’s special talent, the impersonal use of ich
and du is blind to this information. Both examples in (161) express general statements







































‘A police officer is able to catch the fugitives at chases.’
If the impersonal readings were special cases of counterfactual statements, this differ-
ence would not be expected to arise.91
Another prediction of the Counterfactual Hypothesis that turns out to be false is that
the impersonal uses of ich and du should only be restricted to generalizations about
sets of individuals that the speaker and the addressee do not belong to. Consider the

























Susan: #‘If I were a woman, I would have to achieve more than the men.’
It is, however, completely natural for a female individual to state the following gener-
alization about women using impersonally interpreted ich.
91I thank Rajesh Bhatt (p.c.) for pointing this out to me.



















Susan: ‘A woman has to achieve more than men.’
The Counterfactual Hypothesis would assign the counterfactual in (162) to (163).
Hence, the same pragmatic oddness is falsely predicted to arise. Analogously, the
impersonal use of du should be pragmatically odd whenever the addressee is part of
the group of relevant individuals, which is also not observed.
In sum, the discussion above to my mind convincingly shows that the Counterfactual
Hypothesis is inadequate as an analysis for the impersonal readings of first and second
person singular pronouns. It is not only unclear how the counterfactual semantics
should be derived compositionally from the material given in the sentence, the proposed
counterfactual meaning also does not capture the intuitive meaning expressed by the
data, and makes false predictions concerning their use.
I will not further address elaborations of the Counterfactual Hypothesis that argue
that the counterfactual meaning is contributed either by the personal pronoun itself
or a context shift. As was stated above, the idea to let the personal pronoun intro-
duce the counterfactual interpretation goes against the assumption that motivated the
Counterfactual Hypothesis in the first place, i.e. that the directly referential semantics
for first and second person singular pronouns is maintained. An analysis based on the
assumption that the impersonal interpretation arises from context shifted indexicals—
without interpreting these sentences as counterfactual statements—has to be looked at
separately. Such an analysis would introduce an additional assumption on context shift
under modal expressions for languages like German and English, which do not show
context shifts in the paradigmatic cases, i.e. under verbs of saying (cf. Schlenker 2003).
This line of investigation is briefly addressed in the Conclusion, but not considered in
detail.
In the following chapter, I pursue a more promising account based on the observation
of truth-conditional equivalence between the impersonal uses of ich and du and the
impersonal pronoun man, and on Nunberg’s (1993) deferred ostension cases.
1.7 Summary and outlook
The main conclusion of this chapter is that the impersonal use of first and second
person singular pronouns is independent from their referential use (cf. Section 1.5). In
Section 1.6, I showed that analyzing sentences containing impersonally used ich or du
as counterfactual statements fails to capture the intuitive behavior of the data.
So, for the following further investigations in the subsequent chapters, I take the
following characteristics (as established in Sections 1.2–1.4) as starting point:
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• Without exception, sentences containing impersonally used ich and du express
general statements, rules, norms, and generalizations of other kinds, i.e. they are
generic sentences. Furthermore, impersonal readings are unavailable in episodic
statements.
• The impersonal uses of ich and du are truth-conditionally equivalent with the
impersonal pronoun man.
• On a pragmatic level, the impersonal uses of ich and du and the impersonal
pronoun man convey speaker-orientation.
• Regarding participant-oriented pragmatic effects, impersonally interpreted ich is
used to signal distance, while impersonally interpreted du aims to build closeness
between the speaker and the addressee.
Chapter 2 focusses on the semantics of the impersonal uses, and aims to capture
these characteristics in a unified semantics for the impersonal and referential uses. In
Chapter 4, though, this unified account is discarded, and an account which makes
minimal assumptions with respect to the semantics, but focusses on the pragmatic
characteristics of the impersonal uses is proposed.
The blocking and supporting effects observed in Section 1.3 will not be explicitly
addressed. These effects seem to be connected to the distinction between episodic vs.
generic interpretations of a given sentence. Since impersonal readings only arise in
sentences that express a generic statement, I suggest that these effects are not directly
connected to the meaning of the impersonal uses, but are connected to more basic
considerations regarding the episodic/generic distinction.
Chapter 2
Ich and du – a first try
2.1 Introduction
The central result of the previous chapter was that the impersonal uses of German first
and second person singular ich and du constitute distinct uses of these pronouns. It
was shown that impersonally interpreted ich and du and the impersonal pronoun man
are in fact truth-conditionally equivalent, and that the impersonal uses of ich and du
differ in their truth-conditional contribution from their predominant referential uses.
In this chapter, the truth-conditional equivalence between the impersonal uses of
ich and du and the impersonal pronoun man is explored further. The central aim is
to propose a unified account for personal pronouns independently of their uses. The
account that is subsequently presented in Section 2.5.3 is inspired by the discussion of
indexical expressions in Nunberg (1993), and is formally based on a semantic proposal
inspired by this account put forth in Elbourne (2008) (cf. Section 2.5). The account also
incorporates ideas from the literature on impersonal pronouns summarized in Section
2.2 (Chierchia 1995b; Condoravdi 1989; Malamud 2006, 2007; Moltmann 2006, 2010a),
and from the literature on impersonal uses of personal pronouns, notably Malamud
(2006, 2007) as presented in Section 2.3.
In Section 2.6, I discuss the problems and issues faced by the account presented in
Section 2.5.3. Many of these problems are connected to what I call the“(In)definiteness
Problem”, which arises as soon as one aims to give a unified account for the various,
distinct uses of personal and impersonal pronouns. Furthermore, I compare the account
proposed in this chapter (and its issues) to the account proposed in Malamud (2006).
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2.2 The semantics of impersonal pronouns
2.2.1 Syntactic and semantic properties of impersonal pro-
nouns
Traditionally, the class of pronouns is divided into seven subclasses: personal pronouns,
reflexive pronouns, reciprocal pronouns, possessive pronouns, demonstrative pronouns,
relative and interrogative pronouns, and indefinite pronouns.1 The German pronoun
man (Engl. ‘one’) and its counterparts in other languages are classified as indefinite
pronouns. The members of this class are assumed to share the semantic characteristic
of referring to an unspecific, possibly unknown entity or group of entities.2 In the
anglophone literature, indefinite pronouns are usually called “impersonal pronouns” or
“arbitrary pronouns”.3 In the recent literature, however, the classification of man as
an indefinite pronoun has been contested on the basis of its syntactic and semantic
behavior in its “existential use” (cf. Zifonun 2000 among others).
The aim for Section 2.2 is to give an overview of the literature on impersonal pro-
nouns. I first discuss their special syntactic and semantic behavior, and then turn to
previous proposals to capture their interpretation in the literature. In the last part,
the behavior of the problematic existential use of German man is compared to that
of other indefinite pronouns. Even though the focus of the discussion lies on German
man and English one, impersonal pronouns in other languages are also considered at
various points, i.e. Italian si and Spanish se.
A quick review of the literature on German man and English one already reveals that
crosslinguistically, impersonal pronouns do not behave uniformly. Relative to the range
of uses an impersonal pronouns allows, it falls into one of the following three classes.4
The first class is characterized by allowing only that basic impersonal interpretation,
as discussed in Section 1.2.2.5 The second class allows the basic impersonal use and
1In traditional German grammar, indefinite pronouns are called “Impersonalpronomen”.
2For German, the following pronouns are also put into the class of indefinite pronouns; note, that
their English translations are only rough equivalents: all, alle, allesamt, sämtlich (Engl. ‘all’), andere
(Engl. ‘others’), beide (Engl. ‘both’), einer (Engl. ‘one’), einige, etliche, mehrere (Engl. ‘several’), ein
bisschen, ein wenig (Engl. ‘a bit’), ein paar (Engl. ‘a couple/ a few’), irgendein, irgendwelche, etwas,
irgendetwas, irgendwas, was (Engl. ‘something’), irgendwer, jemand, irgendjemand, welche, wer (Engl.
‘someone’), jeder, jeglicher, jedermann (Engl. ‘everyone’), kein (Engl. ‘no’), manche (Engl. ‘some’),
mancher (Engl. ‘some people’), meinesgleichen (Engl. ‘the likes of me’), nichts (Engl. ‘nothing’),
niemand (Engl. ‘no one’). Some of these pronouns are also used as determiners, and are put into the
class of “quantificational determiners”.
3Note that the English term “impersonal pronoun” covers a much more restricted set of expres-
sions than the direct German translation “Impersonalpronomen”. I use “impersonal pronoun” in the
restricted English sense throughout this thesis.
4The different readings that are available for the impersonal pronouns of some languages are some-
times called the “quantificational variability of impersonal pronouns”. To avoid confusion, I want to
reserve the term “quantificational variability (effects)” for the phenomenon which was first described
in Lewis (1975), see the data discussion in Section 1.2.2 and 2.4.
5In the literature on impersonal pronouns, the basic impersonal use is usually called an impersonal
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an additional existential use. And the third class allows a referential use in addition
to the impersonal and existential uses. So given this classification, the impersonal use
immediately falls out as the basic use shared by all impersonal pronouns, i.e. their
common core.
English one falls into the first class of impersonal pronouns. In contrast, dialectal
variation across all three classes can be observed for German man (cf. Kratzer 1997;
Malamud 2007, 2012). The German examples used to illustrate the behavior of man
in this section are grammatical in a dialect for which man falls into the third class.6
As discussed in Section 1.2, the impersonal use of man and one occurs in sentences
that express rules, norms, or generalizations, and which need to be grouped among the



















(2) One does not use a sword to kill a snail. (Yoruba proverb)
The existential use occurs in sentences that report or describe a specific situation,
















‘Yesterday, someone stole my bike.’
The referential use of German man contrasts with the existential reading, in that
the individual referred to is not an arbitrary third person (i.e. ‘someone’). Instead,
referentially used man seems to have a similar denotation to the first person plural



















‘Yesterday, we first went for dinner and then to the movies.’
For impersonal pronouns with more than one possible reading, e.g. German man, the
split between the existential use, on the one hand, and the impersonal use, on the other
pronoun’s “generic” use. However, to maintain the parallel with the impersonal uses of personal
pronouns also regarding terminology, I do not adopt this name.
6There is a difference in the frequency of use between one and man. One seems to fall out of use,
and is replaced by impersonally used you. In contrast, man is still frequently used, and the impersonal
uses of the first and second person singular pronouns appear to be secondary options. For a clear
picture, however, detailed cross-linguistic corpus work is necessary, which is left for further research.
7Note that Zifonun (2000) presents examples for which she argues that man may be substituted
with personal pronouns other than first person plural wir. She suggests, however, that the referential
use of man is not an independent third reading, but that cases of referential uses constitute special
cases of both impersonal and existential uses.
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hand, depends on the episodic/generic distinction for statements. Episodic statements
describe specific events that are spatiotemporally fixed and involve specific, but possibly
unknown, (groups of) actors or participants. In contrast, impersonal pronouns that do
not have an existential use, e.g. English one, are ungrammatical in sentences expressing
episodic statements. Example (5) is the direct translation of German (3).8
(5) One stole my bike yesterday.
Unavailable: ‘Someone stole my bike yesterday.’
Given the truth-conditional equivalence of the impersonal uses of ich, du, and man
observed in Section 1.2, only the (morpho-)syntactic and semantic behavior of the
impersonal use is for now of special interest; the existential and referential uses are not
discussed in any further detail.
The morphosyntactic agreement patterns of man and one—in all of their uses—are
the same as for the third person singular pronouns in the respective languages: verbal
agreement is uncontroversally third person singular, see (2). For German man, which
can co-refer with and bind possessives, the agreement can be further narrowed down











‘One has to brush one’s teeth.’
Even though they share similar agreement patterns, German man and English one
differ in their lexical paradigms, and consequently in their restrictions regarding the
syntactic positions in which they may occur. German man only exists in nominative
form and is thus restricted exclusively to subject position. For accusative and dative
case, but not for genitive case, man has suppletive forms taken from the paradigm
of the indefinite pronoun einer (Engl. ‘one’, ‘someone’, see Zifonun 2000). English
one also preferably appears in subject position, but can additionally form a Saxon
genitive and a reflexive pronoun. In object positions, it is degraded, but no alternative
suppletive forms exist (Malamud 2006; Cabredo-Hofherr 2008).9
Notable syntactic and semantic properties of the impersonal use of impersonal pro-
8Note that English has at least one other lexical item one which can occur in episodic statements,
and which is used anaphorically to previously introduced noun phrases. In (i), one is anaphoric to
the modified noun phrase big apple.
(i) Mary ate a big apple and Peter a small one.
Generic one and anaphoric one historically developed from two distinct sources, and do not constitute
the same alternation as German generic and existential man (cf. Safir 2004).
9A small cross-linguistic comparison on syntactic restrictions: French on and Yiddish men have
only nominative forms and no suppletive paradigm, and can thus only occur in subject position. In
contrast,
Spanish uno also occurs with accusative case (Cabredo-Hofherr 2008).
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nouns are its puzzling co-reference and binding behavior, and the possibility for quan-
tificational variability effects with adverbs of quantification (cf. Section 1.2).10
The first observation is that cross-clausal co-reference is possible for two occurrences
of an impersonally interpreted impersonal pronoun, but never between an impersonal
pronoun and a third person pronoun. As (7) and (8) show, multiple occurrences of


















































b. Onei has to clean onei’s flat, or else he∗i/j can’t feel comfortable there.
This behavior parallels the referential behavior of first and second person singular
pronouns, which also cannot co-refer or bind different referential expressions (Malamud
2006, Moltmann 2006, Cabredo-Hofherr 2008, pace Safir 2004).
Note, that the presence of different indices on impersonally used impersonal pronouns
does not automatically mean that two disjoint sets of individuals are generalized about.
For instance, the sentences in (7) could be interpreted in such a way that the first
occurrence talks about flat owners and the second occurrence simply about individuals
in general. In this case, the set of flat owners is a subset of the set of individuals, and
the two sets are not disjoint.
In contrast, anaphoric impersonally used impersonal pronouns in subordinated clau-
ses are referentially dependent on other, co-occurring instances. In these cases, the
dependant occurrences behave either like bound or like E-type pronouns. Thus the
conditional rule expressed by a sentence like those in (9) holds for each individual in
the set of people generalized over, individually.11 Compare examples (7) and (8) with























b. If onei wants to feel comfortable there, onei/∗j has to clean onei/∗j’s flat .
10The following discussion of the co-reference and binding behavior of impersonal pronouns is based
on Cabredo-Hofherr (2004), Cabredo-Hofherr (2008), Creissels (2011), and Zifonun (2000).
11For an introduction to bound and E-type uses, see Section 1.5.2.
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Table 2.1 summarizes these results (adapted from Cabredo-Hofherr 2004, 2008).12
3msg subject 3msg direct object 3msg possessive impersonal
man impersonal no no yes yes
one impersonal no no no yes
Table 2.1: Material that can be anaphoric to man and one across clauses
The impersonal uses of German man and English one exhibit different inner-clausal
binding behavior. English one, in contrast to man, cannot bind reciprocals, third































b. Onei has to believe in oneselfi/*himselfi.
One possible explanation for this contrast is simply that one has specific forms based
for these three cases, which man lacks. Table 2.2 summarizes these results.
In sum, impersonal pronouns may have three uses: an impersonal use, an existential
use, and a referential use. Of these three uses, only the impersonal use is observed for
impersonal pronouns cross-linguistically. Regarding their syntactic behavior, imper-
sonal pronouns do not behave uniformly cross-linguistically. However, with respect to
12The co-reference possibilities between two existential uses of impersonal pronouns seem to be more
restricted than those between two impersonal uses. Creissels (2011) observes for French on that in the
existential reading, cross-sentential anaphoric relations between two occurrences of on are not always
possible. He suggests that anaphoric on is constrained to those cases for which the second sentence
elaborates on the first. He considers the contrast in (i)
(i) a. *Oni t’a appelé au téléphone; oni avait un accent allemand.
‘Someone called you; they had a German accent.’
b. Oni t’a appelé au téléphone; oni parlait avec un accent allemand.
‘Someone called you; they talked with a German accent.’
This is less strongly paralleled in German. While the second example is perfectly grammatical, the
first feels incoherent.
(ii) a. #Mani hat mich angerufen; mani hatte einen französischen Akzent.
‘Someone called me; they had a German accent.’
b. Mani hat mich angerufen; mani hat nach dir gefragt.
‘Someone called me; they asked about you.’
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3sg reflexives 3p reciprocals 3msg possessive impersonal
man impersonal yes yes yes yes
one impersonal no no no yes
Table 2.2: Material that may be anaphoric to man and one inside the same clause
their restrictions regarding co-reference and binding of different referential expressions,
they behave similarily to first and second person singular pronouns.
2.2.2 Previous semantic analyses of impersonal pronouns
So far, the results in this section regarding the (morpho-)syntactic and semantic prop-
erties of one and man seem to be inconclusive regarding their semantic contribution.
The co-reference and binding behavior together with the morphosyntactic agreement
patterns suggest that man and one are similar to personal pronouns on some level.
And as discussed in Chapter 1, personal pronouns are traditionally analyzed as def-
inite expressions, i.e. as either directly referential expressions or definite descriptions
(this of course does not take into account the impersonal uses). In contrast, the avail-
ability of quantificational variability effects and the existence of an existential use for
man point towards a similarity with indefinite noun phrases; both observations would
be unexpected if impersonal pronouns were referential expressions (i.e. definites).
In the literature, the semantic contribution of impersonal pronouns has been related
to the notion of “arbitrary reference”. This is based on the intuition that impersonal
pronouns do not denote specific (groups of) individuals: in their impersonal use, they
seem to refer to an arbitrary individual while in their existential use, they seem to
denote an unspecific individual (Cabredo-Hofherr 2004, 2008; Cinque 1988; Zifonun
2000).
In accordance with the inconclusiveness regarding their (in)definiteness, there is no
consensus on how impersonal pronouns are best modelled formally.13 The majority
of the analyses put forth in the literature model impersonal pronouns after indefinite
noun phrases (Condoravdi 1989; Chierchia 1995b; Alonso-Ovalle 2000, 2002; Malamud
2006; Moltmann 2006, 2010a). However, two exceptions are Kratzer (1997) and Safir
(2004) who both propose an analysis as definites for man and one, respectively.
One type of indefinite account is proposed in Condoravdi (1989), Malamud (2006),
and Moltmann (2006), who investigate the semantic behavior of English one. Con-
doravdi (1989) argues that one is an inherently generic expression which introduces a
variable that is bound by a generic operator at sentence level. That is, the impersonal
13To capture the inconclusive behavior of impersonal pronouns, König and Mauner (1999) introduce
a third type of noun phrase which they call “a-definites”. A-definites behave like indefinites, but do
not introduce new discourse referents. König and Mauner’s analysis is motivated by a connection
between impersonal pronouns and implicit arguments in passives.
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pronoun one acts like a Heimian indefinite (cf. Heim 1988 [1982]). A similar idea is
put forth in Moltmann (2006) and Malamud (2006). A simplified representation of the
truth-conditions for (13-a) based on these accounts is given in (13-b).
(13) a. One respects others’ rights.
b. Gen x[respects-other’s-rights(x)]
Note that the generic operator has scope over the entire sentence, which means that it
can bind potentially more than one individual variable contributed by different occur-
rences of one. The result is, as intended, quasi-universal quantification over individuals.
To capture the quantificational variability effects, it has to be assumed that the free
variable contributed by one can alternatively be bound by an adverb of quantification
instead of the generic operator, see (14).14
(14) a. One usually respects others’ rights.
b. Usual x[respects-other’s-rights(x)]
Since one does not allow for an existential reading, it needs to be explicitly excluded
that the individual variable contributed by one can be bound by an existential quanti-
fier. For man, on the other hand, existential quantification is an option in episodic sen-
tences. This can be modelled by assuming existential closure at the verb phrase level
(cf. Diesing 1992), which introduces an existential quantifier over individuals which
binds the variable contributed by the impersonal pronoun. Existential closure can
be seen as a last resort startegy if no generic operator or adverb of quantification is
present, i.e. in case the sentence expresses an episodic statement. The formalization of













‘Someone stole my bike.’
b. ∃x[stole-my-bike(x)]
Chierchia (1995b) and Alonso-Ovalle (2000, 2002) choose a slightly different route for
Italian and Spanish, respectively. Chierchia (1995b) analyzes Italian si as an operator
on one-place predicates. The function of the operator is to existentially bind a sortally
restricted variable carrying a distinguished index arb that is taken as an argument by
the one-place predicate, see (16). Note that this predicts that the basic reading of si
is its existential reading available in episodic sentences.
(16) SI(P ) = ∃xarb[P (xarb)]
where P is a one-place predicate, and xarb is sortally restricted to humans
14The notation in (14) is taken from Heim (1988 [1982]).
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For the generic operator, Chierchia adopts an account in the framework of situation
semantics .15 He assumes that the generic operator only binds situation variables, which
means that xarb remains existentially bound in its generic use. The perceived quasi-
universal quantification over individuals is the result of quantification over situations,
and is captured by closely restricting the domain of situations (cf. Chierchia 1995b;
von Fintel 2004/1995).
Chierchia’s analysis of quantificational variability effects also differs from the one
above. He assumes that in contrast to the generic operator, adverbs of quantification
may quantify over individuals. Hence, in the case of quantificational variability effects,
the adverbs can force existential disclosure of the sortally restricted variable that is
bound afterwards (cf. Dekker 1993). Unfortunately it is not addressed why this is not
an option for the generic operator, as well.
Alonso-Ovalle (2000, 2002) adopts Chierchia’s account for the Spanish impersonal
pronoun se, but assumes that the generic operator quantifies over both individuals
and situations. That is like adverbs of quantification, the generic operator triggers
existential disclosure of the sortally restricted variable before binding it.
In sum, the “indefinite accounts” in Condoravdi (1989), Malamud (2006), Moltmann
(2006), Chierchia (1995b), and Alonso-Ovalle (2000, 2002) are able to derive the generic
and the existential use of German man. For English one, all accounts need to be
restricted explicitly to keep them from predicting an existential use for one, as well.
Alternatively, the generic operator could be hard-wired into the lexical entry for one.
Chierchia’s (1995b) assumption that impersonal pronouns introduce an existentially
bound variable by default predicts that the existential use is the default use. This is
problematic since the default use should be the impersonal use, which was identified
in the previous section as the cross-linguistic common core of impersonal pronouns.
Furthermore for English one, Chierchia would have to assume that the existential
quantifier introduced by the operator SI is always removed by existential disclosure,
i.e. that the lexical entry for one never occurs in its unmodified form.
The indefinite accounts discussed above contrast with the accounts in Kratzer (1997)
and Safir (2004). Kratzer and Safir take a different point of view on the data, and
conclude that English one and German man, respectively, should be analyzed as definite
expressions.
Safir (2004) observes that English one has a peculiar connection to the discourse
context. Two discourse participants can contradict one another using one, as in (17).
For A to contradict B is only possible, he argues, if the referent of one is the same in
both utterances.16
15Chierchia (1995b) adopts the view on situations as parts of possible worlds proposed in Kratzer
(1989).
16Since Safir assumes that one is a definite, i.e. a referential, expression, he assumes that it con-
tributes a particular referent to the truth-conditions of a sentence.
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(17) A: One should be kind.
B: One should not be kind.
(Safir 2004:1)
However, the referent of one seems to change relative to the discourse context—
specifically, relative to the current participants. That is, the contribution of A’s use of
one in (17) in some sense differs from the contribution of B’s use of one because of the
change of speaker. Based on this observation, Safir proposes that it is the participants
in the discourse that provide a pool of individuals that is used to compute the referent
of one. This is illustrated in Safir’s discussion of (18).
Scenario: At an interstellar conference, a Martian addresses other extra-terrestrials.
(18) Fortunately, one is not susceptible to human disease.
In this context, the utterance is fine, Safir argues, since property “not being susceptible
to human disease” applies to the majority of the Martian’s audience. If used in a
context in which the Martian addresses only humans, however, the utterance in (18)
has an exclusionary flavor to it. Safir suggests that this is the case because with the
use of one, the Martian communicates that he does not consider humans, who are
susceptible to human disease, to have an effect on his contextual assumptions about
the referent of one.
Safir concludes that one involves constancy of reference with respect to utterance
contexts parallel to the constancy of reference observable with indexicals, e.g. first
person singular I always refers to the same person as long as the utterance context
is held constant. However unlike indexicals, English one always expresses genericity,
and never occurs in episodic statements. Hence, Safir proposes that one involves two
meaning components, an indexical component and a generic component, which interact
to determine the referent of one, see (19).
(19) English impersonal one contributes “the individual who is the hypothetical
typical exemplar of a set salient to, and inclusive of, those that its indexical
restriction requires, namely, the conversational participants in context c”.
(Safir 2004:11)
Based on (19), Safir proposes to treat one formally as a definite description.17 Note,
however, that even though actual conversational participants are used as models, one
does not refer to a particular actual individual, but to a possibly non-existent individual
17Safir (2004) does not work out the formal proposal in detail. In the appendix, he sketches a
formalization for the meaning of one which, however, does not correspond to the analysis of one for-
mulated in (19). In the formalization one is given a standard semantics for third person pronouns (cf.
Chapter 1), and the indexical component and the genericity component are added as presuppositions
on possible values assigned by the variable assignment.
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who possesses all of the contextually relevant properties. The only restriction on this
combination of relevant properties is that it can in principle be found with an actual
individual.
Safir also argues against indefinite accounts as proposed above. He claims that such
an account cannot capture the data, specifically the constancy of reference across sen-
tences. To model constancy of reference in an operator-variable account, the generic op-
erator that binds all variables contributed by pronouns occurring in different sentences
needs to be a discourse operator. However, if binding is determined by c-command,
discourse operators of this kind cannot exist, and constancy of reference cannot be cap-
tured. He further argues that impersonally used one cannot be treated as contributing
an unselectively bound variable as proposed by Heim (1988 [1982]) since impersonally
used one always requires the presence of a generic operator. If one were to only con-
tribute a variable, it could not be ensured that the variable would be bound by the
generic operator.
Safir backs up his argumentation by showing that one cannot occur in existential-
there sentences.18 He gives the example in (20).
(20) She always knew that there would be one waiting in the wings.
(Safir 2004:6)
He argues that one in (20) can only be understood as the unrelated, existential one.
I agree with Safir (2004) that operator-variable accounts that analyze one as a
Heimian indefinite (Condoravdi 1989, Moltmann 2006) need to explain why the vari-
able contributed by the pronoun is never bound by existential closure. That is, why one
always occurs in generic sentences or together with an adverb of quantification. This is
an issue that needs to be addressed. However, I do not accept Safir’s criticism that an
operator-variable account cannot capture his perceived “constancy of reference”. The
generic operator has no influence on the set of individuals for which the generalization
is stated. It only contributes quasi-universal quantification. The properties that de-
termine the set of individuals depend on the descriptive content of the indefinite noun
phrase that contributes the bound individual variable and on its modifiers (cf. Krifka
et al. 1995; Drewery 1998; Greenberg 2007).19
The main problem with Safir’s (2004) proposal, in my opinion, is the way in which
18The possibility to occur in the post-copula position in extistential-there sentences is a tradi-
tional indefiniteness test. Malamud (2006) argues that existential-there sentences are not sensitive to
(in)definiteness, but discourse function. I do not review her argument here. For a short discussion on
existential-there sentences as a definiteness test see Section 2.4.
19In Drewery (1998) and Greenberg (2007), quasi-universal quantification is modelled in two parts.
First, the set of individuals denoted by the indefinite noun phrase is restricted to the non-exceptional
individuals in this set. And second, a universal quantifier quantifying over the restricted set is intro-
duced. So in some sense, the generic operator has an effect on the set of individuals. However, the
generic operator may never remove or add properties.
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the referent of generic one is related to the participants in the discourse, though. By
treating the set of conversational participants as the pool from which the referent of
one is computed, the analysis runs into the following two problems.
First, it should be impossible for a speaker to use one twice in the same sentence with
different referents. As shown in the previous section for co-ordinated clauses, though,
two occurrences of one do not have to “co-refer”, see (21) (repeated from above).
(21) Onei has to clean onei’s flat, or else onei/j can’t feel comfortable there.
A possible answer that Safir could give to this observation is to say that the salient
set containing the conversational participants can change with each occurrence of one.
But this would mean that he cannot ensure constancy of reference across a discourse
any more, which he needs to account for two participants contradicting each other with
sentences containing generic one.
Second, as Safir himself notes, an exclusionary effect can be observed when a speaker
states a generalization using one that does not apply to one or more discourse partic-
ipants. This effect is not predicted by Safir’s proposal since the typical individual is
computed from a set that contains all discourse participants. If the average individual
is computed from all participants, all participants should at least share some of the
relevant properties assigned to the average individual, and the generalization should
apply to them. Consequently, it should not be possible to state a sentence containing
one that has an exclusionary effect with respect to a discourse participant.
A possible way around this conclusion is also given in Safir (2004). While discussing
the exclusionary effect, Safir states that in these cases, the “contextual assumptions
about the typical conversational participant” are not shared by all participants (Safir
2004:4). The speaker (intentionally or unintentionally) assumes different common prop-
erties shared by himself, his addressees, and other salient individuals, and therefore,
his generalization fails to cover all participants. While this is a valid point, the use
of speaker assumptions, or similarily speaker intentions, suggests a different analysis
than the proposal Safir puts forth in the end, i.e. one where the participants and their
actual properties do not play a central role.
In a similar vein to Safir (2004), Kratzer (1997) proposes to treat German man as a
definite expression. She looks at data from the type of German dialect that allows for an
impersonal, an existential, and a referential use of man (cf. Section 2.2.1). However, she
uses a different classification for the data, and distinguishes only between inclusive and
exclusive readings of man, which are determined relative to the speaker: In the exclusive
reading, man denotes a group that excludes the speaker. In the inclusive reading, it
denotes a group that either contains the speaker, or that the speaker sympathizes
with.20 This distinction has grammatical impact:
20The following correspondence between Kratzer’s classification and the one proposed in Section
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First, in the exclusive reading, the suppletive forms of einer are unavailable. For












































‘Yesterday, we then again watched a 3D movie. As an exception, they already
gave us the glasses at the ticket counter yesterday.’























Intended: ‘As guardians of the law, they explained to me that I couldn’t live
here.’ (exclusive/existential)
(Kratzer 1997:4)





































Intended: ‘When they put on their glasses, we got frightened.’
(Kratzer 1997:5) (exclusive/existential)
Working with a feature-based account of pronominal meaning, Kratzer concludes from
these observations that German man is ambiguous between two feature specifications.
Both the exclusive and inclusive interpretations are built up from regular φ-features
and three additional building blocks: MAN, IN, and EX. The latter are interpreted as
2.2.1 can be made: The existential use of man results in exclusive, and the indexical use in inclusive
readings. The interpretation of the impersonal uses may fall in either category, but the default case
seems to be an inclusive reading.
21Kratzer (1997) calls them “predicative NPs”.
22Cf. Cabredo-Hofherr (2008) for a discussion of the inner-sentential co-reference and binding be-
havior of the existential use of man.
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in (26) with the “group of” and “anti-group of” predicates in the denotation of IN and
EX being treated as primitive, atomic concepts.
(26) a. JMANKg,w,c = the speaker in context c
b. JINKg,w,c(x) = the group of x in world w
c. JEXKg,w,c(x) = the anti-group of x in world w
(Kratzer 1997:6)
Regarding the treatment of φ-features, Kratzer (1997) does not make any explicit
assumptions. However, the φ-features attributable to man do not seem to make a
semantic contribution, but seem to be needed for the observed agreement patterns
only.
Inclusive man is built up from the morphosyntactic features [3rd], [sg], [masc], and
two building blocks IN, and MAN, see (27).
(27) Inclusive man refers to the group of the speaker in context c in world w
Exclusive man is built up from [3rd], [sg], EX, and MAN, see (28).
(28) Exclusive man refers to the anti-group of the speaker in context c in world w
Given this formalization, both inclusive and exclusive man are analyzed as definite
descriptions that are undetermined with respect to semantic number. Kratzer supports
this analysis with a definiteness test. She uses the German counterpart of English
































23Egerland (2003) argues that the ungrammaticality of (29) is not a result of the definiteness of
man, but follows from man’s status as a weak pronoun. Weak pronouns in general cannot occur in
low positions in the syntactic structure.
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The definite account proposed by Kratzer differs from Safir’s account in one central
respect. In both accounts, the impersonal pronoun has a context dependent component
which is used to determine the referent of the pronoun. However, Safir hardwires
genericity into the meaning of one while Kratzer never explicitly discusses the generic
use of man.
The central problematic point for Kratzer’s proposal is that the impersonal use
of man cannot be modelled straightforwardly. Since Kratzer does not discuss the
impersonal use, I assume that it is inclusive; although the following argument does
not depend on this choice. Furthermore, I assume that genericity is modelled with a
modal generic operator as proposed in Krifka et al. (1995), which can bind individual,
situation, and world variables. Given these assumptions and Kratzer’s proposal for
inclusive man, the only variable that can be bound by the generic operator is the
world variable, see (27) above. Hence the only possibility to induce quasi-universal
quantification over groups of individuals is by universal quantification over accessible











‘One respects the rights of others.’
b. Gen w′ [respects-the-rights-of-others(the group of the speaker in c)(w′)]
If Gen is interpreted as a universal quantifier over relevantly normal worlds (cf. Krifka
et al. 1995), the formal analysis can be further elaborated as in (33).
(33) In all relevantly normal worlds w′, the group of the speaker (in c) in world w′
respects the rights of others.
As mentioned above, Kratzer treats the“group of”predicate as an unanalyzed primitive
predicate. But to judge the predictive power of the account, further assumptions about
the individuals denoted by the predicate need to be made. Specifically, it has to be
determined which plurality of individuals the description “the group of the speaker (in
c) in w′” needs to refer to for the generic reading of man to be captured adequately.
One intuition about generic sentences, and thus sentences containing impersonal
pronouns, is that they talk about typical or normal individuals. Hence, the “group
of” predicate could depend on the speaker’s assumptions regarding normal or typical
individuals (cf. Safir 2004): If the speaker counts himself among the normal individuals
in the actual world, and wants to state that these people respect the rights of others,
the group of the speaker in the actual world could be assumed to be the group of
typical or normal individuals. This has to be true in all accessible worlds, though.
The group of the speaker in the accessible worlds also needs to be the group of normal
individuals with respect to the speaker’s assumptions in the actual world, but these
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groups are not the same as the group of the speaker in the actual world. However, it
is not enough to keep the group of the speaker constant for all accessible worlds since,
in that case, the generic sentence would “only” express a property of a specific group.
That is, the formalization would predict that man does not generalize over normal or
typical individuals, but over an arbitrary group that the speaker belongs to, and man
would essentially be indistinguishable from the first person plural pronoun wir (Engl.


































‘In Germany, we talk on the phone with our parents every day.’
The example in (34-a) expresses a rule for “normal individuals” regarding phone calls
with one’s parents. In contrast, the example in (34-b) can only be read as a rule for a
certain plurality containing the speaker.
Hence, it seems that the “group of” predicate needs to ensure that man does not be-
have like a first person plural pronoun in generic sentences. That is, for each accessible
world w′, the “group of” predicate needs to pick the group of normal individuals in w′.
This means, however, that part of the generic meaning of the impersonal use needs to
be built into the meaning of the impersonal pronoun. This predicts that inclusive man
always picks the group of normal individuals containing the speaker in c for a given
world, independently of the impersonal use. This, in turn, makes false predictions for
the existential and the referential uses, which are not restricted to statements about
normal or typical individuals. For instance, example (35-a) states that someone, but
not necessarily an “abnormal” or untypical individual (it is an exclusive use), stole
the speaker’s bike. Similarly, (35-b) states that a plurality of individuals including
the speaker, but not necessarily a plurality of normal or typical individuals (it is an


































‘After doing our homework, we were allowed to play with the dog yester-
day.’
One final remark has to be made about the observations that point toward a definite
Chapter 2. Ich and du – a first try 99
analysis of impersonal pronouns that were metioned at the beginning of this section
(i.e. the parallels between the morphosyntactic behavior of first and second person
pronouns and impersonal pronouns). As far as I can tell at this point, one can only
conclude from these parallels that impersonal pronouns, like first and second person
pronouns, are no true pro-forms. And even though it was shown in Section 1.2 that the
impersonal uses of first and second person singular pronouns and impersonal pronouns
are truth-conditionally equivalent, this equivalence does not extend to the other uses
of these pronouns. To point out the obvious: first and second person singular pronouns
do not have an existential use. So in sum—and also to avoid circularity in the subse-
quent argumentation—similarities in the morphosyntactic behavior of first and second
person pronouns and impersonal pronouns do not constitute compelling evidence for
an analysis of these pronouns as definite expressions.
The issue of (in)definiteness is taken up in Section 2.4 on a conceptual level. In the
following section, parallels and differences between impersonal pronouns and existential
indefinite pronouns are discussed in light of an analysis of impersonal pronouns as
indefinite expressions.
2.2.3 Impersonal pronouns and existential indefinite pronouns
In this section, further evidence for or against an “indefinite account” for impersonal
pronouns—specifically German man—is explored. I review two discussions from the
literature that concern comparisons between impersonal pronouns and other indefinite
expressions (Zifonun 2000; Cabredo-Hofherr 2008). The first comparison is between the
existential use of man and the German indefinite pronoun jemand (Engl. ‘someone’),
the second is between the impersonal use of man and indefinite noun phrases in generic
sentences.
One central characteristic property of the existential use of man is its non-specificity
of reference. This property has also been attributed to other pronouns in the class of in-
definite pronouns, e.g. jemand (Engl. ‘someone’). One advantage of a direct comparison
of man and jemand is that it might help to determine the plausibility of an indefinite
account for man since the analysis of jemand as an indefinite expression is uncontro-
versial. However, Zifonun (2000) and Cabredo-Hofherr (2008) show that impersonal
pronouns are different from existential indefinite pronouns24 in at least three respects:
(i) they have different scopal behavior, (ii) they differ regarding the availability of a
generic reading, and (iii) they allow different pronominal anaphors.
Regarding the first point, existentially used man does not interact scopally with
24Zifonun (2000) talks about “Indefinitpronomen”, which are a subclass of “Impersonalpronomen”.
Here the discrepancy between English and German terminology continues: “Indefinitpronomen” (lit.
“indefinite pronouns”) are those indefinite pronouns that are traditionally analyzed as indefinite ex-
pressions, i.e. as involving existential quantification.
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adverbs of quantification, negation, and coordination; it is invariably interpreted in the
scope of these operators. In contrast, jemand shows the scope alternations that are
usually found with quantified expressions, as well as the bias found in German for the

































‘For someone it is the case that he already told me often that . . . ’ (∃>often)
(Zifonun 2000:245)
In the first sentence of (36), jemand is naturally interpreted in the scope of oft (Engl.
‘often’). In the second sentence, the preferred scope order is reversed. In contrast, the

































‘It happened often already that someone told me that . . . ’ (often>∃)
(Zifonun 2000:245)
Both sentences in (37) have the preferred interpretation where man is interpreted in
the scope of oft (Engl. ‘often’).
Similarly, the existential use of man always has low scope with respect to sentential

















‘No one broke into our place last week.’ (¬>∃)
(Zifonun 2000:246)
Note that the use of jemand with overt negation is marked because the alternative
expression niemand (Engl. ‘no one’) is available. Nevertheless, it can be observed that
jemand is naturally interpreted as scoping above sentential negation. The sentence
in (39) shows the same surface order as example (38), but jemand has high scope (in
accordance with the surface scope bias).

















‘Someone did not break into our place last week.’ (∃>¬)
Man and jemand also behave differently in coordinated clauses. Example (40) may be
understood as saying that the person breaking into the speaker’s place was the one who
took the spoons. In contrast, example (41) unambiguously states that different people



















































‘Someone broke into my place, and someone stole silver spoons in the process.’
(Zifonun 2000:245)
The second major difference between man and jemand is the availability of a generic
interpretation for man, but not for jemand. In Section 2.2.1, the impersonal use of
impersonal pronouns was identified as their cross-linguistic common core, and based
on its frequency in corpora, Zifonun (2000) argues quite convincingly that it is also the
primary use of man. The existential indefinite pronoun jemand, in contrast, cannot
be interpreted generically. It is interpreted existentially without exception, and even




























‘Someone usually/ at the moment doesn’t eat with his hands.’
(Cabredo-Hofherr 2008:39)
Note, that while jemand and man seem to contribute the same content when they are
in the antecedent of a conditional with generic flavor—cf. examples (44) and (45)—the
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unavailability of a generic reading in non-conditional sentences is good evidence that
jemand cannot be bound by a generic operator directly.
The third point in which man and jemand differ is the set of possible anaphoric
elements. As discussed in Section 2.2.1, man only allows other occurrences of man as
anaphors. The only anaphors that are possible for jemand, on the other hand, are third







































variable scope generic interpretation anaphors
man no yes only impersonal
jemand yes no only 3rd person pronouns
Table 2.3: Results of the comparison between man and jemand
The differences between man and jemand again suggest that man behaves more
like a personal pronoun in its co-reference and binding behavior than like a quantified
expression. From this, Zifonun (2000) concludes that man should not be analyzed as
an existential indefinite pronoun. She proposes two alternative routes: either (i) man
belongs to the class of personal pronouns, or (ii) man receives a special status between
indefinite pronouns and personal pronouns.
Cabredo-Hofherr (2008) takes up Zifonun’s discussion, and investigates whether the
behavior of man is mirrored by its counterparts in other languages, e.g. French on
and Yiddish men. She observes that the differences between impersonal pronouns
and existential indefinite pronouns seem to be cross-linguistically stable. Based on
this observation, she argues for a special semantic status for impersonal pronouns,
i.e. König and Mauner’s (1999) analysis of man as an “a-definite” (cf. Footnote 12 in
Section 2.2.2).
So far, the data discussed in this section suggests that impersonal pronouns are not
indefinite expressions. Should the discussion of the semantic accounts and its conclusion
in the previous section be rethought then? Perhaps impersonal pronouns are indeed
definite expressions?
Before the results of the previous section are questioned, the core impersonal use
of impersonal pronouns should be compared to the behavior of other noun phrases in
generic sentences.
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Three types of noun phrases receive a “special” interpretation in generic sentences
(Krifka et al. 1995).25 Bare plural noun phrases are either interpreted as kind-denoting
or as quasi-universally quantified:
(46) a. Dodos are extinct. (kind-denoting)
b. Dogs have four legs. (quasi-universally quantified)
Indefinite singular noun phrases only allow for a quasi-universally quantified reading,
and definite noun phrases only for a kind reading:
(47) a. A dog has four legs. (quasi-universally quantified)
b. The dodo is extinct. (kind-denoting)
Zifonun (2000) observes that impersonally used man only occurs quasi-universally
quantified, i.e. even though impersonal pronouns in their impersonal use are constrained
to animate individuals (cf. Section 1.2.2), they can never denote the kind “animate in-











Unavailable: ‘Dodos are extinct.’
Regardless of Zifonun’s observation, the impersonal use of man and its behavior are still
compatible with an underlying semantics parallel to that of bare plurals, in addition













Available: ‘Dogs have four legs.’ / ‘A dog has four legs.’
The unavailability of a kind reading only excludes the possibility that impersonally used
man is interpreted either like a bare plural (in one use) or like a definite noun phrase.
However, some researchers take the differences between impersonal pronouns and exis-
tential indefinite pronouns and the unavailability of a kind reading as evidence against
analyzing impersonal pronouns as indefinite expressions (cf. Zifonun 2000; Cabredo-
Hofherr 2008). I believe that this conclusion is not warranted. I agree with one point
only: impersonal pronouns should not be analyzed exactly like existential indefinite
pronouns or indefinite noun phrases. The comparisons reviewed above provide ample
evidence against a common semantic analysis. Still, the evidence is not enough to
discard an analysis of man as an indefinite expression of some sort. This is supported
by at least three reasons.
First, the two definite analyses proposed in Kratzer (1997) and Safir (2004) run into
25The following discussion ignores taxonomic kind-readings found with singular indefinite noun
phrases, bare plurals, and definite plural noun phrases. Cf. Krifka et al. (1995).
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serious conceptual problems (cf. Section 2.2.2). Second, the arguments presented in
Kratzer (1997) and Safir (2004) to treat impersonal pronouns as definite expressions
are not uncontroversial. In Section 2.4, I address the problematic nature of definiteness
tests, and the general categories of definiteness and indefiniteness. And third, Zifonun
(2000) and Cabredo-Hofherr (2008) both in fact argue for a special status of impersonal
pronouns with respect to personal pronouns and indefinite pronouns. If this is on
the right track, it cannot be concluded that impersonal pronouns are not indefinite
expressions, after all.26
To complete the three-way comparison in this section: existential indefinite pronouns
in fact also differ from indefinite noun phrases regarding the availability of quantifica-
tional variability effects with adverbs of quantification, and regarding the availability
of a generic interpretation. Quantificational variability effects are simply impossible




































Available: ‘Back then, someone usually did not get older than 60.’
Unavailable: ‘Back then, most people did not get older than 60.’
It is perhaps polemic to ask at this point—given these observations—which of the two
expressions, existential indefinite pronouns or indefinite noun phrases, should lose their
status as an indefinite expression. What this is supposed to show, however, is that the
class of indefinite expressions may not be semantically uniform.
Before I return to the question of definiteness and indefiniteness in Section 2.4,
though, I first review two previous formal analyses for impersonally interpreted personal
pronouns in Section 2.3.
2.3 Impersonally interpreted personal pronouns
2.3.1 The relevant semantic properties and their consequences
The aim of this section is to set the stage for the unified analysis for ich and du proposed
in Section 2.5.3. In this first subsection, I summarize the empirical observations made
for English and German impersonally used personal pronouns from Chapter 1. At
some points, new observations regarding the link between the impersonal readings
and impersonal pronouns are added. In the following subsections, I review the formal
proposals for the semantics of impersonally used second person singular pronouns put
26Cf. Malamud (2006:117) for a similar conclusion.
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forth in Malamud (2006, 2007) and Alonso-Ovalle (2000, 2002), and identify their
respective shortcomings.
The relevant characteristics of ich and du/you—in all of their uses—were discussed
at length in Chapter 1. Since the following review lacks empirical depth, I ask the
interested reader to consult the detailed discussions in Sections 1.2–1.5.
The central semantic characteristic of the impersonal uses of personal and imper-
sonal pronouns in German and English is their truth-conditional equivalence. This is
supported by the fact that impersonal uses may be substituted for each other salva
veritate. Crucially, however, this truth-conditional equivalence only holds in the im-
personal uses. First and second person singular pronouns vary between an impersonal
and a referential use, but do not have an existential use corresponding to the exis-
tential use found with some impersonal pronouns.27 In contrast, impersonal pronouns
cross-linguistically rarely have a referential use.
Two considerations add further support to the conclusion that impersonally inter-
preted personal pronouns and impersonal pronouns are truth-conditionally equivalent.
First, as shown in Section 1.2.2, it is possible to switch between different pronominal
forms in the impersonal use. And second, similar co-reference and binding behavior
was observed for impersonally used personal and impersonal pronouns in Section 2.2.28
Table 2.4 summarizes these parallels.29
co-reference reflexives possessives
first singular pronoun 1st sg 1st sg 1st sg
second singular pronoun 2nd sg 2nd sg 2nd sg
impersonal pronoun impersonal
man: 3rd sg man: 3rd sg
one: oneself one: one
Table 2.4: Comparison: morphosyntactic make-up of anaphoric material
The second central observation was that on the surface, impersonally interpreted
personal pronouns are morphosyntactically indistinguishable from their referentially
used variants. This means that examples illustrating the impersonal uses of personal
pronouns usually have a reading in which the pronouns are used referentially. However,
there are three striking differences between the impersonal use and the referential use
of personal pronuns: (i) the context-independent behavior of the impersonal uses in
indirect speech, (ii) the possibility to mix pronominal forms in the impersonal use, and
27Vague uses in the sense of Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990)—if they are indeed indefinite in nature—are
restricted to plural personal pronouns.
28Results from the syntax-semantic interface literature on personal pronouns suggest that the mor-
phosyntactic make up and the agreement, reference, and binding behavior are tightly connected with
the meaning of personal pronouns. Cf. Kratzer (2009).
29For the split in the row for impersonal pronouns see Section 2.2.1.
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(iii) the availability of quantificational variability effects, which further connects the
impersonal uses of personal pronouns with impersonal pronouns (cf. Section 2.2).
Concerning syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic restrictions, the impersonal use of
impersonal pronouns is less restricted than the impersonal use of first and second
person singular pronouns. For German, a hierarchy regarding restrictiveness may be
given: ich > du > man. In non-episodic sentences, man and its suppletive forms
can be used generically without any syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic restrictions. In
contrast, the impersonal uses of ich and du are sensitive with respect to various co-
occurring lexical material (cf. Section 1.3). For all impersonal uses, however, it is a
necessary condition that the sentence expresses a non-episodic statement. Some co-
occuring material may block an impersonal interpretation by suggesting an episodic
interpretation for the sentence.
The main difference between the impersonal uses can be found on the pragmatic level.
Impersonally used personal and impersonal pronouns differ from indefinite noun phrases
in generic sentences and from each other in their pragmatic effects. The impersonal use
of second person singular pronouns aims to build closeness between the speaker and
the addressee by inviting the addressee to empathize with the individuals generalized
over. In contrast, the impersonal use of German first person singular ich is used by
the speaker to distance herself from other individuals in the context. It communicates
that somebody other than the speaker may not share the speaker’s opinion regarding
the validity of the generalization that is expressed. With respect to these participant-
oriented effects, the impersonal uses of man and one are neutral.
In sum, semantic accounts need to capture at least the following central properties
of the different impersonal uses:
• their truth-conditional equivalence
• the restriction to generic sentences
• the availability of quantificational variability effects
Note that it is unclear at this point how to account for the pragmatic effects of the
impersonal uses—they may or may not need to be captured by a semantic account (but
cf. the discussion in Chapter 4).
Given the many similarities between impersonally used personal and impersonal
pronouns, it seems promising to adopt a semantic account which adequately captures
the meaning of impersonal pronouns. Of the two analyses that will be discussed in the
following subsections—Malamud (2006, 2007) for English you and in Alonso-Ovalle
(2000, 2002) for Spanish second person singular—Malamud takes this observation as
her starting point, and proposes a unified indefinite account. Notably, Alonso-Ovalle
(2000, 2002) agrees with Malamud that a unified account should be given for all of the
uses of personal pronouns. In contrast to Malamud, however, he argues against the
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assumption that impersonally used personal pronouns should be analyzed as indefinite
expressions, specifically as Heimian indefinites (cf. Heim 1988 [1982]). He presents the
following five—already familiar—arguments.
1. Not all pronouns that have an impersonal use also have an existential use. This
is predicted to be the case by an analysis of personal (and impersonal) pronouns
as Heimian indefinites since existential closure should apply in those cases where
no other operator binds the variable.
2. Quantificational variability effects do not arise in all cases in which a pronoun
with an impersonal use co-occurs with an adverb of quantification.
3. Most of the time an impersonal interpretation is dispreferred if no explicit re-
strictive expression, like a spatio-temporal adverbial, co-occurs in the sentence.
4. In the existential uses, impersonally used impersonal pronouns do not behave like
ordinary indefinites since they never take wide scope.
5. All pronouns that have an impersonal use do not show the regular anaphoric
patterns found with ordinary indefinites.
All of Alonso-Ovalle’s arguments are valid observations on the behavior of impersonal
uses found with both impersonal and personal pronouns, but as argued in Section 2.2
for impersonal pronouns, these observations do not provide conclusive evidence against
an analysis of the impersonal uses as Heimian indefinites. They might become prob-
lematic, however, as soon as a unified account for all of the uses of personal pronouns
is aimed at. The resulting problems are again connected to considerations regarding
(in)definiteness (cf. Section 2.4).
If a non-unified account for the referential uses, on the one hand, and the impersonal
uses, on the other hand, turns out to be the only option, what is the connection between
the two uses? Malamud (2006) argues that the referential use and the impersonal use
of English you are not the result of lexical ambiguity. Her first argument is that the
impersonal use found with second person you is not a lexical accident exclusively found
in English. For many among the European languages, an impersonal use for second
person singular pronouns is available: an impersonal use is attested for e.g. German,
English, Dutch, Italian, French, Spanish, and Swedish (cf. Alonso-Ovalle 2000, Bennis
2004, Chierchia 1995b, Malamud 2006, Egerland 2003, Cabredo-Hofherr 2004). Mala-
mud’s second argument is that the empathy tracking effects observed for the impersonal
uses point toward a connection between the referential use and the impersonal use. If
the two uses were associated with distinct lexical items, this connection would be un-
expected. And lastly, as Alonso-Ovalle observed, as well, personal pronouns that have
an impersonal use do not automatically also have an existential use. If the impersonal
use were expressed by a distinct lexical item that is similar to an impersonal pronoun,
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an existential interpretation could be expected to arise in episodic sentences—as is the
case e.g. for German man.
While Malamud’s last argument is not particularly strong for English given that one
also does not have an existential use, the systematic availability of impersonal uses
for second person singular and sometimes also first person singular pronouns is, in
my opinion, a compelling argument to view the impersonal use and the referential use
as two distinct uses of the same lexical item. That is, the different uses are related
semantic contributions of the same, possibly polysemous personal pronoun. Moreover,
if the availability of an impersonal use for the second person singular personal pronoun
were a lexical accident in all of the listed languages, different semantic and pragmatic
behavior across languages should be observable. But, at least for German and English,
this is not the case.
As mentioned above, Alonso-Ovalle (2000, 2002) and Malamud (2006, 2007) argue
for the even stronger claim that the referential use and the impersonal use arise from
the same semantic contribution, though. That is, their aim is to give a unified ac-
count which captures both uses depending on their different sentential contexts. Their
accounts are reviewed in the following two subsections.
2.3.2 Malamud (2006, 2007)
Malamud (2006, 2007) proposes a unified account which aims to capture both the
impersonal and the referential use of English you by analyzing it as a special sort of
indefinite expression: the empathy tracking effects observable for the impersonal use
of you are taken as a reflection of the common semantic core of both uses—a relation
between the addressee and potentially other individuals that the addressee empathizes
with.30 To model this relation, Malamud proposes two primitive notions from which
an individual is made-up: its self and its persona. The self of an individual can be
seen as its body, i.e. its physical form; the persona of an individual represents its mind
or soul which is connected to an individual’s self-awareness and point of view.31
30As introduced in Section 1.2, Malamud (2006, 2007) argues that the empathy tracking effects
observable for the impersonal use of you signal that the speaker invites the addressee to empathize
with the set of individuals generalized over. In other words, the addressee is invited to share the
perspective of these individuals.
31Malamud (2006), in contrast to her proposal in her 2007 draft, links the partition of an individual
into its self and its persona to essential properties of Lewisian counterparts (cf. Lewis 1971). The
idea is that all counterparts share the same bundle of essential properties across worlds, which may
be analyzed as these individuals’ self. The persona are those properties of specific individuals that
are not part of the self. In Malamud (2007), she abandons this link because of the possibility to state
identity counterfactuals like the following.
(i) If I were a stone, I would not be able to feel any pain.
The analysis in Malamud (2006) predicts that the stones picked in the accessible worlds share essential
properties with the speaker, which is, of course, undesirable.
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Malamud argues that the notions of self and persona are needed to account for iden-
tity counterfactuals and dream reports, and are, therefore, independently motivated.
She analyzes identity counterfactuals, as well as dream reports, in terms of “pretense”.
In both cases, the speaker pretends that an individual’s persona inhabits the self of
another individual. Consider examples (51) and (52).
(51) If you were Mary, you wouldn’t be dating this horrid guy she’s with!
= If the addressee’s self had Mary’s persona, this individual wouldn’t be dating
this guy.
(adapted from Malamud 2007:23)
(52) I dreamed that I was Brigitte Bardot and I was walking down the street.
John’s dream: Brigitte’s body with John’s mind walking down the street.32
(Malamud 2007:25)
The idea of a persona is defined in (53).
(53) Persona y of x in s is an individual existing in the situation s, which has
a subset of the properties of individual y that does not include y’s point of
view/mind/soul, but includes the point of view/mind/soul of individual x.
(taken from Malamud 2007:25 with minor omissions)
As defined in (52), the notion of a persona does not fit with Malamud’s informal as-
sumptions about the status of an individual’s persona and self reported above. In her
analysis of identity counterfactuals and dream reports, she suggests that the persona
and the self are proper subparts of individuals that do not count as individuals them-
selves, while in (52), the persona is a full-fledged individual. Therefore, I assume that
the definition in (53) has to be understood as in (54).
(54) The persona y of x in s is related to the individual x in the following way: For
x and y and a situation s, there is an individual z in s such that y consists of
z’s physical form and x’s point of view in s.
Note that in both (52) and (54), a persona seems to be a combination of a physical
form and a point of view of two possibility distinct individuals.
For her formal analysis, Malamud introduces persona as a primitive, intensional
relation between two individuals, see (55).
32In Malamud’s (2007) original example, she writes John’s self instead of John’s mind. Given the
division of individuals introduced above, replacing self with mind seems to be what was intended.
The same switch between mind and self happens in the original definition of the “persona”-relation
given in (53), where it is also amended.
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(55) persona(y)(x)(s) = 1 iff y is an entity as defined in (53)
(Malamud 2007:25 with minor changes)
Based on the persona relation in (55), Malamud (2006, 2007) proposes the following
account, which aims to capture the impersonal and referential uses of you.
(56) JyouKg,w,c = λs.λP. ∃y[persona(y)(addressee(c))(s) & P (y)(s)]
In (56), you is analyzed as an existential generalized quantifier which takes a property P
and a situation s as arguments. The persona-relation and the property P are applied to
a variable y which is existentially bound. Given the amended definition of the persona
relation in (54), the variable y represents the individual in the situation s that has the
point of view of the addressee and the physical form of some individual z.
How are the impersonal and referential uses of you captured in this account? Surpris-
ingly in neither of her works, Malamud formalizes ordinary generic sentences containing
impersonal uses of you. Only formal analyses for sentences containing referentially used
you, as in (57), and sentences showing quantificational variability effects between you
and some adverb of quantification, as in (58), are provided.
(57) a. You burned a house.
b. λs0.∃y∃z[house(z)(s0)&persona(y)(addressee(c))(s0)&burned(y)(z)(s0)]
(adapted from Malamud 2007:26)
(58) a. In those days, you usually/rarely lived to be 60.
b. λs0. Most/Few s
(in-those-days(s)&s ∈Min(λs′.∃y[persona(y)(addressee(c))(s′))])
(∀s′′[s < s′′ → lived-to-60(ιy[persona(y)(addressee(c))(s)])(s”)])
(adapted from Malamud 2007:26)
c. Paraphrase: Most situations that are situated in those days and are min-
imal with respect to the existence of an individual with the addressee’s
point of view are such that in all extensions of this minimal situation, the
individual with the addressee’s point of view lived to be 60.33
In contrast to Lewis (1975), Heim (1988 [1982]), and Chierchia (1995b), Malamud
assumes that quantificational variability effects arise from quantification over situations
only. That is, quantification over individuals arises indirectly by quantification over
situations containing only one relevant individual (cf. von Fintel 2004/1995).34
33This is not the paraphrase given in Malamud (2007), which does not make the connection to
quantification over situations transparent. Also note that s0 is vacuously bound in Malamud’s original
proposal.
34Adverbs of quantification are modelled in situation semantics as quantifying over “minimal situa-
tions” (cf. von Fintel 2004/1995). Minimal situations are defined as situations that contain only those
individuals and circumstances as required by the quantification expressed in the sentence.
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The biggest problems for the account proposed in Malamud (2006, 2007) are caused
by the persona-relation. Even though the split of an individual into its self and its
persona was motivated by the empathy tracking data, which suggests a connection
between the referential and the impersonal use, the persona-relation makes undesirable
predictions for both the impersonal and the referential uses.
Since the relation restricts the domain of the existentially quantified variable, it is
predicted that a generalization expressed by a sentence with impersonal you is only
stated for those individuals that share the addressee’s point of view, mind, or soul. The
generalizations found in the data, however, apply to people sharing certain properties
in general, irrespective of the addressee’s point of view. Consider the example in (59).
(59) You have to respect the rights of others.
If this generalization were only to apply to individuals that share the addressee’s mind-
set, the speaker could explicitly exclude herself from the generalization by stating that
she does not share the addressee’s point of view. A continuation of (59) along these
lines, however, results in pragmatic oddness, see (60).
(60) You have to respect the rights of others. #I don’t have to, though, since I don’t
share your point of view.
The problem becomes even more pronouced if the generalization only applies to a
restricted class of individuals, as in (61).
(61) As a farmer, you have to milk your cows.
Malamud’s account predicts that the utterance in (61) expresses a generalization for
those farmers that share the addressee’s mindset. This is again not general enough since
intuitively (61) applies to farmers in general—again irrespective of the addressee’s point
of view.
Two further counter-intuitive predictions for the referential use follow from Mala-
mud’s account. Malamud assumes that the referential interpretation arises whenever
the situation variable is not bound by either a generic operator or an adverb of quan-
tification. This means that the referential uses are treated as last resort readings for
you even though the referential use of you is arguably its default use. The second
prediction is that in negated sentences, all components of the semantic contribution of
you are in the scope of sentential negation. So, for instance, (62) asserts something
about the entire set of individuals, even though intuitively only information about the
addressee in c is given.
(62) You don’t look good at the moment.
Consider the formalization in (63-a).
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(63) a. ¬∃y[persona(y)(addressee(c))(s) & P (y)(s)]⇔
∀y[¬persona(y)(addressee(c))(s) ∨ ¬P (y)(s)]
b. Paraphrase: All individuals y are such that y does not stand in the persona
relation to the addressee or y is not P .
Since the persona-relation holds for all individuals that share the addressee’s point of
view, (63-a) predicts that all people that share the addressee’s mindset, are P , i.e.
sharing the addressee’s mindset determines being P . Hence, (62) should only be true if
all individuals that stand in the persona-relation with the addressee do not look good
at the time of utterance. To mitigate this problem, Malamud argues that usually, the
persona-relation is the identity relation: the only person to whom the addressee stands
in this relation is himself. How this can be ensured, though—apart from stipulating
that the persona-relation is only different from the identity relation when an adverb of
quantification or the generic operator is involved—is unclear to me.
2.3.3 Alonso-Ovalle (2000, 2002)
Alonso-Ovalle (2000, 2002) proposes a unified account which aims to capture the im-
personal and the referential uses of the Spanish null pronoun, pro2, that triggers second
person singular agreement on the verb.35,36 The central idea of both proposals is that
pro2 expresses “non-rigid indexicality”, which is modelled by letting pro2 introduce a
context-dependent functional variable. The two proposals, however, differ with respect
to the type of functional variable contributed by pro2.
Alonso-Ovalle (2000) analyzes pro2 as a free variable ranging over a specific set of
individual concepts; hence, the proposal can in principle be classified as a “definite
account”. Consider (64).
(64) Jpro2Kg,s = g(f)(s)
where f is a free variable ranging over {f ′ ∈ D〈s,e〉 : ∀s[f ′(s) 6= speaker(s0)]}
(adapted slightly from Alonso-Ovalle 2000:12)
The value assigned to the functional variable by the variable assignment g is determined
via contextual salience, i.e. salience in the utterance situation s0. Note that s0 plays
the same role as the Kaplanian context parameter and the world parameter of the
interpretation function.37
35The numeral in pro2 denotes the agreement triggered by the silent pronoun.
36Alonso-Ovalle also contrasts pro2 with its overt counterpart, the second person singular pronoun
tú, which has only a referential use. Since Spanish is a pro-drop language, this contrast between
pro2 and tú is expected. As discussed in Chapter 1, Gruber (2011) observes that impersonal uses of
personal pronouns in languages with pronominal forms of varying morphophonological strength, are
typically only available for the morphologically weakest variant.
37Alonso-Ovalle (2000, 2002) works in situation semantics as proposed in Kratzer (1989).
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Given the proposal in (64), the referential and impersonal uses of pro2 arise as
follows. In the referential use, pro2 is interpreted with respect to the utterance situation
s0. In this case, the variable assignment g picks out the“addressee”-concept because it is
the most salient concept in the utterance situation. Since impersonally used pro2 only
occurs in generic sentences, the value of f is determined relative to the most normal
situations quantified over by the generic operator, and for most normal situations,
Alonso-Ovalle argues, concepts other than the “addressee”-concept are higher in the
salience ranking. Hence, other individuals are considered.38 Example (65) illustrates















b. Gen(in-that-department(s) & proto(s))(work-like-a-slave(pro2 )(s))
(Alonso-Ovalle 2000:13)
Note that the predicate proto in (65-b) is true for a situation iff it is most normal or
prototypical situation with respect to the other material in the restrictor of Gen.
Since Alonso-Ovalle treats the generic operator as an adverb of quantification, pro2
returns one unique individual per situation. Hence as in Malamud’s proposal discussed
in Section 2.3.2, the perceived quasi-universal quantification over individuals is modeled
by universal quantification over situations, specifically most normal situations that
contain possibly different unique individuals.
There are two immediate problems with this proposal. The first problem arises
because the Kaplanian context parameter and the world parameter are subsumed under
one situation parameter. Since pro2 does not rigidly depend on the utterance situation
s0, the formalization in (64) cannot capture the referential use of pro2 in embedded
clauses. Whenever the situation parameter is bound by a higher operator, situations
other than s0 are considered, for which the “addressee”-concept may return individuals
other than the addressee in s0. As a consequence, referential interpretations of pro2
should not be possible in non-episodic sentences, at all. The second problem is that
the value of the functional variable f is fixed once it is assigned contextually. For the
impersonal use, it can therefore not be ensured that f returns an individual for every
situation that is quantified over generically, unless the concept refers to the situation,
e.g. “the typical individual in this situation”. It seems unclear to me whether concepts
of this kind are particularly salient with respect to most normal situations.
In contrast to the proposal in Alonso-Ovalle (2000), Alonso-Ovalle (2002) proposes
that pro2 contributes functions from sets of individuals to individuals, reminiscent of
38Alonso-Ovalle (2000) does not explicitly work out how the contextual salience ranking is deter-
mined for his account.
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choice functions; hence this proposal can be classified as an “indefinite account”. The
idea of “non-rigid indexicality” is, however, retained from his previous account.
With respect to the overall formal framework, Alonso-Ovalle assumes that the in-
terpretation function takes two situation parameters, a reference situation s/r and an
index s.39 In episodic sentences, s/r is the situation of utterance s0; in generic sen-
tences, s/r varies with respect to the most normal situations quantified over by the
generic operator.
The central idea behind the second account is that pro2 contributes a context
dependent functional variable F. The possible values of F are functions from sets
of individuals to individuals assigned to F by the variable assignment g. Further-
more, a partial function R from situations to sets of individuals is introduced that
retrieves all individuals in a given situation. For the utterance situation, it is stipu-
lated that R always returns the set that contains only the speaker and the addressee,
i.e. R(s0) = {speaker(s0), addressee(s0)}.40 Example (66) gives the final formalization
of pro2 proposed in Alonso-Ovalle (2002).
(66) Jpro2Ks/r,s,g = [g(F)](R(s/r)− {speaker(s/r)})
where F ranges over the set of functions of the form f : ℘(De)→ De
(adapted with minor changes from Alonso-Ovalle 2002:6)
The silent pronoun pro2 contributes a function that takes a set of individuals in the
reference situation that explicitly excludes the speaker as its argument, and returns
some individual. Unfortunately, Alonso-Ovalle is not explicit about the possible values
for F. Based on his discussion of the referential and impersonal uses of pro2, I suspect
that the contextually assigned value for F is a function that returns a member of its
input set—similar to traditional choice functions. Without a restriction on the values
of F along these lines, a constant function f : D〈e,t〉 → De could be assigned to F
that always returns the speaker of s/r even though the speaker of s/r was explicitly
excluded from the input set.
If a restriction to choice functions is adopted for F, the meaning of pro2 can be
characterized as follows. If the situation of utterance s0 is picked as the reference
situation, i.e. in episodic sentences, R(s0) − {speaker(s0)} = {addressee(s0)}, and
since {addressee(s0)} is a singleton set, F necessarily returns the single member of this
set: the addressee in s0. Hence, in episodic statements, the referent of pro2 comes
out as the addressee of the utterance. In non-episodic sentences, the generic operator
quantifies over relevantly prototypical situations, which are also the arguments of R
and speaker(.). Since for every prototypical situation, a different set of individuals is
39The term “index” is used in the sense of Lewis (1986), cf. Chapter 3.
40Alonso-Ovalle defines R(s0) as the set {cS , cA}, i.e. the set containing the Kaplanian speaker and
addressee. Since he does not use an explicit context parameter c, I adapted his definitions so that
they consistently use situations.
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determined as the argument for F, F returns a different individual in each prototypical
situation.
The account again suffers from various problems. One general problem shared by
the previous account is that in non-episodic sentences, a referential use of pro2 should
not be available, at all. This is again a consequence of Alonso-Ovalle’s assumptions re-
garding the meaning of the generic operator and the resulting variation across reference
situations. Furthermore, since the proposal in (66) requires that the speaker of any
given reference situation is excluded from the set of individuals returned by R, it has
to be implicitly assumed that for each arbitrary situation a speaker can be determined.
It is, however, unclear to me how this can be ensured.
2.4 Interlude – the (in)definiteness problem
2.4.1 The problem: Conflicting requirements
In the literature on the semantics of impersonal pronouns and on the impersonal read-
ings of personal pronouns, a central issue is whether these pronouns should be analyzed
as definite or as indefinite expressions.
There are two sides to this problem, a conceptual side and a formal side. The
conceptual side involves considerations regarding the behavior of these expressions: Do
(im)personal pronouns show similar syntactic and semantic characteristics to definite
descriptions, indefinite descriptions, or to other (in)definite nominal expressions?41 The
formal side concerns the choice of formal analysis: Is there a formal analysis of other
nominal expressions, which can be adopted, possibly adapted, and which yields the
observed behavior of (im)personal pronouns?
The aim of this section is to shed light on the conceptual and formal aspects that
need to be considered when designing a unified analysis for personal and impersonal
pronouns in all of their uses. I call the challenge of meeting all of the opposing re-
quirements introduced by the different uses of personal and impersonal pronouns the
“(in)definiteness problem”. The rest of this section is used to introduce all of the
conflicting requirements that form the (in)definiteness problem. In the following two
subsections I then discuss the conceptual question of definiteness and indefiniteness
of nominal expressions in episodic and generic sentences, and some recent work on
quantificational variability effects.
Let us now turn to the list of conflicting requirements that make up the (in)definite-
ness problem. As shown in Chapter 1 and Section 2.2, impersonal and personal pro-
nouns have a variety of uses. Impersonal pronouns may have an impersonal use, an
existential use, and a referential use; similarly, some first and second person pronouns
41I use the term nominal expression to cover all syntactic constituents of the categories NP and DP.
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have a referential and an impersonal use. Both types of pronouns also have referentially
dependent bound and E-type uses.
One central result of the data discussion so far was that there are good reasons to as-
sume that the impersonal use of impersonal pronouns is truth-conditionally equivalent
to the impersonal use of personal pronouns, i.e. in their impersonal uses, the pronouns
make the same semantic contribution. In the literature on impersonally used personal
pronouns, this observation has been taken as a promising starting point for a unified
account of personal pronouns in all of their uses (cf. Malamud 2006, 2007).
If the entire spectrum of readings—not just the impersonal uses—is considered, the
following picture arises: Personal and impersonal pronouns are only truth-conditionally
equivalent in one of their uses, the respective impersonal use. In their other, pre-
dominant uses, personal pronouns are preferably analyzed as definite expressions (cf.
Elbourne 2005, Kratzer 2009). Impersonal pronouns, in contrast, have been predom-
inantly analyzed as indefinite expressions (cf. Condoravdi 1989; Malamud 2006, 2007;
Alonso-Ovalle 2000, 2002; Chierchia 1995b). At this point a clear dilemma becomes
apparent. Either personal pronouns stop being definite expressions in their impersonal
uses, or impersonal pronouns in their dominant impersonal use are not indefinite, but
definite expressions.
Another complicating issue is raised by the analysis of E-type uses. Following Cooper
(1979), Evans (1980), Heim and Kratzer (1998), and others, Elbourne (2005) argues
that E-type uses need to be analyzed as definite descriptions to capture the entire range
of data. Since impersonal pronouns also seem to have E-type uses, this suggests that
impersonal pronouns are also better analyzed as definite expressions (cf. Kratzer 1997
and Safir 2004).
What can be made of this situation? To better grasp the (in)definiteness problem,
it is necessary to take a closer look at the definiteness and indefiniteness criteria for
nominal expressions, especially in connection with genericity.
2.4.2 Definiteness and indefiniteness
The conceptual difference between definite and indefinite expressions is one of the big
open problems in the semantic and philosophical literature, and is still extensively
discussed (cf. Abbott 2006, 2014, on which the following overview is based; cf. also
Lyons 1999 for a general overview).
The basic assumption underlying this discussion is that, in general, all nominal ex-
pressions can be classified as either definite or indefinite expressions. Purely intuitively,
a nominal expression is seen as definite if it can be used to talk about a particular in-
dividual. This individual can be abstract or concrete, and can either be a particular
single individual, a particular group of individuals, or a particular mass (Abbott 2014).
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Nominal expressions which do not pick out any particular individual are seen as in-
definite.42 Definite and indefinite descriptions (i.e. the + noun and a + noun) are
taken as the prototypical examples of the two classes, while other nominal expressions
are classified as definite or indefinite based on their behavior in test contexts which
differentiate the prototypical examples.
One of the test contexts for definiteness, which originated from an observation in
the syntactic literature, are existential-there sentences. In these sentences, the position
after the copula cannot be filled by all types of nominal expressions. Specifically, indef-
inite descriptions can occur in the position after the copula while definite descriptions
are ungrammatical in this position, see (67). This is called the “definiteness effect”.
(67) a. There is a man in the garden.
b. *There is the man in the garden.
In analogy, other types of nominal expressions are classified as indefinite if they can
occur after the copula in existential-there sentences, see (68). Otherwise, they count
as definites, see (69).
(68) a. There is some man in the garden.
b. There are some/several/many/no men in the garden.
(69) a. *There is Bill/it in the garden.
b. *There is that/every/Mary’s man in the garden.
c. *There are all/most (of the) men in the garden.
These results are the basis for the classification in Table 2.5.
definite nominal expressions indefinite nominal expressions
personal pronouns, demonstratives,
definite descriptions, possessive
noun phrases, proper names, uni-
versally quantified noun phrases,
partitives
indefinite descriptions, bare nouns,
non-universally quantified noun
phrases, indefinite “this”
Table 2.5: Definite and indefinite nominal expressions
Milsark (1977) discusses complications of using existential-there sentences as test
contexts for definiteness. He argues that some of the nominal expressions that are
acceptable in existential-there sentences do not fit the intuition behind definiteness,
i.e. reference to a particular individual. To account for this intuitive mismatch, he
introduces two new labels, “weak” and “strong”, for expressions that can and cannot
42Abbott (2014) notes that universally quantified noun phrases, partitives, possessive noun phrases,
and specific indefinites are problematic for this naive characterization of definiteness. These nominal
expressions raise issues—even for more sophisticated formal accounts. Cf. Abbott (2006, 2014).
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occur in existential-there sentences, respectively.43 Since Milsark’s work, other critical
works that claim that the “definiteness effect” found in existential-there sentences is a
consequence of other semantic or pragmatic restrictions has been published (cf. Ward
and Birner 1995). Nevertheless, the classification given in Table 2.5 is still used in the
literature to characterize the categories of definite and indefinite nominal expressions
(cf. Abbott 2006).
Abbott also expresses reservations regarding another test for definiteness proposed
in Jackendoff (1977). Jackendoff argues that only definite expressions may occur as
embedded noun phrases in partitives, see (70). He calls this the “partitive constraint”.
(70) some of the apples, few of those options, all of Mary’s dogs
(Abbott 2014:11)
Abbott, however, argues that the only requirement partitives place on their embedded
noun phrases is that they are interpretable as a group of individuals. Therefore, indef-
inite expressions that can be interpreted as a single group can also occur in partitives,
see (71).
(71) a. He ate three of some apples he found on the ground.
b. This is one of a number of counterexamples to the PC.
c. Any of several options are open to us at this point.
(Abbott 2014:12)
The only exceptions for this requirement are bare plurals and mass noun phrases,
although mass noun phrases can freely occur in mass partitives (cf. Abbott 2014).
(72) a. *Most of books by Chomsky are on politics.
b. *Some of green slime is created by bacteria.
(Abbott 2014:12f)
So, in sum, there in fact does not seem to be a reliable syntactic test that captures the
intuitive difference between definite and indefinite expressions.
In the philosophical and the semantic/pragmatic literature, various attempts were
made to reduce the difference between definiteness and indefiniteness to a difference
43A second test context proposed to be sensitive to definiteness is the English have-construction
which indicates inalienable possession, see (i).
(i) a. She had a full head of hair.
b. *She had the full head of hair.
(Abbott 2006:5)
As in the case of existential-there sentences, definite descriptions are unacceptable in this construction.
Cf. Abbott (2006).
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in more basic contextual or discourse-based properties, most notably uniqueness and
familiarity.
The reduction of definiteness to uniqueness of reference has its origins in Russell’s
(1905) analysis of definite and indefinite descriptions. Russell proposed that both defi-
nite and indefinite descriptions existentially quantify over individuals, but that definite
descriptions additionally state that there is only one individual for which the descrip-
tion holds. That is, definite expressions require uniqueness of existence. Compare
(73-b) and (74-b).
(73) a. A representative arrived.
b. ∃x[representative(x) & arrived(x)]
(Abbott 2014:3)
(74) a. The representative arrived.
b. ∃x[representative(x) & ∀y[representative(y)→ x = y] & arrived(x)]
(Abbott 2014:3)
A minor complication that arises for this account is that uniqueness of existence seems
to be too strong as a defining property of definiteness. In its strict formulation in
(74-b), it is practically never given in the world. Therefore, the uniqueness requirement
is usually contextually restricted to a relevant domain (cf. Abbott 2014 on the“problem
of incomplete definite descriptions”).
The uniqueness account of definiteness is independent of Russell’s quantificational
analysis of definite and indefinite descriptions. Following Frege (1892), Strawson (1950)
argues that the requirement that asks for uniqueness of existence for definites is not
part of the asserted content of definite descriptions, but is presupposed.
(75) a. The representative arrived.
b. arrived(ιx[representative(x)])
The ι-term, ιx[representative(x)], presupposes that there is only one individual x such
that x is a representative. If this requirement is met, ι-term refers to this unique
individual. In contrast to Russell’s analysis, Strawson’s formal analysis of definite de-
scriptions is non-quantificational. The ι-term directly contributes the unique individual
to which the descriptive content applies.
There are various reasons to prefer analyses of definite descriptions in which unique-
ness is presupposed. For example, sentential negation cannot affect the requirement of
uniqueness of existence for the referent of the definite descriptions. Consider (76-a).
(76) a. The representative didn’t arrive.
b. Frege/Strawson: ¬arrived(ιx[representative(x)])
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c. Russell: ¬∃x[representative(x) & ∀y[representative(y)→ x = y] &
arrived(x)]
The Frege/Strawson analysis for (76-a) in (76-b) captures the behavior of the unique-
ness requirement relative to sentential negation. Russell’s analysis in (76-c), however,
predicts that example (76-a) can be used as an objection to The representative arrived
in case more than one representative arrived.
The main competitor of the semantic uniqueness account for definiteness is Heim’s
(1988 [1982]) familiarity approach. Heim assumes that the semantic contribution of
definite and indefinite descriptions is the same. Both types of expressions contribute
variables restricted to their descriptive content. The difference between the two types
of noun phrases is that indefinite descriptions always introduce new discourse referents
while definite descriptions require their referents to have been introduced beforehand.
These requirements of novelty and familiarity of reference are also seen as presupposed
in the context.
Heim’s presuppositional account of familiarity runs into problems with “semantic
definite descriptions” (also called “role-type definite descriptions”). These are definite
descriptions for which the descriptive content per se already determines a unique refer-
ent. Contrary to “pragmatic/incomplete definite descriptions”, which signal uniqueness
in the context of utterance, semantic definite description can be used to introduce new
discourse referents (cf. Löbner 1985). For instance, the referent of the definite descrip-
tion the new curling center at MSU in example (77) is uniquely determined by the
descriptive content new curling center at MSU.
(77) The new curling center at MSU, which you probably haven’t heard of, is the
first of its kind.
(Abbott 2014:6)
Abbott argues that this problem for the familiarity account cannot be solved by invok-
ing presupposition accommodation since this would take away all of the account’s pre-
dictive power: “Definites denote familiar entities unless they don’t.” (Abbott 2014:6).44
As an alternative to the familiarity requirement, Abbott (2014) aims to weaken
the uniqueness requirement for some nominal expressions, and contrasts two types of
uniqueness: (i) semantic uniqueness and (ii) referential uniqueness. Semantic unique-
ness corresponds to Russell’s uniqueness of existence in the context; it is a semantic
requirement placed on the utterance context. Referential uniqueness is a pragmatic
property that applies to expressions used by the speaker to refer to a particular entity
that he expects to be identifiable for the addressee.
For most definite nominal expressions, referential uniqueness is the variant which
44But see for instance Geurts (2010) for a defense of definiteness as presupposing givenness.
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captures their behavior best: definite descriptions, proper names, personal pronouns,
and demonstratives are referentially unique, but only proper names can be said to show
semantic uniqueness.
Since Abbott’s classification is based on intuitive characteristics connected to def-
initeness, as well as on results of tests which have been shown to depend on other
semantic and/or pragmatic properties, it seems unclear to me what the conceptual
insight is that follows from Abbott’s conclusion. To my mind, the only conclusion that
can be drawn at this point is that some nominal expressions share the property of
referential uniqueness, and that definite descriptions—however referential uniqueness
is spelled out in detail—are part of this class of expressions. Nevertheless for the rest of
this section, I take referential uniqueness as the definition of definiteness, and classify
all other expressions as indefinite.
One complicating factor for using Abbott’s results on (in)definiteness in the discus-
sion of the (in)definiteness problem is that Abbott (2006, 2014) explicitly excludes all
non-referential uses of nominal expressions from the discussion. That is, she explicitly
leaves aside bound uses of pronominal expressions and nominal expressions in generic
sentences. Hence, Abbott’s concept of definiteness can only be applied to the referen-
tial use of personal pronouns—which is classified as definite—and to the existential use
of impersonal pronouns—which is classified as indefinite.
In contrast to Abbott, Lyons (1999) also considers nominal expressions in generic
sentences. He argues that the meaning that is assigned to these expressions in generic
sentences is independent of the definite/indefinite distinction.
Lyons introduces two new classificatory properties for definite expressions: identifia-
bility and inclusiveness. Identifiability can, more or less, be equated with the property
of referential uniqueness proposed by Abbott. Inclusiveness, on the other hand, refers
to the observation that plural definite descriptions and definite mass descriptions refer
to the maximal plurality of individuals that satisfy their descriptive content. Together,
these two properties determine semantic definiteness. In contrast, a nominal expression
is syntactically (in)definite if it has an (in)definite form and behaves morphosyntacti-
cally like an indefinite expression.
Following Krifka et al. (1995), Lyons distinguishes two classes of generic noun phra-
ses:45 (i) generic noun phrases that express generalizations about a plurality of individ-
uals as a whole, i.e. a kind, and (ii) generic noun phrases that express a generalization
about the members of a plurality individually.
English allows for a “generic interpretation” of definite singular noun phrases, in-
definite singular noun phrases, and bare plurals. Definite plural noun phrases are not
45Krifka et al. (1995) use the label “generic noun phrase” only for noun phrases that receive a kind
reading. All other noun phrases are called “object-referring”.
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available in general, but may be “interpreted generically” with nationalities and with
nouns denoting classes of classes.
(78) a. Dogs are mammals. (bare plural subject)
b. A dog is a mammal. (indefinite singular subject)
c. The dog is a mammal. (definite singular subject)
d. The Germans like beer. (definite plural subject)
Of these noun phrases, definite singular noun phrases and bare plurals can be used
as kind-referring expressions; bare plurals and indefinite singular noun phrases can be
used to generalize over the members of a plurality.
Regarding (in)definiteness, Lyons argues that all generic noun phrases show a similar
behavior and distribution to definite noun phrases—independently of their class and
morphological make up. He provides the following three diagnostic test contexts (Lyons
1999:197).
(79) a. Big as the/*a boy was, he couldn’t lift it.
b. Big as an elephant is, we’ll find room for Nellie here.
c. Big as elephants are, you’ll never get one to lift that load.
(80) a. The/?A house is mine.
b. Surely a letter is mine if it’s addressed to me.
c. ‘Vengeance is mine’ said the president.
(81) a. Is there a/?the dictionary in the house?
b. Is there a lion in Africa?
c. Are there dolphins on the verge of extinction?
Lyons suggests that the tests in (79) and (80) show that generically interpreted sin-
gular indefinite descriptions and bare plurals pattern like non-generic definite descrip-
tions. For instance, the definiteness test in (81), which is an instance of the test
using existential-there sentences, seems to support this result since the indefinite noun
phrases in (81-b) and (81-c) cannot be interpreted generically.
From these three tests, Lyons concludes that even though generic bare plurals and
generic indefinite singular noun phrases are syntactically indefinite—they have an in-
definite morphological form—they are semantically definite. Lyons further argues that
semantic definiteness for generic noun phrases is expected since “their reference is to a
whole ensemble”, and “they can perhaps also be said to be familiar”, i.e. they observe
inclusiveness and identifiability (Lyons 1999:198).
For my part, I have doubts regarding the conclusions that can be drawn from Lyons’s
test contexts.46 More importantly, however, I do not see how non-kind-referring noun
46When Lyons introduces these tests earlier on in the book, he states that they are not very reli-
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phrases in generic sentences observe either inclusiveness or identifiability. As Krifka
et al. (1995) argue, generic sentences express quasi-universal quantification over the
members of the set described by the noun phrase in subject position. One notable
property of quasi-universal quantification introduced by the generic operator is that it
allows for exceptions. This means that quasi-universally quantified noun phrases are
not inclusive in the same way as the plural definite article or true universal quantifica-
tion. Identifiability is also not given since the exceptions to a generalization do not have
to be identifiable (cf. Greenberg 2007). As a result, the plurality of individuals that the
generic sentence generalizes over not strictly identifiable either. Hence, Lyons’ charac-
teristic properties for definiteness seem to fail for non-kind-referring noun phrases in
generics, and for similar reasons Abbott’s referential uniqueness fails, as well.47
In contrast to non-kind-referring noun phrases in generics, kind-referring noun phra-
ses seems to be identifiable even though they also allow for particular, exceptional
individuals. Consequently—with respect to Abbott’s characterization of definiteness—
kind-referring noun phrases in generic sentences can be classified as definite expressions.
As shown in Section 2.2, however, impersonally used impersonal pronouns cannot be
combined with kind predicates. Therefore, they fall into the class of non-kind-referring











Unavailable: ‘Dodos are extinct.’
b. One is extinct.
Unavailable: ‘People/humans are extinct.’48
Hence, I conclude that impersonal pronouns in their impersonal use should be classified
as indefinite expressions.49
Even though this conclusion seems to be intuitively valid, it ignores a central ob-
servation from the literature on generic sentences: quasi-universal quantification over
individuals is not contributed by the noun phrase, but is introduced by the covert
generic operator. The indefinite noun phrases are argued to contribute only free vari-
ables ranging over the set of individuals for which the descriptive content holds (cf.
Krifka et al. 1995); in other words, indefinite noun phrases in generic sentences are
modelled as Heimian indefinites (cf. Heim 1988 [1982]). Hence, if the impersonal uses
able, and provides various counterexamples (Lyons 1999:16f). The low reliability of existential-there
sentences was also mentioned earlier in this section.
47Similar arguments to the ones given for non-kind-referring noun phrases in generics are usually
given to argue for the indefiniteness of most and any. Cf. Abbott (2006)
48The only reading that is available for this sentence involves one being interpreted as a numeral,
referring to one of several salient kinds.
49Lyons (1999:186) proposes that English one and its corresponding forms in other languages can
be analyzed as indefinite singular generics with “arbitrary” human reference. This means that Lyons
effectively groups impersonal pronouns with non-kind-referring expressions, as well.
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of personal and impersonal pronouns are modelled in analogy to indefinite noun phrases
in generic sentences, their quantificational force is also contributed by the generic op-
erator, and their (in)definiteness is not directly perceivable. So in sum, if a unified
account for all uses of personal and impersonal pronouns is aimed for, the presence of
the generic operator may not be hard-wired in the respective lexical entries.50
Given this result, how can the (in)definiteness of personal and impersonal pronouns
in their impersonal use be determined? I argue that one does not have access to hints
regarding their (in)definiteness apart from comparisons of their behavior with that
of bare plurals and indefinite singular noun phrases in generic sentences. And these
expressions have been argued to be syntactically and semantically indefinite when they
occur in episodic sentences.
2.4.3 (In)definiteness and quantificational variability
An indefiniteness test that frequently discussed in the recent semantic literature is the
possibility of quantificational variability effects with adverbs of quantification. Lewis
(1975) first observed that sentences containing indefinite descriptions and adverbs of
quantification show a peculiar behavior: rather than quantifying over situations, times,
or eventualities, the adverb seems to quantify directly over the individuals denoted by
the indefinite description; consider (83).
(83) a. A basketball player is sometimes short.
∼ Some basketball players are short.
b. Basketball players are sometimes short.
∼ Some basketball players are short.
This effect does not arise with definite descriptions, proper names, and referentially
used personal pronouns, see (84).
(84) a. #The basketball player over there is sometimes short.
b. #Peter is sometimes short.
c. #He is sometimes short.
In the only interpretation that is available for the sentences in (84), the adverb some-
times quantifies over situations, which suggests that the height of an individual may
vary over time.
50If the generic operator were to be hard-wired in the lexical entry of an impersonal pronoun, a
rule of “generic disclosure”, similar to “existential disclosure”, would be needed to account for the
referential and existential uses, and the observed quantificational variability effects (cf. Dekker 1993).
A genuine unified account which does not need to stipulate a rule of this kind is arguably more elegant.
Note, however, that this argument still crucially relies on the assumption that all uses of personal and
impersonal pronouns are associated with the same lexical entry.
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The reliability of this diagnostic has been questioned recently in Hinterwimmer
(2005) and Endriss and Hinterwimmer (2006). Hinterwimmer and Endriss and Hin-
terwimmer argue that quantificational variability(-like) effects are also observable for
singular and plural definite descriptions. They give the following examples.
(85) Paul HATES going to jazz-concerts: The PIANO-player always flirts with his
GIRLFRIEND.
(Hinterwimmer 2005:69)
(86) The people that lectured on kangaroos at the conference last summer were usu-
ally open minded.
(Endriss and Hinterwimmer 2006:3)
For definite singular noun phrases, Hinterwimmer (2005) argues that they have a quan-
tificational variability-like reading, which arises indirectly via universal quantification
over a set of jazz-concert-situations; consider (85). Since for every jazz-concert there is
a unique, but possibly different piano-player, the feeling arises that always quantifies
over individuals. These cases differ from quantificational variability in the strict sense
as argued for in Lewis (1975), though, since no such functional dependence on a set
of situations is required.51 These quantificational variability-like effects are in general
more constrained than true quantificational variability effects; the following specific
conditions need to be met: (i) a set of situations needs to be salient in the context,
(ii) the definite singular noun phrase needs to refer to a unique, but possibly different
individual in each of these situations, and (iii) a part of the singular definite description
needs to carry a focus accent or a contrastive-topic accent. The final requirement is
indicated in example (85) by upper case (Hinterwimmer 2005).
For the second, plural definite description cases exemplified in (86), Endriss and
Hinterwimmer argue that these noun phrases show true quantificational variability ef-
fects since the adverb of quantification, they argue, may quantify over the atoms of
the plurality picked out by the plural definite description. However, the availability
of quantificational variability effects differs for bare plurals, singular indefinite descrip-
tions, and plural definite descriptions. Sentences containing singular indefinite and
plural definite descriptions need to observe the “tense agreement constraint” (cf. En-
driss and Hinterwimmer 2006): If a modifying restrictive relative clause and the matrix
predicate do not agree with respect to tense marking, no quantificational variability
effects arise. Consider examples (87-a) and (87-b).
51But see von Fintel (2004/1995), Hinterwimmer (2005), and Elbourne (2005), among others, for
a formalization of quantificational variability effects which uniformly involves quantification over sit-
uations in situation semantics. For these analyses, quantificational variability effects always arise
indirectly.
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(87) a. ??A car that was bought in the eighties is usually blue.
(Endriss and Hinterwimmer 2006:4)
b. ??The cars that were bought in the eighties are usually blue.
(Endriss and Hinterwimmer 2006:13)
In contrast, no such constraint is placed on bare plurals, see (88).
(88) Cars that were bought in the eighties are usually blue.
(Endriss and Hinterwimmer 2006:10)
Quantificational variability effects with bare plurals, on the other hand, degrade if the
relative clause is temporally specific, compare (86) to (89).
(89) ??People that lectured on kangaroos at the conference last summer were usually
open minded.
(Endriss and Hinterwimmer 2006:13)
I do not review the analyses proposed in Hinterwimmer (2005) and Endriss and Hinter-
wimmer (2006) since this is beyond the scope of this discussion. The empirical obser-
vations made in Hinterwimmer (2005) and Endriss and Hinterwimmer (2006) already
suffice to compare them to the quantificational variability effects found with personal
and impersonal pronouns. Any parallel that can be found between the impersonal uses
and one of the cases discussed by Hinterwimmer or Endriss and Hinterwimmer can
be taken as evidence for an analysis of the impersonal uses in parallel to the noun
phrase occurring in that type of effect. The following examples show quantificational
variability effects for English and German impersonal and personal pronouns.
(90) a. One usually lives to be 60.

















































‘As a miner, one is usually older than 60.’
To start out, the impersonal uses cannot be grouped with singular definite descriptions
since the data does not meet the requirements formulated in Hinterwimmer (2005).
First, no set of salient situations is provided by the examples in (90) and (91) that
the adverb could quantify over. Second, none of the pronouns carry an accent. In
fact, for the personal pronouns ich, du, and you, the quantificational variability ef-
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fects understood in (90) and (91) vanish if the pronouns are read with a focus accent.
This is a direct result of the observation discussed in Section 1.3 that stress on the
pronoun blocks an impersonal interpretation. Hence, the quantificational variability
effects found in (90) and (91) speak against an analysis of the impersonal uses a sin-
gular definite descriptions.
In contrast, the behavior of the pronouns in (90) and (91) is consistent with them
being analyzed similar to plural definite descriptions, singular indefinite descriptions,
and bare plurals. Since the personal and impersonal pronouns under discussion all
show singular agreement—if this is a valid criterion, at all—one would expect them to
show the same behavior as singular indefinite descriptions. As the following example






























































‘As a miner who celebrates his 40 year anniversary on Sunday, one is
usually older than 60.’
While (92-a) supports the similarity with singular definite descriptions, (92-b) points
towards a parallel with bare plurals. Further work is needed to tease apart this con-
flicting evidence.
So, unfortunately, the discussion in this section, to my mind, does not resolve the
conceptual side of the (in)definiteness problem. The discussions on genericity and
quantificational variability effects point towards an analysis of the impersonal uses as
indefinite singular or bare plural expressions. In contrast, the discussion about quan-
tificational variability effects in Section 1.2 suggests that all referential uses of personal
pronouns are definite. For the existential use of impersonal pronouns in episodic sen-
tences, an indefinite account is again to be preferred (cf. Section 2.2).
In its entirety, the (in)definiteness problem can be summed up as follows:
(93) (In)definiteness problem:
Personal pronouns in their referential use seem to be definite expressions while
impersonal pronouns in their existential use seem to be indefinite expressions.
In addition, personal pronouns and impersonal pronouns in their impersonal
52I thank Sebastian Bücking (p.c.) for his judgements and detailed comments on the acceptability
of (92-a) and (92-b).
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uses seem to be best analyzed as indefinite expressions, i.e. as contributing a
variable which is bound by the generic operator. This also fits the observations
regarding the pronouns’ quantificational variability effects. In contrast, the
bound and E-type uses of personal and impersonal pronouns again seem to be
definite expressions.
For the formal, unified account that aims to capture all of the uses of first and second
person singular pronouns which will be proposed in Section 2.5.3, I adopt a bare variable
analysis for indefinite expressions in the spirit of Heim (1988 [1982]) and Diesing (1992).
This idea on the formal level is brought together with the conceptual considerations
addressed in Nunberg (1993): a strict Kaplanian analysis of the referential uses does not
capture the full range of data observable for first and second person singular pronouns.
2.5 An alternative proposal for a unified account
2.5.1 A return to Nunberg (1993)
Even though the (in)definiteness problem seems to be hard to get under control, the
project of finding a unified “indefinite account” for first and second person singular
pronouns should, in my opinion, not be discarded just yet. The discussion of the be-
havior of impersonal pronouns in Section 2.2 and Malamud’s (2006) arguments against
positing a lexical ambiguity for the referential and impersonal uses of second person
singular pronouns (cf. Section 2.3.1) provide good reasons to investigate this line of
inquiry further. So, the aim of this section is to propose a new, unified account for
first and second person singular pronouns. Even though the account that I introduce
in Section 2.5.3 is formally quite similar to the account in Malamud (2006, 2007), the
final execution and the underlying motivations of the two accounts differ. Ultimately,
they both suffer from similar problems, though (cf. Section 2.6).
In Chapter 1, I briefly introduced Kaplan’s (1978 [1989]) proposal for the meaning of
first and second person singular pronouns and the empirical problems it faces. In this
subsection, I return to the critical discussion of direct-reference accounts of pronominal
meaning put forth in Nunberg (1993). Nunberg’s criticism and this proposal serve as
the conceptual motivation for the account proposed in Section 2.5.3.
Nunberg (1993) aims to show that the referential uses of first and second person
pronouns are more complex than is generally assumed—and as modelled in Kaplan
(1978 [1989]). He starts out by critically reviewing the three assumptions at the heart
of direct-reference accounts based on Kaplan (1978 [1989]), and shows that at least one
of these assumptions needs to be discarded to capture the relevant data adequately.
The first assumption made by direct-reference accounts is that indexical expressions
have special interpretive properties. In contrast to definite descriptions, their meaning
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is not contributed to the truth-conditional content of the sentences they appear in.
That is, they do not have a descriptive, but an “indicative” meaning: the semantic
function specified in their lexical entries is to point out a specific individual in the
context. Nunberg calls the individual referred to by an indexical its “index”.53
The second assumption is that sentences containing indexical expressions always ex-
press singular propositions, i.e. propositions that are about a specific individual, which
is part of the propositional content. The second assumption follows from the first
assumption if it is assumed that indexical expressions always contribute a specific indi-
vidual, and never e.g. a property. Contrary to indexical expressions, it is argued, defi-
nite descriptions are ambiguous between a referential and an attributive reading which
result in singular and non-singular propositions, respectively (cf. Donnellan 1966).
The first two assumptions are linked via the third assumption: an indexical expres-
sion always refers to its index. That is, the special semantic function of indexical
expressions that is given by the first assumption can never be modified or weakened to
allow indexicals to contribute a different “object” to the truth-conditional content of a
sentence.
Nunberg attacks the third assumption: He argues that by destroying the strict link
between the first and the second assumption, the second assumption can be discarded
as well, and an account that is linguistically more adequate can be designed. His final
proposal, in a nutshell, is that indexical expressions as a whole are indeed directly
referential—their semantic contribution to the truth-conditions of a sentence is not
mediated by an intermediate step that involves descriptive content. The rules for
determining their final referents, however, involve an indirect, two-step procedure.
The truly problematic examples for the direct-reference accounts, Nunberg argues,
are those in which the index-referent identity assumption is violated. These examples
all involve deferred ostension (or: deferred reference), and are usually seen as prag-
matically derived exceptions to the meaning proposed by Kaplan.54 Nunberg, however,
points out that deferred ostension is a semantic strategy that is in fact very common
in the context of plural personal pronouns. To account for this observation, Nunberg
analyzes deferred ostension as the default strategy employed by first and second person
plural pronouns to determine their referents.
The two-step procedure proposed by Nunberg is based on the idea that the meaning
of indexical expressions involves three components that interact to determine the final
referent. Nunberg motivates and illustrates his general proposal with examples of first
person plural we. The central observation on the semantics of we is that it rarely ever
53Note that Nunberg’s (1993) use of the term “index” is different from the use of the term in the
literature on possible worlds semantics. There, “index” is used interchangeably with the term “possible
world” (cf. Lewis 1986).
54Nunberg cites Recanati (1993) for an account of deferred ostension by means of pragmatic infer-
ence.
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refers to a plurality of speakers. Rather, we is most commonly used to refer to a group
of individuals that a single speaker is part of. In these cases, none of the other members
of the group have to be present in the context either.
Even though Kaplan (1978 [1989]) does not talk about plural pronouns, this ob-
servation is problematic from a general direct-reference theoretic point of view. One
possibility to account for it is to claim that first person plural pronouns are not true
indexical expressions. Nunberg discards this possibility as undesirable, and pursues the
follow alternative: (i) the index-referent identity requirement is simply not valid for plu-
ral personal pronouns, but (ii) the referent can be derived from the index. He proposes
that all types of indexical expressions, e.g. personal pronouns and demonstratives, are
made up from three subparts: a deictic component, a relational component, and a clas-
sificatory component. These three subparts interact to determine the semantic value,
i.e. the referent, of any given indexical expression.
The deictic component picks an entity from the context, the “index”. For we, the
only relevant, contextually given individual, and therefore the index, is the speaker/the
set of speakers of the utterance.
The relational component places certain requirements on the relation that holds
between the index and possible referents that may be determined from the two-step
process. In the case of we, the referent has to be a plurality of individuals that contains
the speaker. Hence, the relational component for we restricts the possible relations to
those between the index and the referent for which the index is part of the referent (i.e.
“the index instantiates the interpretation”, Nunberg 1993:9). The relation that holds
between the index and the referent in each specific case depends on speaker intentions,
the expression’s conversational purpose, and the discourse context. Nunberg suggests
that in some cases even the speaker is not able to determine the specific relation that
holds between the index and the referent in the context. He gives the following example.
(94) Mother to child: We don’t talk with our mouths full.
(Nunberg 1993:16)
The third component is the classificatory component, which contains morphosyntactic
and semantic featural information, e.g. on animacy, number, and gender, that further
constrains the choice of referent. We, for instance, always requires the referent to be
an animate plurality.55
55In the same paper, Nunberg (1993) also discusses examples, like (i), in which there is a clash
between the predicate and the individual denoted by the subject noun phrase in that the predicate
can only apply to another object related to that individual.
(i) I am parked out back.
For this type of examples, Nunberg proposes a different analysis from the one discussed in this section.
His analysis involves a pragmatically triggered reanalysis of the meaning of the matrix predicate. For
details cf. Nunberg (1993). Since these examples are irrelevant for my purposes, they are left aside.
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The two-step process to determine the referent of an indexical expression, like we,
first involves determining the index, and then “resolving the relational component to
determine the interpretation” (Nunberg 1993:9). The lexical meaning of indexical ex-
pressions can therefore be seen as providing a guideline and general constraints on how
to determine their referents. The relation and the final referent are determined from/in
the context.
On the basis of Nunberg’s three-component account, deferred ostension can be char-
acterized as the “semantic/pragmatic process” that takes place when the relation that
is chosen to link the index and the referent is not the identity relation. For first person
plural we, as Nunberg notes, this is the rule rather than the exception.
Nunberg’s two-step account provides a new starting point to attack the second as-
sumption of direct-reference accounts, i.e. that sentences containing indexical expres-
sions always express singular propositions. As counter-examples, Nunberg presents
cases in which the referent of we cannot be a specific plurality. One class of problem-
atic examples involves cases for which the contribution of we can be paraphrased by a
bare plural or a plural definite description. Consider examples (95-b) and (96-b).
(95) a. As spoken by a woman:
We are less likely to contract the disease than men.
b. Women are less likely to contract the disease than men.
(Nunberg 1993:12)
(96) a. As spoken by a Supreme Court Justice: We might have been liberals.
b. The Justices of the Supreme Court might have been liberals.
(Nunberg 1993:14)
From these examples, Nunberg concludes that the range of interpretations for indexicals
and descriptive noun phrases (i.e. bare plurals, definite descriptions, and others) is not
that different. He, however, stresses the point that, in contrast to descriptive noun
phrases, indexicals are still as a whole indicative; the informational content of the
three components is not contributed to the truth-conditions of the sentence in which
an indexical occurs.
Nunberg also observes cases of deferred ostension for singular personal pronouns,
although they are less common. Nunberg argues that this is to be expected since
the classificatory component of I restricts possible referents to singular, animate in-
dividuals. That is, I requires the speaker to instantiate, i.e. be part of, the singular
referent determined via some contextually given relation. Given these requirements, in
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the majority of cases, the referent can only be the speaker.56 Nevertheless, in special
circumstances, deferred ostension is also observable for I, see (97).
(97) The condemned prisoner:
I am traditionally allowed to order whatever I like for my last meal.
(Nunberg 1993:20)
In the only reasonable interpretation of example (97), the first person singular pronoun
does not refer to the speaker of the utterance. It is implausible to assume that there is a
tradition concerning last meals for a single individual. Instead, the meaning naturally
assigned to example (97) is (98), in which the singular definite description is read
attributively.
(98) The condemned prisoner is traditionally allowed to order whatever he likes for
his last meal.57
(Nunberg 1993:21)
Given this paraphrase, the referent picked for I in the preferred interpretation is the
respective condemned prisoner in those occasions in which the last-meal tradition ap-
plies. Since the referent of I for each occasion is a single individual, the requirements
of the classificatory component of I are met. The same holds for the conditions of
the relational component since at the time of utterance the speaker is a condemned
prisoner.
It is clear that a direct-reference account cannot derive this interpretation. I is
assumed to always contribute the speaker in the utterance context irrespective of co-
occuring material which induces a shift in the circumstances of evaluation, and suggests
a deferred ostension interpretation.
A comparison between indexicals and proper names is instructive. Proper names are
also assumed to contribute their referents directly to the truth-conditions of a sentence
(cf. Kripke 1980). Hence, a direct-reference account predicts that indexicals should
show the same behavior as proper names. This is not the case, though, as exemplified
by (99).
(99) Darnay (the prisoner currently in cell 15) is traditionally allowed to order
whatever he likes for his last meal.
(Nunberg 1993:21)
The proper name Darnay in (99) cannot contribute the same“functional meaning” that
56The same observations made for we and I can also be made for singular and plural second person
pronouns, which also only differ with respect to their classificatory components.
57The attributive interpretation of the definite description in (98) can be rendered more specifically
as: The condemned prisoner, whoever it is, is traditionally allowed to order whatever he likes for his
last meal.
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is contributed by I in (97), and therefore does not share the interpretation paraphrased
in (98). This discrepancy can be seen as evidence against an account that analyzes
deferred reference as a pragmatic inference. If indexicals and proper names were both
indicative expressions with the same rigid singular reference, then the same pragmatic
inferences that derive deferred reference for sentences containing indexical expressions
should also be able to derive deferred reference for sentences containing proper names.58
Hence, deferred reference has to be directly connected to the meaning of indexical
expressions.
Another argument against deferred reference involving a pragmatic process is that
the literal sentence meanings of most of the examples with deferred reference readings
are odd or even incoherent. Therefore, it is unclear how the pragmatic inferences
needed for deferred reference can be applied at all.59
Grimberg (1994) criticizes Nunberg’s sketch of his two-step process. She argues that
the classificatory component in Nunberg’s account does not figure in any relevant sense
in the process, but should figure prominently in an intermediate step which determines
the general class(es) of possible referents. If the classificatory component is added into
the process with this role, it also places restrictions on the relation between the index
and the referent that is contextually chosen. Consider the following, adapted three-step
process:
(100) a. First, resolve the deictic component to determine the index.
b. Second, resolve the classificatory component to determine the type of
referent with respect to number, gender, animacy, etc.
c. Third, resolve the relational component to determine the referent.
(Grimberg 1994:359)
I adopt Grimberg’s modification as the conceptual basis on how to think about the
interaction of Nunberg’s three components.
In sum, Nunberg’s three-component account maintains two aspects of strict direct
reference accounts: (i) an indexical picks an individual from the context, and (ii) an
indexical is an indicative expression which does not contribute any descriptive content
to the truth-conditions of a sentence. Yet, his account also differs from direct reference
accounts in one crucial aspect: the referent contributed to the truth-conditional mean-
58Nunberg (1993) crucially assumes that pragmatic processes in general can only apply to sentences
as a whole. Therefore, he talks about deferred reference readings for sentences, instead of deferred
reference readings for indexicals or proper names.
59Powell (1998) attacks this line of reasoning. Recanati (1993), who Nunberg cites as a proponent
of the pragmatic view on deferred reference, argues for local pragmatic processes which generate the
deferred referent from the literal meaning of the indexical before the truth-conditional meaning of the
entire sentence is composed. It seems to me that Recanati’s local pragmatic processes and Nunberg’s
semantic two-step process are able to derive the same results. Moreover, it seems that both accounts,
more or less, work in the same manner; Recanati just calls it a pragmatic, and Nunberg a semantic
process.
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ing of a sentence does not have to be the individual picked from the context. Instead,
other referents may be chosen based on their relation to the contextually determined
individual.
Before going on to discuss a formalization of pronominal semantics inspired by Nun-
berg (1993), I briefly address a consideration regarding the connection between the
impersonal uses of personal pronouns and their deferred ostension readings.
Nunberg’s account is not designed to account for impersonal uses of personal pro-
nouns. At least one of Nunberg’s examples, however, could be analyzed as containing
an impersonal use of you. Consider the example in (101).
(101) Chess teacher to a student who played 4. N × P:
According to all textbooks, you often get in trouble with that move.
(Nunberg 1993:21)
The deferred reference interpretation of (101) can be paraphrased as in (102).
(102) According to all textbooks, the person who plays 4. N × P often gets in trouble
with that move.
(Nunberg 1993:21)
This interpretation of you in (101) is the same as the interpretation of the attributively
used singular definite description the person who plays 4. N × P in (102). As discussed
in Section 2.4, singular definite descriptions can interact with quantification over a set
of situations induced by an adverb of quantification. In these cases, quantificational
variability-like effects arise (cf. Hinterwimmer 2005). One prerequisite for this reading
is that each situation contains only one single individual for which the descriptive
content of the singular definite description holds. For the paraphrase in (102), the
set of situations could be fixed as those occasions in which someone plays 4. N × P.
Therefore, (102) can be made more precise, see (103).
(103) According to all textbooks: For most occasions where someone plays 4. N ×
P, the unique person who plays 4. N × P gets in trouble with 4. N × P.
In case you is interpreted impersonally, it can either show a quantificational variability
effect with the adverb of quantification often, or be interpreted as bound by the generic
operator. The first option is paraphrased in (104). For the second option, often is
interpreted in the scope of a generic operator as paraphrased in (105).
(104) According to all textbooks: Most people who play 4. N × P get in trouble
with 4. N × P.
(105) According to all textbooks: For all relevantly normal people regarding the
move 4. N × P, it is often the case that they get in trouble with 4. N × P.
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If deferred reference and the impersonal use of personal pronouns are two distinct
phenomena, the chess example is three-way ambiguous with the interpretations given
in (103), (104), and (105). At this point it is unclear, though, whether all of these
interpretations constitute distinct readings of (101). As far as I can tell, the German
translation of (101) in (106) is only two way ambiguous between an impersonal and a























‘According to all textbooks, you often get in trouble with that move.’
The readings resulting from an impersonal use of du and the deferred reference reading
for du intuitively fall together.
Based on this observation, it could be argued that the impersonal use and the deferred
ostension readings for singular personal pronouns are one and the same, and therefore
should be given the same analysis. As argued in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, however, the im-
personal uses of personal and impersonal pronouns do not behave like singular definite
descriptions while personal pronouns in deferred ostension cases do. I will not try to
resolve this problem; a detailed discussion of the link between the impersonal use and
the deferred reference readings of personal pronouns is out of the scope of this thesis.
2.5.2 A formal account inspired by Nunberg (1993)
Nunberg (1993) does not provide a full formalization for his three-component account.
For some of the examples he discusses, he suggests truth-conditions, though. For
instance, for (107-a) he argues that we contributes a contextually determined kind,
and sketches the formula in (107-b).
(107) a. We don’t talk with our mouths full.
b. ¬Talk-with-their-mouths-full(ιxR(cs)(x))
where x ranges over kinds
(adapted with minor changes from Nunberg 1993:16f)
Inspired by Nunberg’s account, Elbourne (2008) proposes a formal account to analyze
demonstratives. He argues that pronominal expressions should be analyzed as definite
descriptions60, and that, once formalized, Nunberg’s proposal can also account for
60This view goes back to at least Elbourne (2005) and the observation that E-type uses of third
person singular pronouns require an analysis as definite descriptions. Elbourne generalizes this idea
to all uses of third person pronouns.
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deferred reference uses of third person singular personal pronouns and bare and complex
demonstratives.
Elbourne proposes a syntacticized version of Nunberg’s account; for pronominal ex-
pressions, he introduces the complex syntactic representation in (108).
(108) [ pronoun [ R1 i2 ] ]
R . . . models the contextually determined relation
i . . . models the index
(cf. Elbourne 2008:421)
The variables i and R model the index and the contextually determined relation holding
between the index and the referent. Both variables are a fixed part of the syntactic
representation of personal pronouns, and are left unbound.61
The paraphrases given by Nunberg for the deferred reference examples fit in with
Elbourne’s previous work on pronouns as definite descriptions (cf. Elbourne 2005, 2008).
Although Nunberg at some point suggests that the referent of a personal pronoun can be
either an individual or (essentially) an individual concept, Elbourne aims for maximal
generality, and argues that a pronoun always contributes an individual concept, i.e. a
function from worlds/situations to individuals.
To generate the individual concept interpretation compositionally, Elbourne proposes
that R1 is a variable of type 〈e, 〈se, st〉〉 (i.e. an intensional relation between individuals
and individual concepts), and i2 is a variable of type e. The values of the free variables
R1 and i2 are specified contextually by the variable assignment g. The denotation of
the subtree [ R1 i2 ] is R(i), which is of type 〈se, st〉.62
The pronominal forms are interpreted as definite determiners that take R(i) as their
argument, and return the individual concept λs.ιx[R(i)(λs′.x)(s) = 1]. This is the
concept that returns the unique individual x such that the “variable concept”, [λs′. x],
stands in relation R to the index i in a given situation of evaluation s.63
61Elbourne (2008) states that i and R correspond to the deictic component and the relational
component, respectively. This does not correspond to Nunberg’s original proposal. The relational
component does not provide the relation in which the index and the referent stand to each other, but
only general constraints on possible relations. Furthermore, the indexical component acts like a func-
tion from contexts to individuals, and cannot be equated with its output. Consequently, to stay true
to Nunberg’s original account, R can only be meant as the relation that was determined contextually
and/or through speaker intentions, and is constrained by the relational component. Similarly, i has
to be seen as the index.
62For reasons of simplicity and readability, I use R and i for both the variables and their contextually
assigned values g(1) and g(2), respectively.
63Compare the meaning proposed for it in (109) to the meaning usually assigned to the definite
determiner the in (i).
(i) JtheKg,w,c = λf〈se,st〉.λs. ιx[f(λs′.x)(s) = 1]
(Elbourne 2008:416)
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(109) JitKg,w,c = λf〈se,st〉.λs. ιx[f(λs′.x)(s) = 1]
(Elbourne 2008:421)
The interpretation of an “indexical structure” is computed from its complex under-
lying structure as shown in the following example.
(110) J[ pronoun [ R i ]]Kg,w,c =
J pronoun Kg,w,c (J R Kg,w,c(J i Kg,w,c)) =
λf〈se,st〉.λs.ιx[f(λs
′.x)(s) = 1] (R(i)) =
λs.ιx[R(i)(λs′.x)(s) = 1]64
Depending on the contextually determined value for R, the semantic contribution
of a pronoun corresponds to a deferred reference reading or to a standard referential
reading.
Elbourne (2008) does not apply the above formalization to first and second person
singular pronouns. Given his inspiration, however, an account of these pronouns can
be given by straightforwardly assigning the values proposed in Nunberg (1993) to the
variables R and i. The non-deferred referential reading for I, for example, is derived
by contextually assigning the identity relation to R:
(111) λye.λx〈se,st〉.λs.y = x(s) in s
The index i is fixed by the lexical entry of I to be the speaker of the utterance, cs. The
result for the referential use of I without deferred ostension is given in (112).
(112) λs. ιx[cS = [λs
′.x](s) in s] = λs. ιx[cS = x in s]
Elbourne does not explicitly formalize the classificatory component. He suggests, how-
ever, that presuppositional φ-features could be included in his account, i.e. morphosyn-
tactic features that trigger presuppositions on the final semantic value of a pronoun
(cf. Heim and Kratzer 1998 and Section 1.5.3).
Notably in Elbourne’s account, the lexical pronominal expression is only one of three
parts featuring in a complex structure. The final semantic value that Nunberg proposes
as the semantic contribution of a pronominal expression is therefore not the meaning
of the lexical pronominal expression, but the meaning that is assigned to the entire
complex tree structure in (108).65
One problematic aspect of Elbourne’s formalization in general is his choice to fully
syntacticize Nunberg’s original account. Introducing the variables R and i into the syn-
In Elbourne’s system, the definite determiner takes properties of individual concepts as arguments.
Elbourne assumes that each nominal element is evaluated with respect to a situation variable.
64Compare this denotation with Nunberg’s suggestion in (107-b).
65For reasons of space, I do not give Elbourne’s analysis of demonstratives as definite descriptions
based on his formalization. The interested reader is referred to Elbourne (2008:423ff).
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tax is a major conceptual departure from Nunberg’s original proposal. Nunberg argues,
in fact quite forcefully, that for none of the components, the values are contributed to
the truth-conditions of the sentence. So, even though the semantic values contributed
by an indexical may be similar to the contribution of a descriptive nominal expres-
sion, the indexicals’ lexical meaning is strictly indicative. In Elbourne’s formalization,
on the other hand, personal pronouns always contribute descriptive content—even in
their standard referential uses that do not involve deferred ostension. As discussed in
Section 1.5.2, Kaplan and Nunberg argue against analyzing I as the speaker (of this
utterance) since definite descriptions in contrast to indexicals interact with operators
on worlds/situations of evaluation. The descriptive content derived in Elbourne’s for-
malization of Nunberg’s account for the standard referential use of I, i.e. being identical
to cS, is different from the descriptive content argued against by Kaplan and Nunberg.
Nevertheless, this proposal runs into similar problems. The following sentence is in-
tuitively true, but since definite descriptions involve a uniqueness presupposition that
cannot be satisfied in the accessible worlds (because of the antecedent), the sentence
is predicted to be truth-valueless.
(113) If no one were to exist, I would not exist, either.
Another unfortunate aspect of Elbourne’s proposal regarding the aim of this thesis
is that his formalization cannot be used to capture the impersonal uses of personal
pronouns: singular personal pronouns in all of their uses come out as singular definite
descriptions. In the following section, I modify Elbourne’s semantic proposal for my
purposes, and build on it to propose a unified account of a different kind to capture the
impersonal and referential uses of personal pronouns. The complex syntactic structure
proposed in (108) is, for now, adopted as it is.
2.5.3 A unified account of personal pronouns as indefinites
Having set the stage in the previous subsections, I now turn to propose a unified account
of all uses of first and second person singular personal pronouns.66 The proposal is based
on the formal analysis of impersonal pronouns as Heimian indefinites (cf. Section 2.3),
and the syntactic structure proposed in Elbourne (2008). The basic strategy at the
heart of the account is, more or less, to assimilate personal pronouns to impersonal
pronouns.
Semantically, I suggest, pronomial structures are Heimian indefinites that contribute
descriptive content based on a contextually determined relation in the sense of Nun-
berg (1993). The relation links the contextually contributed index to a free variable,
which may then be bound by various quantifiers and operators, just like for impersonal
66A previous version of this account is discussed in Zobel (2010).
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pronouns. The pragmatic differences between personal and impersonal pronouns ob-
served in Section 1.4 are captured by placing different restrictions on the domain from
which the values of the variable may be taken. In the case of personal pronouns, the
domain is restricted by the three components proposed by Nunberg (1993); impersonal
pronouns, on the other hand, are only restricted to animate individuals. Note that this
means that impersonal and personal pronouns are not analyzed completely identically.
In the course of the following proposal, I focus exclusively on German first person
singular ich and second person singular du. But, the account should be applicable to
other personal pronouns that allow for referential and impersonal uses, as well.
Examples (114) and (115) repeat Nunberg’s proposal for I and you.
(114) The components of I :
a. deictic component: the index is the speaker in c
b. relational component: restricts the possible relations to those that relate
the index to semantic values that the speaker instantiates
c. classificatory component: constrains the final referent to singular, ani-
mate etc. individuals
(115) The components of you:
a. deictic component: the index is the addressee in c
b. relational component: restricts the possible relations to those that relate
the index to semantic values that the speaker instantiates
c. classificatory component: constrains the final referent to singular, ani-
mate etc. individuals
Even though the restrictions that are jointly placed on the final semantic contribution
of first and second person singular pronouns are quite restrictive, Nunberg’s account
provides enough freedom and flexibility to derive the impersonal uses. The crucial
feature of the account in this respect is the inbuilt mechanism of deferral.
As a starting point, I assume that the components for German first and second
person singular pronouns are as specified in (114) and (115). Some adaptations of
these specifications will become necessary in the course of the following discussion,
though.
As stated above, I adopt Elbourne’s (2008) general syntactic structure, and I assume
that the values picked by the deictic component and the relational component are
attributed as values to the two free variables, i and R, as well. Since I pursue an
analysis of the impersonal uses of first and second person singular pronouns as Heimian
indefinites, I adapt Elbourne’s structure by replacing the pronominal form by a free
variable. This results in the structure in (116), which is assumed to be common to (at
least) first and second person singular pronouns in all of their uses.
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(116) [ x [ R2 i1 ] ]
x . . . free variable contributed by the pronoun
i . . . models Nunberg’s index
R . . . models the contextually determined relation between x and i
Since I remove the pronominal form, which Elbourne assumes to feature in the un-
derlying complex structure, I have to say something about how I assume pronominal
spell-out to work. For the adapted account, I adopt a view on pronominal spell-out sim-
ilar to that argued for in Kratzer (2009). Following work in Harley and Ritter (2002)
and others, Kratzer assumes that the semantic contribution of personal pronouns is
built up from featural building blocks, i.e. φ-features. The pronominal form itself is
not part of the computation, but is only the phonological form chosen at Spell-Out
relative to the φ-feature composition present in the syntax. For the current proposal,
this means that the pronominal form spells out the entire complex structure in (116).
In accordance with the change proposed for the underlying syntactic structure, the
semantic type of the variable R needs to be adjusted, as well. Since the variables
x and i range over individuals and are therefore expressions of type e, the relational
variable has the semantic type 〈e, 〈e, st〉〉. The syntactic structure in (116) is therefore
interpreted as in (117).67
(117) J[x [R i ]]Kg,w,c =
JR Kg,w,c(Ji Kg,w,c)(JxKg,w,c) =
λw.R(i)(x)(w)
The specific semantic contributions of ich or du in their various uses depend on the
values chosen for R and i and the binder of the free variable.
The value for i is the speaker in c, i.e. cS, in the case of ich, and the addressee in c,
i.e. cA, in the case of du. That is, the values of i distinguish the two pronominal forms.
The different uses of a single pronominal form are distinguished by the different values
for R and the operators binding the free variable x.
For the impersonal uses, the free variable x is bound by a generic operator Gen
at sentence level. Krifka et al. (1995) propose that the generic operator relates two
open propositions, which form the restrictor and the scope (or: matrix ) of the generic
operator. The restrictor specifies which variables are bound by Gen, and which are
closed existentially, see (118).
(118) Gen [x1, . . . xi; y1, . . . , yj ](Restrictor[x1, . . . xi]; Matrix[{x1}, . . . {xi}, y1, . . . , yj ])⇔
Gen [x1, . . . xi; ](Restrictor[x1, . . . xi];∃y1, . . . , yj [Matrix[{x1}, . . . {xi}, y1, . . . , yj ]])
(Krifka et al. 1995:26)
67The values that are contextually determined by the variable assignment g for R and i are again
written as R and i.
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Generic quantification over individuals has been assumed to express universal quantifi-
cation over normal or typical individuals. For the moment, I adopt this interpretation.68
Consider examples (119) and (120)—specifically the material that is translated by











































‘A team simply has to want to win more than the opponent.’70
These examples show that for the impersonal use, the restrictor of Gen contains the
expression [λw.R(i)(x)(w)] contributed by the pronoun, the predication contributed
by the associated als-phrase, and possibly other non-focused material (cf. Krifka et al.
1995). For a fully specified account, though, the value for R and the role of the
classificatory component still need to be determined.
The main ingredient in Nunberg’s account of deferred reference is the contextu-
ally contributed relation restricted by the relational component. The only restriction
Nunberg attributes to the relational component is that the relation needs to be “in-
stantiated” by the index. That is, no matter which value is chosen as the final semantic
value for the pronoun, the index has to be in some sense part of its denotation.
Examples (119) and (120) both express generalizations about soccer teams. This
means that in both cases, the variable x has to range over a set of individuals which
contains soccer teams. If this were not the case, the additional restriction introduced
via the als-phrase, which is also interpreted in the restrictor of Gen, would result in
the empty set. Hence, the question regarding the value of R for (119) and (120) is as
follows: Which relations relate the speaker or the addressee to individuals of various
forms, including soccer teams, and are instantiated by the speaker or the addressee?
I propose that the value for R is an identification relation that relates individuals
to sets of individuals with whom they empathize (cf. Moltmann 2006, 2010a). Hence,
for the impersonal uses I fix the value for R as the following “identifies-with”-relation,
which I take to be a semantic primitive.
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(121) λye.λxe.λw.identifies-with(y)(x)(w)
For this relation, Nunberg’s instantiation requirement holds since every individual can
be assumed to stand in an empathic relation to himself. Moreover, R can be seen as
modelling the speaker- and participant-oriented pragmatic effects described in Section
1.4, which are based on the speaker’s and the addressee’s empathy.
I now turn to the classificatory component for the impersonal uses, which has been
neglected so far. Elbourne (2008) proposes to model the featural restrictions con-
tributed by the classificatory component as presuppositions on the meaning of the
entire complex structure (cf. Section 2.5.2). This fits with Nunberg’s original proposal,
who suggests that the classificatory component restricts the final semantic value rather
than the value for the index, see (122). Here, a plural demonstrative is accompanied
with a gesture to a single sample plate.
(122) In a china shop:
These are over at the warehouse, but those I have in stock here.
(Nunberg 1993:24)
Similarly in the case of first person plural we, the index (i.e. the speaker) is a singu-
lar individual, but the classificatory component restricts the final semantic value to
pluralities.
For the classificatory component of impersonally used personal pronouns, I need to
depart from Nunberg’s original proposal. As discussed in Section 1.2, the impersonal
uses are morphologically indistinguishable from their referential uses, and share the
same agreement patterns, i.e. they share the same morphosyntactic features. Therefore,
I suggest that the classificatory component of ich and du in all of their uses contains
the respective sets of morphosyntactic features (φ-features) proposed in Kratzer (2009):
the feature set for ich is {[1st], [singular]}, the one for du is {[2nd], [singular]}. Consider
the interpretation proposed for these features in Kratzer (2009).
(123) a. J[1st]NK
g,w,c = the speaker(s) of c
b. J[2nd]NK
g,w,c = the addressee(s) of c
c. J[singular]Kg,w,c = λx : x is an atom. x
Since [1st] and [2nd] contribute the speaker and the addressee, respectively, I assume
that the classificatory component does not exclusively restrict the final semantic value
of a personal pronoun (pace Nunberg). In fact, the contributions of the person features,
[1st] and [2nd], are the values that Nunberg assigns to the index. I propose, therefore,
that the classificatory component depends on the pronoun’s morphosyntactic behavior,
and is responsible for restricting both the index (via person features) and the final
semantic value (via presuppositional features). Furthermore, the component regulates
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morphosyntactic agreement and phonological spell-out. For reasons of space, I leave
a detailed proposal for the connection between feature-based theories, like Kratzer
(2009), and the account proposed in Nunberg (1993) for further investigation.
So, if only the presuppositional features restrict the overall interpretation of personal
pronouns, the truth-conditional contribution for impersonally used first person singular
ich and second person singular du come out as in (124). The schematic proposal for
the truth-conditional content of sentences containing impersonally used ich and du,
respectively, are given in (125).71,72
(124) a. JichKg,w,c = λw.identifies-with(cS)(x)(w), defined if x is atomic
b. JduKg,w,c = λw.identifies-with(cA)(x)(w), defined if x is atomic
(125) a. Gen [x; ](identifies-with(cS)(x) & φ;ψ)
‘All normal individuals who the speaker in c identifies with, and who are
φ are ψ.’
b. Gen [x; ](identifies-with(cA)(x) & φ;ψ)
‘All normal individuals who the addressee in c identifies with, and who
are φ are ψ.’
In addition to the generic operator Gen, adverbs of quantification and the existential
quantifier contributed by existential closure (cf. Diesing 1992) can also bind the free
variable x contributed in the pronomial structure. If x in (124) is bound by an adverb
of quantification, the result is a quantificational variability reading.
The referential use—including the deferred reference use—of ich and du are captured
when the variable x is bound by the existential quantifier contributed by existential
closure. The standard referential uses and the deferred reference cases only differ with
respect to the value assigned to the relation variable R.
For the referential use, I follow Elbourne (2008) in assigning the identity relation,
[λw.λye.λxe.y = x in w], to R. Referentially used ich and du consequently have the
following general structure.73
(126) a. Referential use of ich: λw.x = cS in w, defined if x is atomic
b. Referential use of du: λw.x = cA in w, defined if x is atomic
The compositional derivation of the truth-conditional content of episodic sentences con-
taining standard referential uses of ich and du involves two non-standard combinatorial
mechanisms: First, because of a type clash, the complex pronominal structure always
71To improve readability, presuppositions are not included in a formula whenever possible.
72Since so far no compositional account for the meaning of generic sentences exists, no step-by-step
derivation of the truth-conditions in (125) will be given.
73Note that the referential uses and the deferred ostension readings of personal pronouns in this
account come out as quantificational, due to the analysis of personal pronouns as Heimian indefinites.
This is one of the flaws of this account that will be discussed below in Section 2.6.
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has to be raised. A trace that is co-indexed with the free variable x is introduced in the
position from where the structure is moved, but is crucially not bound by a λ-binder.
Second, the open proposition contributed by the pronominal structure and the open
proposition resulting from the rest of the sentence are conjoined by a generalized ver-
sion of predicate modification. The co-indexed variables in the resulting single open
proposition are then existentially bound via existential closure at the clause level. This
results in the following schematically given truth-conditional content.
(127) a. λw.∃x[x = cS in w & P (x)(w)]
b. λw.∃x[x = cA in w & P (x)(w)]
Note that referentially used personal pronouns in generic sentences are interpreted in
the scope of the generic operator, where they are by default existentially bound, see
(118).
The truth-conditional content given in (127) is logically equivalent to the truth-
conditional content of sentences in which the first or second person singular pro-
nouns contained in them were interpreted direct-referentially. That is, after evalu-
ating the propositions with respect to the actual world, w0, the expression ∃x[x =
cS in w0 & P (x)(w0)] is equivalent to P (cS)(w0). This is the case since there is only
one individual that is identical to the speaker, and this is the speaker herself. Analo-
gously, the expression ∃x[x = cA in w0 & P (x)(w0)] is equivalent to P (cA)(w0).
The deferred ostension readings are also accounted for if the value of the relational
variable R is a contextually determined relation, other than the identity relation. The
schematic truth-conditional content of sentences containing deferred ostension uses of
a first person singular pronoun is given in (128).
(128) λw.∃x[R(cS)(x)(w) & P (x)(w)]
Depending on the contextual value assigned toR, different sets of individuals are related
to the speaker, and hence different instances of deferred reference arise.
In sum, I propose to model the personal pronouns ich and du as Heimian indefinites
with an underlying structure that was adapted from Elbourne (2008). Conceptually, the
account is based on the three-component account proposed in Nunberg (1993). More
specifically, I propose that first and second person singular pronouns are expressions
that relate an individual variable to the speaker and the hearer, respectively. The
different uses of both pronouns arise from different combinations regarding (i) the
binder of the individual variable and (ii) the relation assumed to hold between the
variable and the speaker/the hearer.
Note that even though the standard referential uses of ich and du are modelled as
existentially quantifying expressions, they are definite in the sense of Abbott (2014) (cf.
Section 2.4): they can be only used to refer to a single individual which the addressee
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can identify. The same holds for the deferred reference cases, although identifiabil-
ity depends on the choice of relation. The impersonal uses, however, are decidedly
not definite—but see the discussion on the (in)definiteness of noun phrases in generic
sentences in Section 2.4.
2.6 A critical evaluation of the proposal in 2.5.3
The aims of this section are first to compare the account proposed in Section 2.5.3 to
Malamud’s (2006; 2007) account as introduced in Section 2.3, and to then critically
evaluate both accounts with respect to their predictions regarding the data. The main
problems faced by the account proposed in Section 2.5.3 concern the core ingredient
that was used to unify the referential and impersonal uses: the context-dependent
relation that links the index and the individual variable introduced by the pronoun.
The comparison to Malamud’s account, I believe, is instructive since, as mentioned
in Section 2.5, the two accounts are rather similar on the formal level. Malamud also
aims to give a unified account for the impersonal and referential uses, and analyzes
you as an indefinite expression, as well. The first difference to the account proposed
in Section 2.5.3 is that Malamud formalizes you as a generalized quantifier with hard-
wired existential force, see (129).
(129) JyouKg,w,c = λs.λP. ∃y[persona(y)(addressee(c))(s) & P (y)(s)]
Since Malamud’s proposal makes you similar to existential quantifiers like someone
(Germ. ‘jemand’), the question arises of how Malamud can account for the differences
between these expressions. Note that the behavior of jemand (Engl. ‘someone’) de-
scribed in Section 2.2.3 suggests that its existential force is hard-wired in its lexical
entry: (i) it behaves like a quantificational expression with respect to scope taking, and
(ii) it cannot co-vary with Gen or adverbs of quantification.
For German second person singular du, I assume, in contrast, that the pronoun
contributes an open proposition of a sort, i.e. a property containing a free variable, see
(130).
(130) JduKg,w,c = λw.x = cA in w
The operator which binds the free variable and contributes its quantificational force is
not part of the lexical entry of the pronoun.
Nevertheless, both accounts propose a similar propositional meaning to sentences
containing these pronouns. Compare (131) to (132), which contain referential uses of
you and du, respectively.
(131) a. You burned a house.
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b. λs0.∃y∃z[persona(y)(addressee(c))(s0) & house(z)(s0) & burned(y)(z)(s0)]











‘You set a house on fire.’
b. λw.∃x∃y[x = cA in w & house(y)(w) & set-on-fire(y)(x)(w)]
The two accounts also agree with respect to the internal structure of personal pronouns:
pronouns contain a relation that links a contextually given individual to a variable. In
Malamud’s account this is the persona-relation, which occurs in the referential and
impersonal uses. In the account proposed in Section 2.5.3, the relation that links the
two individual denoting expressions is contextually determined and varies across uses.
For the impersonal uses of second person you/du, Malamud’s persona-relation plays
a similar role to the identifies-with-relation proposed above. Both relations take the
addressee, and relate her to those individuals that she empathizes/identifies with. In
both accounts, this is used to model the participant-related effects observed in Section
1.4.
The accounts crucially differ further with respect to (i) the underspecification of the
lexical meanings, and (ii) the interaction between binding operators and the pronominal
meaning.
With respect to the first point, the account presented in Section 2.5.3 is less restrictive
than the proposal in Malamud (2006, 2007). Since R is an unrestricted, free variable
any contextually given relation—observing certain restrictions—can be assigned to R.
Because of this freedom, the different uses, including the deferred ostension cases—can
be derived by assuming different values for R. Since Malamud models impersonal and
referential uses with the same persona-relation, this commits her to the assumptions
that (i) the different uses solely depend on the different co-occurring operators, and
that (ii) the set of people that the addressee empathizes with may vary.74
Regarding co-occurring operators, Malamud assumes that they all are quantifiers over
situations, and that they do not bind individual variables. That is, the impersonal use
and quantificational variability effects are modelled indirectly by quantification over
situations (cf. Section 2.3.2).75 The individual variable y that is part of the meaning
of you remains existentially bound in these readings. In contrast, for the account
proposed in Section 2.5.3 it is assumed that the generic operator Gen and adverbs of
quantification bind the free individual variable contributed by the pronoun. If no such
74Note, though, that her formal proposal cannot capture any context-dependent variance regarding
the set of people the addressee empathizes with; the value of the persona-relation only depends on the
situation of evaluation.
75See von Fintel (2004/1995) and Portner (2009) for a situation semantic account of quantificational
variability effects which may be extended to account for generic quantification. Cf. also Krifka et al.
(1995) for a situation semantic interpretation of Gen.
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operator is present, existential closure applies. Table 2.6 schematically summarizes the
comparison between the two accounts.
relation possible binders of x variables bound by






existential quantifier ∃ situation variable s
Section 2.5.3 free vari-
able R




Table 2.6: Summary: Malamud (2006, 2007) vs. the account in Section 2.5.3
I now turn to issues that arise for the account presented in Section 2.5.3. Given the
similarity between this account and Malamud’s (2006; 2007), some of these issues also
apply to the latter. This is pointed out at the relevant places. In sum, I present seven
points, of which the first five concern the formal specifics of the account, i.e. the complex
structure adopted for personal pronouns from Elbourne (2008) and its interpretation,
and the last two are general considerations regarding co-occurring operators.
The biggest problem for the account concerns a discussion in Nunberg (1993) on the
semantic contribution of indexicals. As argued in Nunberg (1993), first and second
person pronouns never contribute descriptive content to the meaning of a sentence (cf.
Sections 1.5 and 2.5.1). Both of the accounts compared above contribute descriptive
content, and therefore may run into the well-known problems connected to modal
operators (cf. Section 2.5.2).
The descriptive content contributed by the pronouns is also the source for the second
problem, which arises because the contextually determined relation R and index i are
part of the asserted, truth-conditional content. This means that they restrict the
domain of quantification to the set of individuals the speaker or addressee identifies
with for any of the binding operators. Consequently, truth-conditional equivalence
between the different impersonal uses cannot be ensured. It is predicted, for instance,
that a speaker cannot express the same truth-conditional meaning with two sentences
containing distinct impersonally used pronouns. Since the speaker and the addressee
may have different sets of people they empathize with, different impersonally used
pronouns generalize over possibly different sets of people. In the most extreme cases,
the binding operators may even have disjoint domains. This is not reflected in the
data, though. As shown in Section 1.2, a speaker may freely switch between different
pronominal forms to generalize over the same set of individuals, see (133).
(133) Wenn ich als Händler Schrott kaufe, dann muss ich mit so etwas rech-
nen. [. . . ] Wenn du als Händler von jemanden ein Fahrzeug kaufst und
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dann weiter verkaufen möchtest, dann musst du den Wagen vorher überprüfen
lassen.
‘If a trader buys trash, he has to expect a situation like this.[. . . ] If a trader
buys a vehicle from someone, and he wants to resell it, he has to let it get
checked beforehand.’76
The third problematic point is that the contextually determined relation R is an unre-
stricted free variable, and therefore the variable assignment can in principle assign any
relation of the right type to it.77 In Section 2.5.3, I proposed different values for R that
capture the respective readings of ich and du. However, at the moment nothing blocks
the possibility that the identification relation, which is involved in the impersonal uses,
features in deferred reference cases. Similarily, nothing determines that the identity
relation is not a possible value for R in the impersonal uses.
This is clearly a problem of overgeneration, and there are two possible ways to address
it: The first option is to say that the unattested combinations mentioned above are
not prohibited; they are simply no plausible candidates for the meaning of ich and
du. The second option is to explicitly tie the combinations of values for R and the
necessary operators to the different uses. Both options are not unproblematic. Since
both options first need to be worked out further to be discussed in detail, neither will
be addressed further in this thesis; the other problems mentioned in this section are,
to my mind, already reasons enough to discard this type of account in general.
The fourth and fifth issues are not serious conceptual problems like the first three
problems, but counter-intuitive predictions made by the account.
The fourth issue arises because in neither of the accounts compared above, referen-
tially used pronouns aredirectly-referential expressions. In fact, in the account proposed
in Section 2.5.3, referentially used pronouns are analyzed more or less like Russellian
definite descriptions. Consider (134), in which the identity statement restricts the
domain of possible values for x to cS.
(134) ∃x[cS = x in w0 & P (x)(w0)]
As discussed in Section 2.4, Russell’s quantificational proposal for definite descriptions,
which asserts uniqueness, interacts in an undesirable way with sentential negation. The
same is true for the proposal in (134).
(135) ¬∃x[cS = x in w0 & P (x)(w0)]⇔
∀x¬[cS = x in w0 & P (x)(w0)]⇔
∀x[cS 6= x in w0 ∨ ¬P (x)(w0)]
76http://diskussionen.quoka.de/viewtopic.php?t=691
77Besides the instantiation requirement, no other restrictions on the contextually determined rela-
tions are discussed in Nunberg’s original account.
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It is predicted that a negated sentence containing a referential use of ich, for example,
asserts that all individuals are such that they are not identical to the speaker, or P
does not hold of them. This makes the counter-intuitive prediction that a sentence
like I don’t sleep at the moment asserts something about other individuals besides the
speaker; more specifically, that these individuals are (trivially) not the same person
as the speaker. Since the final formula in (135) is equivalent with ¬P (cS), this could
be seen as a negligible issue—if one is prepared to accept the conceptually unintuitive
consequences. A similar issue was discussed in Section 2.3.2 for Malamud’s account.
The fifth issue is that the referential use of personal pronouns is predicted to be a
last resort reading. Since the referential use is derived via existential closure of the free
variable, it is predicted to arise only if no other quantifier binds the free variable first.
This is in conflict with the observation that the referential use is the predominant use
of personal pronouns; the impersonal use the special case. As discussed in Section 2.3,
this problem also applies to Malamud’s (2006; 2007) proposal.
The last two problems—or rather open issues—concern the (expected) interaction
between the meanings proposed for personal pronouns and co-occurring operators—
independently of the specific internal structure of the pronouns.
First, since personal pronouns are analyzed as Heimian indefinites, it is expected that
all operators that can bind a free variable contributed by an indefinite can also bind the
variable contributed by personal pronouns. This is borne out for the generic operator,
adverbs of quantification, and existential closure. For modal verbs/auxiliaries, the
possible interactions still need to be determined.
Second, most recent work on the meaning of generic sentences stresses their intension-
ality (cf. Krifka et al. 1995): generic sentences do not express accidental generalizations,
but general rules, regulations, and norms. To express this type of meaning formally, an
account is needed that involves evaluation in a relevant set of possible worlds. For the
moment, I adopt the modal interpretation proposed in Krifka et al. (1995), see (136).
(136) Gen[x1, . . . , xi; y1, . . . , yj](Restrictor;Scope) is true in w relative to a modal
base Bw and an ordering source ≤w iff:
∀x1, . . . , xi∀w′ ∈ Bw[Restrictor(x1, . . . , xi)(w′)→ ∃w′′ ∈ Bw[w′′ ≤w w′ &
∀w′′′[w′′′ ≤w w′′ → ∃yi, . . . , yj[Matrix(x1, . . . , xi, y1, . . . , yj)(w′′′)]]]]
(Krifka et al. 1995:52)
According to this interpretation, the generic operator introduces universal quantifi-
cation over most normal worlds and over the individuals that exist in these worlds;
example (137) paraphrases (136) along these lines.
(137) In all most normal worlds w′, all individuals which have the properties in the
restrictor in w′ are such that they have the properties in the matrix in w′.
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When the modal interpretation of the generic operator is combined with the meaning for
impersonally used personal pronouns proposed in Section 2.5.3, a sentence containing
an impersonally used personal pronoun is interpreted as follows (cf. also example (125)).
(138) In all most normal worlds w′, all individuals x for which identifies-with(i)(x)
and φ hold in w′ are such that ψ holds for them in w′.
For the interpretation of sentences containing an impersonal use, quantification over
most normal worlds seems inadequate. According to (136), it is assumed that in the
accessible worlds, all individuals behave according to the laws and rules under consid-
eration. That is, for generic sentences which express moral rules, for example, the most
normal worlds are the morally most conforming worlds. This is too strong, though.
Generic sentences containing impersonally used personal pronouns that express moral
rules only state that these rules apply to the individuals the generalization is “about”,
i.e. only to the domain of the variable contributed by the impersonally interpreted
personal pronoun. No specific moral behavior is expected of any of the other entities



































’A bridal couple can’t expect their guests to more or less pay for the party!’78
In example (139), the rule of conduct expressed by the sentence is only stated for bridal
couples, but not e.g. for their guests. This is supported by the possibility to continue





















‘Even if they usually only spend their money buying junk.’
Therefore, for an adequate formalization of (139), one has to assume a stronger tie
between the modal meaning of the generic operator and the contribution of the imper-
sonally used personal pronoun (including the als-phrase). The desired result would be
that Gen picks out only the morally most normal worlds for bridal couples.
In sum, seven issues and problems were identified that need to be addressed and,
if possible, solved for the account to adequately capture the data. In Chapter 4, the
most radical solution for the first five problems is pursued, i.e. to discard Elbourne’s
(2008) syntacticized formalization of Nunberg (1993) altogether. The last two issues,
78http://www.urbia.de/archiv/forum/th-2142726/Wieviel-Geld-zur-Hochzeit-
schenken.html
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which concern the possible binders and the interpretation of Gen are taken up, and
discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
2.7 Summary
The main result of this section is the unified account proposed in Section 2.5.3. To
briefly sum up the cornerstones of the account: It is based on Nunberg (1993), who
argues against direct-reference accounts based on the ideas in Kaplan (1978 [1989]),
and who proposes a complex three-component account for the meaning of personal
pronouns (cf. Section 2.5.1). The specific formalization of the account is based on the
formalization in Elbourne (2008), which is inspired by Nunberg’s three-component ac-
count. The account also incorporates ideas from previous work on impersonal pronouns
(cf. Section 2.2) and on the impersonal uses of second person singular pronouns (cf.
Section 2.3).
The interlude in Section 2.4 addressed the tenability of a unified account with respect
to the question whether the different uses are unifiable given their (in)definiteness
behavior. Together with the list of problems identified in Section 2.6, the results
regarding the (in)definiteness problem for personal and impersonal pronouns suggest
that a unified semantic account that captures all of their uses based on underspecified
lexical entries does not seem to be tenable.
In Chapter 4, I address the impersonal use of ich and du again, but discard the aim
to give a unified account for the two pronouns. Instead I focus on the observation that
impersonally used ich, du, and man bring about different pragmatic effects. The aim
of Chapter 4 is to account for them in a way that avoids the problems caused by the
descriptive content contributed in the accounts presented in this chapter.
In Chapter 3, I now turn to the last two problems discussed in Section 2.6. The main
topics that are discussed are (i) whether modals are potential binders for variables intro-
duced by impersonally used pronouns, and (ii) what an adequate modal interpretation




The impersonal use, modals, and
generic sentences
3.1 Introduction
Chapters 1 and 2, so far, focussed on empirical observations regarding impersonally
used pronouns and various proposals to account for them—some that try to account
for only the impersonal uses, and some that try to account for all of the observable
uses. In Section 2.6, the unified account proposed in Section 2.5.3 was evaluated, and
various issues were identified. Two of these issues concern the intensional sentential
contexts in which the impersonal uses occur.
The first issue is connected to the analysis of the personal pronouns ich and du as
Heimian indefinites. It was argued that the free variable contributed by these pronouns
can be bound by different operators, depending on the intended interpretation of the
pronoun. These binders include the generic operator, adverbs of quantification, and
the existential quantifier contributed by existential closure. The first question that this
chapter aims to answer is whether other operators that may bind variables contributed
by indefinite expressions are also possible binders for the free variable contributed by
ich and du. In particular: Are modals possible binders? This is addressed in Section
3.4.
The second issue concerns an observation regarding the predictions made by the
modal interpretation of the generic operator as proposed in Krifka et al. (1995). The
account predicts that generalizations that are expressed with impersonally used ich,
du, or man demand that all individuals denoted by some nominal expression in the
sentence have to behave in a normal or ideal manner. However, intuitively, the gener-
alizations only require particular normal behavior of those individuals that are denoted
by the pronouns. Hence, the second aim of this chapter is to investigate whether alter-
native semantic accounts for Gen exist that can account for the intuitive connection
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observed above. In Section 3.3, I introduce and discuss three proposals for a modal
interpretation of the generic operator, Gen, in detail: Krifka et al. (1995), Drewery
(1998), and Greenberg (2007).
These two parts are connected in Section 3.5, where the interaction between modal
expressions and Gen is investigated for generic sentences in general. Based on this
discussion, I propose a two-operator analysis of the intensional sentential context for
those impersonally used pronouns that co-occur with overt modals.
The entire formal discussion in this chapter is based on Kratzer’s possible worlds
semantic account for German modal verbs and English modal auxiliaries introduced
in Section 3.2. Note also that to make matters simpler, it is assumed throughout
this chapter that impersonally used pronouns contribute just a simple free individual
variable to the truth-conditions of a sentence.
3.2 A possible worlds semantics for modality
3.2.1 The linguistic category of modality
The intensional sentential context for the impersonal uses of ich, du, and man is mostly
induced by “expressions” that are standardly analyzed as modal expressions, i.e. overt
modal verbs or a conditional sentence structure.
The aim of this section is to discuss the relevant semantic properties of one of these
types of expressions, i.e. English modal auxiliaries and German modal verbs, and to in-
troduce the Kratzerian possible worlds semantic account for these lexical items (Kratzer
1977, 1981a, 1991). The extension of Kratzer’s account to conditional sentences and its
connections to a genericity based account of impersonally used pronouns is discussed
in Appendix A3. Since a conditional sentence structure adds additional complications
from the point of view of modal semantics, Appendix A3 only sketches some first con-
siderations on conditional generics in general, and on conditional generics containing
overt modal verbs or auxiliaries in particular.1
The notional category of modality in natural language is connected to the ability of
humans to talk about situations and circumstances other than the physical context,
and to refer to entities that are not present in the here-and-now: i.e. “displacement”.
In the recent literature, two different definitions of modality with respect to dis-
placement are given: von Fintel and Heim (2011) define modality as the expression of
displacement along the non-temporal dimension, i.e. when circumstances other than
1Note that there is a vast amount of literature on both the semantics of modals and the interpre-
tation of conditional sentences. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to give a comprehensive survey
of the existing research. This section can only provide a brief summary on the topics that are needed
for the discussions on modal accounts of genericity in Section 3.3, on modals as binders in Section 3.4,
and on the interaction between modality and genericity in Sections 3.5 and Appendix A3.
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the here-and-now are addressed, excluding the temporal dimension. In contrast, Port-
ner (2009) defines modality as the expression of displacement in general, including
expressions of displacement exclusively along the temporal dimension.
Since Hintikka (1962) and Kripke (1963)2, alternative circumstances to the here-and-
now, i.e. “how things could be, or could have been different”, are viewed as possible
worlds. Possible worlds are fully specified alternatives, which means that for a given
possible world and for every sentence, it can be determined whether the sentence is
true or false given the circumstances in the world.
Regarding the temporal structure of possible worlds, two prominent views need to be
distinguished. According to the first view, possible worlds include all of their “history”
and “future”, i.e. all stages of the world at different points in time. This view is usually
adopted in the literature on modality (e.g. Kratzer 1977, 1981a, 1991; Portner 2009).
According to the second view, a possible world consists of one temporal stage only.
In other words, the temporal dimension is seen as an independent, external dimension
along which worlds vary. This second view is frequently adopted in the literature on
temporal logic and tense in natural language (cf. Mani et al. 2005). Since the problem
of the interaction of tense and modality is (mostly) orthogonal to the issues that are
addressed in this thesis, I leave aside the temporal dimension completely, and follow
the tradition in the literature on modality. For work on the interaction between tense
and modality, see e.g. Condoravdi (2002).
Portner (2009) distinguishes three categories of modal expressions found in natu-
ral language: (i) sentential modality, (ii) sub-sentential modality, and (iii) discourse
modality. In the following discussion, the category of sentential modality is central. It
covers modal auxiliaries, modal verbs, modal adverbs, generics, habituals, individual
level predicates, conditionals, and covert modality.3 The overt modal elements that
can be found in sentences containing impersonally used ich, du, and man are part of



































‘A guest goes there to have a nice evening and to listen to good music.’4
2Hintikka (1962) and Kripke (1963) independently developed their logical systems to address differ-
ent problems of modal logic. Hintikka discusses possible worlds semantics in the context of epistemic
logic. Kripke devised possible worlds semantics as a model for modal propositional logic. The possible
worlds interpretation of extension vs. intension is first proposed in Carnap (1947).
3Sub-sentential modality involves modal adjectives and nouns, propositional attitude verbs, verbal
mood, infinitives, dependent modals, and negative polarity items. Discourse modality, in contrast,
covers evidentiality, clause types, performativity, modal subordination. Cf. Portner (2009).
4http://106332.iboox.com/st_80.html






























































‘If a team wants to win, they also have to enter the field motivated.’6
As (1)–(3) show, impersonal uses are found in mono-clausal sentences with and without
overt modal elements, as well as in conditionals with (but also without) an overt modal
verb in the consequent.
3.2.2 A semantic account for modals
The most prominent analysis of modals that is adopted in the literature is the pos-
sible worlds account proposed in Kratzer (1977, 1981a, 1991), and its refinements in
subsequent work.7 Kratzer’s proposal is a generalized, context-sensitive version of the
Stalnaker/Lewis analysis of modality, which in turn is a generalization of the treatment
of necessity and possibility in propositional modal logic (cf. Blackburn et al. 2001).8
In propositional modal logic, necessity and possibility are syntactically represented
by the logical constants  and ♦. The expressions p and ♦p, where p is a proposition
symbol, are formulas of propositional modal logic, and express ‘p is necessary’ and ‘p
is possible’, respectively.
Necessity and possibility are interpreted as quantifiers over possible worlds with
respect to a model M :
(4) M = 〈〈W,R〉, V 〉)
The pair F = 〈W,R〉 is the frame of the model which consists of a set of worlds W
and an accessibility relation R.9 R ⊆ W ×W is a relation between possible worlds:
for w,w′ ∈ W , R(w)(w′) expresses that w′ is accessible from w. R defines a relational




7I use “modals” as a cover term for English modal auxiliaries and German modal verbs. In the
literature, it is usually assumed that German modal verbs and English modal auxiliaries differ with
respect to their syntactic behavior, but not in truth-conditional meaning.
8This summary owes a lot to the discussions in Portner (2009) and Hacquard (2011).
9The set of worlds W is sometimes called the set of “indices”. In this case, the term “index” is used
synonymously to the terms “world” or “world-time-pair”. Cf. Lewis (1986).
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The valuation function V assigns denotations to the syntactically well-formed formulae
of the logic relative to the frame F and a distinguished world, the world of evaluation.10
Necessity is interpreted as universal quantification, and possibility as existential
quantification over the set of worlds that is accessible from the world of evaluation
w. The interpretation of modal formulas of the form p and ♦p is given in (5).
(5) a. Necessity: VM,w(p) := ∀w′ ∈ W [R(w)(w′)→ p(w′)]
b. Possibility: VM,w(♦p) := ∃w′ ∈ W [R(w)(w′) & p(w′)]
The formalization of modality in propositional modal logic is too rigid to model modal-
ity as found in natural language. Kratzer (1981a) observes that cross-linguistically,
modals express various different types of necessity or possibility.11
(6) a. (In view of the available evidence,)
John must/might/may be the murderer. (epistemic)
b. (In view of his parent’s orders,)
John may watch TV, but he must go to bed at 8pm. (deontic)
c. (In view of his physical abilities,)
John can lift 200 lbs. (ability)
d. (In view of his goal to get a PhD,)
John must write a dissertation. (teleological)
e. (In view of his desire to retire at age 50,)
John should work hard now. (bouletic)
(Hacquard 2011:1485)
The same multiplicity of interpretation is also observed for German modal verbs. The










































10The typical world of evaluation is also called the “actual world” in the linguistic and philosophical
literature since usually the truth of sentences in the discourse situation, which is part of the actual
circumstances, is at issue. I use the more general term “world of evaluation” in the course of this
chapter.
11Nauze (2008), however, argues that this multiplicity in interpretation for English modal auxiliaries
is in fact a cross-linguistic exception.
12Note that in general, modals are restricted with respect to the types of necessity or possibility
that they can express. For instance, German dürfen only allows a limited range of non-epistemic
interpretations.























Kratzer argues that this systematic ambiguity found with the interpretation of modals
is the result of an underspecified, context-dependent semantics, rather than of lexical
ambiguity. This is the core observation, which is reflected dominantly in Kratzer’s
account. She assumes that the meaning of modals is determined by three parts: the
modal force, the choice of modal base, and the choice of ordering source. The modal
force may either be existential or universal quantification over worlds, and is the only
part that is hard-wired in the lexical entry of the modal.13 With respect to the modal
base and the ordering source, the lexical entries are crucially underspecified—both are
modelled as free variables. The values for variables that model the modal base, f, and
the ordering source, g, can be determined either overtly, e.g. by an in view of phrase,
or contextually.14 The values assigned to f and g are relations between worlds and sets
of propositions (i.e. sets of sets of worlds), called conversational backgrounds.
Accessibility in Kratzer’s doubly relative system is defined via the parameters f and
g. The idea is to split up the job of the accessibility relation R in propositional modal
logic among these two parameters, see (8).
(8) A world w′ is accessible from the world of evaluation w iff it is a member of the
modal base f that is optimal relative to the ordering induced by the ordering
source g.
This definition of accessible worlds as such does not guarantee that a set of accessible
worlds exists when a modal proposition is interpreted relative to an infinite set of
possible worlds W . For example, an infinite sequence of worlds may arise in which
there is always a world that is minimally better with respect to the ordering than
the previous world in the sequence. To avoid this complication, the so-called limit
assumption in (9) is made.
(9) Limit assumption:
For every infinite sequence of possible worlds, there is a set of possible worlds
that constitutes the limit of the sequence, i.e. for every set A of possible worlds
there is a determinable set of optimal worlds with respect to a given ordering
source g(w).15
13But see discussions on modals with apparent variable modal force, e.g. Rullmann et al. (2008).
14The modal parameters are set in a sans serif font to set the symbol for the ordering source
parameter, g, apart from the symbol used for the assignment function g.
15The limit assumption was first formulated and argued against in Lewis (1973). It is defended e.g.
in Stalnaker (1979).
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Since the question of the existence of a set of optimal worlds is independent of the
material that is addressed in this thesis, I simply follow other researchers in the field,
and assume the limit assumption.
The modal base f assigns a set of propositions f(w) to the world of evaluation w.
This set is used to determine the set of worlds in which all propositions in f(w) are
true.
(10) Set of worlds determined by the modal base f: ∩f(w)
(Kratzer 1991:644)
The idea behind the modal base is that it provides the set of relevant facts or back-
ground assumptions that are considered when determining the truth or falsity of the
modal statement. Kratzer assumes that two types of modal bases are found in natural
language: epistemic modal bases, which consider a body of knowledge (typically the
speaker’s knowledge state), and circumstantial modal bases, which contribute a set of
relevant facts that hold in the world of evaluation.16
The ordering source g also assigns a set of propositions g(w) to the world of evaluation
w. This set of propositions induces an ordering, ≤g(w), on a set of worlds, as defined
in (11).
(11) Ordering ≤g(w):
Let g be a conversational background, g(w) ⊆ P(P(W )), and u, z ∈ W then
u ≤g(w) z :⇔ {p : p ∈ g(w) & z ∈ p} ⊆ {p : p ∈ g(w) & u ∈ p}
(Kratzer 1991:644)
The ordering, ≤g(w), is used to determine the set of optimal worlds in the set of worlds
picked out by the modal base, ∩f(w). These are the worlds in ∩f(w) in which the most
propositions in g(w) are true, i.e. the minimal elements in ∩f(w) with respect to ≤g(w).
Conceptually, the ordering source is the subset of relevant criteria that are considered
to be relevant or ideal regarding the truth or falsity of a modal statement. Examples of
ordering sources are deontic (regarding laws, rules, and regulations), bouletic (regarding
wishes), teleological (regarding aims), and stereotypical (regarding the most normal
course of events) conversational backgrounds.
The modal auxiliaries must and can, as well as the German modal verbs müssen and
können are analyzed as expressing universal and existential quantification, respectively,
over the set of those worlds that are accessible from the world of evaluation w (cf.
Kratzer 1991). To refer to the set of optimal worlds accessible from w with respect to
16Kratzer (2012) seems to give up on this distinction, however.
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a modal base f and ordering source g, I adopt the notation O(f, g, w) from Kaufmann
(2012:84).17
Hence, lexical entries English must and can and German müssen and können are as
defined in (12).
(12) a. Jmust/müssenKc,g,w = λp〈s,t〉.∀w′ ∈ O(f, g, w)[p(w′)]
b. Jcan/könnenKc,g,w = λp〈s,t〉.∃w′ ∈ O(f, g, w)[p(w′)]
The dependence on the world of evaluation is necessary to model the contingency
of modal statements. If the values for the modal base and the ordering source were
independent of the world of evaluation, and were constant for all possible worlds, modal
statements would be either true for all possible circumstances, or false for all possible
circumstances.
As stated above, the specific interpretation of modals depends on the interplay be-
tween the modal base and the ordering source, which are both contextually determined.
In the formalization above, no formal connection is made between the choice of conver-
sational backgrounds for the modal base and the ordering source. Empirically, however,
constraints on the choice of ordering source for a given modal base can be determined
(cf. Kratzer 1991, 2012). Epistemic modal bases only seem to occur with information-
related ordering sources. These are conversational backgrounds that concern (i) the
normal course of events, (ii) reports, (iii) beliefs, or (iv) rumors. Circumstantial modal
bases, in contrast, seem to combine with ideal-based ordering sources, i.e. deontic,
bouletic, or teleological conversational backgrounds, but they also combine with the
empty ordering source to model “pure circumstantial” modals.
Modals and their interpretations can be grouped with respect to different classifica-
tion criteria. The most common classification discussed in the literature is the split
of modal meanings into epistemic and root modality. As introduced above, epistemic
modality expresses modality connected to (the speaker’s) knowledge, cf. (6-a). Root
modality is defined negatively as the cover term for all modal interpretations that are
not epistemic, e.g. deontic, ability, teleological, and bouletic modality. See (6-b)–(6-e).
This split is motivated by the different behavior of epistemic modals and root-class
modals regarding their scope behavior with respect to (i) quantificational subjects, (ii)
other epistemic and root modals, and (iii) sentential negation (cf. Brennan 1993).18
First, epistemic modals usually have high scope relative to quantificational subjects,
root modals scope under them. This observation explains the following contrast.
17There is no standard notation in the literature. For example, Hacquard (2011) uses the notation
Bestg(w)(∩f(w)), and Portner (2009) Best(f(w), g(w)).
18Hacquard (2011) addresses an additional aspect which she calls “temporal relativity”. Temporal
relativity concerns the question whether tense provides the time of evaluation for the modal, i.e. the
point in time for which the necessity or possibility is stated. For root modals, the time of evaluation
is the reference time detemined by tense. Epistemic modals, in contrast, are always interpreted with
respect to the utterance time. For details see Hacquard (2011).
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(13) a. Every radio may get these stations and no radio may get these stations.
(epistemic may)
b. #Every radio can get these stations and no radio can get these stations.
(root can)
(shortened from Brennan 1993:93)
Only if the quantificational subject has scope under the possibility modal, the conjoined
sentences are inconsistent. This is the case with root modals, but not with epistemic
modals.
Second, a preferred stacking order for modals with different interpretations can be
observed. The usual ordering for epistemic modals and root modals is for the epistemic
modals to outscope the root modals. This has been seen as indication that epistemic
modals occur higher up in the syntactic structure than root modals. Consider example
(14).
(14) John may have to watch TV.
(Hacquard 2011:1496)
The sentence can only be understood as: ‘Given what the speaker knows, it is possible
that John has the obligation to watch TV’. That is, may is interpreted epistemically,












‘It is possible that Hans has to watch Germany’s Next Topmodel.’
However, Kratzer (1977) claims that German also allows for root modals to outscope





































‘And also hereafter, it must be the case that this snail can have suction feet in
view of all information I receive.’
For English, the ordering restriction seems to hold for all pairs of modal auxiliaries.
Modal adverbs and periphrastics, however, may occur in either order. In example
(17), it is possible to interpret the higher scoping has to deontically, and be possible
epistemically.
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(17) For the test costs to be reimbursed, it has to be possible that the patient has
Alzheimer’s.
(Hacquard 2011:1496 citing lecture notes of von Fintel and Iatridou)
Third, epistemic modals tend to scope above sentential negation, root modals below
negation.19 Consider the disambiguating continuations in (18) and (19).
(18) John may not watch TV . . .
a. . . . he never knows any celebrity gossip. epistemic: may > negation












a. He never knows any of the results. epistemic: kann > negation
b. His father doesn’t like reality shows. deontic: negation > kann
However, for both types of modals, examples with the reverse scope order can also be
found. See Ehrich (2001) for a discussion on the interaction between German modals
and negation.
The difference in behavior for root and epistemic modality challenges the unified
semantic account proposed by Kratzer. Consequently, analyses of the data that aim to
maintain Kratzer’s account (cf. Cinque 1999; Brennan 1993; Hacquard 2006), as well
as analyses that modify it according to the root vs. epistemic distinction have been
proposed (cf. Brennan 1993; Nauze 2008).
A classification of modal interpretations that is more fine-grained than the epistemic
vs. root distinction is proposed in Portner (2009). He distinguishes three classes of
modal meanings based on the type of accessibility relations: (i) “epistemic”, (ii) “pri-
ority”, and (iii) “dynamic” modality.20
The class of priority modals contains deontic, bouletic, and teleological modal inter-
pretations. These modals involve a circumstantial modal base and an ordering source
based on some individual’s priorities.
The class of dynamic modality is further split up into “volitional” and “quantifica-
tional”21 modals. Like priority modals, dynamic modals have a circumstantial modal
base. Volitional modal interpretations cover ability, opportunity, and dispositional
19Drubig (2001) claims that epistemic modals always scope above sentential negation. This is
challenged in von Fintel and Iatridou (2003).
20A discussion of the different classifications of modal meanings proposed in the literature can be
found in Portner (2009).
21This term was introduced in Carlson (1977). As Portner (2009) argues, to name a subclass of
modals “quantificational” is confusing since according to Kratzer’s analysis, all modals are quantifiers
over possible worlds. In this case “quantificational” refers to quantification over individuals.
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readings. They express how the circumstances affect the actions of a volitional agent.
Examples for the latter two readings are given in (20).
(20) a. You can see the ocean from here. (opportunity)
b. Mary will laugh if you tell her that. (dispositional)
(Portner 2009:135)
Quantificational modals differ greatly from all other modal interpretations: they show
quantificational variability effects with indefinite expressions (cf. Brennan 1993, 1997).
These are illustrated in (21).
(21) a. A spider can be dangerous. ∼ ‘Some spiders are dangerous.’
b. A spider will be dangerous. ∼ ‘All spiders are dangerous.’
(Portner 2009:136)
For the remainder of this thesis, I adopt the possible worlds account for modal
meanings as proposed by Kratzer (1977, 1981a, 1991), and the classification proposed
in Portner (2009). In Section 3.4, the class of quantificational modals and the quan-
tificational variability effects that they induce are discussed further. This discussion
forms the basis for the subsequent investigation of the interaction between the generic
operator and overt modals in Section 3.5.
3.3 Modal accounts of genericity
3.3.1 Preliminaries on genericity and generic sentences
In the data discussion in Section 1.2, it was shown that sentences containing imperson-
ally interpreted ich and du express rules, norms, and other generalizations of various
kinds, i.e. that they are generic sentences. The proposal put forth in Section 2.5.3
accounts for this observation as follows: it was assumed that impersonally used ich
and du contribute, among other material, a free variable which is bound by the generic
operator Gen at sentence level. To determine the predictions made by the proposal,
I adopted the modal interpretation for Gen proposed in Krifka et al. (1995). One of
the results of Section 2.6 was that sentences containing impersonal uses of ich and du
express norms, rules, or—in general—generalizations only for those individuals that
are denoted by the material in the restrictor of Gen. No specific behavior is demanded
from, or attributed to individuals denoted by other noun phrases that occur in these
sentences. Since the modal interpretation proposed in Krifka et al. (1995) does not dif-
ferentiate between individuals for which the regularity is stated and other individuals,
it cannot capture this observation.
In this section, I first discuss the modal proposal put forth in Krifka et al. (1995)
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in detail to determine how the undesirable behavior arises. Then I introduce two
other modal accounts proposed in Drewery (1998) and Greenberg (2007), and discuss
their problems and merits. The central aim is to find a modal account for generic
sentences which captures the observation above, and which can be taken as the basis
for the investigation of the intensional sentential contexts of the impersonal readings
in Sections 3.4, 3.5, and Appendix A3.
Before a detailed discussion of Krifka et al. (1995), Drewery (1998), and Greenberg
(2007) is given in Sections 3.3.2 to 3.3.4, the notion of genericity as such and the
characterizing properties of generic sentences are introduced.
The notion of genericity concerns the linguistic means to express lawlike generaliza-
tions or regularities, and their semantic interpretation. Generic sentences express a
non-accidental connection between the individual(s) denoted by (usually) the subject
of the sentence and the property denoted by the verb. The type of non-accidental
connection is not uniform for all generic sentences, and can come in various forms and
flavors, as illustrated in (22).
(22) a. Glass breaks easily. (disposition)
b. Bishops move diagonally. (rule of a game)
c. Robert works for the government. (occupation)
d. Soap is used to remove dirt. (function)
e. A wise man listens more than he speaks. (moral injunction)
(Carlson 2005:19)
The lawlike generalizations expressed by “generic statements” stand in opposition to
“episodic statements”, which describe specific circumstances or events. See the exam-
ples in (23).22
(23) a. Mary ate oatmeal for breakfast this morning.
b. Mary and George ate oatmeal for breakfast this morning.
c. Each student in the class handed in a completed assignment.
Carlson (2005:18)
As the examples above show, episodic statements describe single or multiple, but cru-
cially specific events involving one or more individuals. Hence, the communication of an
underlying “non-accidental, lawlike regularity” that holds independently of the actual
circumstances is the central, distinguishing factor for episodic vs. generic sentences.
This insight is already found in Dahl (1975), who identifies the underlying regularity
that accompanies generic statements as the central, intensional component involved
in genericity, which is absent in episodic statements. This, however, does not mean
22Krifka et al. (1995) call sentences that express episodic statements “particular sentences”.
Chapter 3. The impersonal use, modals, and generic sentences 165
that episodic statements cannot express generalizations. For instance, example (24)
expresses a generalization over students.
(24) All students in my class are wearing a t-shirt today.
However, the generalization expressed in (24) is an “accidental generalization”. Gener-
alizations of this kind express circumstances which happen to hold for the totality of
a particular group of individuals in one particular world. In contrast to lawlike gener-
alizations expressed by generic sentences, the circumstances need not be the result of
an underlying regularity, though. An accidental generalization can have come about
completely by coincidence.23 Similarly, a sentence can contain intensional expressions
(e.g. overt modals), and still express an episodic statement, see (25).
(25) Today, Peter had to sneeze ten times.
One of the challenges for a linguistic analysis is that genericity is not expressed
uniformely by a single linguistic form or specific morphological element.
In the literature, the different types of generic sentences are distinguished with re-
spect to the status, morphological make up, and denotation of the noun phrase in
subject position. At least for German and English, (i) kind denoting noun phrases
and (ii) non-kind denoting noun phrases that are interpreted differently in generic and
episodic sentences need to be distinguished from (iii) nominal expressions that do not
fall in either class (i) or (ii). Expressions of class (iii) are interpreted the same in
episodic and generic sentences. Consider the bold face expressions in (26).
(26) a. Dodos are extinct. (kind-denoting)
b. The dodo is extinct. (kind-denoting)
c. Lions are dangerous. (non-kind-denoting)
d. A lion is dangerous. (non-kind-denoting)
e. Peter eats oatmeal for breakfast. (other)
The dodo sentences in (26-a) and (26-b) illustrate a form of generic sentence which
involves “kind predication” rather than “object predication”.24 That is, the property of
being extinct is not attributed to individual dodos, but to the entire kind dodo. Note
that kind-denoting noun phrases that occur in generic sentences are sometimes called
“generic noun phrases”.
23In English and German, accidental generalizations are typically expressed with overt nominal
quantifiers.
24The terms “kind predication” and “object predication” are taken from Krifka et al. (1995). Kind-
predication differs from object predication in two respects: (i) the noun phrase in subject position
denotes a kind entity, and (ii) the matrix predicate is ascribed to the kind entity as a whole. In generic
sentences involving object-predication, the entities denoted by the noun phrase in subject position are
quantified over, but considered individually with respect to the matrix predicate. For the general
difference between individuals and kinds, see Carlson (1977).
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For examples like (26-c), (26-d), and (26-e), Krifka et al. (1995) introduce the
terms “characterizing sentences”, “generic sentences”, and “habitual sentences” as inter-
changable names.25 In contrast to examples (26-a) and (26-b), characterizing/generic/
habitual sentences involve object predication. In recent work, Greenberg (2007) also
further explicitly distinguishes “bare plural generic sentences” as in (26-c) and “indefi-
nite singular generic sentences” as in (26-d).
Characterizing sentences can be further subclassified with respect to different com-
binations of types of noun phrases and types of predicates; depending on the “in-
gredients”, different intuitions regarding the domain of generalization arise. Regarding
noun phrases in subject position, indefinite singular noun phrases and bare plural noun
phrases pattern together, and form the class of “unspecific noun phrases”. They need
to be distinguished from all other nominal expressions, i.e. “specific noun phrases”.
Regarding the type of predicates, “individual level predicates” (ILP) have to be distin-
guished from “stage level predicates” (SLP).26 Consider the combinations in (27).
(27) a. Peter is intelligent. (specific; ILP)
b. Peter eats oatmeal for breakfast. (specific; SLP)
c. Students are intelligent. (unspecific; ILP)
d. Students eat oatmeal for breakfast. (unspecific; SLP)
“Unspecific noun phrases” and stage level predicates both provide bases for generaliza-
tion. For generic sentences that contain stage level predicates, the intuition is that the
generic operator generalizes over situations that fit the verb denotation. For instance,
(27-b) expresses a regularity regarding Peter’s breakfast situations. “Unspecific noun
phrases”, in contrast, are associated with generalizations over the set of individuals
that fit the descriptive content of the noun phrase. For instance, (27-c) expresses a
generalization about students, and conveys that they are intelligent.
In case an unspecific noun phrase and a stage level predicate co-occur, both domains
for generalization are available, and may be generalized over. This is indeed observable
in (27-d) where a regularity regarding breakfast situations for students in general is
expressed.
The status of the last combination exemplified in example (27-a) as a generic sen-
tence is controversial. Chierchia (1995a) investigates the behavior of individual level
25The terminology introduced in this section is not used uniformly in this way in the literature.
The use of the terms “generic sentences” and “habitual sentences” in this thesis complies more or less
with the use in the formal semantic literature on genericity. In some traditions, generic sentences are
seen as special cases of habitual sentences; in other traditions, the term “generic sentences” is used to
denote the basic concept from which “habitual sentences” are derived.
26Individual level predicates express a more or less permanent property, while stage level predicates
are typically transitory properties of individuals (Carlson 1977; Kratzer 1995). For example, be intel-
ligent and have brown hair are individual level predicates, while eat an apple and sit on a chair are
considered stage level predicates.
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predicates in comparison with stage level predicates in generic sentences, and proposes
that individual level predicates are inherently generic. In other works, this combination
is analyzed along different lines. For instance, Kratzer (1995) proposes a Davidsonian
account of the formal difference between individual level and stage level predicates.
Stage level predicates in generic sentences have another interesting property. They
allow for three different readings: (i) a dispositional, (ii) a universal, and (iii) a “habit-
ual” reading.27
(28) John drinks beer.
a. John does not object to drinking beer. (dispositional)
b. Whenever John drinks something, it is beer. (universal)
c. John has the habit of drinking beer. (habitual)
(Krifka et al. 1995:41f)
Krifka et al. (1995) argue that the three readings arise from generalizations over dif-
ferent types of situations. In the dispositional reading, the sentence expresses a gener-
alization about situations that contain John and a beer. In the universal reading, the
generalization covers situations in which John drinks something, and in the habitual
reading a generalization about situations containing just John is expressed. Notably, a
similar parallel for generic quantification over individuals is not observed.
One further classification for generic sentences is proposed in Dahl (1975). He distin-
guishes between “descriptive lawlike statements” stating e.g. physical or biological laws,
and “normative lawlike statements” involving e.g. social norms, moral norms, customs,
or regulations. He observes that the norms in normative statements may be broken,
but that the laws in descriptive statements cannot.
I now turn to the characteristic semantic properties of generic sentences. For reasons
of space, only generic sentences that parallel sentences containing impersonally used
pronouns are discussed further. These are characterizing sentences that contain bare
plural and indefinite singular noun phrases (cf. Section 2.2.1). Therefore, the term
“generic sentences” is henceforth used restricted to characterizing sentences of this
kind. Note, though, that some of the properties that are discussed in the rest of this
section may also hold for those types of generic sentences that are left aside.
The two defining properties of generic sentences are that they allow for exceptions,
and that they support inferences to appropriate counterfactuals. Both properties are
connected to the basic observation that generic statements involve a non-accidental,
lawlike regularity which holds independently of the actual circumstances. In other
words, they are connected to the intensional component proposed by Dahl (1975).
The property of allowing for exceptions is discussed on the basis of example (29).
27Here, “habitual” is not used as a technical term, but to convey that a sentence talks about a
person’s habit.
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(29) a. Lions have four legs.
b. A lion has four legs.
The generalization expressed by the sentences in (29) is valid in the world of evaluation
given that the genetic make-up of lions determines that they have four legs. Assume
that there is a specific lion, Paul, who lost one of his legs in an accident. The existence of
this single, three-legged lion does not invalidate the generalization about lions expressed
in (29). Three-legged Paul has a special status, though: he is seen as a legitimate
exception to the rule. Specifically, it can be said that having lost his leg e.g. when he
was run over by a car makes Paul an exceptional lion with respect to having four legs.
On the basis of this observation, Dahl’s (1975) characterization of descriptive and
normative generic sentences needs to be reconsidered. In some sense, Paul the lion
does not conform to the rule of having four legs for lions. Because he counts as an
exception to the rule, however, he does not break the biological law in the same way as
a true counterexample would. So, exceptions need to be distinguished explicitly from
counterexamples, and Dahl’s classification needs to be rephrased: It is possible to find
true counterexamples to norms in normative lawlike statements, i.e. individuals which
do not adhere to the norms even though they cannot be considered exceptions. For de-
scriptive lawlike statements, in contrast, no such individuals can be found. This means
that all individuals that do not adhere to descriptive laws are considered exceptions
for some reason or another.
The second characterizing property of generic sentences is to support inferences to
appropriate counterfactual sentences.28 This means that it is possible to defeasibly
derive statements about specific individuals from a generalization expressed by a generic
sentence. The inference is defeasible because generics allow for exceptions, i.e. the
generalization may only be applied to individuals that are judged to be putatively non-
exceptional. For example, a speaker may use the generalization about lions in (29) to
defeasibly infer the statement in (30) about herself—under the assumption that if she
were a lion, she would be a non-exceptional lion.
(30) If I were a lion, I would have four legs.
Famously, there are examples like (31) that seem to pose a problem for the support
of appropriate counterfactuals as a general property of generic sentences.29
(31) Dutchmen are good sailors.
The observation is that the counterfactual statement in (32), formed in analogy to the
28Dahl (1975) also adds the property of supporting future-oriented predictions, as illustrated in (i).
(i) Farmers milk cows. Thus, if I become a farmer, I will milk cows.
29This observation is known in the literature as the “Port-Royal Puzzle”.
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counterfactual in (30) for (29), does not follow from the generalization expressed in
(31)—even if the speaker assumes that she would be a non-exceptional Dutchman.
(32) If I were a Dutchman, I would be a good sailor.
Intuitively, however, example (31) is different from (29) in that it does not express a
generalization about Dutchmen as such—as expected from the noun phrase in subject
position—but about Dutchmen that are sailors. That is, the property of being a sailor,
which is part of the denotation of the predicate be a good sailor, is understood as
restricting the denotation of the noun phrase Dutchmen. If that is indeed the case, it is
expected that the counterfactual statement in (33) is supported. This is indeed borne
out.
(33) If I were a Dutch sailor, I would be a good sailor.
With respect to example (31), a first difference between bare plural generic sentences
and indefinite singular generic sentences can be observed: this exceptional behavior is
not observed for the corresponding indefinite singular generic sentence in (34). This
version can only be interpreted as expressing that Dutchmen in general are good sailors.
(34) A Dutchman is a good sailor.
Given this difference between the bare plural and the indefinite singular versions, Krifka
et al. (1995) argue that the bare plural Dutchmen is in fact interpreted as kind-denoting.
That is, (31) is predicted to pattern with (35).
(35) The Dutchman is a good sailor
Krifka et al. argue that this is borne out: (35) also expresses a statement for Dutchmen
that are sailors. Hence, for the type of generic sentences that this thesis is concerned
with, the properties of allowing for exceptions and of supporting inferences to appropri-
ate counterfactual sentences seem to apply without exceptions, and without any special
cases.
The two characterizing properties distinguish generic sentences from sentences ex-
pressing accidental generalizations. Consider the following scenario: in the actual
world, lions are almost extinct, and the remaining four lions all lost one limb in an
accident. In this scenario, (36) is true.
(36) All lions have three legs.
If it is assumed that there is no rule requiring that “accidents” involving lions’ legs hap-
pen, one should judge (36) as an accidental generalization. Even though all lions that
are still alive have only three legs, one would not want to claim that three-leggedness
is a general property of lions. All living lions simply happen to be exceptions to the
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regularity expressed in (26-c). Hence, while the accidental generalization in (36) is true
in the given scenario, the corresponding generic statement in (37) is judged false.
(37) Lions have three legs.
Furthermore, (36) also does not support inferences to appropriate counterfactuals. This
is illustrated in (38).
(38) All lions have three legs. #Therefore, if I were a lion, I would have three legs.
An important fact about generic sentences that follows from this discussion is that
generic sentences can be used to make lawlike statements that are true with respect to
the actual world even if there are no actual individuals that instantiate the rule.
I now turn to review three modal accounts for the meaning of generic sentences:
Krifka et al. (1995), Drewery (1998), and Greenberg (2007). As stated in the beginning
of this section, the aim is to find a modal account which provides an adequate basis
for the discussion of the intensional sentential context found with impersonally used
personal pronouns. Specifically, an account is needed that captures the connection
between the individuals that the generalization is about and the relevant accessible
worlds (cf. Section 2.6).
3.3.2 Krifka et al. (1995)
In the semantic literature, the special lawlikeness associated with generic sentences
is modelled by assuming a covert generic operator, Gen, which, among other things,
contributes an intensional meaning component.30 The consensus in the literature is
that Gen is a relational operator, similar to a covert adverb of quantification, which
expresses a relation between its restrictor and its scope.31
Krifka et al. (1995) introduce the general structure for the dyadic generic operator
Gen in (39).
(39) Gen[x1, . . . , xi; y1, . . . yj](Restrictor; Scope)
(Krifka et al. 1995:26)
The variables x1, . . . , xi, y1, . . . yj in the bracket after the generic operator Gen are the
list of all free variables that occur in the restrictor and the scope of the generic operator.
By convention, the variables x1, . . . , xi in front of the semicolon are interpreted as
30An alternative formalization, which is based on treatments of rules in the literature on artificial
intelligence, models generic sentences as expressing defeasible inferences in default logics. Cf. Asher
and Pelletier (1996). For a modal account of generic sentences which replicates the properties of these
extensional systems see Eckardt (2000).
31Carlson (1977) analyzes all types of generic sentences as predication over kinds. For reasons of
space, this alternative proposal will not be discussed. For a detailed discussion and comparison with
the modal relational analysis, see Condoravdi (1994).
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bound by Gen. The variables y1, . . . yj, on the other hand, occur only in the scope of
the operator, and are interpreted as existentially bound.
In the semantic literature on generic sentences, indefinite singular noun phrases and
bare plural noun phrases are assumed to be Heimian indefinites, i.e. expressions that
contribute free variables which are either bound by appropriate operators or via ex-
istential closure. Hence, the definition in (39) has to be read as follows: only in case
the variable contributed by an indefinite expression is bound by the generic operator,
the descriptive content of the indefinite is interpreted in the restrictor of the operator.
Descriptive material belonging to individual variables that are bound by the existen-
tial quantifier is interpreted in the scope of Gen. The same distribution also applies to
situation variables and any descriptive content depending on them.
The distribution of variables across the restrictor and the scope captures the behavior
of indefinite expressions in generic sentences. Consider (40-a) and its formalization in
(40-b).
(40) a. Professors usually have a cup of tea after lunch.
b. Gen[x; y](professor(x); cup-of-tea(y) & has(y)(x))
Since the variable x that is contributed by the bare plural is bound by the generic
operator, the bare plural noun phrase professors is interpreted in the restrictor of
Gen. Consequently, (40-a) expresses a regularity about professors. The variable y
contributed by a cup of tea, on the other hand, is existentially bound in the scope of
Gen. As a result, professors in (40-a) is interpreted as generically quantified and a cup
of tea as existentially quantified. Which variables are bound by Gen and which are not,
is determined by sentential stress, topicality, and various other factors. The default
case for individual variables in indefinite singular and bare plural generic sentences is
that Gen binds only the variable contributed by the indefinite noun phrase in subject
position; all other nominal and/or verbal material is interpreted in the scope of Gen
(Krifka et al. 1995:26).32
The partitioning into a restrictor and a scope also captures the intuition that generic
sentences express a lawlike relation between two states of affairs.
The structure in (39) as such does not make any claims regarding the interpretation
of the generic operator, though. The intuition shared in the literature is that the
32The following sentence constitutes a counterexample to this default split:
(i) Typhoons arise in this part of the pacific.
(Krifka et al. 1995:26)
The most natural reading of the example above is that it expresses a regularity for a certain part of the
pacific: regularly some typhoons arise there. In this case, situations involving the part of the pacific
under discussion form the restrictor, and the bare plural in subject position, typhoons, is part of the
scope of Gen. The other, less accessible, reading is given by the default restrictor-scope arrangement:
‘Typhoons in general arise in this specific spot of the pacific ocean’. (Krifka et al. 1995:26).
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generic operator contributes (quasi-)universal quantification over individuals and/or
situations of a certain kind that may or may not be part of the world of evaluation.
This is illustrated in the examples in (41) (repeated from above).
(41) a. Lions have four legs.
b. A lion has four legs.
Intuitively, the generic sentences in (41) state that all relevantly normal lions (i.e. those
that are not legitimate exceptions) have four legs. How can this intuition be captured?
The dyadic operator account introduced in (39) is in principle compatible with many
different formal analyses of the interpretation of Gen. In fact—apart from modal ac-
counts, which are discussed below—various different interpretations for Gen have been
proposed in the literature: e.g. (quasi-)universal quantification over relevant/possible
entities, prototypes, or stereotypes. A detailed discussion of these accounts is beyond
the scope of this dissertation; for a summary see Krifka et al. (1995).
Modal accounts for the meaning of Gen are motivated by the non-accidental nature of
the generalizations, as well as their tolerance for the existence of exceptional individuals
in the actual world. In these accounts, Gen is interpreted as a modal operator in
analogy to Kratzer’s account for the meaning of modals (cf. Section 3.2). The various
proposals differ with respect to the set of accessible worlds associated with Gen, and
the degree of influence that is accorded to the properties denoted by the subject noun
phrase and the predicate on the make-up of the accessibility relation (cf. Krifka et al.
1995; Papafragou 1996; Drewery 1998; Eckardt 2000; Greenberg 2007).
As stated above, the first modal account that will be discussed in detail is the pro-
posal in Krifka et al. (1995), which is based on Heim’s (1988 [1982]) account for“generic
indefinites”. Heim proposes that indefinite noun phrases in generic sentences act like
if -clauses in conditional sentences. That is, they restrict a covert necessity modal (cf.
Appendix A3). The covert modal involved in generic sentences differs from the covert
epistemic necessity modal found with indicative conditional sentences, though, which
is assumed to only take realistic modal bases and ordering sources. Since the covert
modal in generic sentences expresses lawlike regularities, Heim proposes that it is in-
terpreted with respect to non-realistic modal bases and stereotypical ordering sources.
Krifka et al. (1995) flesh out Heim’s proposal as follows.
(42) Gen[x1, . . . , xi; y1, . . . , yj](Restrictor;Matrix) is true in w relative to a modal
base Bw and an ordering ≤w iff:
∀x1, . . . , xi∀w′ ∈ Bw[Restrictor[x1, . . . , xi](w′)→
∃w′′ ∈ Bw[w′′ ≤w w′ & ∀w′′′[w′′′ ≤w w′′ →
∃yi, . . . , yj[Matrix[x1, . . . , xi, y1, . . . , yj](w′′′)]]]]
(adapted from Krifka et al. 1995:52)
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The specific modal flavor of the generic operator is such that the property contributed
by the material in the restrictor is evaluated against the worlds in the modal base Bw,
which are “most normal” with respect to the ordering ≤w.
The truth-conditions of the generic sentence in (43-a), for example, come out as in
(43-b).
(43) a. Lions have bushy tails.
b. ∀x∀w′ ∈ Bw[lion(x)(w′) → ∃w′′ ∈ Bw[w′′ ≤w w′ & ∀w′′′[w′′′ ≤w w′′ →
∃y[bushy-tail(y)(w′′′) & has(y)(x)(w′′′)]]]]
(Krifka et al. 1995:52)
The formula states that “a world which contains a lion without a bushy tail is less
normal than a world in which that lion has a bushy tail” (Krifka et al. 1995:52), i.e.
in the most normal worlds from the point of view of the world of evaluation, all lions
have bushy tails.
If the limit assumption is made, the account proposed by Krifka et al. can be stated
as in (44).
(44) ∀x∀w′ ∈ O(f ∩ {w′′ : lion(x)(w′′)}, g, w)[has-a-bushy-tail(x)(w′)]
Krifka et al. argue that Heim’s analysis of the modal flavor of Gen and of the covert
necessity modal in conditionals is too restrictive. They argue that Gen, as well as
the covert necessity modal involve many different combinations of modal bases and
ordering sources. For generic sentences in particular, different “most normal” worlds
are required to capture the different types of generic statements found in the data.
Consider the different possible readings for Gen in (45).
(45) a. Two and two equals four. (tautology)
b. A spinster is an old, never-married woman. (definition)
c. This machine crushes oranges. (design)
d. Mary smokes cigarettes. (behavior)
e. Bob jumps 8.90 meters. (ability)
f. A lion has a mane. (stereotype)
(Krifka et al. 1995:53f)
For the examples in (45), the set of accessible worlds vary among most normal with
respect to e.g. mathematical laws, the interpretation of English, and the specific design
of an artifact. Hence, the parameters that model the modal base and the ordering
source seem to allow a similar array of possible values as for modals (cf. Section 3.2).
The account in Krifka et al. (1995) successfully captures that generic sentences ex-
press non-accidental regularities, and that they tolerate exceptions. Since Krifka et al.
assign a modal interpretation to generic sentences, not only actual facts and situations
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are considered when a generic sentence is evaluated. As discussed above, generaliza-
tions that only hold for the world of evaluation may be accidental, and therefore do
not necessarily depend on an underlying regularity. By evaluating the generic sentence
against a specific set of possible worlds, it is ensured that accidental generalizations
that are not based on an underlying regularity come out as false.
The observed tolerance for exceptions found with generic sentences is also captured.
In case the accessibility relation determined for a given generic sentence is a non-realistic
relation (e.g. ideal-based, see Section 3.2), the world of evaluation is not a member of
the set of most normal worlds.33 Consequently, the facts in the world of evaluation
are not considered when the validity of the universal statement about individuals in
the accessible worlds is evaluated; individuals in the world of evaluation that do not
conform to the regularity that is expressed do not have an effect on the truth or falsity
of the generic sentence.
Krifka et al.’s (1995) account is not without shortcomings, though. One issue is
already pointed out in Krifka et al. (1995): defining the accessible worlds as the “most
normal”worlds seems counter-intuitive for some generic sentences. Krifka et al. observe
that the “normalcy” that is required for the truth of these sentences seems highly
abnormal from the point of view of the world of evaluation. Consider (46).
(46) Turtles die old.
Example (46) is a true statement about turtles given what is known about their biology.
For this generic sentence to come out as true, though, the most normal worlds with
respect to considerations of biology need to be those where all turtles die old. However,
these worlds are highly abnormal from the point of view of the actual world. In fact,
most turtles die young because they are killed by predators.34
Example (47) illustrates another problematic aspect for the accessibility relation
assumed in Krifka et al.
(47) Cats bear live young.
Since (47) expresses a true generalization about cats, the account predicts that in
the biologically most normal worlds all cats bear live young. This means that the
biologically most normal worlds are those where only female cats of the right age exist.
However, worlds like these are highly abnormal, if not impossible: how can the existing
female cats bear any young, if no male cats exist?35 One possibility to account for
33An accessibility relation R is realistic iff ∀w ∈W [wRw], i.e. if R is reflexive. Accessibility relations
that are not realistic are said to be non-realistic.
34Similar observations are made e.g. in Papafragou (1996), Eckardt (2000) and Greenberg (2007).
35Krifka et al. (1995) propose that this problem can be solved by assuming that the generic operator
quantifies over “most normal” situations instead of most normal worlds. For reasons of space, the
situation theoretic account cannot be introduced at this point. For details, cf. Krifka et al. (1995).
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(47) in Krifka et al.’s account is to argue that the noun phrase in subject position is
contextually restricted to female cats. The following two reasons speak against this
argument. First, in contrast to nominal quantifiers, generic sentences do not allow
for contextual restrictions (cf. Dahl 1975; Condoravdi 1994; Krifka et al. 1995, pace
Drewery 1998; Greenberg 2007). Compare (48) and (49).
(48) a. Uttered at UCLA: All professors wear a tie.
b. At UCLA, all professors wear a tie.
(Krifka et al. 1995:45)
(49) a. Uttered at UCLA: A professor wears a tie.
b. At UCLA, a professor wears a tie.
(Krifka et al. 1995:45)
Nominal quantifiers, like all in (48-a), may be understood as contextually restricted,
i.e. (48-a) may be understood as (48-b). For generic sentences, contextual restriction is
impossible. Even if (49-a) is uttered at the UCLA campus, Krifka et al. argue, it cannot
be understood as expressing (49-b), which contains an explicit spatial expression.
Even if one were to assume that contextual restriction is an option—as argued for
in Drewery (1998) and Greenberg (2007)—no adequate restriction for (47) could be
found. Assume for example, that cats is contextually restricted to female cats of the
right age. This restriction is not strong enough. It does not exclude e.g. female cats of
the right age that have a birth defect and are infertile, or female cats of the right age
that are kept apart from male cats and never bear any young. In fact, many different
reasons can be found for why female cats of the right age might not bear live young. All
of the individuals that have at least one of the properties that make them exceptions
will have to be excluded by the contextual restriction for Gen in (47). However, the
disjunction of all of these properties seems to be a highly unnatural“salient property”to
be assigned contextually. In other words, while a contextual restriction of all professors
to all professors at UCLA seems plausible enough, the restriction of cats to female cats
of the right age that neither have a birth defect, nor are kept apart from male cats, nor
. . . does not.
The second argument against appealing to contextual restrictions is that, for some
sentences, incompatible restrictive properties would have to be assumed for the subject
noun phrase. Consider (50).
(50) Peacocks lay eggs and have beautiful feathers.
Since only female peacocks lay eggs and only male peacocks have the characteristic,
beautiful feathers, the subject noun phrase peacocks would have to be restricted to
individuals that are both male and female. Hence, the assumption that Gen is contex-
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tually restricted cannot solve the problems that are raised by the accessibility relation
assumed in Krifka et al. (1995).
Two further issues for Krifka et al.’s (1995) modal account arise because the set of
accessible worlds Bw does not depend on the material in the restrictor of Gen.
As observed for generic sentences with impersonally interpreted ich and du in Chap-
ter 2, all individuals in the accessible worlds have to behave according to what is most
normal. This is the case because the set of worlds Bw is determined entirely contextu-
ally, and depends neither on the material in the restrictor, nor on the material in the
scope of Gen. Consider the example in (51).
(51) Dogs chase cats.
Since the sentence above expresses a regularity regarding the behavior of animals, it
is plausible to assume that only such worlds are considered that are most normal with
respect to biological laws (or maybe even specifically with respect to the behavior of
animals). This predicts that both the dogs and the cats show“most normal behavior” in
these worlds. Intuitively, however, only the individuals that are picked by the material
in the restrictor have to be relevantly normal or ideal. For (51), this means that only
the most normal behavior of dogs is relevant. Nothing seems to be required regarding
the behavior of the cats in these worlds.
The lack of dependence between Gen and the specific form of the subject property
leads to another problem (cf. Drewery 1998): the addition of an intersective modifier
to the subject property results in simple intersective modification of the material in
the restrictor. Compare the examples in (52).
(52) a. Birds fly.
b. Baby birds fly.
If modifiers have the simple effect of restricting the domain of individuals—given the
same subject matter—it is predicted that the same set of worlds is picked for both
sentences in (52). The truth-conditions of the two sentences are given in (52).
(53) a. ∀x∀w′ ∈ O(f ∩ {w′′ : birds(x)(w′′)}, g, w)[fly(x)(w′)]
b. ∀x∀w′ ∈ O(f ∩ {w′′ : baby-birds(x)(w′′)}, g, w)[fly(x)(w′)]
Since universal quantifiers are left-downward-monotone, and the set of baby birds is a
subset of the set of birds, the truth of (53-b) follows from the truth of (53-a). This is
undesirable since, of course, baby birds do not fly, yet.
The final issue that is discussed for Krifka et al. depends on the assumption of strict
universal quantification over individuals in the accessible worlds. As the discussion of
example (47) above suggests, this assumption is too strong. The quantification needs to
be qualified. For the truth of (47) according to Krifka et al.’s account, only female cats
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of a certain age may be considered, but worlds in which only these kinds of cats exist
may not contain any cats that actually bear live young.36 To ensure that sentences like
(47) can be interpreted, quantification over individuals in the accessible worlds cannot
be strictly universal. Since contextual restriction of the domain of quantification has
been shown to be implausible, the restriction has to be part of the meaning of Gen:
the modal interpretation of generic sentences needs to involve a special type of in-built
restriction which picks out the relevantly non-exceptional individuals in the accessible
worlds.
The following consideration also supports this assumption. Tolerance for exceptions
is captured in Krifka et al. (1995) with the assumption of a non-realistic accessibility
relation. Since the actual world is consequently not necessarily a member of the set of
accessible worlds, the properties and behavior of actual individuals may turn out to be
irrelevant. However, it seems counter-intuitive to assume that the accessibility relation
involved with generic sentences is necessarily non-realistic given that generic sentences
may express regularities that are observed in the world of evaluation. A similar point is
made by Dahl (1975), who argues that physical and biological rules require a realistic
accessibility relation. If generic sentences were to involve realistic accessibility relations,
though, Krifka et al.’s account would require that the generalizations that are expressed
be exceptionless. Even though Dahl suggests that physical and biological laws fall into
this class, this is obviously not always the case, as exemplified by the scenario featuring
the three-legged lion Paul in Section 3.3.1.
In sum, the modal account in Krifka et al. (1995) successfully captures that generic
sentences express non-accidental generalizations, and provides an account for their tol-
erance of exceptions. The account is not without problems, though. The problematic
aspects identified above point toward two desiderata for modal proposals for the mean-
ing of Gen:
(54) a. The set of accessible worlds needs to depend on (at least) the subject
property.
b. Universal quantification over individuals needs to be restricted by a generi-
city-specific, inbuilt restriction.
To meet the second desideratum, Papafragou (1996) and Eckardt (2000) argue for
the introduction of a normalcy predicate that restricts the domain of quantification of
Gen to those individuals in the accessible worlds that are relevantly normal or ideal.37
36The only worlds that fulfill the criteria are those in which cats are nearly extinct, only pregnant
cats exist, and the last male cat died recently. These worlds, however, do not count as normal in any
sense of the word.
37Eckardt (2000) introduces two different operators which filter out the exceptional individuals in
the accessible worlds depending on the type of generalization that is expressed. That is, generalizations
about normal or ideal course of events are distinguished. Eckardt introduces an operator N(F ) which
returns the set of“normal” individuals for the subject property F , and an operator I(F ), which returns
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With respect to the accessibility relation associated with Gen, they keep the basic
architecture of the modal account in Krifka et al. (1995), though.
Drewery (1998) and Greenberg (2007) aim to capture both of the desiderata above.
Both in particular focus (i) on the problem of which individuals count as legitimate
exceptions for generic sentences, (ii) on how intuitions regarding this point can be
modelled formally, and (iii) in what way this affects the set of accessible worlds.
3.3.3 Drewery (1998)
Drewery (1998) discusses generic statements in conjunction with other lawlike state-
ments from a philosophical point of view.38 She distinguishes three types of general-
izations: (i) “true laws”, (ii) “ceteris paribus laws”, and (iii) accidental generalizations.
True laws and ceteris paribus laws, in contrast to accidental generalizations, are non-
accidental, lawlike regularities. Ceteris paribus laws also differ from true laws and
accidental generalizations in their tolerance for exceptions. Specifically, the excep-
tional individuals and circumstances are assumed to be filtered by a ceteris paribus
clause.
Conceptually, Drewery argues that true laws are special cases of ceteris paribus laws,
i.e. laws for which no exceptional individuals or circumstances exist. This is motivated
by the observation that true laws and ceteris paribus laws—in contrast to accidental
generalizations—can be expressed with generic sentences.
Drewery stresses the importance of a detailed analysis of the nature of exceptions to
determine the truth-conditions for generic sentences. In fact, the task of determining
the set of appropriate exceptions for a given generic sentence is seen as the central
issue on which all other interpretational aspects of generic sentences are based. This
assumption is motivated by the following considerations: Exceptional individuals and
circumstances do not have arbitrary properties. Or rather, the properties that are
responsible for making individuals or circumstances exceptional with respect to a given
generic statement are neither random, nor independent from the generalization that
is expressed. Exceptions underlie other, specific regularities that are in conflict with
the regularity expressed by the generic statement, and that override it. In most cases,
the exact regularity that is seen as the reason for why a given individual counts as
an exception cannot be determined. However, the specific, conflicting properties are
assumed to belong to the same greater body of rules, e.g. moral principles, legal codes,
the set of “ideal” individuals for F . Formally, the two operators differ with respect to their properties
regarding reasoning with generic sentences. For details cf. Eckardt (2000).
38Drewery (1998) exclusively discusses bare plural generic sentences. She notes, though, that indef-
inite singular generic sentences, and generic sentences that involve kind predication are linguistically
more restricted.
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physical laws of nature, or genetic laws. This greater body of rules exists independently,
and is part of world knowledge.39
Drewery’s (1998) focus on the nature of exceptions is connected to an observation
first made in Carlson (1977): The properties that constitute an exception depend on the
properties in the restrictor and the properties in the scope of the generic operator. That
is, no single set of exceptional F s can be determined for different generic statements
about individuals with property F . Any account that proposes such a “static” set of
exceptions makes undesirable predictions. Consider the true generic statement in (55),
and assume that a three legged dog Fido exists in the world of evaluation that lost its
leg in an accident.
(55) Dogs have four legs.
With respect to (55), Fido is a legitimate exception, i.e. Fido is in the set of exceptional
dogs.40 But, even though Fido is an exceptional dog with respect to having four legs,
Fido is not an exception to (56).
(56) Dogs are mammals.
If the set of exceptional dogs were determined independently of the property denoted
by the predicates have four legs and be a mammal, Fido would have to be both a
member of the set of exceptional dogs and a member of its complement.
From these considerations, Drewery infers that the set of exceptional individuals for
a given generic sentence depends on the two properties that are related by the generic
sentence, and that the set is determined in a principled way relative to a greater body
of law.
The core idea of Drewery’s formal proposal is to model the considerations and intu-
itions about legitimate exceptions, and to take this result as the basis from which all
other aspects of the interpretation of generic sentences are determined.
Drewery calls the set of individuals that count as legitimate exceptions to a given
generic statement its exception class. Its complement is the set of non-exceptional
individuals. Drewery models the set of non-exceptional individuals with the help of
a primitive function NF,G, which depends on the restrictor F and the scope G of the
generic operator.41 The extension of NF,G in an arbitrary world w is the set of all
(actual and possible) non-exceptional F s with respect to G, see (57).42
39For an account of generic sentences which also stresses the role of the speaker’s beliefs/knowledge
see ter Meulen (1986, 2012).
40Incidentally, Fido and Paul are friends.
41The property NF,G is intended to perform the role of the ceteris paribus clause.
42Drewery (1998) does not work in a system with explicit world variables, and assumes world-relative
individual domains. Consequently, the extension of an expression like NF,G(x) is always determined
relative to the world in which x exists.
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(57) NF,G(x)⇔ x is a non-exceptional F with respect to being G
(Drewery 1998:91)
The following example illustrates how NF,G is determined for the sentence Peacocks
have a brightly coloured tail.
(58) Npeacock, has-a-brightly-coloured-tail = actual or possible peacocks without the exception
class, i.e. without the females, juveniles, those whose tails have been amputated
and so on.
(Drewery 1998:92)
In other words, the set of non-exceptional F s with respect to being G contains those
individuals that are not filtered out by another rule.
In Drewery’s account, the modal accessibility relation involved in generic sentences is
derived from the set of non-exceptional individuals. The set NF,G is used to determine
an equivalence relation ∼F,G on the set of possible worlds W , which creates a partition
on W . The resulting equivalence classes are such that all worlds in a class share the
same set of non-exceptional F -individuals with respect to being G.43
(59) w1 ∼F,G w2 iff the extension of NF,G in w1 = the extension of NF,G in w2
(Drewery 1998:91)
The relevantly similar worlds that are accessible from the world of evaluation are all and
only the worlds that are members of the equivalence class of the world of evaluation.
From the way in which w1 ∼F,G w2 is determined, it follows that the accessible worlds
agree (i) on the individuals that are to be considered non-exceptional with respect to
a specific, world-dependent body of law, and (ii) on the content of the relevant body
of law used to determine NF,G.
In sum, Drewery proposes that generic sentences of the form F s are G have the
following truth-conditional content.
(60) In all possible worlds in which the same F s are non-exceptional with respect
to being G (as in the world of evaluation), all non-exceptional F s with respect
to being G are G.
(Drewery 1998:91, elaboration in parentheses added for clarification)
Notably, Drewery assumes that every individual only exists in one single possible
world. To make her system independent from this assumption, and compatible with
a shared domain of individuals (as is usually assumed in the literature on modality),
43An equivalence relation on a domain A is a reflexive, symmetric, and transitive relation. A set of
elements related to each other by an equivalence relation is a subset of A, and is called an equivalence
class induced by the relation. The set of equivalence classes constitutes a partition on A, i.e. the
classes are pairwise disjoint and their union is A.
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I give a translation of her account into a system with explicit world variables and a
constant individual domain.
The first step is to let NF,G assign a set of pairs of individuals and worlds to a given
world w.44
(61) A pair 〈x,w′〉 is in NF,G(w) iff x is a non-exceptional F with respect to G from
the point of view of the world w, but with respect to its properties in w′.
The similarity relation ∼F,G is also adapted to fit the new version of NF,G: The
relation ∼F,G partitions the set of worlds depending on whether the worlds pick out
the same set of individual-world-pairs based on the body of rules under consideration.
This is defined in (62).
(62) w1 ∼F,G w2 iff ∀〈x,w〉[NF,G(w1)(〈x,w〉)↔ NF,G(w2)(〈x,w〉)]
The right side in (62) is equivalent to NF,G(w1) = NF,G(w2). Therefore, in all worlds
that are accessible from the world of evaluation w, the set of non-exceptional F s with
respect to being G is constant, and can be simplified to NF,G(w).
In combination, the translation of Drewery’s account for the meaning of generic
statements of the form F s are G into a system with explicit world variables results in
the truth-conditional content proposed in (63).
(63) ∀w′[w ∼F,G w′ → ∀x[F (x)(w′) & NF,G(w)(〈x,w′〉)→ G(x)(w′)]]
Drewery’s account captures both desiderata for modal accounts of Gen listed at the
end of Section 3.3.2: (i) The accessibility relation is defined based on the function NF,G
that models the set of non-exceptional F -individuals with respect to being G, and (ii)
the function NF,G depends on the property denoted by the material in the restrictor
and the material in the scope of Gen.
Hence, the problems identified for the account in Krifka et al. (1995) in the pre-
vious section do not apply to Drewery’s account. Drewery discusses her solution for
the problem regarding restrictive modification of the subject property in detail. Her
account captures that the introduction of restrictive modifiers changes the set of ac-
cessible worlds: The truth of a generic sentence depends first and foremost on the
function NF,G, which, in turn, depends on the properties F and G. Therefore, if the
subject property F is restricted by a property K, it cannot be ensured that the set
NF,G(w) stands in any kind of well-defined relation to the set NF&K,G(w) (for an ar-
bitrary world w). In principle, NF,G(w) and NF&K,G(w) cannot be identical, and do
44This definition is compatible with both world-dependent domains of individuals and a single
domain of world-independent individuals. Since non-exceptionality is determined with respect to
facts in specific worlds, ∀x∀w,w′, w′′[¬(〈x,w〉 ∈ NF,G(w′′) → 〈x,w′〉 ∈ NF,G(w′′)] holds. That is, an
individual x may be in NF,G(w
′′) with respect to its properties in w, but may be an exceptional F
with respect to being G relative to its properties in w′.
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not have to stand in a subset relation; the two sets of non-exceptional individuals may
even be disjoint. Drewery illustrates this last possibility with the following example
(adapted from Drewery 1998:108–110 to the revised formalism).
(64) Students take exams.
Assume that the generic statement about students in (64) is true in w with respect to
the body of law governing educational institutions in w. Assume also that there is a
special school, the University of Carlops, where students are not evaluated by taking
exams, but via a continuous assessment system. Thus, it is also true in w that
(65) Students at Carlops University do not take exams.
This means that students at the University of Carlops count as exceptional students
with respect to taking exams. Hence, Nstudent,take-exams(w) will not contain any pair 〈x,w〉
where x is a student at Carlops in w. However, NCarlops-student,take-exams(w)
45 will contain
only individuals which are students at Carlops University. Therefore, there is no 〈x,w〉
such that Nstudent,take-exams(w)(〈x,w〉) and NCarlops-student,take-exams(w)(〈x,w〉).
This observation can be generalized to any type of modifying material. Formally, all
properties that are interpreted in the restrictor of the generic operator have this effect.
This includes not only adjectival or prepositional modifiers of the subject noun phrase,
but also relative clauses and if/when-clauses restricting Gen. As Drewery (1998) points
out, scenarios like the one above are a problem for any account of restricted generic
sentences in which restrictions are simply intersective modifiers on the domain of indi-
viduals, e.g. the modal proposal of Krifka et al. (1995).
Even though Drewery’s proposal captures both crucial desiderata for a modal account
of Gen, some aspects of her account are, to my mind, problematic. One issue of
Drewery’s proposal concerns her view on the scope of the data that can be captured
by her account. She argues that the value of NF,G is context dependent since (i) the
truth of generic sentences can change over time, and (ii) generic sentences without an
overt modal can sometimes be interpreted as if it contained an overt modal element.
Regarding the first point, I argue that a change in content of NF,G over time is not
context dependence as observed e.g. for modals, anaphora, and other context dependent
material. Compare the examples in (66).
(66) a. Scenario: Peter sneezes ten times.
Just now, Peter had to sneeze ten times.
45Drewery (1998:95) argues that, in general, NF,G = NF,¬G if the body of rules is held constant.
For example in the actual world, penguins are exceptional birds with respect to flying. However, they
are also exceptional birds with respect to not flying, because Penguins do not fly is true, although
Birds do not fly is judged false. That is, to evaluate the generic statement Birds do not fly the same
set of birds is considered as for evaluating Birds fly.
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b. Scenario: Properties of dogs are discussed.
#Just now, dogs had four legs.
Note that the value of NF,G does not change from one moment to the next, which is
implied by the phrase just now. Even if at the moment referred to by just now the
truth of a generic sentence holds, pointing out one specific instance is pragmatically
odd. In contrast, obligations expressed by modals may change more freely.
Drewery’s second point above is based on the observation that generic sentences
without overt modal elements sometimes express the same regularity as a corresponding
generic sentence with an overt modal element. Compare (67-a) and (67-b).
(67) a. Countries with common borders share their resources.
(Drewery 1998:93)
b. Countries with common borders must share their resources.
Example (67-a) has two readings. In its first reading, it is understood as a description
or report of a regularity regarding the conduct of countries with common borders. This
regularity is motivated by legal or moral considerations, and may be based on a series
of observations for countries of this kind in the world of evaluation. In the second
reading, (67-a) expresses a legal or moral necessity for countries with common borders.
This reading (67-a) shares with (67-b). Drewery argues that which of the two possible
interpretations is understood depends on “the kind of modality implied in the context”
(Drewery 1998:93), and is also not an instance of context-dependent variation as found
with e.g. modals. While one and the same modal may be used with different flavors in
the same utterance, see (68), no variance of this sort is observable for generic sentences.
(68) Peter canepistemic only be at his neighbor’s place right now because he told me
that he candeontic watch Germany’s Next Topmodel there.
It can be shown that generic sentences that express ideal rules of conduct, i.e. (67-a) in
its second interpretation, cannot be captured in Drewery’s system. Since both readings
of (67-a) express a regularity based on the legal/moral body of law in force at the world
of evaluation, both readings are modelled by assuming thatNcountries-with-common-borders,share-their-resources
is determined with respect to this body of law. For the second reading, Drewery sug-
gests that (67-a) expresses the same statement as (67-b). Hence, both sentences have
the same truth-conditions. In particular, both sentences are interpreted relative to the
same non-exceptional individuals. This means that the overt modal in (67-b) does not
contribute any additional meaning to the shared truth-conditions.
Undesirable predictions arise because the definition of the accessibility relation in-
duced by NF,G cannot capture generalizations about ideals: the accessibility relation
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∼F,G is by definition realistic, independently of the body of law used to determine
NF,G.
46
(69) w1 ∼F,G w2 iff NF,G(w1) = NF,G(w2)
(70) ∀w′[w ∼F,G w′ → ∀x[F (x)(w′) & NF,G(w′)(〈x,w′〉)→ G(x)(w′)]]
Consequently, Drewery’s account predicts that no true counterexamples for generic
sentences may exist in the world of evaluation. If even a single counterexample were to
exist in the world of evaluation, the sentence would immediately come out as false.47
This means that generalizations about ideals cannot be captured as soon as the gener-
alization is violated in the world of evaluation. Unfortunately, in a situation in which
a generic sentence is intended to be taken as a rule of conduct typically some non-
conforming non-exceptional individuals exist—their existence motivates the use of the
generic sentence in the first place. Crucially, the speaker is not unsure whether the
non-conforming individuals are in fact exceptional. If the non-conforming individual
were exceptional, the speaker’s utterance of the rule of conduct would not be motivated
any more. Consider example (71).
Scenario: A finds out that B, a student, is still living at his parents’ place.














A to B: ‘Students don’t still live at their parents’ place!’
In (71), A intends to convey is that B should not live at his parents’ place any longer.
He neither questions B’s being a student, nor his non-exceptionality regarding the rule.
If B were not a student or an exception to the rule, A’s utterance would not apply to
B in the first place, and B would not feel criticized. Consequently, the rule expressed
in (71) can be valid, even though the non-exceptional individual B violates it in the
world of evaluation.
Since Drewery assumes that sentences like (71) have a realistic accessibility relation,
she cannot capture this example. In fact, two results follow from the discussion above:
(i) Drewery’s proposal can only capture generalizations that are not violated in the
world of evaluation, and (ii) generic sentences with overt modals cannot be modelled
as proposed by Drewery. That is, the presence of an overt modal has an effect on the
truth-conditions of a generic sentence.
46The set of accessible worlds contains those worlds w′ that are in the equivalence class of the world
of evaluation w with respect to NF,G. Hence, w will always be in the set of accessible worlds.
47In fact, no individual that does not conform to the rule or norm expressed by a generic sentence
may exist in any accessible world.
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Dahl’s (1975) class of “descriptive lawlike statements” are, however, unproblematic
for Drewery’s account.48
I leave the problem of the second interpretation of sentences like (67-a) and (71)
for further research since a detailed analysis of these examples necessarily involves an
investigation of their primary discourse function to enforce the rule, norm, or ideal
expressed by the sentence. This investigation is beyond the scope of this thesis.
3.3.4 Greenberg (2007)
Like Drewery (1998), the modal account proposed in Greenberg (2007) also aims to
capture the influence of exceptional individuals on the overall interpretation of generic
sentences. Greenberg also aims to investigate and model the difference between generic
sentences containing indefinite singular noun phrases (IS generics) and those containing
bare plurals (BP generics).
Greenberg’s starting point is an observation from the literature that only a proper
subset of lawlike generalizations can be expressed with IS generics, while all lawlike
generalizations can be expressed by means of BP generics (cf. Krifka et al. 1995).49
Compare the IS generics in (72) and (73) to the respective BP generics.
(72) a. A dog has four legs.
b. Dogs have four legs.
(Greenberg 2007:131)
(73) a. #A madrigal is popular.
b. Madrigals are popular.
(Greenberg 2007:132)
Previous attempts in the literature to capture the asymmetry between IS generics and
BP generics propose e.g. that IS generics can only express relations between individuals
and their “essential properties” (cf. Krifka et al. 1995), or that the underlying semantics
of IS generics differs fundamentally from that of BP generics (cf. Cohen 2001). In
contrast, Greenberg (2007) argues that the main difference between IS generics and
BP generics lies in their different behavior regarding their tolerance for exceptions:
Only BP generics can be used to express generalizations that have exceptions for which
speakers cannot explicitly state what causes their status as exceptions. This vagueness,
Greenberg argues, is the result of vagueness with respect to the underlying regularity
which can only be expressed by BP generics. IS generics, in contrast, can only express
48Note that the descriptive readings still differ from accidental generalizations in that some under-
lying non-accidental regularity is assumed.
49This is also observed in Drewery (1998), but not further pursued. Drewery leaves generic sentences
containing indefinite singular noun phrases for further research, and focusses completely on generic
sentences containing bare plurals.
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generalizations for which speakers can determine explicitly which individuals count as
exceptions, and why. Example (74) illustrates this observation.
(74) a. #A Norwegian student with a name ending in ‘s’ wears thick green socks.
b. Norwegian students with a name ending in ‘s’ wear thick green socks.
(Greenberg 2007:132)
Assume that it is observed that Norwegian students with a name ending in ‘s’ seem to
wear thick green socks all the time, but that it is unclear whether there is an underlying
reason for this. In such a scenario, only the BP generic variant in (74) can be used,
which expresses that there is an underlying regularity which cannot be made explicit.
The IS variant is infelicitous. If (74) is considered in a different scenario in which there
is an underlying rule issued by some official institution, the IS variant improves. As
expected, the BP variant stays felicitous.
A central topic in Greenberg’s investigation of the difference between IS generics
and BP generics are the different effects exceptions and irrelevant individuals have
on the truth of a generic sentence. Irrelevant individuals, in contrast to exceptional
individuals, are not taken into consideration at all when the validity of a given generic
statement is considered. Which individuals are relevant is argued to be determined
either contextually as in (75-a) (pace Condoravdi 1994; Krifka et al. 1995, see discussion
in Section 3.3.1), or by some explicit frame-setting expression as in (75-b).
(75) a. (Context: There are professors and students in this university.)
A professor wears a tie./ Professors wear a tie.
(Can mean: A professor in this university wears a tie.)
(Greenberg 2007:134)
b. In this university, a professor wears a tie.
Exceptional individuals are relevant for the truth of a given generic sentence. Their
defining property is that for some reason or other, they are exempt from conforming to
the generalization that is expressed. Greenberg formulates the abnormality constraint
in (76) to capture this intuition.
(76) Abnormality constraint: Individuals that are exceptions to a given generic
statement need to be non-standard or abnormal in some sense.
The same considerations apply to irrelevant and exceptional situations.
Since IS generics and BP generics sometimes express the same generalizations, as
e.g. in (72), Greenberg proposes a unified, underspecified modal semantics for both
types of generic sentences. She argues that the difference between the two variants is a
result of additional conditions regarding the make-up of the accessibility relation in the
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case of IS generics. BP generics, in contrast, can combine with any given accessibility
relation assigned to Gen.
The general form of Greenberg’s (2007) modal account for Gen is the same as in
Krifka et al. (1995) and Drewery (1998): the generic operator expresses universal quan-
tification over a set of accessible worlds and, in addition, universal quantification over a
subset of the domain of individuals and/or situations in these worlds. Her specific pro-
posal for IS generics and BP generics has two basic ingredients: (i) a genericity-specific
type of accessibility relation, and (ii) a domain restriction on the set of individuals and
situations adapted from Kadmon and Landman (1993), which is intended to capture
the tolerance for exceptions.50
The genericity-specific type of accessibility relation for generic sentences of the form
‘Ps are Q ’, or ‘a P is a Q ’ is called an“in-virtue-of accessibility relation”. The relation is
induced by an underlying in-virtue-of property S, which is shared by all non-exceptional
individuals in the denotation of P . It encodes the “reason” why P s in general have the
property Q. Consider example (77).
(77) A boy does not cry. assumed in-virtue-of property: being tough
(Greenberg 2007:142)
In (77), the generic sentence expresses a regularity between being a boy and not crying.
The in-virtue-of property that connects the properties of being a boy and not crying
is assumed to be being tough: all non-exceptional boys are tough, and someone who is
tough does not cry.
Which properties constitute valid in-virtue-of properties for generic statements is
subject to two requirements: (i) reasonable causation and (ii) association. Both restric-
tions are intended as presuppositions on the meaning of generic sentences (Greenberg
2007:143).
The reasonable causation restriction on S is intended to ensure that there is some
positive or negative link between the in-virtue-of property S and the property Q, see
(78).
(78) S is a reasonable causer for Q as seen from w iff
∃w′ ∈ B′w[∀x[S(x)(w′)→ Q(x)(w′)] ∨ ∀x[S(x)(w′)→ ¬Q(x)(w′)]]
for B′w maximally similar to w
(Greenberg 2007:144)
The reasonable causation requirement holds if the sentence in (79) is true in the world
of evaluation.
50Greenberg (2007) refines the formal proposal put forth in Greenberg (2003). The original proposal
in Greenberg (2003) differs minimally from the account presented here, and will therefore be left aside
in this discussion.
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(79) It could be the case that all Ss are Qs or that no S is a Q.
The association requirement is given in (80).
(80) S is associated with P in w iff
∀w′ ∈ Bw[∀x[P (x)(w′)→ S(x)(w′)]]
for Bw epistemically/deontically/stereotypically etc. accessible from w
(Greenberg 2007:143)
The accessibility relation used to determine whether S is associated with P can be any
knowledge- or rule-based relation.51 So, for two properties to be associated, (81) needs
to be true in the world of evaluation for one possible interpretation of must.
(81) All Ps must be Ss.
The in-virtue-of accessibility relation based on S is given in (82).
(82) λw.λw′.∀x[P (x)(w′)→ S(x)(w′)]
For a world w, this relation returns those worlds w′ in which all P individuals have the
in-virtue-of property S.52
The final architecture of Greenberg’s account for sentences of the form ‘P s are Qs ’
and ‘a P is a Q’ is schematically represented in (83).
(83) ∀w′[w′ ∈ Rw → ∀x[PX(x)(w′)→ Q(x)(w′)]]
with Rw = λw
′.∀x[P (x)(w′)→ S(x)(w′)]
51Greenberg does not explicitly state which accessibility relation is chosen in a particular case, or
whether facts, norms, or stereotypes exhaust the possible sources for determining association. From
the accompanying explanations, it seems that for S to be associated with P , it is sufficient if there is
one accessibility relation that provides the necessary set of worlds.
52Mari (2008) criticizes Greenberg’s assumption of an underlying in-virtue-of property. She argues
that it is an established fact—she cites Rooth (1995) among others—that for any generic sentence
that contains a subject NP with an overt modifying element, the modifying element is the relevant in-
virtue-of property. Since Greenberg assumes that in-virtue-of properties are shared by all individuals
in the accessible worlds, Mari argues that the modifiying properties are predicted to be essential
properties of the non-exceptional individuals.
I think that this is not a valid point of criticism and does not reflect what Greenberg intends with
the in-virtue-of property. First, the association relation is not an essential property relation. Second,
Mari’s way of reasoning would imply that any in-virtue-of property could be inserted as an overt
modifier without a change in the truth-conditions of the generic statement. That is, (i-a) should be
equivalent to (i-b).
(i) a. A boy does not cry. assumed in-virtue-of property: tough
(Greenberg 2007:142)
b. A tough boy does not cry.
However, introducing a modifier on the noun boy in (i-b) in fact changes the expressed regularity.
This is another instance of Drewery’s (1998) observation regarding restrictive modifiers (cf. Section
3.3.3).
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The second main ingredient of the account is the restriction on the domain of in-
dividuals that are P s in the accessible worlds. In (83), the restriction is symbolized
by the superscripted variable X. This domain restriction filters out all irrelevant and
exceptional individuals to ensure that only relevant and non-exceptional individuals
are universally quantified over.
With respect to this domain restriction, Greenberg’s proposal is based on Kadmon
and Landman’s (1993) account of generic sentences. They argue that generic quan-
tification over individuals involves a vague restriction of the quantifier domain—in
contrast to true universal quantification (e.g. with quantificational determiners ‘every ’
and ‘all ’). The characteristic property of vague sets is that for some individuals in the
domain of discourse, it cannot be determined with complete certainty whether they are
elements of that set, or not. The truth of sentences containing universal quantifiers
that are restricted to vague sets is determined in the spirit of supervaluationism (cf.
Kadmon and Landman 1993).53
Greenberg adapts the original proposal in Kadmon and Landman (1993), and pro-
poses a restriction XP that vaguely restricts the set of individuals denoted by the
property P in the accessible worlds. For a specific generic sentence, the restriction
is determined relative to the in-virtue-of property S and a set of blocking properties
B〈〈S,Q〉,w〉. As stated above, the set of blocking properties contains those properties
that block the reasonable causation relation between the in-virtue-of property S and
the property Q. In other words, blocking properties determine whether a P -individual
is a legitimate exception. Consider the definition in (84).
(84) B ∈ B〈〈S,Q〉,w〉 iff B is taken to be a property which, from the point of view of
w, ‘blocks’ the reasonable causation relation between S and Q.
Formally, B ∈ B〈〈S,Q〉,w〉 iff ∀x[(S(x)(w) & B(x)(w))→ ¬Q(x)(w)]
(Greenberg 2007:156)
The formal definition states that a blocking property effectively cancels out the effect
of the in-virtue-of property without denying it. This means that blocking properties
53In classical logical systems, a formula A is either true or false. A supervaluationist system, in
contrast, can capture that intuitively, it is sometimes not possible to determine the truth or falsity
of a statement. This is accounted for because for any formula A, all combinations of truth-values for
all subformulas of A are considered as independent precisifications of the formula. For instance, an
atomic term A has two precisifications: A is true and A is false. The formula (A & ¬A) also has two
precisifications: if A is true, the formula is true, and if A is false, the formula is also true. A formula
counts as supertrue iff it is true in all precisifications. Kadmon and Landman (1993) adapt this
general idea to model vague domain restrictions for quantifiers. For a set of predicates, they consider
all possible consistent combinations of properties as restrictions on the domain of quantification. These
combinations constitute different precisifications of the domain restriction. Since an individual x in the
domain of quantification may be filtered out by one precisification, but not by another, the restricted
domain of quantification comes out as vague. For details see Kadmon and Landman (1993).
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are consistent with the respective in-virtue-of property S, but inconsistent with the
matrix predicate Q.
The restrictor XP is defined on the basis of B〈〈S,Q〉,w〉. The restriction is defined as
a pair 〈v0, v〉 where v0 and v are sets of properties. The strict part v0 contains those
properties that are contributed contextually, or by a spatio-temporal adverbial. It filters
out all irrelevant individuals. The vague part, v− v0, contains the complements of the
blocking properties.54 It filters out the exceptional individuals, and models the vague
quality of being a non-exceptional individual by contributing an arbitrary, consistent
set of properties compatible with the properties P , S, and Q. The properties in v− v0
obey two constraints, abnomality and relevant abnormality. The abnormality constraint
is based on Cohen’s (1996) idea that being “abnormal” means to have properties that
are only true for the minority of the relevant individuals in all of the accessible worlds.
Given this idea, Greenberg proposes that the properties in v − v0 have to hold for the
majority of relevant individuals in all of the accessible worlds. The second requirement,
relevant abnormality, additionally demands that the negated blocking properties are in
v − v0. In sum, the restriction XP is defined as follows.
(85) Let XP be a pair 〈v0, v〉, where both v0 and v are consistent sets of properties,
every property vi ∈ v0 is directly supplied by the context, and v0 ⊆ v. Let
B〈〈S,Q〉,w〉 be a set of blocking properties:
a. |
⋂
v ∩ P in c | is not significantly smaller than |
⋂
v0 ∩ P in c |
(abnormality)
b. If b ∈ B〈〈S,Q〉,w〉 then b− ∈ v − v0 (relevant abnormality)
(Greenberg 2007:162)
As stated above, the difference observed for IS generics and BP generics is that IS
generics can only be used to express generalizations for which the in-virtue-of prop-
erties can be explicitly stated. BP generics, in contrast, do not restrict the value of
S explicitly; it is sufficient if the existence of some unspecific underlying in-virtue-of
property can be assumed. Greenberg tries to capture this difference with the assump-
tion that in the case of an unspecific in-virtue-of property, no specific, single value for
S can be assigned. Instead, there are many different, potential values for S that could
be the underlying link between P and Q.
With respect to the desiderata for modal accounts of genericity that were formu-
54Greenberg (2007) does not define the notion of the complement of a property. One possible
definition which seems plausible given the discussion of blocking properties is proposed in (i).
(i) A property P− is the complement of a property P iff their extensions P−ext and Pext in all
possible worlds w are such that Pext∩P−ext = ∅ and Pext∪P−ext = Dw, where Dw is the domain
of individuals of world w.
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lated in Section 3.3.2, Greenberg, like Drewery, can capture both with her formaliza-
tion. Greenberg refers to a previous version of Drewery’s account proposed in Drewery
(1997), and argues that her account improves on Drewery’s account regarding the
treatment of exceptions. Greenberg’s major point of criticism is that exceptions in
Drewery’s account only depend on the properties denoted by the subject and the ma-
trix predicate. She argues that this is not sufficient since exceptions also depend on the
context. This context dependence is captured by the contextually chosen in-virtue-of
property S in Greenberg’s account. Consider example (86).
(86) A woman in this place doesn’t walk alone outside.
a. in virtue of: ‘living in such a violent place’
b. in virtue of: ‘living in such a religious town’
c. in virtue of: ‘having so many children’
(Greenberg 2007:142)
Depending on when and where the speaker utters the sentence in (86), a different in-
virtue-of property needs to be chosen from the context. Therefore, the exceptions to
the generic sentence cannot be determined by the linguistic material in the sentence
alone.
I am not quite convinced that Greenberg’s criticism is entirely valid. Drewery’s
(1998) account seems to be able to capture the different in-virtue-of properties proposed
by Greenberg indirectly. Example (86) contains the deictic spatial adverbial in this
place. Consequently, Drewery’s account predicts that the functionNF,G that determines
the non-exceptional individuals does not only depend on the properties denoted by
woman and does-not-walk-alone-outside, but also on the location denoted by this place.
(87) A woman in this place doesn’t walk alone outside.
a. this place = A: Nwoman & in A, does-not-walk-alone-outside
b. this place = B: Nwoman & in B, does-not-walk-alone-outside
c. this place = C: Nwoman & in C, does-not-walk-alone-outside
As Drewery shows, restrictive modifiers, like frame-setting material, may have the
specific effect of inducing specialized rules. Therefore, if women in location A do not
walk alone outside because of the violence, this will not affect the rule about women in
location B, who do not walk alone outside because they live in a particularly religious
town. And analogously, the rule about women in location C is independent of the rules
for other locations. Hence at least for (86), Greenberg’s criticism of Drewery’s account
is not justified.
Greenbergs’s formalization of IS generics and BP generics has some problematic
aspects that need to be addressed. In my opinion, the following four problems arise.
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First, the truth-conditions for generic sentences proposed above depend on the world
of evaluation only indirectly; dependence on the world of evaluation is only brought in
by the presupposed conditions. Note that the world of evaluation w does not feature
in the formula that is intended to capture the general meaning of generic sentences,
repeated in (88).
(88) ∀w′[∀x[P (x)(w′)→ S(x)(w′)]→ ∀x[PXP (x)(w′)→ Q(x)(w′)]]
The central issue is that dependence on the world of evaluation via presupposed require-
ments is not enough to model the contingency of generic statements. Presuppositions
cannot ensure that a given statement can be true in some possible worlds and false
in others: given (88), a generic sentence has no truth value in contexts for which the
requirements for S are not met, and has a uniform truth value in all other contexts in
which the requirements are met.55
The second property concerns the different modal flavors observable for generic sen-
tences. Greenberg argues that the different flavors for generic sentences discussed in
Section 3.3.1 are brought in via the association requirement. However, the specific
modal flavor which is used to check this requirement is not inherited by the in-virtue-of
accessibility relation. After the association requirement for the in-virtue-of property
S is checked, it is established that for all worlds w′ ∈ Bw ⊆ W , which are accessible
in some specific way, ∀x[P (x)(w′)→ S(x)(w′)] holds. In the truth-conditional content
given in (88), the specific accessibility relation Bw is not included. The association
requirement only ensures that the set of worlds that are accessible via the in-virtue-of
accessibility relation is a superset of the set of accessible worlds Bw in the association
requirement. Thus, the in-virtue-of accessibility relation does not reflect the specific
“flavor of modality” used for Bw, either.
The third problem arises with the formulation of the reasonable causation require-
ment. The in-virtue-of property seems to be introduced to “span the bridge” between
the subject property P and the matrix predicate Q. The association relation ensures
that there is previous experience, or some set of rules that link the restrictor property
P to the in-virtue-of property S. However, the reasonable causation requirement does
not link the in-virtue-of property S to the matrix property Q in a way that a transitive
link between P and Q is formed.
Consider the accessibility relations involved in the two requirements: The association
requirement considers all worlds in the contextually determined set Bw; the reasonable
causation requirement looks at the maximally similar worlds. Since the set Bw for the
association requirement may be determined relative to prioritizing modal flavors in the
sense of Portner (2009) (cf. Section 3.2), Bw may be disjoint from the set of maximally
55Or alternatively, it could be assumed that in those contexts in which the requirements are not
met the sentence is false—depending on the theory of presuppositions that is adopted.
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similar worlds. Hence: Even though the set of accessible worlds picked by the in-virtue-
of accessibility relation is a superset of Bw, it cannot be ensured that this set and the
set of maximally similar worlds have a non-empty intersection. Consequently, the two
requirements do not ensure that the in-virtue-of property S forms a link between P
and Q.
Moreover, the formulation of the reasonable causation requirement does not capture
the intuition that there is a principled connection between S and Q. The link between
the two properties is only required to exist in one, single world that is most similar to
the world of evaluation. In this world, this link may, however, be completely accidental.
To evade this problem, it seems to me, that the reasonable causation requirement needs
to be modelled similar to the association requirement, i.e. with universal quantification
over relevantly accessible worlds.
The fourth and last problem concerns Greenberg’s adaptation of Kadmon and Land-
man’s (1993) proposal. Greenberg modifies their supervaluation account in a non-
standard fashion. She argues that the in-virtue-of property S and the set v − v0 used
to determine XP may receive an“arbitrary value”that obeys the respective restrictions.
The possibility to chose any arbitrary value among many possible values is intended
to model the vagueness associated with exceptions and the accessibility relation for
BP generics. It is unclear to me, though, how this account captures vagueness in the
way that a supervaluationist proposal does. If there are various potentially different
values for S and v− v0, but no specific value is chosen, how can the meaning of generic
sentences ever be computed? Regarding the choice of in-virtue-of property S for BP
generics, Greenberg elaborates her idea that no specific property can be chosen among
a set of possible/plausible in virtue of properties. She states that “we end up with mul-
tiple propositions [. . . ], and thus with multiple sets of accessible worlds, each of them
represents one way of making the accessibility relation precise” (Greenberg 2007:162).
Again, it is unclear to me whether these multiple propositions also vary with respect to
the different choices for v−v0, and if they do, whether all of the sentences are evaluated
to determine the truth of a generic sentence. This also remains an open question: How
is the truth of a generic sentence determined from a set of propositions in Greenberg’s
(2007) system? This is an important aspect which is not addressed explicitly.56
One final remark regarding Greenberg’s example in (75) needs to be made: I be-
lieve that (75) needs to be considered with caution. It seems to me that Gen can
only be restricted by a covert “contextually” given property in some cases, and only if
the relevant set of entities is made salient verbally in the previous discourse context.
That is, Greenberg’s example can be understood as restricted to professors at a salient
university, but only if the topic of the discourse has been explicitly restricted to this
56 Note that in Greenberg (2003), Kadmon and Landman’s (1993) original proposal is adopted
without any modifications.
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location. Crucially, the examples in (75) cannot be understood out of the blue, even if
the extra-linguistic context is appropriate:
(89) a. (Context: There are professors and students in this university.)
A professor wears a tie./ Professors wear a tie.
(Can mean: A professor in this university wears a tie.)
(Greenberg 2007:134)
b. In this university, a professor wears a tie.
This cautionary note is also supported by the following observation on linguistically
given restrictions. Consider the following scenario.
Scenario: A and B stand in front of a cage with lions and tigers. All of the lions
lost one leg, but the tigers are healthy. A and B explicitly talk about the animals in
the cage.
(90) a. A: Look at these beautiful cats. Lions have three legs.
b. A’: In this cage, there are two kinds of feline predators. Lions have three
legs.
c. A”: ?There is a rule regarding the number of limbs for the two kinds of
feline predators in this cage. Lions have three legs. And tigers have four
legs.
While the generic sentence lions have three legs in A and A’ is still interpreted as
unrestricted, i.e. as a rule for lions in general57, the sentence can be understood as
restricted in A” (the example is still marginal, though). In A”, the first sentence
crucially differs from those in A and A’ since it announces the existence of general
rules for the individuals in the cage. Hence, lions have three legs is understood as one
of these rules (the same is true for ‘a lion has three legs’).
A general requirement for explicit contextual restrictions of generic sentences there-
fore seems to be that the generic sentence has to express a plausible rule for the re-
stricted context. The exact conditions that govern explicit contextual restriction of
generic sentences, though, need to be left for further research.
3.3.5 Choosing a modal account for Gen
In the previous three subsections the modal accounts for generic sentences in Krifka
et al. (1995), Drewery (1998), and Greenberg (2007) have been presented, and discussed
in detail. Since the aim of this section was to find an alternative account to Krifka et
57Note that in A’, the functional reading of the bare plural is also available, and possibly preferred
(cf. Condoravdi 1994).
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al.’s proposal adopted in Chapter 2, Drewery’s and Greenberg’s accounts were evaluated
with respect to the two desiderata for modal accounts introduced in Section 3.3.2:
• The set of accessible worlds needs to depend on (at least) the subject property.
• Universal quantification over individuals needs to be restricted by a genericity-
specific, in-built restriction.
Which of the two more recent proposals should be adopted then? Drewery (1998)
and Greenberg (2007) propose the same basic structure for generic sentences of the
form Fs are G or an F is a G, see (91).
(91) ∀w′ ∈ Rw∀x[F (x)(w′)&N(x)(w′)→ G(x)(w′)]
where R models the accessibility relation and N the restriction on the domain
of individuals
Both proposals also include the following two aspects which fulfill the two desiderata
above: (i) the set of accessible worlds that is considered to evaluate a generic statement
is made sensitive to the given subject property and the matrix predicate, and (ii) the
dependence of exceptions to an interacting set of rules is explicity modelled.
The two proposals, however, differ with respect to the specific proposals for the ac-
cessibility relation R and the restriction component N . While Drewery (1998) assumes
that N is a primitive function NF,G that is determined by a body of interconnected
rules, Greenberg (2007) proposes an elaborate analysis of how these rules interact.
As shown above, both accounts are not without problems. However, for the remain-
der of this thesis, I adopt the modal account for generic sentences in Drewery (1998) in
its proposed adaptation to a system with explicit world variables. This choice is moti-
vated by the following points: even though Greenberg’s account is conceptually more
elaborate, the additional layer of vagueness that is introduced to model the difference
between IS generics and BP generics goes beyond what is needed at this point. Given
the problems identified for Greenberg’s formalization, her formal system is also, to my
mind, not sufficiently worked out to be adapted straightforwardly.
3.4 Modals as binders?
3.4.1 Initial considerations
In Chapter 2 following previous results in the literature on impersonal pronouns and
impersonal readings of personal pronouns, three (types of) binders for the variable con-
tributed by these pronouns were discussed: (i) the generic operator Gen, (ii) existential
closure, and (iii) adverbs of quantification. The choice of binders is connected to the
different readings of ich, du, and man (cf. Section 2.2 and 2.5.3).
196 3.4 Modals as binders?
In Chapter 1, the frequent presence of co-occurring modals (with or without an
additional conditional structure) was noted (cf. Section 1.3), and it was observed that
overt modal elements have a supporting effect on the availability of the impersonal
use. This suggests that the modals found in the data play a part in deriving the
impersonal readings. At least superficially, the meaning of modals as expressions of
necessity and possibility are compatible with the observation that sentences containing
impersonally interpreted ich, du, or man express rules, norms, or regulations (cf. Section
3.2). So far, however, the modals’ contribution to the intensional sentential context
of the impersonal reading was left aside. This section aims to fill this gap and to
investigate whether, in addition to the generic operator Gen, overt modals can act as
binders for the free variable contributed by impersonally used ich, du, and man.
In Section 3.2.1, the class of quantificational modals was introduced. The character-
izing property of these modals is that they show quantificational variability effects with
indefinite noun phrases like adverbs of quantification (Lewis 1975). Hence, if modals
can in principle bind the free variable contributed in the impersonal uses, the class of
quantificational modals would be the first class to investigate further.
Still, even if quantificational modals are possible binders, two different analyses for
sentences containing an impersonal use of ich, du, or man, and an overt modal element
need to be considered. Consider the two accounts sketched in (92).
(92) a. One-operator account: If an overt modal is present, it binds the free
variable contributed by impersonally interpreted pronouns. Else, if no
overt modal is present in the sentential context, the variable is bound by
the covert generic operator.
b. Two-operator account: The variable contributed by impersonally in-
terpreted pronouns is always bound by a covert generic operator. Hence,
even though co-occurring overt modals could in principle act as binders,
they never actually bind these variables.
Before discussing which of these two analyses captures the data presented for the
impersonal uses in Chapter 1, the class of quantificational modality, which originated
in Heim (1988 [1982]), is introduced in greater detail.
Heim (1988 [1982]) analyzes indefinite expressions as contributing free variables that
are bound either by operators higher up in the sentence, or via existential closure at
discourse level. She lists modals among the possible binders for these free variables,
and proposes that some modals can unselectively bind free variables in their syntactic
scope. Heim observes that the result of this binding configuration are quantificational
variability effects as observed between indefinite expressions and adverbs of quantifica-
tion in Lewis (1975).
Lewis (1975) notes that in some cases adverbial quantification shifts from quantifying
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over times/situations/events to express quantification over cases/individuals. Lewis
gives the example in (93).
(93) A quadratic equation usually has two different solutions.
∼ ‘Most quadratic equations have two different solutions.’
The quantificational variability reading of (93) is the result of the adverb of quantifi-
cation usually quantifying over individual quadratic equations, instead of situations or
events.
Heim (1988 [1982]) argues that the modals in (94) behave similarly in that they bind
the variable contributed by a cat and a woman’s coat in addition to a world variable.
(94) a. If a cat is exposed to 2,4-D, it must be taken to the vet immediately.
b. If a woman’s coat is missing from the coat rack, she may have gone out.
(Heim 1988 [1982]:171)
For instance, (94-a) is interpreted as ‘All cats that are exposed to 2,4-D must be taken
to the vet immediately ’.
To model modals as unselective binders, Heim adapts the semantics for modals pro-
posed in Kratzer (1981a). The proposal is given in (95) in the notation introduced in
Section 3.2.
(95) a. Jmust/müssenKc,g,w = λp〈s,t〉.∀w′ ∈ O(f, g, w)[p(w′)]
b. Jcan/könnenKc,g,w = λp〈s,t〉.∃w′ ∈ O(f, g, w)[p(w′)]
Heim modifies (95) to make modals sensitive to free variables contained in their propo-
sitional argument. That is, whenever modals take a proposition p containing free
variables, x1, . . . , xn, as their argument (this is written as: p[x1, . . . , xn]), the quantifier
may unselectively bind these variables in addition to the obligatory world variable.
This results in the truth conditions in (96).
(96) a. Jmust p[x1, . . . , xn]Kw,c,g = 1 iff
∀w′ ∈ O(f, g, w)∀x1, . . . xn[p[x1, . . . , xn](w′)]
b. Jcan p[x1, . . . , xn]Kw,c,g = 1 iff
∃w′ ∈ O(f, g, w)∃x1, . . . xn[p[x1, . . . , xn](w′)]
Heim’s analysis of the cases in (94) has been challenged by Chierchia (1995b) and
Brennan (1997), who both argue that the two sentences are in fact conditional generic
sentences (cf. Appendix A3). Brennan proposes two tests to check whether an interpre-
tation for sentences like (94) is the result of quantificational variability effects arising
between the modal and the indefinite expression, or whether they are the result of the
generic operator binding the variable contributed by the indefinite expression.
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(97) Covariance test : Does the quantificational force found with the indefinite ex-
pression change when the modal force is changed? If yes, one can assume that
the variable is bound by the modal.
(98) Counterfactual entailment test : Generic quantification supports counterfactual
entailments (cf. Section 3.3), but unselective binding by the modal does not.
Therefore, if appropriate counterfactuals are entailed, the variable contributed
by the indefinite expression is bound by a generic operator rather than the
modal.
The first step of testing for quantificational variability between modals and indefinite
expressions is to apply the covariance test. If no covariance is observed, the counterfac-
tual entailment test can then be used to check whether the sentence should be analyzed
as a generic sentence.
Brennan (1997) applies these tests to different sets of data, and concludes that the
examples in (99) involve unselective binding by the modals will and can.
(99) a. A basketball player will be short. ∼ ‘All basketball players are short.’
b. A basketball player can be short. ∼ ‘Some basketball players are short.’
When the modal will is substituted by can, or vice versa in (99), the quantificational
force of the indefinite changes, as well. Hence, the modals are taken to act as binders.
And indeed, no counterfactual entailments arise for these sentences. This is illustrated
for the second example in (100).
(100) A basketball player can be short. #Therefore: If I were a basketball player, I
could be short.
(Brennan 1997:168, reuses Heim’s examples)
The test results for the modals in Heim’s examples in (94) crucially differ from those
for (99): the modals in (94) do not seem to act as unselective binders of the indefinite
expression a cat occurring in their scope. First, no covariance can be observed when
must is replaced by may.58
(101) a. If a cat is exposed to 2,4-D, it must be taken to the vet immediately.
b. If a cat is exposed to 2,4-D, it may be taken to the vet immediately.
And second, the examples in (101) are general statements about cats that are exposed
to 2,4-D. This is supported by the availability of the counterfactual entailment shown
in (102) for (101-b).
582,4-Dichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4-D) is a pesticide/herbicide. It is the most widely
used herbicide in the world, and the third most commonly used in North America. Source:
http://www.24d.org/
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(102) If a cat is exposed to 2,4-D, it may be taken to the vet immediately. So, if
Sienna were a cat who had been exposed to 2,4-D, she could be taken to the
vet immediately.
(Brennan 1997:168)
Consequently, Brennan (1997) suggests that in (94), the generic operator scopes over
the modal, and binds the free variable provided by the indefinite noun phrase. This
analysis captures the lack of covariance, and the support of the counterfactual entail-
ment in (102).
Given that cases like (94) and (99) exist, Brennan concludes that modals are some-
times (but not always) able to bind free variables contributed by indefinites. Binding
only occurs in those cases that involve real quantificational modals. Picking up Bren-
nan’s and Chierchia’s results, Portner (2009) suggests that the only English modals for
which quantificational uses are observable are can and will.
In sum, even though Heim’s initial proposal that all modals can act as unselective
binders has been shown to be empirically inadequate—her examples in (94) involve
the generic operator—some modals can interact with free variables contributed by
indefinite expressions. In those cases, quantificational variability effects similar to those
with adverbs of quantification arise.
Hence for the data presented in Chapter 1, it has to be determined whether those
sentences that contain overt modals can be grouped with cases like (94) or with cases
like (99). Crucially, this differentiation coincides with the two accounts sketched in
(92) above.
Before this investigation is conducted in the following subsection, a final considera-
tion has to be addressed that links this section to the data discussion in Section 1.2.
There it was argued that sentences containing impersonally used personal pronouns
have to be classified as generic sentences, which was illustrated on the basis of a few
naturally occurring examples. So why even discuss the issue of modality here? Since
the claim in Section 1.2 was not supported by a detailed presentation of conclusive
evidence, this second part of Chapter 3 aims to provide the full empirical basis for this
claim. Furthermore, I aim to spell out the resulting intensional sentential contexts for
the impersonal uses in detail.
3.4.2 Identifying the overt modals found with impersonal uses
The aim of this section is to decide whether the one-operator or the two-operator
account sketched in Section 3.4.1 captures the truth-conditional content of sentences
containing impersonally used ich, du, or man and an overt modal. The first step
that is needed is to identify and analyze the overt modal elements found in the data.
Specifically, the range of modal interpretations that these elements receive in their
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contexts is of interest.59 To save space, the full range of modal interpretations found
in the data is only illustrated in detail for impersonally used first person singular ich.
These results also apply to the impersonal use of du, and since the impersonal use of
man is in general less restrictive (cf. Chapter 1), though it is to be expected that the
modal interpretations found with ich and du do not exhaust the possibilities for man.
Hence, further work might be needed to discuss the full range of modal elements that
can co-occur with man.
A detailed investigation of the collected data reveals that the modal interpretations
found with impersonally used ich are ability, teleological, bouletic, stereotypical, and
deontic interpretations. These types of interpretation are not equally frequent, though.
The predominant modal interpretation has a deontic flavor based on either a legal or a



























‘As a married couple, one can put up to 300.000 Euros as an overnight loan































‘As a customer, one also doesn’t have to check, whether the movie theater
screens a pirated copy.’61
The example about bridal-couples illustrates a deontic possibility modal that is intu-



































‘As a bridal couple, one can’t expect the guests to pay for one’s party!’62
For the examples in (106)–(109), the intuition is that they illustrate bouletic, teleo-
logical, stereotypical, and ability interpretations.
59Note that determining the exact type of modal interpretation that was intended by the speaker is
close to impossible (cf. Kratzer 1991). The assignment of readings is based on my personal intuitions,
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‘A community has to be willing to pay a certain price for its infrastructure.’63





























‘A sports association has to boost the competition to attract a higher amount
of talent.’64



























‘A customer shouldn’t always act on the assumption that everything is han-
dled legitimately.’65









































‘A system-administrator can generate a certificate, and probably install it in
Mozilla for all of his users without them noticing.’67
The modal readings illustrated above are predominantly non-realistic root interpre-
tations (cf. Section 3.2). The only exception to this generalization is the one instance






66This is the only ability reading I found the collected data.
67http://www.ntzl.org/604481-https-proxy
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impersonally interpreted du, the co-occurring overt modals show the same array of
readings.





















‘An artist has to be economical with his emotions.’68























‘A team has to simply want to win more than their opponent.’69





















‘A pair has to look really well, that’s of advantage.’70
For modals co-occurring with impersonally used ich and du, epistemic readings seem
to be completely unavailable. Consider the example in (113), for which the given
context is constructed to support the epistemic reading of the possibility modal kann.
Context: The speaker learns that cows get sick when they are not milked daily.
Furthermore, farmers are required by law to keep their cows healthy. Thinking about

















In this context, the generalization farmers milk their cows daily is compatible with,
and may be inferred by the addressee from the two assumptions about cows and laws
for farmers—a prerequisite for the epistemic interpretation. Nevertheless, informal
speaker surveys showed that the sentence cannot be readily understood as in view of
my (newly acquired) knowledge, it is possible that farmers milk their cows daily. That





71A possible counterargument to this reasoning is to say that the deontic reading that is intuitively
understood is “primed” in some sense by the second premise involving laws about farmers. However,
if there were a preference to keep the interpretations of modals constant, no two modals with different
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The intuition that only root modal interpretations are available for modals that
co-occur with impersonally interpreted personal pronouns is also supported by the
following three observations.
First, sentential negation is interpreted as having scope over the modal. As discussed
in Section 3.2, epistemic modals tend to scope above negation, and root modals below
negation. Consider examples (104) and (105). In both examples, the modals können
and müssen are interpreted below nicht. However, since higher scope for sentential
negation relative to non-epistemic modals is only a general tendency, this observation
might not provide a decisive criterion.
The second observation is reported in Lauer (2010) among others: German irgend-
indefinites are sensitive with respect to the interpretation of modals if they occur in
their scope. In general, irgend-indefinites show two readings: (i) an ignorance reading,
and (ii) an indifference/free-choice reading. The indifference reading is only available in
case the indefinite is embedded under a non-epistemic modal, though. The ignorance
reading is available for all modal interpretations. Example (114) illustrates an example















Available: ‘A student (I don’t know who) was in my office today.’ (ignorance)
Unavailable: ‘A student (no matter who) was in my office today.’
(indifference)
In contrast, the example in (115) is ambiguous between an ignorance and an indifference











Available: ‘I have to supervise a student (I don’t know who)’ (ignorance)
Available: ‘I have to supervise a student (no matter who).’ (indifference)
The observation for sentences containing impersonal uses of ich, du, or man, is that
if irgend-indefinites occur under an overt modal, they show an indifference reading. In
example (116), this is even the preferred reading.
interpretations would be allowed to co-occur in the same sentence—and maybe even in the entire
discourse. That this is not the case is shown in (i).
(i) Peter must be at home, since he can’t stay out after 10pm.
In (i), must is easily interpreted epistemically while can is given a deontic reading, e.g. according to
the rules set by Peter’s parents.

























‘A single farmer has to have [someone/an employee] (no matter who), who
helps him.’
The ignorance reading of (116), i.e. that a farmer has to have someone unknown to the
speaker to help him is completely unavailable. Similarly, example (117) can also only


























‘A conductor can’t kick random passengers from the train.’
The third observation that supports the assumption that the modals in the data show
only root interpretations is that the overt modals found in the data can be substituted
by other modal verbs that are lexically restricted with respect to their interpretations.
For example, the German modal dürfen (Engl. ‘be allowed to’) has been analyzed
as a strictly prioritizing (i.e. non-epistemic, non-dynamic) possibility modal (cf. Grosz
2011). All of the possibility modals occurring in the examples above can be replaced by
dürfen without a change in truth-conditional meaning. The only exception is example
(109), where können has an ability reading.
In sum, the readings found in the collected data, and the native speakers’ intuitions
about constructed examples with epistemic interpretations point towards the conclu-
sion that those modals that co-occur with impersonally used ich, du, or man exclusively
show non-epistemic readings. This means that, so far, the data is still compatible with
the presence of quantificational modals to bind the variables contributed by imperson-
ally used pronouns. Hence, the decision between the one-operator and the two-operator
account is still open.
Whether epistemic readings are strictly incompatible with impersonally interpreted
personal pronouns, or whether the lack of data may be explained by a (possibly prag-
matic) restriction is left for further research.
3.4.3 One or two operators?
The aim of this subsection is to decide between the one-operator account and the two-
operator account introduced in Section 3.4.1. The central question is whether one can
find evidence to exclude a possible quantificational use for the co-occurring modals. The
Chapter 3. The impersonal use, modals, and generic sentences 205
arguments are based on the considerations about quantificational modality discussed
in Section 3.4.1, and on the characterizing properties of generic sentences introduced
in Section 3.3. To anticipate the result of the following discussion, the two-operator
account repeated in (118) seems to be the more adequate analysis of the German data.
(118) a. One-operator account: If an overt modal is present, it binds the free
variable contributed by impersonally interpreted pronouns. Else, if no
overt modal is present in the sentential context, the variable is bound by
the covert generic operator.
b. Two-operator account: The variable contributed by impersonally in-
terpreted pronouns is always bound by a covert generic operator. Hence,
co-occurring overt modals are never interpreted as binders for the vari-
able, even if they could act as binders in principle.
As a first step, I apply Brennan’s (1997) covariance test to the data. The dialogue
in (119) illustrates the application of the test for the impersonal reading of ich.72


























































‘That’s not true! In the second paragraph it says that a farmer can milk
his cows also in an automated way.’
The two modals in A’s and B’s utterances are interpreted deontically with respect to
the same body of law, i.e. the German law pertaining to farmers. The crucial obser-
vation regarding this dialogue is that both A and B talk about farmers in general, i.e.
no covariance with müssen (Engl. ‘must’) and können (Engl. ‘can’) can be observed.
B’s utterance cannot be understood as ‘According to the German law, some actual
farmers milk their cows in an automated way’, which would be expected if B’s ut-
terance were to involve a quantificational modal.73 B’s utterance can only mean that
in view of the German law, farmers in general can milk their cows in an automated
way (assuming they have some qualifying property that allows the application of the
72The same behavior can be observed for du or man.
73Heim’s (1988 [1982]) proposal for modals as unselective binders also makes false predictions. That
is, the sentence cannot be understood as ‘According to the German law, some farmers can milk their
cows in an automated way.’
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second paragraph). In other words, the (quasi-)universal interpretation for ich . . . als
Bauer as ‘farmers in general’ in B’s utterance cannot be dependent on the overt modal
co-occurring in the sentence.
A second observation that supports the two-operator account in a similar fashion
is the behavior of the German modals that correspond to the English quantificational
modals can and will, i.e. können (Engl. ‘can’) and werden (Engl. ‘will’). The German
equivalents of Brennan’s quantificational modality examples in (120) and (121) are
easily interpreted as showing quantificational variability effects between the indefinite
singular noun phrase in subject position and the respective modal.
(120) A: You have a date with a basketball player tomorrow? I couldn’t date a





















B: ‘But a basketball player can also be less than two meters tall.’
B’s answer in German, as well as in the English translation, is interpreted as ‘Some
basketball players are less than two meters tall’. The analogous observation holds for
example (120).
(121) A: I’m nervous about my blind date with a basketball player tomorrow. I
























B: ‘I guess not. A basketball player will be more than two meters tall.’
∼ ‘All basketball players are more than two meters tall.’
Hence, the modals kann and wird have a quantificational interpretation, and show
quantificational variability effects with indefinite singular noun phrases. If the indef-
inite singular noun phrase in (120) and (121) is substituted by ich . . . als Basketball-
spieler (intended as an impersonal use), the quantificational modality reading becomes
unavailable, though. Even if the same preparatory contexts are used as in (120) and
(121), the modals können (Engl. ‘can’) and werden (Engl. ‘will’) cannot be understood
in their quantificational use.
(122) A: You have a date with a basketball player tomorrow? I couldn’t date a
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B’s answer in (122) can only be read as ‘Basketball players in general are allowed to be
smaller than two meters’. An even stronger effect occurs in example (123). When ich
. . . als Basketballspieler is substituted for ein Basketballspieler, the impersonal reading
for ich in combination with werden (Engl. ‘will’) is completely unavailable.
(123) A: I have a blind date with a basketball player tomorrow. Do you think he’ll





















The only possible, but pragmatically odd interpretation for B’s utterance is ‘As a
basketball player, I will be more than two meters tall.’ This interpretation arises if ich
is understood in its referential use and werden is interpreted as the auxiliary used to
form future tense in German.
Based on these two observations, I conclude that covariance is not only unobservable
for impersonally used ich and its co-occurring modals, but that it seems to be actively
blocked by the impersonally used pronoun.
At this point, one might consider weakening the one-operator account to account for
the invariant universal interpretation of the impersonal readings.
(124) One-operator account (weakened):
If an overt necessity modal co-occurs with impersonally used pronouns, it
acts like a quantificational modal, and binds the free variable contributed by
the pronouns. Else, the covert generic quantifier is introduced to bind the
variables.
This weakened version divides sentences containing impersonally used pronouns into
two classes. The first class contains all sentences with no overt necessity modals. These
are uniformly interpreted as generic sentences. The second class comprises all sentences
in which an overt necessity modal occurs. For these sentences, it is assumed (i) that the
modal binds the variable contributed by the pronoun, and that (ii) the generalization
involves strict universal quantification over individuals.
The weakened version of the one-operator account, however, still does not capture
the semantic behavior of sentences containing overt necessity modals. It can be shown
that these sentences have the characteristic properties associated with generic sen-
tences. Specifically, they support inferences to appropriate counterfactuals, and allow
for exceptions (cf. Section 1.2). The availability of counterfactual inferences is illus-
trated in (125).





































‘A farmer must milk his cows. Therefore, if Peter were a farmer, he would
have to milk his cows.’
Brennan’s (1997) counterfactual entailment test states that sentences that express gen-
eralizations, and that support inferences to appropriate counterfactuals should be an-
alyzed as generic sentences. This predicts that a sentence that contains impersonally
used ich and any type of co-occurring overt modal behaves like an ordinary generic
sentence. An immediate consequence of this result is that these sentences always allow















‘A farmer must milk his cows.’
The exceptional individuals for the rule expressed in (128) are farmers who e.g. have
hired help, or who ensure in some other way that their cows are milked.
This observation, to my mind, is the strongest argument for the two-operator ac-
count. In their quantificational modality use, necessity modals express strict universal
quantification over individuals which does not allow for exceptions (cf. Heim 1988
[1982]; Brennan 1997; Portner 2009). Generically induced quasi-universal quantifica-
tion is the only form of universal quantification that allows for exceptions. Therefore,
the weakened one-operator account ceases to be a viable alternative.
In sum, the observations in this section point toward the conclusion that overt modals
that co-occur with impersonally used ich, du, and man do not behave like quantifica-
tional modals. Consequently, the variables contributed by ich, du, and man are always
bound by Gen. In other words, a two-operator account is necessary to capture the
truth-conditions of sentences containing impersonally used pronouns and overt modals.
This account correctly predicts that no covariance with the modal force of overt modals
can be observed, and that sentences containing impersonal uses uniformly behave like
generic sentences, as claimed in Chapter 1.
Note that the discussion in this section only excludes “conventional” quantificational
modality as described in Brennan (1997) and Portner (2009). Quantificational modal-
ity of this sort seems to arise exclusively with can (Ger. ‘können’) and will (Ger.
‘werden’). It cannot be definitively ruled out that a special generic interpretation for
the occurrences of müssen in the data exists in which the modals behave like the modal
operator Gen.74 In this special interpretation, müssen would have to act as an unse-
74I thank Magdalena Kaufmann (p.c.) for pointing this out to me.
Chapter 3. The impersonal use, modals, and generic sentences 209
lective binder for world and individual variables, and would have to contribute strictly
universal quantification over worlds and quasi-universal quantification over individu-
als (cf. Section 3.3). While this option cannot be excluded, I argue that it is highly
implausible that a generic interpretation should be available for necessity modals, but
not for possibility modals even though they share the same modal flavor.
3.5 Spelling out the two-operator account
3.5.1 Determining the scope order
In this section, the details of the two-operator account argued for in Section 3.4 are
investigated, and worked out formally. This task is connected with two challenges:
First, one consequence of analyzing modals and the generic operator in possible worlds
semantics is that theoretically, two scope orderings for Gen and overt modals are
possible. And second, the modal analyses of Gen and the overt modals may interact
in various ways with respect to the respective sets of accessible worlds.
This subsection aims to establish whether the generic operator and overt modals
occur in a fixed scope ordering, or whether variable scope orderings are found. This in-
vestigation is conducted for bare plural generic sentences, which are the least restricted
type of regular characterizing sentences (cf. Section 3.3), and overt non-epistemic
modals (cf. Section 3.2.1). The epistemic interpretation of overt modals is only ad-
dressed briefly. A detailed investigation of the possible scope orderings between the
generic operator and epistemic modals is beyond the scope of this thesis, though. The
aim of Section 3.5.2 is to spell out the two-operator account formally. I investigate the
interaction of the account for generic sentences proposed in Drewery (1998) (cf. Section
3.3) with the analysis for modals based on the work in Kratzer (1977, 1981a, 1991) (cf.
Section 3.2).
Let us start with the investigation of the possible scope orderings for Gen and overt
non-epistemic modals. Sentences of the form Fs must/may be Gs or an F must/may
be a G technically allow for two scope orderings if a modal interpretation for Gen is
assumed. The two possible orderings are schematically given in (127).75
(127) a. Gen > Mod: Gen(F ;Mod ·G)
b. Mod > Gen: Mod ·Gen(F ;G)
for Mod ∈ {,♦}
In the following discussion, I present three arguments for the first ordering, Gen >
Mod, and against the second ordering, Mod > Gen, for modals that have one of the
75The notation ‘Gen(. . . ; . . .)’ is an abbreviation of the notation used in Krifka et al. (1995). The
semicolon separates the restrictor and the scope of Gen.  and ♦ symbolize necessity and possibility
modals, respectively.
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non-epistemic interpretations identified in Section 3.4. The arguments concern various
interpretational aspects that are connected to the predictions made by the two scope
orderings: (i) the set of exceptional individuals determined by the generic operator,
(ii) the make-up of the set of accessible worlds associated with the overt modals, and
(iii) the counterfactual inferences that are supported by the sentences.
The first argument is based on the intuitions regarding the set of exceptional individ-
uals that is associated with generic sentences containing overt non-epistemic modals.
Consider the examples in (128) for the necessity modal müssen (Engl. ‘must’) and
the possibility modal dürfen (Engl. ‘may’); assume that müssen and dürfen are read






















‘Farmers may milk their cows.’ ♦
If the sentences in (128) are considered for both orderings of the generic operator
Gen and the modal, the following four readings in (129) and (130) (two readings per
sentence) arise. Example (129) spells out the two readings for Gen > Mod.
(129) a. müssen: For every relevantly non-exceptional farmer: in view of the
German law, it is necessary that he milks his cows.
b. dürfen: For every relevantly non-exceptional farmer: in view of the Ger-
man law, it is permissible that he milks his cows.
Example (130) specifies the two readings for Mod > Gen.
(130) a. müssen: In view of the German law, it is necessary: Every relevantly
non-exceptional farmer is such that he milks his cows.
b. dürfen: In view of the German law, it is permissible: Every relevantly
non-exceptional farmer is such that he milks his cows.
In the form given above, the paraphrases of the readings for both orderings still appear
to be indistinguishable, even logically equivalent variants. However, the readings given
by the second ordering Mod > Gen in (130) are in fact much weaker than the readings
for the ordering Gen > Mod in (129). This becomes clear when the set of non-
exceptional farmers for the two orderings are determined.
As a reminder: in Drewery’s (1998) system, the set of individuals that are considered
to be exceptions to a given generic statement depends on the restrictor F and the scope
G of Gen. As a result, universal quantification over individuals in the relevant accessible
worlds is restricted by NF,G.
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For (128), the set of non-exceptional farmers in the first ordering Gen > Mod—as
spelled out in (129)—is determined with respect to a modal property. In the second
ordering Gen >Mod as given in (130), the set of non-exceptional farmers is determined
with respect to a simple, non-modal property. Compare the paraphrases in (131).
(131) a. NF,G for Gen >Mod: the set of relevantly non-exceptional farmers with
respect to the necessity of having to milk their cows
b. NF,G for Mod > Gen: the set of relevantly non-exceptional farmers with
respect to milking their cows
Given the specific form of the exceptions determined for Gen in (131), (132) and (133)
further specify how (129) and (130) are to be distinguished.
(132) Gen > Mod:
a. müssen: In general, farmers have a legal obligation to milk their cows.
However, there may be farmers that count as legitimate exceptions for
this legal obligation. That is, there may be exceptions to the application
of the law.
b. dürfen: In general, farmers are permitted by law to milk their cows.
However, there may be farmers that count as legitimate exceptions for
this legal permission. That is, there may be exceptions to the application
of the law.
(133) Mod > Gen:
a. müssen: In view of the German law, it must be the case: all relevantly
non-exceptional farmers with respect to milking their cows actually milk
their cows. Whether exceptional farmers with respect to milking their
cows actually milk their cows is not relevant. That is, the law expresses
a necessity regarding the truth of a lawlike generalization.
b. dürfen: In view of the German law, it may be the case: all relevantly
non-exceptional farmers with respect to milking their cows actually milk
their cows. Whether exceptional farmers with respect to milking their
cows actually milk their cows is not relevant. That is, the law expresses
a possibility regarding the truth of a lawlike generalization.
To make the set of exceptional farmers that is considered in the second ordering more
precise, consider possible exceptions to the generalization expressed in (134).
(134) Farmers milk their cows.
The exceptional farmers with respect to milking their cows are e.g. farmers who had
an accident and are unable to do manual work; farmers who have a hired help for this
212 3.5 Spelling out the two-operator account
task; and farmers who are alcoholics, and, therefore, do not perform their duties. The
reading derived by the second ordering states that all of these exceptional farmers with
respect to milking their cows are irrelevant for the truth of the sentences in (128).
If sentences like (128-b) can be interpreted with respect to the second scope ordering,
it is predicted that sentences like (135) express a consistent statement since they are

























Available: #‘According to the law: farmers are allowed to milk their cows
and farmers are not allowed to milk their cows.’ Gen > Mod
Unavailable: ‘It is compatible with the law that farmers milks their cows, and
that farmers do not milk their cows.’ Mod > Gen
The reading that is expected to arise if the second scope ordering were possible is
unavailable, though. Example (135) can only be understood with the underlying logical
structure ‘Gen(F ;♦G) & Gen(F ;¬♦G)’. This structure represents the first scope
ordering, and is logically inconsistent.77
Informal surveys of native speaker judgements are also consistent with the claim
that only the first scope ordering is understood for sentences like those in (128). The
interpretation determined by the second ordering is consistently judged as too weak to





































‘Farmers may milk their cows.’
76I thank Magdalena Kaufmann (p.c.) for pointing this out to me.
77Note that if the example in (135) is changed minimally, a consistent reading arises that involves

























Available: ‘According to the law: farmers are allowed to milk their cows and farmers are
allowed to not milk their cows.’ Gen > Mod
The underlying logical structure is ‘Gen(F ;♦G) & Gen(F ;♦¬G)’, i.e. focus forces sentential negation
to be interpreted below the deontic possibility modal. This results in a consistent reading.
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B and B’ in (136) are intended to express statements regarding the necessary or possible
truth of a generic sentence according to the German law; A’s question biases the reader
towards this interpretation. However intuitively, neither B nor B’ communicate that
the German law has a particularly weak stance on farmers milking their cows (given
by the second ordering). Instead, B and B’ are understood as stating that farmers
in general have the legal obligation/the legal right to milk their cows (given by the
first ordering). Hence, even with contextual help, the second ordering seems to be
unavailable.
For the naturally occurring examples discussed in Section 3.4, only the first scope
ordering, Gen > Mod, is understood, as well. Consider (137)–(139).











‘Farmers must milk their cows.’













‘Sports associations have to boost the competition.’











‘System-administrators can generate a certificate.’
According to native speaker judgements, these three sentences cannot be interpreted
as the statements in (140), which paraphrase the second Mod > Gen order.
(140) a. In view of the wishes of farmers regarding profit and health of their
animals, it is necessary that every relevantly non-exceptional farmer with
respect to milking his cows milks his cows.
b. In view of the goal of sports associations to attract more talent, it must
be the case: Every relevantly non-exceptional sports association with
respect to boosting the competition boosts the competition.
c. In view of the abilities of system administrators, it is possible: Every rel-
evantly non-exceptional system administrator with respect to generating
a certificate generates a certificate.
A second consideration that points towards the first ordering involves the observa-
tion in Hacquard (2006) that non-epistemic modal interpretations are usually subject-
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dependent. For generic sentences containing overt modals, it could be assumed that
for each relevantly non-exceptional individual the laws, wishes, goals, and abilities are
considered relative to each specific non-exceptional individual. If this were the case,
it could be assumed that the generic operator binds an individual variable inside the
accessibility relation. A binding relation of this kind would, of course, only be possible
if the modal is in the scope of the generic operator. This assumption is schematically
represented in (141).78
(141) Genx(F ;Mod[x] ·G)
Unfortunately, no clear arguments can be given that (141) is necessary to account for
the data.
Kaufmann (2012) discusses the possibility for accessibility relations to depend on a
quantificational subject. For instance, she investigates whether the abilities considered
for the interpretation of the modal in (142) need to be determined relative to each
single individual in the domain of the quantifier.
(142) Nobody can play the guitar. (ability)
(Kaufmann 2012:78)
Kaufmann concludes that to capture the meaning of (142), it is not necessary to assume
binding into the accessibility relation. Instead of considering different sets of abilities
that vary with different individuals, Kaufmann suggests that the union of all individual
sets could be assigned as a non-dependent, uniform accessibility relation, i.e. “in view
of people’s abilities”.
This strategy of unifying individually determined accessibility relations is not avail-
able for all quantificational examples, though. Kaufmann provides the scenario and
example in (143).
Scenario: Assume a set of pairwise unrelated children all of whose parents are
very ambitious with respect to their sons’ and daughters’ sportive success. Two of the
children, namely Hans and Fritz, are good sprinters. Both Hans’ and Fritz’ parents
want by all means that their son win the 100m-sprint. The other children are specialized












‘Exactly two children should win.’
(Kaufmann 2012:79)
78The notation Mod[x] expresses that the individual variable x occurs in the accessibility relation
of the modal operator Mod.
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In this scenario, the wishes of Hans’ and Fritz’ parents are inconsistent. This means
that the sets of wishes of all parents cannot be unified. From this, Kaufmann concludes
that binding into the accessibility relation for modals occurring under a quantificational
subject might be needed, after all.79
In contrast to (143), the generic sentences about farmers in (128) do not force the
analysis that the generic operator binds into the accessibility relation. The law that is
considered for the deontically interpreted modals is the same for all farmers, and conse-
quently, no inconsistencies arise if a unified accessibility relation is assumed. Similarly,
the wishes, goals, and abilities of the relevantly non-exceptional individuals considered
in the examples in (137)–(139) prima facie do not stand in conflict with each other,
and may therefore be considered in conjunction. So in sum, the subject-dependence
of the non-epistemic overt modals found in the data cannot be used as a conclusive
argument for the Gen > Mod order.
However, one observation can be made on the basis of these considerations. It seems
to be the case that the laws, wishes, goals, and abilities that are considered when
the sentences in (128) and (137)–(139) are evaluated are assumed to be shared by all
relevantly non-exceptional individuals. For example, intuitively, the statement about
sports associations in (138) can only be understood in the sense that all non-exceptional
sports associations share the same goals. Example (138) cannot be understood as
saying that the associations’ goals that are at the heart of the necessity to boost the
competition differ for each individual non-exceptional sports association. That is, in
some sense the accessibility relation is “generic”, as well.
The last consideration that supports the claim that Gen >Mod is the only possible
interpretation, concerns the counterfactual inferences that are expected be supported.
For the first scope ordering, the supported counterfactuals are predicted to be of the
form in (144).
(144) Gen(F ;Mod ·G)  ‘if A were an F , it would be a Mod ·G’
For the second ordering, the counterfactuals that are supported are expected to be of
the form in (145).
(145) Mod ·Gen(F ;G)  ‘Mod·[if A were an F , it would be a G]’
All counterfactual statements that were discussed as supported by the data so far
contained the same modal (interpreted with the same modal flavor) as the correspond-
ing generic sentences. The same is the case for all generic sentences in this section. In
fact, an even stronger observation can be made: The supported counterfactuals require
not only that the modal flavor is the same as in the associated generic sentences, but
79Modals for which the accessibility relation contains a variable that varies with the subject of the
modal statement are seen as instances of “personal modality”. Cf. Kaufmann (2012).
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that the modal is interpreted against the same conversational backgrounds that are
assigned to the modal base and the ordering source in the generic sentence. Example
B in (136) contains a deontic modal that is interpreted in view of the German law.
As claimed above, answer B supports only counterfactuals with the same deontically





















‘If Peter were a farmer, he would have to milk his cows.’
For the inference to the supported counterfactual in (146) to be felicitous, it has to
be not only assumed that Paul falls among the relevantly non-exceptional farmers
regarding the legal obligation under discussion, but that the obligation which is coun-
terfactually assigned to Paul is assigned with respect to exactly the same body of law
as is considered in the generic sentence. If the modal in the consequent is omitted, the
resulting counterfactual does not follow from (136) any more.
What about the counterfactual inference associated with the second ordering? Exam-
































‘It is necessarily the case that if Peter were a farmer, he would milk his cows.’
The statement in (147) does not follow from B’s answer in (136), either. This lends
further support to the claim that the ordering Mod > Gen is not available.
Analogous observations can be made for B’s answer in (136) in combination with
modals of other non-epistemic modal flavors. The following examples illustrate the
counterfactual entailments for B’s answer with a bouletic, a teleological, and an ability
reading of the co-occurring overt modal in (137)–(139).

































‘Farmers must milk their cows. Therefore, if Peter were a farmer, he would
have to milk his cows.’
80Note that the combination of würde and müssen (Engl. ‘would have to’) becomes müsste.
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‘Sports associations have to boost the competition. Therefore, if an asso-
ciation for competitive stair climbing existed, it would have to boost the
competition.’

































‘System-administrators can generate a certificate. Therefore, if Paul were a
system-administrator, he would be able to generate a certificate.’
All of the supported counterfactuals above contain the same modal with the same
interpretation as the generic sentences from which they are inferred. Additionally, for
the individuals Peter, the fictional association, and Paul in examples (148)–(150), it has
to be assumed (i) that they would fall under the relevantly non-exceptional individuals
as required by the generic sentence, and (ii) that they would consequently share the
same wishes, goals, and abilities of all other non-exceptional farmers, associations, and
system-administrators, respectively.
Note that counterfactual entailments of the form in (145) are not unavailable in
general. Entailments of this kind are observed for overt epistemic modals in generic
sentences. Since epistemic modals show different scopal behavior (cf. Section 3.2, they
can be interpreted as scoping over the generic operator (Mod > Gen). Hence, in-
ferences to counterfactuals embedded under a modal expression are expected to be
supported. This is borne out, as illustrated in (151).81
81A more detailed investigation of the interaction of Gen with epistemic modals is beyond the scope
of this thesis and is left for further research. For examples like (151), the epistemic flavor may not
be conceptually compatible with the Gen > Mod ordering. This order expresses a necessity for the
individual members of a specific set of individuals based on the speaker’s knowledge. Hence, the vague,
quasi-universal quantification over individuals induced by the generic operator may be incompatible
with specific, individual knowledge on the speaker’s part. For examples of generic sentences with overt
epistemic modals that are interpreted in the first ordering, see von Fintel and Iatridou (2003).
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Scenario: It’s Peter’s first time at the zoo. Peter learns about lions, and that they









Peter: ‘Lions must be carnivores!’
∼ ‘Given what I know it must be the case that lions are carnivores.’

































‘Therefore, it is necessarily the case that Chester would be a carnivore if he
were a lion.’
In sum, the three observations above permit the conclusion that for non-epistemic
modals, sentences of the form Fs must/may be Gs in German and English are only
intuitively understood in the reading given by the ordering Gen > Mod. This result
can be extended to the corresponding sentences with indefinite singular noun phrases
and impersonally used pronouns. For instance, the two examples in (153) support the




















































































‘If Peter were an artist, he would have to be economical with his emo-
tions.’
Again, the assumptions that Peter would be a non-exceptional system administrator
82Shortened from http://www.ntzl.org/604481-https-proxy
83http://www.france-delon.de/buch4.htm
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or artist, and that the interpretation of the possibility and necessity modals is kept
constant are prerequisites to infer the statements in (154).
To determine the reason for why the second scope ordering Mod > Gen seems to
be unavailable for non-epistemic modals, further investigations are needed. Since the
answer to this question is not necessary at the moment to proceed, this issue is left for
further research.
3.5.2 Formalizing the two-operator account
Based on the results in the previous subsection, the outline of the two-operator account
argued for in Section 3.4 can be made more precise. The refined formulation is given
in (155).
(155) Two-operator account: The variable contributed by an impersonally used
pronoun is always bound by a covert generic operator. Hence, co-occurring
overt modals never bind this variable. In addition, they are always interpreted
in the scope of the generic operator.
For the German modal verbs müssen (Engl. ‘must’), können (Engl. ‘can’), and dürfen
(Engl. ‘can/be allowed to’), I assume the meaning in (156) as discussed in Section 3.2.
(156) a. JmüssenKc,g,w = λp〈s,t〉.∀w′ ∈ O(f, g, w)[p(w′)]
b. Jkönnen/dürfenKc,g,w = λp〈s,t〉.∃w′ ∈ O(f, g, w)[p(w′)]
For the generic operator, Gen, I adopt Drewery’s (1998) proposal as fleshed out in
Section 3.3. The truth-conditions for sentences of the form ‘F s are G’ and ‘an F is a
G’ are assumed to be captured by the formula in (157).
(157) ∀w′[w ∼F,G w′ → ∀x[F (x)(w′) & NF,G(〈x,w′〉)(w′)→ G(x)(w′)]]
With respect to overt modals in generic sentences, I depart from Drewery’s proposal
discussed in Section 3.3.3.84 In accordance with the outline of the two-operator ac-
count in (155), I assume that for generic sentences containing an overt modal, the
modal always contributes its standard denotation, which interacts with the semantic
contribution of the generic operator.
The aim of this second part of Section 3.5 is to analyze the interaction between the
semantic contribution of Gen and the overt modals found in the data. This investiga-
tion results in a formal account for the intensional sentential contexts of the impersonal
uses of ich, du, and man.
84Drewery (1998) assumes that overt modals only have an effect on the interpretation of the generic
operator Gen, but have no independent semantic contribution.
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The first step of spelling out the two-operator account is to combine the meaning
proposed for the modals in (156) and the generic operator in (157) as indicated by the
two-operator account. This results in the truth-conditional content given in (158-a) and
(158-b) for the combinations of the generic operator with a necessity and a possibility
modal, respectively.
(158) a. JF s must be GKw,g,c = 1 iff
∀w′[w ∼F,G w′ → ∀x[F (x)(w′)&NF,G(〈x,w′〉)(w′)→
∀w′′ ∈ O(f, g, w′)[G(x)(w′′)]]]
b. JF s may be GKw,g,c = 1 iff
∀w′[w ∼F,♦G w′ → ∀x[F (x)(w′)&NF,♦G(〈x,w′〉)(w′)→
∃w′′ ∈ O(f, g, w′)[G(x)(w′′)]]]
Since the modal occurs in the scope of the generic operator, it is part of the matrix
property of Gen. This means that it has an effect on the accessibility relation and the
set of non-exceptional individuals associated with Gen, i.e. the sets NF,G and NF,♦G
and the induced equivalence relations w ∼F,G w′ and w ∼F,♦G w′. This captures the
observation that the exceptions are not determined with respect to the “bare” matrix
property G, but with respect to the modal property, G or ♦G (cf. Section 3.5.1). The
terms G and ♦G are intended as abbreviations for the following complex expressions.
(159) a. G := λw.λx.∀w′ ∈ O(f, g, w)[G(x)(w′)]
b. ♦G := λw.λx.∃w′ ∈ O(f, g, w)[G(x)(w′)]
In other words, G and ♦G express the properties of necessarily and possibly being G,
respectively. The abstraction over the world variable w and the individual variable x
is needed since the generic operator, which binds these variables at the sentence level,
is not considered when the set of non-exceptional individuals is determined.
The formalization in (158) presents a naive perspective on the interaction between
the generic operator and overt modals. Since the modal is interpreted in the scope of
the generic operator, its accessible worlds are determined relative to the set of accessible
worlds of the generic operator. Specifically, for every generically accessible world w′,
the interpretation of the modal depends only on w′. If the data is considered in greated
detail, however, not only the interpretation of the generic operator, but also that of












‘Farmers may milk their cows.’
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The sentence above is intuitively interpreted as a statement about farmers in general,
in view of the German law in the world of evaluation w. In other words, (160) states
a possibility for non-exceptional farmers that is granted by the German law in the
world of evaluation. However according to (158), (160) is interpreted as follows: All
non-exceptional farmers with respect to being allowed to milk their cows are permitted
to milk their cows with respect to the German law in the generically accessible worlds.
Since the German law in the generically accessible worlds could differ substantially
from the German law in the world of evaluation, the intuitive interpretation of (160)
is not captured.
The same intuition arises for the interpretation of other non-epistemically interpreted
overt modals, e.g. the bouletic, teleological, and ability modals in (161)–(163).











‘Farmers must milk their cows.’













‘Sports associations have to boost the competition.’











‘System-administrators can generate a certificate.’
Therefore, the intuitive interpretation for sentences of the form ‘F s must be Gs ’ and
‘F s may be Gs ’ should be given as (164).
(164) a. JF s must be GKw,g,c = 1 iff
∀w′[w ∼F,G w′ → ∀x[F (x)(w′)&NF,G(〈x,w′〉)(w′)→
∀w′′ ∈ O(f, g,w)[G(x)(w′′)]]]
b. JF s may be GKw,g,c = 1 iff
∀w′[w ∼F,♦G w′ → ∀x[F (x)(w′)&NF,♦G(〈x,w′〉)(w′)→
∃w′′ ∈ O(f, g,w)[G(x)(w′′)]]]
Instead of stipulating that the modal is interpreted relative to the world of evaluation
as done in (164), it would be preferable if the connection to the world of evaluation
could be derived from the given parts. To see whether this is possible, the predictions
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made by Drewery’s account for generically accessible worlds need to be examined more
closely, and need to be checked against the requirements for the interpretation of the
modal.
Drewery (1998) assumes that the generically accessible worlds are induced by a func-
tion NF,G that assigns each world the set of non-exceptional individuals in this world
with respect to a specific body of law in force at that world. The definition is repeated
in (165).
(165) A pair 〈x,w′〉 is in NF,G(w) iff x is a non-exceptional F with respect to G
from the point of view of the world w, but with respect to its properties in
w′.
It follows from (165) that an individual x counts as an exception in w′ with respect
to the point of view of w iff 〈x,w′〉 6∈ NF,G(w). Given Drewery’s assumptions on
exceptional individuals, this means that the body of rules under consideration contains
another rule that overrides the rule expressed by the generic sentence for the individual
x.
For all non-exceptional individuals, being in NF,G(w) expresses that they do not have
a property that is part of any specialized rule in any of the accessible worlds. From this
observation, and the definition of the class of accessible worlds as those worlds that
agree on the non-exceptionality property NF,G(w), Drewery (1998) concludes that the
accessible worlds share the same body of rules that is used to determine the function
NF,G. However, this conclusion can be read in either of the following two ways:
85
• The accessible worlds agree on the content of the body of rules that is used to
determine the function NF,G.
• The body of rules in force at each accessible world could in principle differ from
all other bodies of rules regarding their content, but could be indistinguishable
with respect to NF,G.
I argue that Drewery’s definition only ensures the latter view. Recall that the in-
dividuals x that are exceptional in a world w′ trigger a specialized rule for all of the
accessible worlds. However, the exact content of these rules may differ for each of the
accessible worlds. This is shown with respect to the following toy model.
(166) Assume, W = {w1, w2} and Dw1 = Dw2 = {a, b, c, d} such that
a. w1: catw1 = {a, b, c, d}; blackw1 = {a, b}; blindw1 = {b, c};
no-teethw1 = {a, c}; likes-micew1 = {d}
Specialized rules in w1 about cats:
Black cats do not like mice.
Blind cats do not like mice.
85I thank Magdalena Kaufmann (p.c.) for pointing this out to me.
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b. w2: catw2 = {a, b, c, d}; blackw2 = {a}; blindw2 = {a};
no-teethw2 = {a}; likes-micew2 = {b, c, d}
Specialized rules in w2 about cats:
Blind, black cats do not like mice.
Cats without teeth do not like mice.
In Drewery’s system, to evaluate the truth of Cats like mice in w1 with respect to
the model in (166), first the properties Ncat, likes-mice(w1) and Ncat, likes-mice(w2) need to be
determined. These are as in (167).
(167) a. Ncat, likes-mice(w1) = {〈d, w1〉, 〈b, w2〉, 〈c, w2〉, 〈d, w2〉}
b. Ncat, likes-mice(w2) = {〈d, w1〉, 〈b, w2〉, 〈c, w2〉, 〈d, w2〉}
In w1 the intersection of ‘blind cat’ and ‘black cat’ is the set {a, b, c}. This is also the
intersection of ‘blind and black cat’ and ‘cat without teeth’ in w1. Similarly for w2,
the intersection of ‘blind cat’ and ‘black cat’, as well as for ‘blind and black cat’ and
‘cat without teeth’ is {a}. Therefore, the set of generically accessible worlds are w1
and w2 which agree on the set of exceptional individuals, but which do not agree on
the specific content of the body of rules used to determine this set.
Given this result, one can now determine whether the parts that are combined to
build up the proposal in (158) ensure that the set of accessible worlds for the modal
depends on the world of evaluation.
First, the details regarding how a modal can depend on the world of evaluation
needs to be determined. The specific interpretation of a modal is relative to the two
parameters f and g which fix the modal base and the ordering source, respectively. As
determined in Section 3.4, all modal flavors that are found with overt modals in the data
are non-epistemic. For all non-epistemic modals, the modal base f is circumstantial,
i.e. the values of f(w′) for an arbitrary world w′ depends on the relevant circumstances
in that world. The ordering source g reflects the specific flavor of the modal, and
contributes the criteria which determine what counts as ideal in a given world.
For the interpretation of the relevant non-epistemic modals, the intuition regarding
their dependence on the world of evaluation can be made precise as follows. The worlds
picked by the modal base, f, need to vary across accessible worlds, since f is sensitive to
the specific facts that determine which individuals count as non-exceptional individuals
in a given accessible world. In contrast, the set of propositions picked by the ordering
source, g, should stay constant across all generically accessible worlds. This captures
that the body of law should be the same for all accessible worlds. So in sum, the
dependence on the world of evaluation is only required for the value of the ordering
source, g.
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Consider again example (160). This sentence expresses that in all accessible possible
worlds, all non-exceptional farmers regarding the possibility to milk their cows may
milk their cows. That is, the non-exceptional farmers are considered relative to their
own circumstances in the accessible worlds, but the possibility is evaluated given the
law in the world of evaluation.
Formally, the deontic interpretation of the possibility modal können in (160) is de-
termined on the basis of a circumstantial modal base which reflects the circumstances
in the worlds of the non-exceptional individuals, and an ordering source which contains
the relevant laws regarding farmers of the world of evaluation.
How does the set of propositions assigned by the ordering source g to each generically
accessible world relate to the relevant body of law that is shared by all accessible worlds
in Drewery’s (1998) account? To answer this question, it needs to be investigated how
NF,G and NF,♦G are determined, i.e. which individuals count as exceptions for modal
properties G or ♦G.
In general, non-exceptional F -individuals regarding G or ♦G are those for which
no specialized rule exists. For deontic modals regarding a body of law, it was discussed
in Section 3.5.1 that the set of exceptional individuals are those that are explicitly
excluded by the law. Therefore, all generically accessible worlds need to have specialized
rules in the relevant body of law which exclude the same exceptional F s. The same is
true for morally deontic modal interpretations. For the behavior of other non-epistemic
interpretations found in the data, consider the three examples for bouletic, teleological,
and ability readings in (161)–(163). For the bouletic, teleological, and ability flavors,
the set of underlying rules is not part of an official code of law as in the case of the
German law on farmers. However, all three flavors depend on interconnected sets of
rules which need to be in force in the world of evaluation:
• (161): The exceptional farmers regarding the necessity to milk their cows (in
view of a specific set of wishes which they share) are those for which the wishes
are realized even if they do not milk their cows.
• (162): The exceptional sports associations regarding the necessity to boost the
competition (in view of a specific set of goals which they share) are those that
reach their goals even if they do not boost the competition.
• (163): The exceptional system administrators regarding the possibility to gener-
ate a certificate (in view of a specific set of abilities which they share) are those for
which their ability does not suffice to generate a certificate because of additional
(possibly external) factors.
Hence, it seems to be the case that the set of rules used to determine NF,G and
NF,♦G is also used to fix the value of the ordering source for the interpretations of the
co-occurring modals.
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Even if the discussion above is on the right track, one problem remains: it cannot be
formally ensured that g assigns the same set of propositions to all generically accessible
worlds. As shown in (166), while the bodies of rules for all accessible worlds ultimately
agree on which individuals count as exceptional, the different bodies of rules do not have
to agree on the exact content. Therefore, it cannot be ensured that the correspondence
in (168) holds, which is needed to capture the intuitive dependence stated in (164).
(168) For any F , G, w and ideal-based g:
∀w′[w′ ∼F,Mod G w → g(w′) = g(w)]
for Mod ∈ {,♦}
In addition, it is unclear whether the body of rules that is used to determine the
accessible worlds for Gen is identical with, or only a subset of the set of propositions
that is used to determine the ordering source g. The vagueness involved in determining
the sets NF,G and NF,♦G and the context dependence of the ordering source g put a
definitive answer to this question out of reach. Hence, a formal way is needed to ensure
the desired interpretation for the ordering source of a modal in the scope of a generic
operator.
The meaning postulates in (169) again spell out (168) for the two different modal
forces. They stipulate that the value assigned by g does not vary inside the equivalence
class determined by w ∼F,Mod G w′.86
(169) a. ∀w′[w ∼F,G w′ → g(w) = g(w′)]
b. ∀w′[w ∼F,♦G w′ → g(w) = g(w′)]
Hence, the value of the free variable g depends on the specific value attributed to the
relevant modal property in the world of evaluation.
For the modal base f, no meaning postulates need to be formulated. As discussed
above, the modal base has to depend on the different accessible worlds. One reason for
this is that for a given individual, being exceptional or non-exceptional is not a constant
property. That is, for any two worlds wi and wj such that wi 6= wj, if 〈x,wi〉 ∈ NF,G(w),
it is not necessarily the case that 〈x,wj〉 ∈ NF,G(w).
To summarize this section, the final result regarding the formalization of the refined
two-operator account is given in (170).
(170) a. JF s must be GKw,g,c = 1 iff
∀w′[w ∼F,G w′ → ∀x[F (x)(w′) & NF,G(〈x,w′〉)(w′)→
∀w′′ ∈ O(f, g, w′)[G(x)(w′′)]]]
provided: ∀w′[w ∼F,G w′ → g(w) = g(w′)]
86These meaning postulates could be interpreted as felicity conditions on the possible values that
may be assigned contextually to g if the modal is embedded under a generic operator. I thank
Magdalena Kaufmann (p.c.) for suggesting this view on these postulates to me.
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b. JF s may be GKw,g,c = 1 iff
∀w′[w ∼F,♦G w′ → ∀x[F (x)(w′) & NF,♦G(〈x,w′〉)(w′)→
∃w′′ ∈ O(f, g, w′)[G(x)(w′′)]]]
provided: ∀w′[w ∼F,♦G w′ → g(w) = g(w′)]
3.6 Summary
Chapter 3 addressed the two modality-related issues that were identified for the unified
account proposed in Section 2.5.3.
The first issue concerning the predictions made by the account for Gen proposed
in Krifka et al. (1995) was addressed in Section 3.3. I introduced the two alternative
modal accounts proposed in Drewery (1998) and Greenberg (2007), and discussed their
positive, as well as their undesirable predictions. At the end of this section, I adopted
an adapted version of the account proposed in Drewery (1998).
The second issue concerning possible binders for the free variables contributed by
impersonally used ich, du, and man was addressed in Section 3.4. I argued that the
non-epistemic modals frequently found in the data cannot bind variables contributed by
impersonal uses. Consequently, I suggested that a two-operator account for sentences
containing overt modals is needed. This two-operator account was further refined, and
spelled out in Section 3.5. In this section, the modal flavors found in the data and
the relative scope order of the generic operator and the overt modals were discussed
in detail. It was determined that non-epistemic modals are always interpreted in the
scope of Gen. Based on these results, the two-operator account was refined to the form
in (171).
(171) Two-operator account: The variable contributed by an impersonally used
pronoun is always bound by a covert generic operator. Hence, co-occurring
overt modals never bind this variable. In addition, they are always interpreted
in the scope of the generic operator.
The straightforward combination of the account for Gen in Drewery (1998) and the
meaning proposed for modals in Kratzer (1977, 1981a, 1991) (cf. Section 3.2) was
discussed in Section 3.5.2. There, an additional meaning postulate was formulated
that is needed to capture the intuitive dependence of the lower scoping modal on the
world of evaluation.
Given the assumption made at the beginning of this chapter that impersonally in-
terpreted ich, du, and man only contribute a free variable, the proposals for the truth-
conditions of (172-a) and (173-a) come out as in (172-b) and (173-b), respectively.87
87The domain of the universal quantifier over individuals in (172-b) and (173-b) is made explicit by
the als-phrases (cf. Appendix A1).















‘A farmer milks his cows.’
b. J(172-a)Kc,w,g =
















‘A farmer must milk his cows.’
b. J(173-a)Kc,w,g =
∀w′[w ∼farmer,milk-cows w′ →
∀x[farmer(x)(w′) & Nfarmer,milk-cows(w′)(〈x,w′〉)→
∀w′′ ∈ O(f, g, w′)[milk-cows(x)(w′′)]]]
and ∀w′[w ∼farmer,milk-cows w′ → g(w′) = g(w)] (postulate)
The predictions that are made by the full account that combines the results from
Chapters 2 and 3 are discussed in Chapter 4.
Note that the formalization of the two-operator account in Section 3.5 only takes into
account one of the varied types of intensional contexts in which the impersonal uses
of ich, du, and man occur. The conditional declaratives, conditional imperatives, and
interrogatives that are also found in the data (cf. Section 1.2) have not been addressed,
yet. A detailed analysis of these types of intensional sentential contexts, however, falls
outside the scope of this thesis. In Appendix A3, I propose and briefly discuss an
extension of the two-operator account for conditional sentences.

Chapter 4
Accounting for the pragmatic
effects of ich and du
4.1 Introduction
Chapters 2 and 3 so far focused on the semantics of impersonally used personal pro-
nouns: In Chapter 2, I proposed a semantic account for first and second person sin-
gular pronouns that aimed to capture both the referential and the impersonal uses of
these pronouns. Based on a formal proposal in Elbourne (2008) for Nunberg’s (1993)
three-component analysis of indexicals, I argued that first and second person singular
pronouns are Heimian indefinites with underspecified, context-dependent descriptive
content. In Chapter 3, I addressed two issues regarding the intensional sentential con-
texts in which the impersonal uses of personal pronouns occur. Based on investigations
regarding the combination of the generic operator with overt modals, I proposed a for-
mal account for these contexts.
The first point that I briefly address in this chapter is an evaluation of the combined
results of Chapters 2 and 3. In Section 4.2, I investigate the interaction between the
proposal for the meaning of personal pronouns from Chapter 2 with the modal analysis
of the intensional sentential context from Chapter 3. I discuss the problems that still
remain for the combined account, and conclude that the account for first and second
person singular pronouns proposed in Section 2.5.3 is simply not tenable. As a result—
this was already anticipated in Section 2.6—I drop the search for a single, underspecified
account for all uses of first and second person pronouns, and focus exclusively on the
pragmatic aspects of the impersonal uses (cf. Section 1.4).
The main aim of this chapter is to propose a novel account for the impersonal readings
of ich, du, and man. For this, I conduct an in-depth investigation of the pragmatic
effects. This investigation is based on observations on the pragmatic effects of English
impersonal one (cf. Moltmann 2006, 2010a,b) and German man (cf. Zifonun 2000).
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These observations, Moltmann’s formal account for English one, and its problems are
reviewed and discussed in Section 4.3.
In contrast to Moltmann (2006, 2010a,b), I argue that the pragmatic effects are the
result of independent meaning components which contribute additional information
about (i) the belief state of the speaker and (ii) the interaction between the speaker
and other discourse participants. This view is spelled out in Section 4.5. The traditional
view on content that is communicated “in addition” to the primary truth-conditional
content, as well as recent work on the difference between “at-issue” and “not-at-issue”
content is introduced in Section 4.4 (cf. Grice 1975; Potts 2005; Stalnaker 1972, 1973,
1974; Simons et al. 2011).
Since the account proposed in Section 4.5 aims to capture only the impersonal uses
of first and second person singular pronouns, one might wonder whether a principled
connection between the impersonal use and the referential use can obtain at all (cf.
Section 2.3.1). In Section 4.6, I discuss possible links between the contribution of
impersonally interpreted personal pronouns and a directly referential semantics for the
referential use.
4.2 A combination of the results of Chapters 2 & 3
and its problems
4.2.1 Combining the results of Chapters 2 & 3
The aim of this section as a whole is to combine the results regarding the seman-
tic contribution of first and second person singular pronouns from Section 2.5.3 with
the two-operator account of the intensional sentential contexts of the impersonal uses
worked out in Section 3.5.2. For the resulting proposal, I then discuss the predictions
and remaining problems based on the list of problems identified in Section 2.6.
To anticipate the result of this section: unsurprisingly, the main problems for the
proposal presented in Section 2.5.3 did not miraculously disappear since an improved
analysis of the intensional sentential context has no influence on the pronominal mean-
ing. Hence at the end of this section, the conclusion to discard the proposal made in
Section 2.6 is still valid.
Let us nevertheless examine the full proposal in detail. In Section 2.5.3, the common
core of the meaning of first and second person pronouns was proposed to be as in (1).
(1) λw.R(i)(x)(w)
x . . . free variable contributed by the pronoun
i . . . individual selected from the utterance context
R . . . contextually determined relation between the values of x and i
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This meaning is derived from the complex syntactic structure in (2) that underlies all
uses of first and second person singular pronouns.1
(2) [ x [ R2 i1 ] ]
The difference between first and second person pronouns is modelled by assigning differ-
ent values to the free variable i1: the possible values are restricted by the morphosyntac-
tic person features, [1st] and [2nd], associated with these pronouns (cf. Kratzer 2009).
For first person singular pronouns, the variable assignment g assigns the speaker of
the utterance, cS, to i1. For second person singular pronouns, the value of i is the
addressee in the utterance context, cA. The presuppositional morphosyntactic features
of personal pronouns, e.g. number features (cf. Heim and Kratzer 1998; Kratzer 2009),
are assumed to contribute presuppositions on the values for the individual variable x.
For instance, in the case of first person singular ich and second person singular du, the
requirement that the values of x be atomic is contributed by the φ-feature [singular].
The refined truth-conditional contribution for ich and du is given in (3).
(3) a. JichKg,w,c = λw.R(i)(x)(w), defined iff x is atomic (i = g(i1) = cS)
b. JduKg,w,c = λw.R(i)(x)(w), defined iff x is atomic (i = g(i1) = cA)
The referential and impersonal readings of the pronouns differ in two respects: (i) the
value of the free relation variable R, and (ii) the operator that binds the free individual
variable x.
In the referential use, the variable assignment g assigns the identity relation for
individuals to R.2 This ensures that the only individual that satisfies the descriptive
content is the individual picked from the context. The variable x is bound by an
existential quantifier introduced via existential closure. The propositions denoted by
episodic sentences that contain referentially used ich and du are schematically given in
(4).
(4) a. λw.∃x[x = cS in w & P (x)(w)] (ich)
b. λw.∃x[x = cA in w & P (x)(w)] (du)
For the impersonal use, in contrast, the value of R is used to model the pragmatic
effects observed with the impersonal reading. Formally, a primitive “identifies-with”-
relation is introduced that relates the speaker or the addressee to those individuals
with whom they empathize. Furthermore, the free variable x in the impersonal use is
bound by the generic operator Gen, see (5).
1As in Chapter 2, I use R and i to talk about the variables R2 and i1 and their respective assigned
values, g(2) and g(1).
2The deferred ostension readings for first and second person singular pronouns discussed in Nunberg
(1993) are left aside in this discussion.
232 4.2 A combination of the results of Chapters 2 & 3 and its problems
(5) a. Gen [x; ](identifies-with(cS)(x) & φ;ψ) (ich)
b. Gen [x; ](identifies-with(cA)(x) & φ;ψ) (du)
In Chapter 3, I introduced and discussed the modal proposals for the generic operator
put forth in Krifka et al. (1995), Drewery (1998), and Greenberg (2007). It was shown
that the observation made for impersonally used personal pronouns in Section 2.6, i.e.
only those individuals that the generalization is about have to conform to a certain set
of ideals, holds for generic sentences in general. Based on a comparison of the three
accounts, I adopted a modified version of Drewery’s (1998) account.
Drewery argues that only those worlds should be considered in which the non-
exceptional individuals denoted by the material in the restrictor of Gen act accord-
ing to the regularity expressed in the sentence. This is done by introducing an non-
exceptionality function, N , which depends on the restrictor and the scope of Gen, and
which is used to induce Gen’s accessibility relation, see (6) and (7).
(6) a. A pair 〈x,w′〉 is in NF,G(w) iff x is a non-exceptional F with respect to G
from the point of view of the world of evaluation w, but with respect to its
properties in w′.
b. w1 ∼F,G w2 iff NF,G(w1) = NF,G(w2)
The truth-conditions proposed for generic sentences of the form ‘F s are Gs ’ and ‘an F
is a G’ are given in (7).
(7) JF s are GKw,g,c = 1 iff
∀w′[w ∼F,G w′ → ∀x[F (x)(w′) & NF,G(w′)(〈x,w′〉)→ G(x)(w′)]]
Furthermore, it was determined that no co-occurring non-epistemic modal can act
as binder for variables contributed by impersonally used pronouns. And furthermore,
that the co-occurring modals are always interpreted in the scope of the generic operator
Gen. An investigation of the interaction between Gen and overt modals in its scope
revealed in addition that modals embedded under Gen intuitively depend on the world
of evaluation w rather than the generically accessible worlds.
For German modal verbs, a formal analysis based on the definition in Kratzer (1977,
1981a, 1991) was adopted, see (8).
(8) a. JmüssenKc,g,w = λp〈s,t〉.∀w′ ∈ O(f, g, w)[p(w′)]
b. Jkönnen/dürfenKc,g,w = λp〈s,t〉.∃w′ ∈ O(f, g, w)[p(w′)]
The formalization in (9) illustrates the resulting proposal for the truth-conditional
content of generic sentences containing an overt modal element.
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(9) a. JF s must be GKw,g,c = 1 iff
∀w′[w ∼F,G w′ → ∀x[F (x)(w′) & NF,G(w′)(〈x,w′〉)→
∀w′′ ∈ O(f, g, w′)[G(x)(w′′)]]]
b. JF s may be GKw,g,c = 1 iff
∀w′[w ∼F,♦G w′ → ∀x[F (x)(w′) & NF,♦G(w′)(〈x,w′〉)→
∃w′′ ∈ O(f, g, w′)[G(x)(w′′)]]]
The abbreviations G and ♦G were introduced for the following complex expressions.
(10) a. G := λw.λx.∀w′ ∈ O(f, g, w)[G(x)(w′)]
b. ♦G := λw.λx.∃w′ ∈ O(f, g, w)[G(x)(w′)]
To capture the intuition that non-epistemic modals under Gen also depend on the world
of evaluation, the value of the respective ordering source g was fixed for all generically
accessible worlds to the value assigned to the world of evaluation w. This was done
with the following meaning postulates.3
(11) For any F , G, w and ideal-based g:
a. ∀w′[w ∼F,G w′ → g(w) = g(w′)]
b. ∀w′[w ∼F,♦G w′ → g(w) = g(w′)]
By combining the two proposals for the intensional sentential context and the first
and second person singular pronouns, the truth-conditions for e.g. the sentences in















‘A farmer must milk his cows.’
b. J(12-a)Kc,w,g =
∀w′[w ∼farmer & R(cS), milk-cows w′ →
∀x[farmer(x)(w′) &R(cS)(x)(w′) &Nfarmer & R(cS), milk-cows(w′)(〈x,w′〉)→
∀w′′ ∈ O(f, g, w′)[milk-cows(x)(w′′)]]]
The formula in (12-b) can be spelled out as: ‘All worlds that agree with the world
of evaluation on the set of non-exceptional-farmers-that-the-speaker-identifies-with re-
garding necessarily-milking-their-cows are such that all non-exceptional individuals of















3It was shown in Section 3.5.2 that the dependence of the ordering source g of the embedded modal
on the world of evaluation does not fall out automatically from the semantics of Gen and the modals.
4For reasons of readability, “R” is not substituted by “identifies-with” in the formulas in (12-b) and
(13-b).
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‘A farmer must milk his cows.’
b. J(13-a)Kc,w,g =
∀w′[w ∼farmer & R(cA), milk-cows w′ →
∀x[farmer(x)(w′) &R(cA)(x)(w′) &Nfarmer & R(cA), milk-cows(w′)(〈x,w′〉)→
∀w′′ ∈ O(f, g, w′)[milk-cows(x)(w′′)]]]
In analogy to (12-b), (13-b) can be paraphrased as: ‘All worlds that agree with the
world of evaluation on the set of non-exceptional-farmers-that-the-addressee-identifies-
with regarding necessarily-milking-the-cows are such that all non-exceptional individ-
uals of this kind in these worlds have the obligation to milk their cows.’
4.2.2 The problems of the combined account
I now turn to the problems and issues that arise for the combined account introduced
above. This discussion is based on the observations made in Section 2.6, and in princi-
ple provides a formally more precise restatement of the central issues identified in that
section. As stated in the previous subsection, the conclusion will be that the combined
account does not resolve any of the issues regarding the descriptive content. Of course,
this is to be expected since the intensional sentential context does not have any influ-
ence on the contribution of the personal pronouns. However—perhaps surprisingly—in
the combined proposal, the interaction of the descriptive content contributed by the
pronouns and the proposal for the intensional sentential context creates additional
problems.
It was already noted in Section 2.6 that the central flaw of the account is the de-
scriptive content that is contributed to the truth-conditions of a sentence by both of
the pronouns’ uses. This flaw is inherited by the combined account.
For the impersonal use, the descriptive content is intended to capture the core of
the pragmatic effects that are observed for ich and du. The intuitive connection be-
tween the impersonal uses and the speaker/the addressee is modelled by assigning the
“identifies-with”-relation to the variable R. This descriptive content is then interpreted
in the restrictor of the generic operator along with e.g. the predication expressed by co-
occurring als-phrases. This means that the descriptive content is seen as a restricting
property on the set of individuals for which the generalization is stated. This is illus-
trated in (12) and (13). In both examples the set of non-exceptional individual-world
pairs and the accessibility relation depend on the descriptive content identfies-with(i),
i.e. the property of being identified with by i. Consider the properties taken as argu-
ments by N in (14).
(14) a. Nfarmer & identifies-with(cS), milk-cows
b. Nfarmer & identifies-with(cA), milk-cows
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That the speaker’s or addressee’s identifying attitude should have an effect on the
generic statement is in conflict with three observations regarding the meaning of im-
personally used ich and du and of the sentences containing them.5
The first issue concerns the meaning of impersonally used ich and du proper. It was
observed that the two pronouns can be substituted for each other salva veritate. This
means that in the impersonal uses, they are truth-conditionally equivalent (cf. Sections
1.2 and 2.3). In case the descriptive content contributed by ich and du is interpreted
in the restrictor of Gen, two sentences that are identical modulo impersonally used ich
vs. impersonally used du, e.g. (12-a) and (13-a), are predicted to express two different
generalizations. Consider the descriptive content given in (15).
(15) a. identifies-with(cS)(x)(w)
b. identifies-with(cA)(x)(w)
Put formally, the problem is that it cannot be ensured that for all contexts c,
(16) ∀w∀x[identifies-with(cS)(x)(w) = identifies-with(cA)(x)(w)]
and consequently that
(17) Nfarmer & R(cS), milk-cows = Nfarmer & R(cA), milk-cows
These equalities have to hold for the contributions of impersonally used ich and du, as
well as the truth-conditional content of the sentences containing them to be equivalent.
The second issue concerns the generalizations expressed by sentences containing im-
personal uses of personal pronouns. It was argued that these sentences denote the same
propositions as corresponding ordinary generic sentences (cf. Section 1.2). That is, the
sentences in (12-a) and (13-a) intuitively express the same regularity regarding farmers
























‘Farmers have to milk their cows.’
The interpretation of the descriptive content in the restrictor of Gen predicts, though,
that (12-a) and (13-a), on the one hand, and (18), on the other hand, express different
regularities. Compare the arguments of N in (14) to the properties taken by N in (19)
for the sentences in (18).6
5The following discussion elaborates on the first two issues discussed in Section 2.6.
6It is assumed as a simplification that bare plural generics and indefinite singular generics share
the same specific values for N and ∼. Whether Greenberg’s (2007) insights regarding the difference
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(19) Nfarmer, milk-cows
For the sentences in (12-a) and (13-a), it is predicted that they express generalizations
for certain subsets of farmers while the sentences in (18) express generalizations for
farmers in general. Since the generic operator is not downward entailing—as Drewery
convincingly shows (cf. Section 3.3.3), one cannot even assume that (12-a) and (13-a)
are entailed by the sentences in (18). From the truth of sentences of the form ‘F s are
Gs ’, it simply cannot be inferred that for some arbitrary property H, ‘F s that are Hs
are Gs ’ is true. Hence, sentences of the form ‘F s are G’ and ‘F s that are Hs are not G’


























‘As a farmer, one has to milk one’s cows. #But farmers don’t.’
Furthermore, it is predicted that the supported counterfactual inferences of sentences
containing impersonally used personal pronouns should contain the descriptive content.


































‘If Peter were a farmer and I were to identify with him, then he would
have to milk his cows.’
between indefinite singular generics and bare plural generics can be integrated in Drewery’s account
has not been discussed in Chapter 3, and is still an open question which is left for further research.
7Note that the specific order of the sentences does not play a role for this argument, but has an
effect on the availability of the intended impersonal interpretation of ich. Since in the reverse order
in (i), the subject of the second sentence has to carry contrastive stress, the personal pronoun ich is

























‘Farmers have to milk their cows. But, I (#as a farmer) do not.’
If ich is interpreted referentially, an incoherence connected to the als-phrase, als Bauer, arises since it
conveys that the properties of being a farmer and of not milking one’s cows are connected in general
(cf. Appendix A1). This is, of course, in conflict with the generalization expressed by the first sentence.
If the als-phrase is omitted, the sequence is coherent, and expresses that the speaker sees himself as
an exception to the rule.
8For this argument, it is assumed that the verb sich mit jmd. identifizieren (Engl. ‘to identify with
someone’) needs to be read as an abbreviation for the semantic content of the primitive “identifies-
with”-relation.

































‘If Peter were a farmer and you were to identify with him, then he would
have to milk his cows.’
Neither counterfactual in (21) is supported; in fact, the counterfactual statements that
are supported by (12-a) and (13-a) are those that are also supported by the sentences














































‘If Peter were a farmer, then he would have to milk his cows.’
The third issue concerns the question whether the pragmatic effects that are at the
heart of the observed participant-oriented effects are captured adequately if the de-
scriptive content is interpreted in the restrictor of Gen. I argue that this is not the
case. The participant-oriented effects of ich and du are the result of additional content
contributed by ich and du which comments on the truth-conditional content. The



































’A bridal couple can’t expect their guests to more or less pay for the party!’9
By uttering (23), the speaker does not talk about the set of bridal couples that she
empathizes with, but about bridal couples in general for which it is also communicated
that the speaker empathizes with them. That is, the participant-oriented content
seems to behave similar to appositions and expressive content. Both appositions and
expressives always comment on the entire asserted content (cf. Potts 2005).
In addition to these problems for the impersonal uses, the same three problems for
the referential uses arise that were discussed in Section 2.6:
First, assuming descriptive content for the referential uses of ich and du goes against
the property of “indicativeness” observed for the referential uses. In other words, first
and second person pronouns never contribute descriptive content to the meaning of a
sentence (cf. Sections 1.5.2 and 2.5.1).
9http://www.urbia.de/archiv/forum/th-2142726/Wieviel-Geld-zur-Hochzeit-
schenken.html
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Second, the treatment of the referential uses as quantificational expressions is counter-
intuitive. Since the proposal can be seen as a special variant of Russellian definite de-
scriptions (cf. Russell 1905), the interaction between the semantic contribution of the
pronouns with logical and intensional operators, e.g. negation, comes out as counter-
intuitive.
And lastly, the account predicts that the referential interpretation is a last resort
interpretation. This is in conflict with the fact that the referential uses are the pre-
dominant uses of first and second person singular pronouns.
The main conclusion that needs to be drawn from this discussion is that the ac-
count for first and second person singular pronouns put forth in Section 2.5.3 needs to
be changed with respect to two points: (i) finding an adequate analysis for the prag-
matic effects connected to the impersonal uses, and (ii) assigning a proper “referential”
semantic contribution to referentially used first and second person singular pronouns.
An important step that affects both of these points is to reconsider the motivation for
the assumption of descriptive content in Chapter 2: The descriptive content is a result
of the interpretation of the complex syntactic structure assigned to first and second
person singular pronouns. This complex structured was adopted to model the three-
component account in Nunberg (1993). However, it is not part of Nunberg’s original
account as such to assume descriptive content for pronouns! It is purely a result of the
syntacticized formalization of Nunberg’s account proposed in Elbourne (2008) and of
its adaptation in Section 2.5.3. Hence, the necessary step is to discard the the complex
syntactic structure that is assumed for personal pronouns.
If the underlying structure is discarded, however, the quest for an account that
captures both the referential and the impersonal uses of personal pronouns is put back
on square one. So, should we start over? Another possibility to unify the impersonal
and referential uses is briefly sketched in the Conclusion. In this chapter, however, I
do not aim at proposing another unified account for the referential and the impersonal
uses.10 In what follows, I concentrate on giving an adequate account for the impersonal
uses of ich, du, and man. For the referential use of ich and du, I adopt a directly-
referential analysis as proposed in e.g. Kaplan (1978 [1989]) or Kratzer (2009).
Based on the discussion above, the following desiderata for any model of the semantic
contribution and pragmatic effects of impersonally used ich and du (and man) can be
identifed.
• Semantic desiderata: The impersonal uses of ich, du, and man need to come out
as truth-conditionally equivalent. Sentences containing these pronouns need to
express the same generalizations as ordinary generic sentences.
10Note that with the decision not to propose a unified account, I do not want to claim that the
discussion in this section rebuts all possible approaches towards a unified account.
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• Pragmatic desiderata: The component that is responsible for the pragmatic ef-
fects of ich, du, and man does not contribute content to the truth-conditions of
a sentence. Its only function is to comment on the truth-conditional content of
the sentences containing these pronouns.
These desiderata are at the heart of the account proposed in Section 4.5.
4.3 An analysis of the pragmatic effects of one
4.3.1 Moltmann’s account of English one
In this first subsection of Section 4.3, I review the account for the English impersonal
pronoun one put forth in Moltmann (2006, 2010a,b), for which the speaker-oriented
effects observed for one play a central role. Moltmann argues that observations regard-
ing the appropriate contexts of use for one, as well as its speaker-orientation are a reflex
of a special meaning component. This component relates the individuals for which the
generalization is expressed to certain individuals in the sentential and non-sentential
context.11
In the following subsection, I discuss the problems that arise for Moltmann’s for-
mal account. I argue that neither formalization for the semantic contribution of one
proposed by Moltmann adequately captures the pragmatic effects that she observes.
In a series of papers, Moltmann (2006, 2010a,b) investigates the semantic and prag-
matic properties of the English impersonal pronoun one. She argues that the pragmatic
properties of one—specifically those connected to its use—need to be considered in de-
tail since they are the basis for most intuitions regarding its meaning. The following
observations on the semantic and pragmatic behavior of one are seen as central.
First, Moltmann observes that one is only acceptable in certain linguistic contexts.
It can co-occur only with a subset of the predicates that occur with other types of
nominal expressions in generic sentences. Consider examples (24-b) and (25-b), in
which one is contrasted with the nominal expressions the typical person and people.
(24) a. ??One has a nose.
b. The typical person has a nose.
(Moltmann 2006:264)
(25) a. ??One lives in a big city.
b. People live in a big city.
(Moltmann 2006:264)
11Moltmann calls the impersonal pronoun one “generic one” to distinguish it from its indefinite
counterpart (cf. Section 2.2). Moltmann’s terminology will be adapted to the terminology used in this
thesis.
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These judgements, Moltmann suggests, can be generalized to the following restriction
on co-occurring predicates:
(26) Generalization: The impersonal pronoun one cannot be used in sentences that
express generalizations about characteristic properties, locations, psychological
states, or habits.
In contrast, predicates that describe a possible experience or action by the speaker
co-occur particularly well with one, see (27).
(27) One can sleep on this sofa.
(Moltmann 2010b:203)
The strength of Moltmann’s restriction on co-occurring predicates, however, is rela-
tivized by a related observation: the sentences in (24-b) and (25-b) are acceptable
when they are used in conditionals (28-a), under intensional operators (28-b), or when
they are read as requirements or norms, instead of descriptive generalizations.
(28) a. If one has a nose, one can breathe.
(Moltmann 2006:265)
b. One may dream that one does not have a nose.
(adapted from Moltmann 2006:265)
Second, Moltmann observes that to be able to utter a sentence containing one,
it suffices for the speaker to have checked whether the predicate holds for herself;
the speaker’s subjective experience provides enough epistemic grounds to state the
generalization. Moltmann illustrates this by comparing sentences containing one with
ordinary generic sentences. Compare (29-a) and (29-b).
(29) a. Sometimes one receives strange advertisements in the mail.
b. Sometimes people receive strange advertisements in the mail.
(Moltmann 2006:268)
Moltmann argues that to utter (29-a), it suffices if the speaker at least once received
strange advertisements herself. That is, the speaker may generalize a possibly singu-
lar personal experience. For (29-b), by contrast, the speaker must have independent
evidence that there exists a regularity for people with respect to receiving strange
advertisements.
In fact, the speaker’s actual personal experience is not even strictly required to serve
as the grounds on which a general statement expressed with one is based. The speaker
can also just pretend to be in the situation described by the generic sentence, and
simulate the relevant experience. Moltmann illustrates this with (30).
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(30) One can see me from the entrance.
(Moltmann 2010b:202)
Since the speaker of (30) can never have the actual experience of seeing himself from
the entrance in question, his subjective experiences cannot be required as the epistemic
grounds for (30). However, if the speaker pretends to take the point of view of another
individual standing at the entrance, he may simulate the experience of seeing himself
from the entrance. This simulation can then serve as the grounds for uttering (30).
Example (31) also illustrates the same point.
(31) If one is an angel, one is neither human nor divine.
(Moltmann 2010a:28)
To be able to utter (31), the speaker simulates that he is an angel, and generalizes his
resulting property of neither being human nor divine to angels in general.
Third, Moltmann (2010b) discusses an additional observation. Two speakers may
disagree with each other by using sentences containing one even though both have valid
reasons for uttering the respective generalization. This disagreement pattern arises for
sentence pairs like the one in (32).12
(32) A: One can sleep on this sofa.
B: One can not sleep on this sofa.
Moltmann argues that even though A and B in example (32) contradict each other,
neither A nor B can be held at fault with respect to their reasons for uttering the re-
spective sentence. This apparent“faultlessness”can be connected to one of Moltmann’s
previous observations. Since one is connected to the speaker’s personal experiences,
A and B may simply have had different experiences. Therefore, they may argue for
contradictory generalizations. Nevertheless, Moltmann argues, only one of the gener-
alizations in (32) can be a true statement.
Moltmann’s final observation, in her opinion, reveals a more general connection be-
tween the participants and the generalizations that are expressed. She argues that if a
speaker states an established generalization, i.e. a generalization that has been estab-
lished independently, using a sentence with one, his statement allows for an immediate
“self-application” by the addressee.
12Moltmann (2010b) compares the “faultless disagreement” dialogue for one in (32) with faultless
disagreement dialogues found in the literature on predicates of personal taste, see (i).
(i) A: Pizza is tasty.
B: Pizza is not tasty.
Moltmann argues against both the relativist approaches (cf. Lasersohn 2005, 2009) and the contex-
tualist approaches for predicates of personal taste, and extends her proposal for impersonal one to
account for predicates of personal taste. For details see Moltmann (2010b).
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(33) One is not allowed to enter the room.
(Moltmann 2006:273)
The addressee of (33), Moltmann suggests, can immediately grasp whether the gener-
alization applies to him or not by taking the first person point of view. From this point
of view, he can then infer that he is not allowed to enter the room. In contrast, the
ordinary generic sentence in (34), for instance, requires additional reasoning to derive
that perhaps a prohibition for the addressee is expressed.
(34) People are not allowed to enter the room.
In sum, Moltmann’s observations reveal that the use of one is strongly tied to the
personal experiences of the speaker, but also allows for other individuals to immediately
put themselves into the speaker’s perspective. Moltmann calls the connection of the
use of one to actual or simulated subjective experiences of the first person the “quasi-
first-person orientation” of one.13
Based on these observations, Moltmann (2006, 2010a,b) develops an analysis for one.
She, however, does not adopt a standard proposition-based view on sentence meaning:
she rejects the assumption that sentences denote propositions, and proposes that they
denote “attitudinal objects” (cf. Moltmann 2003). That is, the semantic contribution of
a sentence is the content that an attitude holder considers when evaluating the truth or
falsity of that sentence. Moltmann introduces the concept of the “first person”, which
refers to any attitude holding individual. In every discourse context, the speaker and
the addressee, but also other participants may take the place of the first person with
respect to any given utterance.
In attitude reports, the quasi-first-person orientation of one can be made explicit.
When a clause containing one is embedded under an attitude verb, the subject of
the attitude report is argued to take the first person perspective with respect to the
embedded clause, see (35).
(35) John found out that one can see the picture from the entrance.
To capture this effect, Moltmann argues that one is in some sense connected to (the
experiences of) the “first person”, i.e. any individual that can consider the truth of the
sentence containing one.
Moltmann (2006, 2010a) analyzes the connection to the speaker’s actual or simulated
experience and the possibility to use one in sentences expressing established general-
izations as two licensing strategies that guide the use of one. In her formal proposal,
13Moltmann (2006, 2010a) argues that one is a de se expression based on a comparison with PRO.
In Moltmann (2010b), she distinguishes two kinds of expressions with first-person-oriented content: (i)
quasi-first-person generic expressions, and (ii) de se expressions. Given further evidence distinguishing
one and PRO, she reanalyzes one as a quasi-first-person generic expression.
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Moltmann attempts to capture both licensing strategies. To do this, she assumes that
sentences containing one are generic sentences, and that similarly to indefinite nominal
expressions in ordinary generic sentences, one introduces a free variable which is bound
by a generic operator Gen at sentence level.14,15
The quasi-first-person orientation of one is modelled as an additional component
contributed by the pronoun. Specifically, one in fact contributes a complex expression
that contains a free individual variable. For this complex expression, two different
versions are proposed in Moltmann (2006) and Moltmann (2010a,b), respectively. Both
versions are formulated in Moltmann’s system of attitudinal objects (cf. Moltmann
2003), but differ with respect to the specific form of the content that one is taken to
contribute.
In Moltmann (2006), the contribution of one is proposed to be a complex variable
of the form in (36).
(36) 〈x, λz.z = y〉
The first component x is a free variable ranging over individuals. This is the variable
that is bound at sentence level by Gen. The second component is intended to capture
the first-person-orientation of one. To this end, the free variable y is assumed to be
bound at sentence level by a λ-operator, which forms an argument slot for the first
person.
For complex variables of the form in (36), predication is as defined in (37).
(37) A predicate P is taken to be true of 〈x,M〉 iff P is true of x as if it was M .
(Moltmann 2006:270)
This definition, Moltmann argues, takes the content of the second component as the
description under which a property is ascribed to an individual in the sense of Lewis
(1979a). Lewis defines ascription of a property P to an individual x under a description
Z by an attitude holder a as follows.16
14Moltmann (2010b) assumes a simplified version of Greenberg’s modal account for the generic
operator (cf. Greenberg 2007). Consider (i).
(i) ∀w′∀x[wRw′ & x ∈ D(w′) & N(w′)(x) & C(w′)(x)→ P (w′)(x)]
(adapted with minor changes from Moltmann 2010b:201)
R models the accessibility relation, D(w′) models the domain of individuals in w′, N and C denote the
restictions to relevantly normal and contextually relevant individuals, and P is the matrix predicate.
This specific proposal is never explicitly related to the final proposal for one.
15Moltmann’s analysis for one is comparable to the analyses of impersonal pronouns in Condoravdi
(1989), Malamud (2006, 2007), and Chierchia (1995b) (cf. Section 2.2.2).
16Lewis (1979a) is concerned with belief de dicto, de re, and de se. He argues that in the case of
an attitude de se, the complement of the attitude verb is a property, and not a proposition (pace eg.
Stalnaker 1981). He generalizes this view to de re ascriptions.
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(38) An individual a ascribes the property P to an individual x under a description
Z iff
a. a bears the relation Z uniquely to x
b. a self-ascribes the property of bearing relation Z uniquely to something
which has property P
(Lewis 1979a:539)
In contrast to Moltmann, however, Lewis (1979a) does not assume that the truth-
conditional content of a sentence that expresses an ascription of a property to an
individual contains the description Z. Ascription of properties under a description is
seen as a non-linguistic act.17
Consider Moltmann’s (2006) final formalization of example (39-a) in (39-b). This
analysis reflects that Moltmann (2006) essentially interprets sentences containing one
as properties that are self-ascribed de re by any “first person”.
(39) a. One can see the picture from the entrance.
b. λy. Gen x[can-see-the-picture-from-the-entrance(〈x, λz.z = y〉)]
(Moltmann 2006:272)
If one interprets (39-b) in the style of Lewis’ proposal in (38-b), it comes out as: (i)
a first person a ascribes the matrix predicate (=P ) to the individuals in the domain
of the generically bound variable x under the description that a is identical with x
(=Z), and (ii) self-ascribes the property of standing in the identity-relation (=Z) to
something that has the property expressed by the matrix predicate (= P ). In other
words, example (39-b) expresses a generalization for the individuals in the domain of
x, and conveys that the first person ascribes the property to the individuals in the
domain of x “as if he would ascribe it to himself”.
Note that Moltmann’s (2006) analysis focuses nearly exclusively on the conditions
placed on the use of one in connection to the personal experiences of the first person.
She does not discuss the conditions regarding the truth or falsity of what would tra-
ditionally be analyzed as the truth-conditional content of the generic sentence. Her
views regarding the truth-conditional content of the generalizations that are expressed
are briefly addressed in Moltmann (2010b), see below.
In her later papers, Moltmann (2010a,b) proposes that the quasi-first-person orien-
tation of one has to be seen as the speaker attributing the predicate of the sentence
to the set of “normal” individuals “as individuals that the speaker identifies with”.
That is, she dismisses her idea to treat first-person-orientation in the sense of Lewis
(1979a), and adopts qua-predication based on the work in Fine (1982). She motivates
17Lewis (1979a:538) states, “We needn’t take the so-called descriptions as verbal, thereby limiting
ourselves to what can be expressed in some particular language. (. . . ) We might take descriptions as
properties, not as particular expressions of properties in thought and language.”.
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this change by an observation on English as-phrases, which are analyzed as expressing
qua-predication in Szabo (2003) and Asher (2006, 2011).18
The crucial intuition is that as-phrases seem to make explicit the epistemic grounds
for the ascription of a property to an individual. For instance in (40), the as-phrase,
as a father, seems to give an explanation for John’s knowledge regarding the behavior
of children.
(40) John as a father knows how children behave.
(Moltmann 2010b:206)
For qua-predication, Moltmann offers the definition in (41), which is an adaptation of
the definition proposed in Fine (1982).19
(41) Qua-predication forms a new type of individual, x qua P . The three defining
properties of qua-individuals formed in this way are
a. x qua P exists in a world w whenever P (x)(w)
b. x qua P = x′ qua P ′ iff x = x′ and P = P ′
c. x qua P has a property Q in w iff Q(x)(w) whenever P (x)(w), and the
qua-property P provides epistemic grounds for x being Q.
Building on this definition, Moltmann analyzes one as an expression that introduces a
variable over qua-individuals, i.e. x qua [λy. the speaker identifies with y]. Formally,
this is expressed as in (42).20
(42) qua(x, λy.identifies-with(y)(z))
The individual variable x in (42) is bound by the generic operator Gen. The individual
18The work on as-phrases in linguistics (e.g. Landman 1989; Jäger 2001, 2003; Szabo 2003; Asher
2006) and the work on qua-predication in philosophy (e.g. Fine 1982; Lewis 2003) have been brought
together in Szabo (2003). This view was taken up in Asher (2006, 2011) and adopted in Moltmann
(2010a), who cites Asher (2006). Note, however, that Fine (1982) does not connect as-phrases to
qua-predication. That is, his definition is not intended to capture the behavior of these linguistic
expressions.
19Fine’s (1982) original definition of qua-predication is as in (i).
(i) A qua-object is a special kind of entity, consisting of an individual a, together with a property
P , and denoted by ‘a qua P ’, which observes the following conditions:
a. Existence: a qua P exists at t in w iff a is P at t in w
b. Identity: a qua P = b qua Q iff a = b and P = Q; a 6= a qua P
c. Inheritance: If a qua P exists at t in w and Q is normal, a qua P is Q iff a is Q
(Fine 1982)
20Moltmann’s original proposal is given in (i).
(i) qua(x, λy[Iyz])
(Moltmann 2010b:206)
The name of the identification relation “I” is substituted above with “identifies-with” to increase
readability.
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variable z, on the other hand, is again bound by a λ-operator at sentence level to derive
a property that can be self-ascribed by any first person.
The identification relation [λy.λz.identifies-with(y)(z)] models the quasi-first-person
orientation of one. The idea behind this relation is that whenever a speaker expresses
a generalization that is based on his own personal experiences, he needs to abstract
from his own particular person and the specific circumstances of his experiences. In
other words, he has to identify himself with those individuals which, in his view, count
as the relevantly non-exceptional individuals for the generalization.
Moltmann argues that the qua-predication in (42) is not part of the truth-conditions
of a sentence containing one. Hence, it does not act as a restriction on the set of
individuals over which the generic operator quantifies. Instead, the qua-predicate, i.e.
λy.identifies-with(y)(z), specifies the first person’s epistemic grounds. That is, from the
speaker’s perspective qua-predication expresses the epistemic grounds underlying his
utterance. How qua-predication as defined in (41) captures this intuition is, however,
unclear to me (cf. the discussion in Section 4.3.2).
For (43-a), the semantic value that results from the speaker cS’s self-ascription is
given in (43-b).
(43) a. One can see the picture from the entrance.
b. Gen x[can-see-the-picture-from-the-entrance(
qua(x, λy.identifies-with(y)(cS)))]
So in sum, Moltmann suggests that the impersonal pronoun one contributes a complex
expression with two integral parts: (i) a free variable x which is bound by the generic
operator Gen at sentence level and (ii) a second part that models the quasi-first-person
orientation of one. The idea behind the second part is that the quasi-first-person
orientation results from an explicit connection to the speaker’s experiences that form
his epistemic grounds.
4.3.2 A critical review of Moltmann’s claims
The aim of this subsection is to critically review Moltmann’s observations and her
conceptual and formal analysis of one that were presented in the previous subsection.
I agree that generic sentences containing one differ in certain respects from ordinary
generic sentences, and that the meaning of one involves speaker-oriented content that
is not part of to the truth-conditional content. Nevertheless, I believe that Moltmann’s
discussion of the properties of one and her formal account raise certain issues.21 I first
21For the course of this discussion, I call Moltmann’s quasi-first-person-orientation “speaker-
orientation” since the speaker necessarily takes the position of first person when he utters the sentence.
Since I do not adopt Moltmann’s view on the meaning of sentences as attitudinal objects, I prefer to
retain the terminology introduced in Chapter 1.
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bring up a minor point of criticism regarding her data discussion and the conclusions
she draws from it. The second problem I address, however, concerns the heart of her
proposal in Moltmann (2010a,b): her decision to model the speaker-oriented content
via qua-predication.
First, I address Moltmann’s observations regarding the oddness of certain sentences
containing one. Moltmann observes that the sentences in (44) in contrast to those in
(45) seem to be marginal. She proposes that this contrast is the result of a restriction
on predicates that can co-occur with one.
(44) a. ??One has a nose.
b. ??One lives in a big city.
c. ??One breathes.
d. ??One is nervous.
(Moltmann 2006:264)
(45) a. One sometimes thinks one’s life is too short.
b. One can see the picture from the entrance.
c. One can sleep on the sofa.
(Moltmann 2010b:201ff)
In Moltmann (2006), she identifies the predicates that describe characteristic proper-
ties, locations, psychological states, or habits—like those in (44)—as those that are odd
when they co-occur with one. This view is extended in Moltmann (2010b), where she
argues that in fact only predicates that describe possible experiences or actions—like
those in (45)—are acceptable with one; specifically, one is restricted to predicates for
which self-application requires only “self-knowledge”.22
I argue that the underlying contrast exemplified in (44) and (45) is not captured by
Moltmann’s restriction, and that the oddness in (44) is not the result of a restriction
on co-occurring predicates. Instead, I suggest that it is connected to a lack of material
that qualifies the individuals and situations that are generalized over, e.g. adverbs of
quantification, adjectives, or spatio-temporal adverbials. This alternative explanation
is supported by the observation that the sentences in (44) improve if additional material
is added, see (46).
(46) a. In Hollywood, one has a perfectly straight nose.
b. One rarely lives in a big city.
c. On top of a mountain, one breathes more easily.
d. One is rarely nervous in front of one’s parents.
22Self-knowledge is specified as “knowledge of one’s own experiences, intentions, and actions” (Molt-
mann 2010b:203).
248 4.3 An analysis of the pragmatic effects of one
The predicates in (46) still express the same characteristic properties, locations, psycho-
logical states, or habits as in (44). Nevertheless, the sentences in (46) are considerably
better than those in (44).
The alternative explanation given above seems to be connected to, and is in line with
Moltmann’s own observation that the sentences in (44) are fine when they are embedded
in conditionals and under intensional operators. Furthermore the good examples in (45)
also contain additional specifying material. Incidentally, if there is indeed a need for
specifying material, this would fit with the observation for German impersonally used
ich and du that certain linguistic elements have a supporting effect for the availability
of the impersonal reading (cf. Section 1.3).
Another indication that Moltmann’s suggested restriction on predicates is not com-
pletely on the right track is that Moltmann’s generalization does not hold for predicates
that are supposed to fall into the class of admissible predicates, but which do not co-
occur with qualifying material. Consider the examples in (47), which are shortened
versions of (45).
(47) a. ??One thinks something.
b. ??One sees a picture.
c. ??One sleeps.
Additionally, Moltmann’s description of the set of predicates that may occur with one
also does not seem to capture all of the felicitous examples in (45). It is unclear to
me, for instance, how “being able to see the picture from the entrance” constitutes
an experience or an action. A person may have the experience of seeing the picture
from the entrance, and can conclude from this experience that he can see the picture.
However, it seems strange to me to say that the ability can be experienced per se.
Another motivation for Moltmann to formulate this particular restriction on co-
occurring predicates is provided by the contrast in (48).
(48) a. ??One lives in a big city.
b. People live in a big city.
(Moltmann 2006:264)
To my mind, this contrast cannot be accounted for by Moltmann’s restriction. Instead,
the contrast seems to arise because indefinite noun phrases in ordinary generic sentences
contribute their own descriptive content, e.g. people in (48-b), which acts as qualifying
material. The impersonal pronoun one lacks this descriptive content.
The same difference in descriptive content can also be observed for German imper-
sonally used ich, du, and man. First and foremost, their domain of quantification
seems to depend on the content of the generalization. For sentences like (49), i.e. if
man is used to express moral norms or rules, the set of people for whom the rule is
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stated are those members of the society that the moral code applies to. The subset of












‘One respects the rights of others.’
For generalizations that do not express moral rules, the set of individuals that are con-
sidered to be non-exceptional differs. For example (50), the non-exceptional individuals













‘One is not allowed to enter the room.’
Example (50) contrasts with the ordinary generic sentences in (51), for which the rele-
vant domain of individuals is restricted by the descriptive content Leute and Menschen



























‘Humans are not allowed to enter the room.’
Crucially, the sentence in (50) does not express the same generalization as either sen-
tence in (51). To restrict the domain of individuals for the impersonal pronoun man
to a specific set of individuals, an appropriate als-phrase has to be added; otherwise

















‘As an unauthorized person/a human, one is not allowed to enter the room.’
Note that since the domain of quantification of the generic operator cannot be restricted
contextually, adding a restriction with an als-phrase (or for one, an as-phrase) is the
only possible strategy for man aside from formulating a full conditional (cf. Section
3.3.1).
So in sum, Moltmann’s examples in (44) and (45) rather seem to illustrate that
additional qualifying material improves sentences containing one, similarly to the effect
23Example (51-b) might sound odd at first. In a science fiction context, though, in which different
species of aliens exist, a specific rule for humans might not seem so out of place.
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of co-occurring, frame-setting material that was observed for the impersonal uses of ich
and du. The reason for this behavior, as well as its connection to the supporting effects
of co-occurring material observed with respect to impersonally interpreted ich and du
requires a more detailed look at the data, which is left for further research.
Before discussing the second, major issue for Moltmann’s formal account, I first-off
want to address a general weakness of Moltmann’s account: Moltmann is not explicit
enough on what the truth-conditions of the sentences containing one are, and how they
are built up. To build a foundation for the criticism to come, I try to make explicit
how I interpret Moltmann’s discussion of her formalization of speaker-orientation. I
start out with the observation of “faultlessness”.
For the sentences in example (53), Moltmann argues that the two speakers may be
faultless in their grounds for stating the respective generalization, but still only one of
them makes a true statement.
(53) A: One can sleep on this sofa.
B: One can not sleep on this sofa.
(Moltmann 2010b:203)
To my mind, this suggests that the content of the generalizations that are expressed in
(53) is independent of the epistemic grounds of the speakers A and B. Given Moltmann’s
(2010b) proposal, this means that the qua-predication is not part of the truth-conditions
of a sentence containing one. Therefore, the truth-conditional content of A’s utterance
in (53) seems to be as in (54).
(54) Gen x[can-sleep-on-this-sofa(x)]
This formula matches the proposal for sentences containing impersonal pronouns in
Condoravdi (1989) and Malamud (2006, 2007), but differs from Moltmann’s own formal
proposal.
Unfortunately, Moltmann is not entirely clear in her discussions with respect to
the restrictive or non-restrictive effects of the speaker-oriented content. In one and
the same paragraph, she states that the qua-predication does and does not affect the
truth-conditions of the generic sentence. Consider the following quotes.
“In generic-one sentences the gloss24 only serves to provide an epistemic basis
for the application of the predicate; it does not affect the truth-conditions of the
sentence.” (Moltmann 2010b:206 with the footnote added for clarification)
“The gloss will somewhat influence the domain of quantification, though: the
domain will consist of entities the speaker identifies with.”
(Moltmann 2010b:206)
24I.e. the qua-property [λy.identifies-with(y)(z)].
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If the qua-predicate is assumed to restrict the generic operator, it is predicted that
sentences containing one express different generalizations than ordinary generic sen-
tences (cf. Section 4.2). Intuitively, however, the sentences in (55) express the same
generalizations regarding farmers.25
(55) a. As a farmer, one has to milk one’s cows.
b. Farmers have to milk their cows.
If the set of farmers for which the generalization in (55-a) is stated were restricted to
those that the speaker identifies with, the following counterfactual inference should be
supported. This is not the case.
(56) If Peter were a farmer with whom I identify, he would have to milk his cows.
So, whatever the effect of qua-predication is, the data clearly suggests that the speaker-
oriented content does not restrict the domain of quantification of the generic operator.
This conclusion is, however, not captured if the speaker-orientation of one is mod-
elled with qua-predication. This is my main point of criticism of Moltmann’s formal
proposal.
Moltmann’s motivation for adopting qua-predication is the apparent parallel between
the behavior of the speaker-oriented content and the contribution of English as-phrases.
For example (57), Moltmann argues that the as-phrase, as a father, does not affect the
truth-conditional content of the sentence, i.e. ‘John knows how children behave’. It
only adds the epistemic grounds for why John knows how children behave: because he
is a father.
(57) John as a father knows how children behave.
(Moltmann 2010b:206)
25For example (55-a) another issue arises. Two as-phrases that perform the same function cannot
co-occur in a sentence. Consider (i).
(i) *John as a judge as a janitor earns $50,000.
(Szabo 2003:392)
That no two as-phrases may co-occur, however, is not a universal restriction on as-phrases, see (ii).
(ii) As a teenager, Gerald finds success as a member of the Hazelwood Tigers basketball team.
Taken from: http://sharondraper.com/bookdetail.asp?id=5
Crucially in cases like (ii), the function of the two as-phrases is different. In (ii), the first as-phrase,
as a teenager, acts like a frame-setting adverbial, and restricts the content of the sentence to those
past times in which Gerald is/was a teenager. The second as-phrase performs a similar function as
the as-phrase in (58) below, i.e. it provides the role in which Gerald finds success.
Whether it is predicted by the assumption that qua-predication captures the speaker oriented con-
tent that co-occurring overt as-phrases, as in (55-a), are ungrammatical, therefore depends on whether
the qua-predication and the overt as-phrase are functionally different. Whether this is the case will
not be determined in detail, since the use of qua-predication to model speaker-orientation suffers from,
in my opinion, even more serious problems.
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Two issues for this view arise: (i) the parallel that Moltmann draws between as-phrases
in English and the speaker-oriented content of one only takes into account a fraction of
the observations regarding the behavior of as-phrases, which do, in fact, interact and
affect the truth-conditional content of the sentences in which they occur, and (ii) the
adaptation of the axioms proposed for qua-predication in Fine (1982) in fact does not
capture the behavior of English as-phrases.
Let us consider the first point. The as-phrase in (57) intuitively does not have an
effect on the truth-conditions of the sentence, i.e. it does not restrict the predication.
Since John’s knowledge on how children behave will persist even if he ceases to be a
father (if this is at all possible), the only function of the as-phrase in (57) seems to
be to communicate that John’s property of being a father has a relevant connection
to John’s knowing how children behave. This behavior of the as-phrase in (57) is,
however, not observable for all as-phrases. There are sentences in which as-phrases
are used to contrast two different aspects of the same person, or to pick out one role
among many for that person. In these sentences, the as-phrases have an effect on the
truth-conditions of the sentence. Consider the sentences in (58).26
(58) a. #Peter earns 50.000 Euros, but he doesn’t earn 50.000 Euros.
b. Peter as a judge earns 50.000 Euros, but he as a janitor doesn’t earn
50.000 Euros.
Example (58-a), which does not contain as-phrases, is inconsistent since a property
and its negation are attributed to the same individual simultaneously. By contrast, in
(58-b) this inconsistency disappears. If as-phrases had no effect on the truth-conditions
of the sentences that contain them, and could in principle always be omitted, it would
be expected that (58-a) and (58-b) are equally inconsistent. Similarly, the as-phrase
in (59) needs to restrict Clark Kent to his Superman aspect since in his other role as
a reporter at the Daily Planet, he does not rescue people.
(59) As Superman, Clark Kent rescues people.
26For German als-phrases, the split regarding the different functions is encoded in the syntactic




























‘As a farmer, Hans earns 3000 Euros.’
The contribution of German adnominal als-phrases is similar to that of as a father in (57); these
als-phrases seems to behave like appositions. Adverbial als-phrases can also be interpreted like as a
father in (57), but their prefered interpretation is the restrictive “in-this-role” reading exemplified by
the as-phrases in (58). For a detailed discussion of the properties of German als-phrases, see Appendix
A1.
Chapter 4. Accounting for the pragmatic effects of ich and du 253
Hence, something more has to be said about the lack of an effect on the truth-conditions
of qua-predication in the case of one.
Another observation made for as-phrases is that predication on aspects that are
introduced by as-phrases is in general not monotone. That is, a property Q that holds
of x qua P does not necessarily hold of x simpliciter. Consider example (60).
(60) As a judge, Peter earns 50.000 Euros, and as a janitor, he earns 10.000 Euros.
a. 6⇒ Peter earns (only) 50.000/10.000 Euros.
b. ⇒ Peter earns 60.000 Euros.
This behavior of as-phrases is not captured by the axioms adopted for qua-predication
in (61).
(61) Qua-predication forms a new type of individual, x qua P . The three defining
properties of qua-individuals formed in this way are
a. x qua P exists in a world w whenever P (x)(w)
b. x qua P = x′ qua P ′ iff x = x′ and P = P ′
c. x qua P has a property Q in w iff Q(x)(w) whenever P (x)(w), and the
qua-property P provides epistemic grounds for x being Q.
The third axiom states that every property of the qua-entity is also a property of
the individual simpliciter. Therefore, if it is assumed that as-phrases express qua-
predication, it is predicted that the sentence in (58-b) should be inconsistent, and that
the inference in (60-a) should be valid. Consequently, if as-phrases are kept as the
overt linguistic model for the formal component that introduces speaker-orientation,
a different, more adequate formalization for the effects of this component needs to be
adopted (cf. Jäger 2001, 2003; Szabo 2003; Asher 2006, 2011).
An argument against using as-phrases as a motivating example for the speaker-
oriented component, though, is that they are too restricted with respect to the con-
stituents they can comment on. That is, properties expressed by as-phrases are strictly
tied to a specific individual, i.e. the individual or individual variable that they are as-
sociated with. Consider the example and its representation in (62).27
(62) a. As fathers, most of my friends know how children behave.
b. Knoww(most of my friends qua father, how children behave)
As-phrases do not restrict the domain of quantification of nominal quantifiers, includ-
ing the quasi-universal quantifier introduced by the generic operator Gen (cf. Appendix
A1). Without the as-phrase, example (62-a) would state that a subset of the speaker’s
friends know how children behave. The additional as-phrase in (62-a) intuitively con-
27The attitude verb know is represented by the operator Know, analogously to the Believe-
operator defined in Section 4.2.
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veys that for all individuals in this subset, it is true that they are fathers. Crucially,
this subset of the speaker’s friends does not contain all of the speaker’s friends that are
fathers. Now, consider the scenario in (63).
(63) Scenario: All of the speaker’s friends are fathers, though not all of them are
equally comfortable with their children. Some are still frequently surprised by
their children’s behavior.
In this scenario, (62-a) is true. This suggests that the as-phrase provides epistemic
grounds for each individual separately, but not for the truth of the entire sentence. In
other words, example (62) cannot express: ‘Since all of the speaker’s friends are fathers,
it is for most of them the case that they know how children behave’; the fact that all
of the speaker’s friends are fathers is not conveyed to be the reason for why just most
of them know how their children behave.
Analogously, the qua-predication in the interpretation proposed for the sentence
in (64-a) can only provide epistemic grounds for single qua-individuals, i.e. for each
possible value of the individual variable x separately.
(64) a. One can see the picture from the entrance.
b. Gen x[can-see-the-picture-from-the-entrance
(x qua being identified-with by the speaker)]
In light of Moltmann’s discussion about the background behind the speaker-oriented
content, this behavior of as-phrases makes the wrong predictions regarding the speaker-
oriented effect. Recall that Moltmann suggests that the speaker’s actual or simulated
experiences are taken as epistemic grounds for the generalization to hold. That is,
given the assumption that other people would share the same experience, the speaker
abstracts from the particulars of his experience, and generalizes it to all non-exceptional
individuals. The connection between the speaker and these non-exceptional individuals
is modeled with the “identifies-with” relation. If identification were to work like an as-
phrase, though, it would be predicted that a sentence like (64-a) states a generalization
for a certain set of individuals, but that independently of this generalization, the speaker
identifies with all non-exceptional and exceptional individuals, i.e. the entire set of
individuals. This does not capture the intuition that the speaker identifies with a set
of people that he takes to be the non-exceptional individuals for the rule, and that by
virtue of doing so believes himself to have reasonable grounds to utter the generalization
truthfully.
So in sum, two conclusions can be drawn: (i) as-phrases as the linguistic expression
of qua-predication do not constitute a good analogy for the speaker-oriented component
of one, and (ii) without further clarificatory comments regarding its independence of
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the truth-conditional content of a sentence, qua-predication is not an adequate tool to
model the speaker-oriented content of one.
Regardless of these issues, however, Moltmann’s observations provide important in-
sights on the meaning of English one. The aim is therefore to model the meaning of one
in such a fashion that allows for the speaker-oriented content to comment on the entire
truth-conditional content of a generic sentence containing one without restricting it.
A first attempt to do just that is discussed in Section 4.5. Before the new proposal
is presented, a brief introduction to the literature on content that is communicated in
addition, but that is not asserted is given in Section 4.4.
4.4 Classes of not-at-issue content: Presuppositions
and implicatures
4.4.1 Traditional views on presuppositions and implicatures
An important observation pertaining to the meaning of expressions of natural language
is that sentences convey various types of additional information that go beyond the
literal meaning of these sentences, i.e. “what is said”.28 Sometimes the literal meaning
is not even part of what the speaker intends his utterance to mean. To account for
the difference between what is said and what the speaker means by saying it presents
a challenge for any theory of meaning.
First and foremost, different types of meaning that can be conveyed need to be distin-
guished systematically. One important distinction is between the literal and non-literal
meaning of sentences. Another distinction is made between content that is commu-
nicated “primarily”, and content that is communicated “in addition” to the primary
content. A principled discussion of these differences requires a precise definition of
literal vs. non-literal meaning, and primary vs. additional content. These are the cen-
tral and also the hardest questions that are addressed in the fields of semantics and
pragmatics—also because any decision on the definitions and on the scope of these four
terms are attractive as criteria to delineate the two fields. Needless to say, there is no
consensus in the literature regarding these definitions.
One pervasive tradition in the literature defines the literal meaning of a sentence
as the truth-conditional content that is built up in a compositional manner from the
conventional meanings of the words occurring in that sentence. Non-literal meaning is
28Grice (1975) introduces the term “what is said” to distinguish the conventional, literal meaning of
a sentence from its non-literal meaning in a context of utterance.
(i) What is said: “I intend what someone has said to be closely related to the conventional meaning
of the words (the sentence) he has uttered” (Grice 1975:25)
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defined negatively as the complement of literal meaning. This distinction provides a
narrow view on the division between semantics and pragmatics: literal meaning is put
into the domain of semantics while non-literal meaning is the subject of pragmatics.
This narrow view is discussed in detail in Levinson (1983). This view has recently
again been criticized as rather naive, and has been challenged by analyses of linguis-
tic expressions that contribute their conventional meaning at a different “level” than
the truth-conditional content of the sentence (cf. e.g. Potts 2005). Further challenges
are provided by analyses of “pragmatic” processes affecting the composition of truth-
conditional content (cf. e.g. Recanati 2010). For my investigations, particularly the
former analyses are of specific interest.
I adopt Potts’s (2005) distinction between at-issue content and CI content as the dis-
tinction between content that is contributed primarily and content that is contributed
in addition, respectively.29 Hence, the primary content of a sentence is its asserted
truth-conditional content. Any additional content that in some sense or other com-
ments on the truth-conditional content is seen as independent. Content of this kind
is either derived contextually on the basis of the truth-conditional content of the sen-
tence, or is “triggered” by some lexical item in the sentence. Note that content that
is contributed in addition to the primary content can nevertheless be true or false. In
other words, it usually has its own truth-conditional content.
The aim for this section is to give a short overview of two types of non-primary con-
tent: presuppositions and implicatures. First, I give a brief overview of the traditional
work on presuppositions and implicatures, and furthermore contrast conventional im-
plicatures with conversational implicatures. For the rest of this section, I then focus
on conventional additional content, i.e. presuppositions and conventional implicatures.
For both classes, I present the diagnostic properties that have been proposed in the
literature.
Traditionally, presuppositions and implicatures are seen as two distinct types of non-
primary content. The difference between the two types lies in how they arise, and how
the additional content interacts with the truth-conditional content of the associated
sentence.
Presuppositions convey additional content that needs to be established in the dis-
course context such that the associated sentence can be uttered truthfully. In the lit-
erature on presuppositions, two prominent views need to be distinguished (cf. Beaver
and Geurts 2011): (i) the purely semantic view, and (ii) the pragmatic view.30
On the semantic view, presuppositions express definedness conditions on the de-
29Note that Potts (2005) does not use the terms “primary” and “in addition”.
30There is a considerable amount of literature on the accommodation of presuppositions, which
for reasons of space will not be reviewed at this point. For a recent discussion of the problem of
accommodation see von Fintel (2008) and Beaver and Geurts (2011).
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notation of an expression. This way of thinking about presuppositions was notably
developed first in Frege (1892) and then in Strawson (1950).
(65) “One sentence presupposes another iff whenever the first is true or false, the
second is true.” (taken from Beaver and Geurts 2011)
On this view, presuppositions are “triggered” by natural language expressions. The
classical examples that are discussed in the literature are the definite article and factive
verbs.31 The definite article, for instance, is said to trigger a presupposition requiring
uniqueness of existence. That is, it is presupposed that there is only one individual for
which the descriptive content of the definite description holds. Consider (66).
(66) The king of France is bald.
The definite description the king of France in (66) presupposes that there is only one,
unique individual who is the king of France. If no unique individual of this kind exists,
the definite description has no denotation.32
Two views can be found in the literature regarding the effect of presuppositional
content that is not fullfilled in the context. On the first view based on Russell (1905),
sentences with presuppositions that are not fulfilled are grouped with false sentences.
The advantage of this analysis is that for sentences, bivalence regarding truth-values
can be maintained. The second view is based on the proposal in Frege (1892) that
was taken up in Strawson (1950) to give up strict bivalence. According to this view,
sentences for which one or more presuppositions are not fulfilled are “undefined” with
respect to their truth-values. That is, the consequence of presuppositions that are
triggered in a sentence, but are unfulfilled in the context is that the sentence cannot
be evaluated in the context.
The second prominent view on presuppositions is the pragmatic view of “speaker’s
presuppositions” put forth in Stalnaker (1972, 1973, 1974) and later work. The central
idea is that presuppositions express content that is taken for granted by the speaker,
and that places a requirement on the context of use of the associated sentence. In con-
trast to the semantic view, presuppositions are not triggered by linguistic expressions;
it is the speaker who may presuppose content when uttering a sentence. The effect
of presupposed content in this view is as follows: only if this content is established in
the discourse context, the content of the associated sentence may be added to the set
31Factive verbs presuppose the truth of their propositional argument. For example, the factive verb
know in (i) presupposes that it is true that Peter is a spy.
(i) John knows that Peter is a spy.
32This presupposition is usually relativized to the context of utterance. In this case, it is required
that there is only one, unique individual in the context of utterance for which the descriptive content
holds (cf. Section 2.4).
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of propositions that are mutually accepted as true by the discourse participants. If
Stalnaker’s (1978) notion of Common Ground is adopted as defined in (67), a presup-
position can be defined as a requirement that the presupposed content be part of the
Common Ground.
(67) Common Ground:
The common ground for a context is the set of all propositions that the dis-
course participants in that context mutually and publicly agree to treat as true
for the purposes of the conversation (cf. Stalnaker 1978).
Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (2000) give the following definition for presupposed
content.
(68) Presupposition:
(An utterance of) a sentence S presupposes a proposition p if (the utterance
of) S implies p and further implies that p is somehow already part of the
background against which S is considered.
(Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 2000:349)
One reason to adopt a more pragmatic view on presuppositions is that presuppositions
that are not in the Common Ground at the time of utterance, i.e. are hearer-new,
can sometimes be “accommodated” (cf. Lewis 1979b). This means (i) that the speaker
assumes that the content of the presupposition is already established in the Common
Ground, and (ii) that the addressee may agree to add the presupposed content that
is missing from the Common Ground to it before evaluating the meaning of the asso-
ciated sentence. In a purely semantic view of presuppositions as definedness criteria,
accommodation is not expected to arise. The scenario and example in (69) illustrate
accommodation.
Scenario: A talks to B about her family for the first time. It has been established
that A’s parents live in Salzburg, but she has not yet mentioned her brother.
(69) A to B: My younger brother lives in Vienna, though.
Presupposition: The speaker has a younger brother.
Since B does not know that A has a brother, the presupposition triggered by my brother
in (69) is not part of the Common Ground. The addressee B, however, may tacitly
adjust the Common Ground by adding the proposition that A has a younger brother.
Against this new Common Ground, the primary content of (69) can be evaluated.
Accommodation is not available for all types of presupposed content. Assume that
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(70) is a continuation of (69) above, and consider the presupposition that arises for
too.33
(70) A to B: #He played volleyball, too.
Presupposition: There is another individual who played volleyball.
Example (70) illustrates that a presupposition associated with a sentence containing
too is usually not easily accommodated. The availability of accommodation for vari-
ous kinds of presuppositions has been argued to depend on how unsurprising and/or
uncontroversial the presupposed content is (cf. von Fintel 2008).
In the more recent literature, also a mixed semantic/pragmatic view of presupposi-
tions can be found. For instance, von Fintel (2008) assumes that there is a presupposi-
tional component that is hard-wired in the lexical meaning of linguistic expressions, but
that the pragmatic effects of presuppositions on the Common Ground are as proposed
by Stalnaker (1972, 1973, 1974) and later work.
Finally, one last topic that is discussed frequently in the literature on presuppositions
is their “projection behavior” (cf. Karttunen 1973; Heim 1983; van der Sandt 1992).
This topic concerns the question of whether presuppositions that are associated with
expressions in embedded clauses are“inherited”by the embedding clause. This question
is connected to the observation that certain logical operators that cancel logical entail-
ments do not affect the content of presuppositions that are triggered by material in
their scope. Entailments are cancelled e.g. under sentential negation, in the antecedent
of a conditional, in questions, and in the scope of an epistemic modal. Compare the
examples in (71) with those in (72).34
(71) a. Peter doesn’t smoke. 6⇒ Peter smokes.
b. If Peter smokes, he does so secretly. 6⇒ Peter smokes.
c. Does Peter smoke? 6⇒ Peter smokes.
d. Peter might smoke. 6⇒ Peter smokes.
(72) Peter stopped smoking.
a. Peter did not stop smoking.  Peter smoked.
b. If Peter stopped smoking, he feels more healthy now.  Peter smoked.
c. Did Peter stop smoking?  Peter smoked.
d. Peter might have stopped smoking.  Peter smoked.
Projection is not possible from under all logical operators, however. Karttunen (1973)
33In (70), another presupposition that may be associated with too is that the referent of he, i.e. the
speaker’s younger brother, also played another type of sports besides volleyball.
34The type of sentences in (72) is usually used to test for an interaction with logical operators.
This is called the “family of sentences test”: place the relevant expression in these environments, and
check whether the content contributed by the expression “survives” the embedding, or not. This test
is based on the observations in Karttunen (1973).
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observes that for some operators, e.g. attitude verbs, the presupposed content is trapped
in the operator’s scope. This is illustrated for the attitude verb believe in (73).
(73) Sheila believes that Paul is Peter’s brother. But Peter does not have a brother.
In (73), the presupposition that is triggered by the noun phrase Peter’s brother, i.e. that
Peter has a brother, is caught in the scope of the verb believe, and is not presupposed
by the entire utterance. In the primary, truth-conditional content, it is only stated that
Sheila believes that this is the case. Therefore, the denial of Peter’s having a brother
in the second sentence is consistent with the content conveyed by the first sentence,
and no oddness arises.
Since expressions like believe “keep” presuppositions in their scope, Karttunen calls
these expressions “presupposition plugs”. Plugs are contrasted with “holes” and “fil-
ters”. Holes are operators that always allow presupposed content to be projected, e.g.
negation, modals, conditionals, and questions. Filters may allow or block projection
depending on various linguistic and contextual factors. For a more detailed overview
and a discussion of recent theories of presupposition projection see Schlenker (2008).
Let us now turn to the second type of additional content, i.e. implicatures. Impli-
catures are introduced in Grice (1975) as a very heterogeneous class of pragmatically
inferred content. Grice distinguishes two major types of implicatures: (i) conversa-
tional implicatures and (ii) conventional implicatures. Conversational implicatures are
“calculated” from the truth-conditional content of a sentence and the context in which
it was uttered. The calculation is guided by the “Co-operative Principle” and four
classes of associated “Conversational Maxims” that speakers seem to adhere to in order
to ensure communicative success.35
(74) Co-operative Principle:
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which
it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which
you are engaged.
(Grice 1975:45)
The Conversational Maxims are secondary to the Co-operative Principle, and constitute
specific desiderata for a speaker’s conversational contribution (Grice 1975:45f).
• Maxims of Quantity:
– Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current pur-
poses of the exchange).
– Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
35Grice (1975) does not see the Co-operative Principle and the Conversational Maxims as rules or
norms that need to be obeyed by the discourse participants. He argues that the principle and the
maxims are descriptive generalizations that reflect the usual, natural behavior of discourse participants.
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• Maxims of Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true.
– Do not say what you believe to be false.
– Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
• Maxim of Relation: Be relevant.
• Maxims of Manner: Be perspicuous.
– Avoid obscurity of expression.
– Avoid ambiguity.
– Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
– Be orderly.
Conversational implicatures may arise in different communicative settings. One
prominent setting is given when a speaker violates one or more of the Conversational
Maxims but observes the Co-operative Principle. Example (75) illustrates a metaphor;
the non-literal meaning that is understood is a conversational implicature. The mean-
ing that A wants to convey with (75) is that the addressee B plays a special role in the
A’s life.
(75) A to B: You are the cream in my coffee.
The conversational implicature arises from A’s violation of the Maxim of Quality. This
maxim states that a co-operative speaker should only say what he believes to be true.
It can be assumed that A does not believe that B, literally, is the cream in his coffee.
Hence, given the assumption that A is co-operative, it can be concluded that A means
something other than the literal meaning of (75). The intended meaning is inferred in
analogy to the relation between cream and coffee as it is usually perceived in general
and by the speaker.
As illustrated by (75), the content of conversational implicatures depends on the
truth-conditional content of the sentence that was uttered, the context of utterance,
and extra-linguistic knowledge, i.e. world knowledge.
Grice (1975) contrasts the class of conversational implicatures with the class of con-
ventional implicatures, which involves pragmatically conveyed content that is part of
the conventional meaning of specific words. Words of this kind are called “triggers”. In
addition to the conventional implicature, triggers may also contribute content to the
truth-conditions of the sentence that contains them. Triggers that are traditionally
discussed are therefore and but. Consider examples (76-a) and (76-b).
(76) a. He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave.
(based on Grice 1975:44)
b. Peter writes his dissertation, but he is not sleep-deprived.
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The conventional implicature triggered by therefore in (76-a) is that being an En-
glishman is the reason for why the referent is considered to be brave. The content
contributed by therefore to the two clauses is conjunction. The connective but is an-
alyzed similarly as triggering the conventional implicature that the two sentences are
linked by a causal relation. For (76-b), it is conveyed that writing a dissertation usually
causes sleep deprivation. The contribution of but to the truth-conditions of a sentence
is again conjunction.36
Conventional implicatures contrast with conversational implicatures in that they are
triggered conventionally by specific expressions, and do not depend on the specific
utterance context and world knowledge.
In early works on content that is conveyed in addition to the truth-conditional con-
tent of an utterance, presuppositions and conventional implicatures were usually not
distinguished (cf. e.g. Karttunen and Peters 1979). One reason for this conflation
was that presuppositions and conventional implicatures share the properties of being
“non-detachable” and ”conventional”.
(77) Detachability:
Non-primary content is detachable iff it is not preserved when the expressions
that serve to trigger it in the associated sentence are substituted by other
truth-conditionally equivalent expressions.
(78) Conventionality:
Non-primary content is conventional iff it is part of the conventional, lexical
meaning of the expression that serves to trigger it.
However, presuppositions and conventional implicatures also have properties that dis-
tinguished them from each other: (i) their behavior regarding “cancelability”37 and
(ii) the connection their content has to the truth-conditional content of the associated
sentence.
Regarding “cancelability” it was stated above that presuppositions may project from
under some classes of logical operators, but are caught in the scope of others. In the
latter case, the presupposed content that is triggered seems to be “lost” since it is not a
presupposition of the entire utterance. So, in case the presupposition does not project,
36Grice’s brief characterization of conventional implicatures has since then been used to account for
a diverse class of lexical items and linguistic phenomena (cf. Potts 2005).
• Lexical items that are analyzed as triggering conventional implicatures are e.g. but, therefore,
still, even, only, too, already, and yet.
• Complex linguistic expressions that are said to trigger conventional implicatures are honorifics,
parentheticals and appositions, evidential morphemes, and discourse particles.
37This term is put in scare quotes since at least for presuppositions it is not an uncontroversial
assumption that they are cancelled if they do not project. Compare the views in Karttunen (1973)
and Gazdar (1979).
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one could say that it was “canceled”. For instance, a presupposition may be blocked
from projecting by explicitly denying its content. This is illustrated in (79).
(79) A: Did Peter stop smoking?
B: No, in fact he never smoked.
The change of state verb stop in A’s question triggers the presupposition that Peter
smoked in the past. This presupposition is “canceled” in B’s answer by B’s explicit
denial that Peter smoked at some point in the past.
Conventional implicatures, in turn, cannot be “canceled”, i.e. they always seem to
project from under any type of logical operator. Consider example (80).
(80) Peter is an Englishman and therefore brave. # But that he is an Englishman
is actually not the reason.
In the second sentence of (80), the speaker explicitly denies the content of the conven-
tional implicature , i.e. that Peter’s being English is the reason for his being brave. The
fact that this explicit denial results in pragmatic oddness suggests that the convention-
ally implicated content cannot be cancelled in this way. A more elaborate comparison
shows that none of the contexts in which presuppositions do not project have an effect
on conventional implicatures (cf. Potts 2005). Consider also (81).
(81) Sheila believes that Chuck, a confirmed psychopath, should be locked up. #But
Chuck isn’t a confirmed psychopath.
(Potts 2005:117)
In (81), the appositive a confirmed psychopath triggers the conventional implicature
that Chuck is a confirmed psychopath. This content projects from under believe which
is known to block the projection for presuppositions (cf. Karttunen 1973). Conse-
quently, it is assumed to hold in the context of utterance. Hence, the denial in the
second sentence is inconsistent with the content conveyed by the first sentence.
The second point in which presuppositions and conventional implicatures differ is
whether the truth of the associated sentence depends on the truth of the pragmatically
inferred content. For presuppositions, this is the case.
(82) The king of France sleeps.
If the content of a presupposition is false, i.e. if there is “presupposition failure”, the
semantic view on presuppositions assumes that the sentence that contains the trig-
ger cannot be evaluated with respect to its truth-value. On the pragmatic view, the
associated sentence cannot be evaluated in the given Common Ground.
In contrast, for conventional implicatures, truth of the conveyed content in the utter-
ance context is not a necessary condition for the evaluation of the associated sentence
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with respect to truth/falsity. For instance, irrespective of the truth or falsity of the
conventional implicature in (80), the speaker can state truthfully that Peter is an En-
glishman and brave.
This difference between presuppositions and conventional implicatures and their in-
teraction is also illustrated by the following sentence pair.
(83) a. The king of France, François Hollande, wears glasses.
b. François Hollande, the king of France, wears glasses.
In example (83-a), the presupposition trigger the king of France is part of the matrix
clause. Therefore, the truth of the sentence depends on the unique existence of a king
of France. In (83-b), the same presupposition trigger appears in an apposition. Since
the content of appositions is analyzed as a conventional implicature, the presupposition
trigger, the king of France, is not part of the truth-conditional content of the asserted,
primary content that François Hollande wears glasses, but part of the conventionally
implicated content that François Hollande is the king of France. Consequently, no
dependence between the existence of a unique king of France and the truth of the
primary content can be observed. Note, however, that the truth of the conventionally
implicated content in (83-b) depends on the presupposition triggered by the definite
description.
In sum, two types of meaning need to be distinguished that may be conveyed in
addition to the primary, truth-conditional content of an utterance: presuppositions
and implicatures. In the class of implicatures, conversational implicatures need to be
distinguished from conventional implicatures: Conversational implicatures are inferred
on the basis of the truth-conditions of the entire associated sentence, the utterance
context, and world knowledge. In contrast, conventional implicatures pattern with pre-
suppositions in that they are part of the conventional meaning of the lexical items and
syntactically complex expressions that trigger them. Presuppositions and conventional
implicatures are distinguished, however, by their influence on the truth-evaluability of
the associated sentence, and their projection behavior.
Which of these forms of additionally conveyed content is relevant to the discussion
of the speaker- and participant-oriented content can already be narrowed down based
on the data discussion in Section 1.4 and the discussion of Moltmann’s observations in
Section 4.3. The results of these sections support the conclusion that the pragmatic
effects of impersonally used pronouns are directly connected to the specific lexical items,
i.e. that the speaker-oriented and the participant-oriented content is part of the lexical
meaning of these items. Hence, this content is either presupposed or conventionally
implicated. The exact classification of the content that is conveyed is determined in
Section 4.5.
In the following section, I review more recent discussions on additionally conveyed
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content under the label “not-at-issue content”. This cover term includes both presup-
positions and conventional implicatures as specific subclasses.
4.4.2 Recent work on “not-at-issue content”
In recent semantic and pragmatic investigations, the strict differentiation of presuppo-
sitions and conventional implicatures and their connection to primary asserted content
are reconsidered. The aim at the heart of this work is twofold: The first goal is to find a
strict criterion to define what it means for information to be communicated as primary
or additional content. The second goal is to develop classification criteria to distinguish
different sub-classes of additional content that is conventionally communicated either
by a lexical item or by a syntactically complex expression.
The source of the recent increase in interest in this line of investigation is usually
considered to be Potts (2005). Potts investigates the class of conventional implicatures
in detail from a syntax-semantic interface perspective. Potts adopts Grice’s view that
conventional implicatures constitute a proper class of content, i.e. “CI content”. CI
content is conveyed in addition to the primary content of a sentence, and is triggered
conventionally. By uttering a statement with CI content, the speaker commits herself
to the truth of the truth-conditional content, i.e. the “at-issue” content, as well as the
truth of the CI content.38
Potts distinguishes two types of CI content triggers: (i) supplements, i.e. appositives
and parentheticals, and (ii) expressives. See (84) and (85).
(84) Ames, who stole from the FBI, is now behind bars. (appositive)
CI content: Ames stole from the FBI.
(Potts 2005:13)
(85) Sue’s dog is really fucking mean. (expressive)
CI content: The speaker has heightened emotions with respect to the degree
of meanness of Sue’s dog.
(Potts 2005:170)
Potts (2005) observes that if content has been introduced into a discourse, reintro-
ducing the content as a CI is perceived as pragmatically odd. Potts calls this the
“antibackgrounding effect”. Example (86) illustrates that repeating asserted content as
part of CI content is odd. In contrast, repeating it as a presupposition is pragmatically
felicitous.
38At-issue content in the sense of Potts (2005) is comparable with “proffered content” in Roberts
(1996). It can also be equated with the truth-conditional content of the sentence that contains the
lexical item that triggers the conventional implicature as adopted above.
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(86) Lance Armstrong survived cancer.
a. #When reporters interview Lance, a cancer survivor, he often talks about
the disease.
b. And most riders know that Lance Armstrong is a cancer survivor.
(Potts 2005:112)
In addition to the antibackgrounding effect, Potts emphasizes the different projection
behavior of CI content and presupposed content (cf. Section 4.4.1). He claims that CI
content is effectively “scopeless”. That is, it seems to be the case that CI content can
project from under any logical operator that is part of the at-issue content.39
A property that distinguishes CI content from at-issue content is its lack of direct
deniability.
(87) a. A: Ames, who stole from the FBI, is now behind bars.
b. B: No, that’s wrong.
c. B’: No, Ames never stole from the FBI.
For instance, B’s denial in (87-b) can only be with regards to the at-issue content of
A’s utterance in (87-a) that Ames is behind bars at the time of utterance. If B wanted
to deny that Ames stole from the FBI, B would have to do it explicitly as in (87-c).
Based on these observations, Potts proposes a two-dimensional formal system to
account for the logical independence of the CI content from the at-issue content. He
introduces a typed language LCI which encodes the difference between at-issue content
and CI content by providing two sets of types.40
(88) a. Basic at-issue types: ea, ta, and sa
b. Basic CI types: ec, tc, and sc
c. Functional types 〈σ, τ〉 and product types 〈σ × τ〉 are defined inductively
from the basic types.41
The language LCI does not interpret the tree structures provided by the syntax directly.
On the basis of syntactic input structures, semantic parsetrees are first generated in
39This generalization is first stated in this manner in Amaral et al. (2007) on the basis of Potts’s
claims. Amaral et al., however, contest this view. They argue that in speech reports expressives may
either be associated with the reported speaker or with the actual speaker uttering the speech report.
Potts, however, contests this counterexample. For a discussion see Potts (2012).
40The introduction of two incompatible sets of types means that no expression may contribute both
to the at-issue content and the CI content. This has been challenged by various researchers. For
instance, Horn (2011) gives the following example.
(i) a. You shouldn’t vote for that bastard Jones.
b. You shouldn’t vote for that bastard.
(Horn 2011:5)
41A product type 〈σ × τ〉 encodes a set of ordered pairs of expressions of type σ and τ .
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a type-driven manner. The resulting parsetrees are then interpreted by LCI . In these
parsetrees, expressions with at-issue types and expressions with CI types inhabit dif-
ferent “dimensions”. The dimensions are graphically delimited by a bullet: •. The
interpretation of a sentence via such a parsetree results in an ordered pair consisting
of the interpretation of the at-issue content and the interpretation of the set of CI
contents at the root of the derived parsetree.
Consider Potts’s treatment of the expression Lance, a cyclist. First, the following
parsetree structure is derived.
(89) Lance:ea • cyclist(Lance):tc
Lance:ea comma(cyclist):〈ea, tc〉
cyclist:〈ea, ta〉
A featural42 Comma-operator is defined which shifts the at-issue predicate cyclist to
the CI content comma(cyclist). The CI content that is then combined with the proper
name Lance to derive the CI content ‘Lance is a cyclist’. The at-issue content of the
expression is the individual denoted by Lance. In a next step, the parsetree in (89) is
interpreted as the tuple in (90).
(90) 〈JLance : eaK, {Jcyclist(Lance) : tcK}〉
For reasons of space, I will not go into greater detail regarding Potts’s system at this
point. For a detailed discussion of the formal system, see Potts (2005). The crucial
point for the purposes of this thesis is the idea that at-issue content and not-at-issue
content are part of two different dimensions of meaning.
The depth of the data discussion, as well as the two-dimensional formal account in
Potts (2005) is reviewed, and criticized in Amaral et al. (2007). Their main point of
criticism is that Potts designs an elaborate syntax-semantics interface for CI content,
but ignores its pragmatic aspects. They argue that an adequate theory of CI content
has to take into account its pragmatic properties. They also criticize (i) that Potts never
formally defines the notion of at-issueness, and (ii) that his system cannot account for
possible interactions between CI content and at-issue content.
As a possible remedy to the first point, Amaral et al. define at-issueness based on
relevance for the question under discussion (QUD) in the sense of Roberts (1996). The
42The Comma-operator is “featural” in that it is contributed by a feature which is part of the
syntactic label of the constituent that has to be interpreted on the dimension of CI content. Cf. Potts
(2005).
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QUD is the current open question that was either explicitly or implictly asked in the
previous discourse, and which corresponds to the current discourse topic.43 See (91)
(91) The felicity of an utterance necessitates that its at-issue content be relevant to
the question under discussion.
(Amaral et al. 2007:732)
Relevance to the QUD is defined as partial answerhood:
(92) In order to be relevant to the question under discussion, an utterance must
contextually entail at least a partial answer to that question.
(Amaral et al. 2007:732)
CI content is one type of content that is not at-issue.
To support their criticism of the strict independece of at-issue content and CI content
at the heart of Potts’ formal system, Amaral et al. present data that suggests that the
two types of content sometimes interact. For instance, anaphoric pronouns of various
kinds may occur in CI content for which the antecedent is part of the at-issue content,
or vice versa. This is illustrated in (93).
(93) a. Stan Bronowski, who took an exam, passed it with flying colors.
b. Several students, most of them linguists, missed the bus.
(Amaral et al. 2007:740)
They suggest that Potts’ characterization of CI content as logically entirely indepen-
dent from at-issue content is not adequate. Instead, the defining property of CI content
is that it comments in one way or another on (i) the at-issue content, e.g. for expres-
sives and supplements, (ii) the speech act, e.g. for utterance-modifiers, or (iii) the
speech situation connected to the syntactic complement of a lexical element triggering
a conventional implicature, e.g. for honorifics. From this point of view, Amaral et al.
conclude, a two-dimensional account which completely separates the at-issue content
from the CI content is not motivated. They suggest that CI content simply has a
special status compared to at-issue content with respect to its relevance for the QUD.
The connection between not-at-issue content and relevance to the QUD is explored
further in Roberts et al. (2009), Simons et al. (2011), and subsequent work. The central
idea is that presuppositions, CI content, and possibly other types of pragmatic content
constitute special cases of a more general phenomenon: “projective content”.
(94) Definition of projection:
An implication projects if and only if it survives as an utterance implication
43Here, “topic” is understood differently from the notion of “topic” in the literature on information
structure, cf. Roberts (2011b).
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when the expression that triggers the implication occurs under the syntactic
scope of an entailment-cancelling operator.
(Simons et al. 2011:309)
Simons et al. (2011) show that formal systems that are proposed to account specifi-
cally for either presuppositions (cf. Heim 1983; van der Sandt 1992) or for conventional
implicatures (cf. Potts 2005) cannot be extended to account for the entire range of
projective meaning since these accounts try to build all of the properties of presup-
posed or conventionally implicated content into their systems. But, as shown above,
presuppositions and conventional implicatures differ from each other e.g. with respect
to their interaction with at-issue content.
To account for the common properties of all classes of projective content, Simons
et al. (2011) propose that these classes share the same pragmatic property, i.e. not-
at-issueness. Based on the results in Roberts (1996), at-issueness is defined in Simons
et al. (2011) as in (95).
(95) Revised definition of at-issueness:
a. A proposition p is at-issue iff the speaker intends to address the QUD via
?p.
b. An intention to address the QUD via ?p is felicitous only if:
(i) ?p is relevant to the QUD44 (cf. (92))
(ii) the speaker can reasonably expect the addressee to recognize this
intention.
(Simons et al. 2011:323)
As suggested for CI content in Amaral et al. (2007), not-at-issueness is defined nega-
tively as holding for linguistic material that does not meet the criteria in (95). The
content that is contributed by this material is said to be “projective”. An attractive
feature of this definition is based on the notion of at-issueness. It provides a unified
characterization of the pragmatic behavior of projective content: any content that is
not relevant to the current QUD is expected to be independent of logical operators
that are part of the at-issue content. Hence, the account covers presuppositions, con-
ventional implicatures, and other projective content which cannot be easily classified
as either. See for instance e.g. the prejacent of only.45
On the basis of Simons et al. (2011), Roberts (2011a) and Tonhauser (2011) give three
sets of diagnostic tests for (not-)at-issueness. These tests are based on the observations
44The definition given in Simons et al. (2011) is: A question is relevant to a QUD iff it has an answer
which contextually entails a partial or complete answer to the QUD (Simons et al. 2011:316).
45Simons et al. (2011) already note, however, that connecting at-issueness to a purely pragmatic
notion, i.e. the QUD, does not take into account the link of presuppositions and conventional implica-
tures to the conventional meaning of their triggers. Or more generally, the account does not capture
that linguistic form is a strong indicator of the at-issueness status of contributed content.
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(i) that only at-issue content can be directly assented to/dissented from, (ii) that only
at-issue content addresses the QUD, and (iii) that for focus marking, only at-issue
content is taken into account when the set of focus alternatives is determined.
Roberts (2011a) proposes two additional criteria to distinguish specific classes of
not-at-issue content.
(96) a. Influence on the contextual felicity of an utterance: Does the not-at-issue
content place restrictions on the utterance context?
b. Local effect: Is the truth of the not-at-issue content locally entailed by the
at-issue content?
Table 4.1 shows Roberts’s results for three classes of not-at-issue content: (i) anaphoric
presuppositions, (ii) speaker-oriented content, and (iii) backgrounded content. Anapho-
ric presuppositions are triggered by e.g. too, pronouns, demonstratives, various ellipti-
cal constructions, and definite descriptions. Speaker-anchored content is essentially CI
content as described in Potts (2005), and backgrounded content is, for instance, con-
tributed by the complements of change of state verbs, factive verbs.46 Further criteria
might provide a more fine grained classification.
Contextual Felicity Local Effect
Anaphoric presuppositions yes yes
Speaker-anchored content no no
Backgrounded content no yes
Table 4.1: Central classes of projective meaning in Roberts (2011a)
In sum, the recent literature on (not-)at-issue content provides a new point of view on
presuppositions and conventional implicatures based on the central notion of projection.
Presupposed content, on the one hand, and CI content as described in Potts (2005),
on the other hand, can be subsumed in the general class of projective content. To
distinguish types of projective content, and to give a more fine-grained classification of
this class, additional criteria are proposed.
In the following section, I employ the tests described above to classify the content
at the heart of the pragmatic effects of ich, du, and man. I argue that the speaker-
oriented component, as well as the participant-oriented component of the three pro-
nouns contribute projective content. Specifically, the content seems to behave like
speaker-anchored content in the sense of Roberts (2011a) which can be equated with
CI content as described in Potts (2005).
46For a detailed discussion of the classes see Roberts (2011a).
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4.5 A new proposal for the impersonal uses of ich,
du, and man
4.5.1 The pragmatic effects of German ich, du, and man
In this section, I propose a new account for the impersonal uses of ich, du, and man.
The main goal for this account is to capture the pragmatic effects of these pronouns in
a manner that is more adequate than in the account proposed in Section 2.5.3. This
means that it avoids all of the problems that were identifed for the old account in
Section 4.2. As announced at the beginning of this chapter, this new account is not
intended as a unified account for the referential and impersonal uses of ich and du. For
the referential use, I adopt the directly referential treatment as proposed in Kaplan
(1978 [1989]) repeated in (97).47
(97) a. JichKc,g = cS
b. JduKc,g = cA
Possible connections on different grammatical levels between the directly referential
meaning of the referential uses and the meaning that is proposed for the impersonal
uses in this section will be discussed in Section 4.6.
This section is structured as follows. First, the observations on the pragmatic effects
from Section 1.4 are summarized. On the basis of this summary, I then determine
which type of not-at-issue content fits the pragmatic components that are identified for
ich, du, and man. The core of this section is an analysis of the content of the pragmatic
components and their interactions. In the second part, I join together these results to
give a new analysis of the meaning contributed by the impersonal uses of ich, du, and
man.
Let us take a brief look at the main results of Section 1.4. In this section, the
pragmatic effects of the impersonal uses of ich, du, and man were described. One of
the observations that were made is that in this use, ich, du, and man share the same
speaker-oriented content that is observed for the English impersonal pronoun one (cf.
Section 4.3). In addition, the personal pronouns ich and du show participant-oriented
effects; no corresponding effect is observed for the impersonal pronoun man.
The speaker-oriented effect of ich, du, and man is best observed in comparison
with ordinary generic sentences. If impersonally used pronouns occur in generic sen-
tences, the speaker intuitively conveys a personal point of view with respect to the
generalization that is expressed. For English one, Moltmann argues that this observa-
tion points towards a hard-wired aspect in the meaning of the pronoun that conveys
47Alternatively, the account proposed in Nunberg (1993) in its original formulation or the account
proposed in Kratzer (2009) may be adopted, as well.
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speaker-orientation (cf. Section 4.3). Zifonun (2000) makes a similar observation for
the speaker-orientation of German man. Her description of the speaker-connection ex-
hibited by man is strikingly similar to Moltmann’s proposal of the licensing strategies
for one. Consider Zifonun’s comment in (98-b).
(98) “Especially significant on the pragmatic level is the use of man for which gen-
eralizability is intended. In this use, it is communicated:
a. that the generalization that applies to all (relevant) individuals is also
applicable to the speaker and
b. what the speaker experiences could be experienced in the same way by all
other (relevant) individuals, as well.”
(translated from Zifonun 2000:242)
Based on Moltmann’s discussion, I suggest that the speaker-oriented content that is
conveyed by impersonally used pronouns expresses that the speaker’s actual or simu-
lated beliefs are such that he does not, or would not exclude himself from the set of
people to which the generalization applies. The effect of the speaker-oriented compo-
nent of impersonally used man is illustrated in example (99).
Scenario: A knows that a new exhibition on Klimt opened featuring “The Kiss” in






















A: ‘#As a visitor, one can see the picture from the entrance.’
The speaker-oriented component of the first sentence in (99) states that the speaker’s
beliefs are consistent with the speaker’s actual or simulated beliefs about his being a
visitor at that exhibition. The speaker knows that if he were to visit the exhibition, he
would not be able to see the picture from the entrance because of his medical condition.
This knowledge is in conflict with the speaker-oriented component of man. Hence, the
sentence in (99) is judged as odd.48
The function of the second, participant-oriented content of ich and du involves the
creation of distance or closeness between the speaker and other people, respectively.
When the speaker uses impersonally interpreted ich, he signals distance between
himself and some other set of people, but not necessarily other discourse participants.
Specifically, the speaker communicates that he has grounds to believe that the validity
of the regularity expressed by his utterance, which he fully supports, may not be
48I thank Patrick Grosz (p.c.) for detailed discussions on this point.
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supported, or adhered to by others.49 Neither the complete support on the part of the
speaker, nor the belief that someone does not accept the generalization can be explicitly
retracted. This is illustrated in (100) and (101) for the scenario given below.
Scenario: A and B discuss obligations of farmers. B states that she knows a farmer



































A: ‘As a farmer, one has to milk one’s cows (and I support this fully)! # But

















































A: ‘As a farmer, one has to milk one’s cows (in contrast to the actions of that
farmer)! # I am sure that the farmer you know agrees with me.’
When a speaker uses impersonally interpreted du, in contrast, he aims to create close-
ness or an informal camaraderie between himself and the addressee. Specifically, the
function of the participant-oriented content is to invite the addressee to simulate the
necessary experiences on the basis of the generalization in the sense of Moltmann (2006,
2010a), and to come to the same conclusion as the speaker with respect to the validity
of the regularity that is expressed. In analogy to impersonally used ich, the invita-
tion and the expectation that the addressee will share the speaker’s opinion cannot be
retracted. This is illustrated in (102).








































A: ‘As a childcare specialist, you (imp.) have to interact well with children.
# But I am certain that you (add.) will have a different opinion about that.’
49The type of evidence cannot be strictly defined as in the case of evidentials (cf. e.g. Matthewson
et al. 2007). As discussed in Chapter 1 for negative sentential contexts, the violation of the general-
ization can be as diverse as an explicit violation of the rule by some individual in the context, or the
speaker’s belief that another individual may not share his views.
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Since the impersonal pronouns man and one do not show any similar participant-
oriented effects, this content has to be seen as independent from the speaker-oriented
content.
To sum up, the following effects have to be accounted for for each of the pronouns:
• man: the speaker’s actual or simulated beliefs are such that he does not, or would
not exclude himself from the set of people to which the generalization applies
• ich:
– the speaker’s actual or simulated beliefs are such that he does not, or would
not exclude himself from the set of people to which the generalization applies
– the speaker communicates that he has grounds to believe that the validity
of the regularity expressed by his utterance, which he fully supports, may
not be supported, or adhered to by others
• du:
– the speaker’s actual or simulated beliefs are such that he does not, or would
not exclude himself from the set of people to which the generalization applies
– the speaker invites the addressee to simulate the necessary experiences, and
to come to the same conclusion as the speaker with respect to the validity
of the regularity expressed by the sentence
4.5.2 Speaker- and participant-orientation is CI content
As shown in Sections 2.6, 4.2, and 4.3, the pragmatic effects based on the speaker-
orientation and the participant-orientation of ich, du, and man cannot be modeled as
a restriction on the set of individuals for which the generalization is stated. As an
alternative, I propose to analyze the speaker-orientation of ich, du, and man and the
participant-oriented effects of ich and du as not-at-issue content (cf. Section 4.4). This
means that the content of the two pragmatic meaning components needs to be treated
as independent from the truth-conditional content of the three pronouns. In particular,
both components seem to behave like speaker-anchored content in the sense of Roberts
(2011a), i.e. CI content as described in Potts (2005). Roberts (2011a) summarizes the
properties of this kind of not-at-issue content as follows.
• CI content is projective, i.e. it is scopeless with respect to logical operators.
• CI content places no constraints on the utterance context.
• The truth of CI content is not entailed by the at-issue content.
In the following discussion, I show that the the speaker-oriented content, as well as
the participant-oriented content of impersonally used pronouns displays all the char-
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acteristics of CI content.50 For reasons of space, I only give examples of impersonally
interpreted ich, but analogous examples for du and man could also be provided.
First, the sentences in (103-a) and (103-b) show that the speaker-oriented content
and the participant-oriented content do not interact with logical operators such as








































‘If a trader buys something, he can lay a claim on prepaid tax.’53
In neither (103-a) nor (103-b), the speaker- or participant-oriented content is inter-
preted in the scope of sentential negation or as part of the if -clause, respectively. That
is, example (103-a) cannot be used to deny that the speaker believes that the generaliza-
tion ‘players can simply transfer to Minneapolis’ would apply to him if he were to play
football. Neither can it be used to deny that the speaker believes the rule to be valid,
or to deny that he has grounds to believe that his opinion is not universally shared.
The sentential negation in example (103-a) can only be understood as denying a possi-
bility for players in general, as given in the translation. The speaker-oriented content
and participant-oriented content are conveyed independently from, and comment on
this at-issue content. The argument for (103-b) works analogously. The speaker- and
participant-oriented contents are not assumed hypothetically, but express a comment
on the conditional generic statement in its entirety.
Second, the content of the speaker- and participant-oriented components cannot be































‘A community has to be willing to pay a certain price for its infrastruc-
ture.’54
50This discussion follows the discussion in Roberts (2011a) on the status of the prejacent of only.
51Examples (103-a) and (103-b) can be seen as the first and third sentence in the family of sentences
test (cf. Section 4.4). Since the behavior of the impersonal uses of ich and du has not yet been
investigated for other clause types apart from declaratives, the behavior of impersonally interpreted






















‘Yes, that’s true. / No, that’s not true.’
In (104), B’s affirmation or denial can only be directed at the at-issue content of A’s
utterance, i.e. the generalization about communities given in the translation. B can
neither affirm nor deny the speaker- or the participant-oriented component in this way.
Third, both the speaker-oriented, as well as the participant-oriented component con-
tribute new information. This means that they do not place a givenness constraint on





































‘If a team plays like that, it is low standard to go running to the boss


























‘You seem very upset about that!’
In this dialogue, B comments directly on the speaker-oriented content contributed by
impersonal ich in A’s utterance; B’ comments on the participant-oriented content of
ich in A. Both B and B’ are direct reactions to the speaker- and the participant-related
components of ich. Given the way in which B and B’ are formulated, this suggests that
the addressee did not have prior knowledge of the additional content conveyed by A.
Lastly, the truth of the content of the speaker-oriented and the participant-oriented
component is not entailed by the at-issue content. In generic sentences containing the
impersonal uses of ich, du, and man, no lexical material occurs which can operate on
the content of the two components. Compare the examples in (103) to (106), which













‘Peter knows that Maria likes Paul.’
The content of the presupposition triggered by wissen (Engl. ‘know’) is also contributed
locally as the content of Peter’s knowledge. In contrast, the speaker and participant-
oriented content is part of the pronouns conventional meaning, and is never explicitly
spelled out by material in the sentence. This rules out that the components contribute
backgrounded content (cf. Section 4.4.2).
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The observation that the content of the speaker-oriented and participant-oriented
components in many cases contributes hearer-new information makes a classification
as presuppositions implausible. However, presupposed content that has not been previ-
ously established, can in some cases be tacidly accommodated. Hence, the observation
that the components sometimes contribute hearer-new content is not a particularly
strong argument against their being presupposition triggers. It, however, lends support
to the results of the following two arguments against this content being presupposed.
First, the speaker may use any of the three pronouns pretending that the content
of the pragmatic components holds. If it turns out afterwards that what the speaker
conveyed by using the specific pronominal form is false, e.g. that she has no grounds to
believe that someone disagrees with the content of the generalization, the truth of the
generalization is not affected. For presuppositions, the falsity of their content always
has an effect on the truth-evaluability/the integration of the at-issue content.
Second, the effect of the two components cannot be explicitly denied. As shown
above in (99), (100), (101), and (102), any attempt results in pragmatic oddness, .
Given these results, it can be concluded that in the coarse-grained classification of
not-at-issue content discussed in Roberts (2011a), both components contribute speaker-
anchored content, i.e. CI content.
This result is further supported by the observation that both components also show
the traditional properties of Gricean conventional implicatures: they cannot be “can-
celed”, and do not have an influence on the truth of the at-issue content. They are
also detachable and conventional since (i) a switch to another (pro)nominal expression
results in the loss of the specific combination of implicated content, and (ii) the con-
tent of the pragmatic effects does not depend on the context of utterance or on world
knowledge.
Nevertheless, a more fine-grained analysis of the two components might provide a
more differentiated picture. One difference between appositions and expressives—the
traditional CI triggers—in comparison to the speaker- and participant-oriented com-
ponents is that appositives and expressives make their content explicit in the linguistic
form. A detailed comparison is needed to provide new insights into the landscape of
not-at-issue content; this comparison is left for further investigation, though.
4.5.3 Formalizing the speaker- and participant-oriented con-
tent
I now turn to a formal analysis of the content contributed by the speaker-oriented
and participant-oriented components. Note that the following proposal needs to be
seen as a first approximation of the content contributed by these components. Further
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investigations of the behavior of the impersonal readings in their contexts of use are
required to spell out the contribution of these components in full detail.
To start out, I first want to propose a general principle regarding utterances by a
speaker. By uttering a sentence S with the at-issue content JSKg,c = p, the speaker cS
also communicates the content in (107).
(107) λw.Believew(cS, p)
This principle is based on a proposal by Kaufmann given in (108).55
(108) Principle of truthful propositions:
“A speaker who expresses a proposition is taken to believe it unless this is
prevented by explicit marking (e.g. rising intonation, particles, etc.)”
(Kaufmann 2012:152f)
The operator Believew in (107) expresses universal quantification over the set of
worlds that are doxastically accessible from w relative to the respective attitude holder
denoted by the first argument of Believew (cf. Hintikka 1962). Given this assumption,
(107) is equivalent to (109).
(109) λw.∀w′ ∈ DoxcS ,w[p(w′)]
For a sentence of the form ‘pron als F is G’, with pron ∈ {ich, du, man}, the belief
in (107)/(109) can be alternatively specified as in (111). This alternative specification
is based on the adapted version of Drewery’s (1998) modal account for generic sentences
proposed in Section 3.3.3, repeated in (110).56
(110) ∀w′[w ∼F,G w′ → ∀x[F (x)(w′) & NF,G(w′)(〈x,w′〉)→ G(x)(w′)]]
(111) λw.Believew(cS, λw.∀w′[w ∼F,G w′ →
∀x[F (x)(w′) & NF,G(w′)(〈x,w′〉)→ G(x)(w′)]])
If F is not specified, i.e. if no als-phrase occurs in the sentence, I assume that the
default value for F is the property of being an animate individual (cf. Section 1.2).
Crucially, (111) is not part of the speaker- and/or participant-related effects of ich,
du, and man, but an independent assumption about utterances in general.
For the speaker-oriented component, I argue that the CI content that is expressed
55A similar connection between the speaker’s belief and his utterances is stated as part of the
definition of what it means to assert a sentence in Condoravdi and Lauer (2011).
(i) An assertion of a declarative φ in context C adds JφKC to the public beliefs of the speaker,
thereby publicly committing the speaker to act as though he believes JφKC .
(Condoravdi and Lauer 2011:8)
56I abstract away from any overt modal that may occur in G.
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conveys exactly the intuitions regarding the speaker-orientation described in Moltmann
(2010b) and Zifonun (2000). These intuitions were specified in the previous subsection
as: “The speaker’s actual or simulated experiences and beliefs are such that he does
not, or would not, exclude himself from the set of people to which the generalization
applies.” Given the semantics for sentences of the form ‘pron als F is G’ in (110), the
CI content of the speaker-oriented component can be reformulated as: “The speaker
believes that he is a non-exceptional F with respect to being G if he is an F , or that he
would be a non-exceptional F with respect to being G if he were an F .” By adopting
Drewery’s notation NF,G for non-exceptional F -individuals with respect to being G,
this can be expressed as in (112).
(112) Speaker-oriented component:
λw.[F (cS)(w)→ Believew(cS, λw.NF,G(w)(〈cS, w〉))] & [¬F (cS)(w)→
Believew(cS, λw.∀w′ ∈ MaxSimF (cS),w[NF,G(w′)(〈cS, w〉)])]
The set of accessible worlds MaxSimp,w used to model the counterfactual assumption
by the speaker is the set of worlds that are maximally p-similar to w. This is a crude
approximation of Kratzer’s analysis of counterfactual sentences (cf. Kratzer 1981b,
1989, 2005). Also note that I assume that the speaker knows whether he is an F or
not.57
A first, reassuring result of this proposal is that in conjunction, the beliefs in (111)
and (112) capture the observations in Moltmann’s and Zifonun’s work: the speaker’s
beliefs and experiences support the truth of the generalization.58 It can be shown that
(i) if the speaker is an F in the world of evaluation, he believes that he is a G, and (ii)
if the speaker is not an F in the world of evaluation, he believes that if he were an F ,
he would be a G. That is, the speaker believes that the generalization applies, or may
apply to himself.
Proof. The proof of this result involves two cases.
In the first case, the speaker is an F in the world of evaluation w, i.e. F (cS)(w). By
this assumption and (112), it follows that
(113) ∀w′ ∈ DoxcS ,w[NF,G(w′)(〈cS, w′〉)]
By (111), the set of doxastically accessible worlds is a subset of the worlds in which
the generic sentence holds. By the assumption of the analysis of Believew in (109),
this means that
57The case that the speaker might falsely believe that he is F or that he is ¬F is not taken into
account by the formalization. A detailed investigation of the effect of false belief is beyond the scope
of this thesis and needs to be left for further research.
58I take experiences to also add propositions to the set of beliefs of the experiencer.
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(114) ∀w′ ∈ DoxcS ,w∀w′′[w′′ ∼F,G w′ →
∀x[F (x)(w′′) & NF,G(w′′)(〈x,w′′〉)→ G(x)(w′′)]]
Since∼F,G is reflexive (cf. Section 3.3.3), the consequent of the first material implication
holds in all doxastically accessible worlds:
(115) ∀w′ ∈ DoxcS ,w∀x[F (x)(w′) & NF,G(w′)(〈x,w′〉)→ G(x)(w′)]]
From the starting assumption (113) and (115), it follows that
(116) ∀w′ ∈ DoxcS ,w[G(cS)(w′)].
In the second case, the speaker is not an F in the world of evaluation w, i.e.
¬F (cS)(w). By this assumption and (112),
(117) ∀w′ ∈ DoxcS ,w∀w′′ ∈ MaxSimF (cS),w′ [NF,G(w′′)(〈cS, w′′〉)]]
By (111), the set of doxastically accessible worlds is a subset of the worlds in which
the generic sentence holds. This means that
(118) ∀w′ ∈ DoxcS ,w∀w′′[w′ ∼F,G w′ →
∀x[F (x)(w′′) & NF,G(w′′)(〈x,w′′〉)→ G(x)(w′′)]]
I assume that the maximally similar worlds to the doxastically accessible worlds w′
with respect to cS being F are those worlds w
′′ in which, everything else being equal,
the speaker cS is an F . Since the speaker’s being an F in a world w
′ has no influence on
the rules and generalizations that hold in that world regarding F s, it can be assumed
that the maximally similar worlds to the doxastically accessible worlds agree on these
rules. This means that the maximally similar worlds are also generically accessible
from any w′ ∈ Doxcs,w.
(119) ∀w′ ∈ DoxcS ,w∀w′′ ∈ MaxSimF (cS),w′ [w′ ∼F,G w′′]
By the reflexivity of ∼F,G, the quantified consequent of the first material implication
holds in all of the worlds that are maximally similar to the doxastically accessible
worlds.
(120) ∀w′ ∈ DoxcS ,w∀w′′ ∈ MaxSimF (cS),w′∀x[F (x)(w′′) &
NF,G(w
′′)(〈x,w′′〉)→ G(x)(w′′)]]
From (117), and (120), it follows that
(121) ∀w′ ∈ DoxcS ,w∀w′′ ∈ MaxSimF (cS),w′ [G(cS)(w′′)].
The additional participant oriented content of ich and du has two parts. The first
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part is shared by both pronouns and states that the speaker believes that the validity
of the generalization which he expresses is “uncontroversial”. I model this belief as
follows.59
(122) Participant-oriented component for ich and du - part I:
λw. Believew(cS, all individuals that consider ?p should accept that p)
where ?p is the question whether or not the proposition p holds
The analysis in (122) contains two parts that need to be further analyzed: (i) what
it means to consider ?p, and (ii) what it means to accept p. For the course of this
discussion, I take “to consider ?p” to mean “to try to decide whether p holds in the
world of evaluation”. Regarding the second question, there are intuitively two ways
to accept a generic statement as valid: the first is induction over individuals and the
second is being told of the existence of a rule by an authority (cf. Carlson 1995).60
I assume that acceptance of the generic sentences containing an impersonally used
pronoun involves one of these, and possibly both, options. A third option may be
to check the generalization against one’s own beliefs and experiences, as proposed by
Moltmann (2006, 2010a). I will not go into further detail at this moment; a more
in-depth investigation is left for further research since it is beyond the scope of this
thesis.
The second part of the participant-oriented component differs for ich and du. Im-
personally interpreted ich conveys that the speaker believes that his belief that p is not
universally shared.
(123) Participant-oriented content for ich - part II:
λw. Believew(cS, there is a specific individual that does not accept that p)
The speaker’s belief may be the result of direct or indirect“evidence”given the behavior
of a specific individual, as discussed above.
In combination, (122) and (123) state that the speaker believes that the truth of
p is uncontroversial, but that nevertheless some individual does not share his opinion
that p. These contrasting beliefs can be seen as the basis for the heightened emotional
involvement of the speaker that often accompanies the use of impersonally interpreted
ich (cf. Section 1.4).
59As a first approximation, I propose that the modal should in (122) is to be interpreted as: it is
necessary given common sense reasoning by a rational agent on the basis of world knowledge.
60Carlson (1995) discusses two options for the truth-conditions of generic sentences. The first
option are “inductive” approaches to generic sentences, which assume that a generic sentence is true
iff “enough” episodic evidence for the truth of the generalization exists. The second option is the type
of “rules and regulations” approaches. In this type, a generic sentence is true iff a causal structure
constituting the rule exists. Both types of accounts are based on intuitions how people come to accept
generic sentences: either by induction over episodic cases or by being told by an authority that a
certain generalization holds.
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For the second part of the participant-oriented content of impersonally interpreted
du, I model the intuition proposed in Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990) and Malamud (2006,
2007). Intuitively, the speaker tries to build closeness between him and the addressee,
and to appeal to the addressee to “put herself in the shoes” of the individuals for which
the generalization is stated. I interpret these intuitions as the speaker inviting the
addressee to consider the validity of the generalization.
(124) Participant-oriented content for du - part II:
Invite(cS, cA, consider ?p)
The Invite-operator models the invitation that cS extends to cA. Whether this invi-
tation has the status of a genuine speech act of inviting still needs to be investigated
at this point. Since a detailed discussion requires an in-depth discussion of speech act
theory (cf. Austin 1962; Searle 1969 among others), which is beyond the scope of this
thesis, this question is also left for further research.
In combination, (122) and (124) state that the speaker believes that the truth of p
is uncontroversial, and that he invites the addressee to consider ?p. If the addressee
accepts the invitation to consider ?p, it can be derived from the first part formulated
in (122) that the speaker expects that the addressee will accept that p.
This proposal for the participant-oriented effects of ich and du still needs to be refined
to account for empathy tracking effects (cf. Malamud 2006, 2007; Section 1.4.3). Since
these effects guide the speaker’s/the addressee’s empathy to specific syntactic positions,
i.e. those occupied by the impersonally used personal pronouns, the proposals in (122),
(123), and (124), are too coarse-grained. The main reason is that the components
are so far assumed to express attitudes/speech acts involving the entire prepositional
content of the generic sentence. At the moment, it is unclear to me how to modify
the current proposal to account for empathy tracking effects. Therefore, the necessary
in-depth investigation required to answer this question unfortunately has to be left for
further research.
The content of the participant-oriented components can be linked to the preferred
contexts of use for ich and du. Impersonally interpreted ich conveys that the speaker
believes that some individual does not accept the generalization. Consequently, imper-
sonally used ich prefers discourse contexts in which the belief is justified. These types
of contexts are negative contexts, as described in (125).
(125) Negative context:
A context for which the general statement, rule, law, or norm that is expressed
by the sentence containing the pronoun is violated or contested.
In contrast for impersonally used du, the invitation issued by impersonally interpreted
du, together with the assumption of p being uncontroversial, seems to result in a pref-
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erence for contexts in which the speaker cannot assume that the addressee is already
strongly committed to ¬p. In Section 1.4, these contexts were called“positive contexts”,
see (126).
(126) Positive context:
A context in which the opinion expressed by the speaker has not been con-
tested, and nothing points towards a possible objection.
These types of contexts are not strictly required, but only preferred by ich and du.
That is, the pronouns are not ungrammatical, and also not necessarily infelicitous in
discourse contexts that do not meet the criteria in (125) or (126). In this respect, im-
personally used ich, du, and man behave similarly to discourse particles. For discourse
particles it has been observed that their preferences with respect to their contexts of
use may be disregarded to induce secondary pragmatic effects (cf. Zimmermann 2011a
and Appendix A2). Hence, from the point of view of the impersonal uses, discourse
particles can be said to contribute participant-oriented not-at-issue meaning.
In sum, the speaker-oriented component of ich, du, and man conveys the speaker’s
attitude regarding the applicability of the generalization to himself. In contrast, the
participant-oriented content conveys the speaker’s beliefs about the acceptance of the
generalization by others for impersonally interpreted ich, and issues an invitation to
consider ?p for impersonally interpreted du.
4.5.4 A conservative new proposal for the impersonal uses
Based on the results in the previous subsection and the assumptions made at the begin-
ning of this section, I propose a new formal account for the meaning of the impersonal
uses of ich, du, and man. The account is proposed in such a way that the following
desiderata for the semantic and the pragmatic contribution formulated in Section 4.2
are met.
• Semantic desiderata: The impersonal uses of ich, du and man need to come out as
truth-conditionally equivalent, and generic sentences containing these impersonal
uses need to express the same generalizations as ordinary generic sentences.
• Pragmatic desiderata: The subject-oriented and the participant-oriented content
of ich and du is not contributed to the truth-conditions of the sentences containing
the pronouns. Their function is to comment on these truth-conditions.
For the at-issue content contributed by impersonally interpreted pronouns, I pro-
pose that they contribute a free variable to the truth-conditions of the sentence. This
is motivated by the observation that generic sentences containing these uses express
the same generalizations on the truth-conditional level as ordinary generic sentences.
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Additional motivation for the at-issue content being a free variable can be found in
the discussion of the (in)definiteness problem in Section 2.4. One of the results of this
discussion was that the behavior of the impersonal uses is similar to that of indefinite
expressions.
Note that this proposal does not conflict with the results of Section 4.2. There, it was
concluded that ich and du cannot be captured adequately by adopting the adapted ver-
sion of the complex structure proposed in Elbourne (2008) and its interpretation given
in Section 2.5.3. The conclusions in this section did not contest that the impersonal
uses are best analyzed as indefinite expressions, as such.
By the assumption that the impersonal uses only contribute a free variable, the
desirable results of previous accounts for impersonal pronouns in the literature are
replicated (Condoravdi 1989; Chierchia 1995b; Malamud 2006, 2007; Moltmann 2006,
2010a,b).
For the non-at-issue component(s) of ich, du, and man, I propose that these pronouns
trigger the CI content proposed in the previous subsection. Hence, taken as a whole,
the content contributed by ich, du, and man is as follows.61
For the impersonal use of man, its contribution to the truth-conditions of a sentence
of the form ‘man als F is G’ is a free individual variable. The CI content is the
speaker-orientated content defined in (112).62
(127) Jman als F is GKg,w,c = Gen[x; ](F (x);G(x))
Speaker-oriented component:
λw.[F (cS)(w)→ Believew(cS, λw.NF,G(w)(〈cS, w〉))] & [¬F (cS)(w)→
Believew(cS, λw.∀w′ ∈ MaxSimF (cS),w[NF,G(w′)(〈cS, w〉)])]











‘One is young only once.’
(129) a. J(128)Kg,w,c =




61For the meaning of the generic operator, overt modals, and conditional structure in the examples,
I again adopt Drewery’s and Kratzer’s accounts introduced in Chapter 3.
62For the at-issue content contributed by the sentences, I employ the notation proposed for Gen in
Krifka et al. (1995). Cf. Chapter 3.
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As stated in the previous subsection (cf. also Appendix A1), the default restriction
on the domain of the variable contributed by the pronouns is—in the absence of an
als-phrase—the property of being an animate individual. Since every speaker has
the property of being an animate individual, the first case of the speaker-oriented
component applies, and the content can be simplified to (129-b).
In contrast to the meaning contributed by man, the contribution of impersonal uses
of ich and du has two CI components. Like man, both pronouns contribute a free
individual variable to the truth-conditions of the sentence.
(130) Jich als F am GKg,w,c = Gen[x; ](F (x);G(x))
a. Speaker-oriented component:
λw.[F (cS)(w)→ Believew(cS, λw.NF,G(w)(〈cS, w〉))] & [¬F (cS)(w)→
Believew(cS, λw.∀w′ ∈ MaxSimF (cS),w[NF,G(w′)(〈cS, w〉)])]
b. Participant-oriented component:
λw. Believew(cS, all individuals that consider ?p should accept that p
& there is a specific individual that does not accept that p)



















‘A team has to enter the field motivated.’
(132) a. J(131)Kg,w,c =
∀w′[w ∼team,enter-field-motivated w′ →
∀x[team(x)(w′) & Nteam,enter-field-motivated(〈x,w′〉)(w′)→






λw.Believew(cS, all individuals that consider ?p should accept that p &
there is an individual that does not accept that p)
where p is the at-issue content of (131)
Since the speaker can never be a team, the second case of the speaker-oriented compo-
nent applies, and the content can be simplified to (132-b).63
One potential point of criticism for the analysis in (132) is that counterfactually
assuming that the speaker is a plurality of individuals seems odd; it raises questions
63I assume that group-denoting noun phrases, like team, group, couple, and family denote sum-
individuals in the sense of Link (1983). This is supported by the fact that they are morphologically
singular.
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regarding identity statements between individuals that are semantically singular and
individuals that are semantically plural. There are, however, attested identity counter-



































































‘If I were this couple, I would wonder at some point about the reason
why the child doesn’t want anything to do with me/them.’65
Therefore, any feeling of uneasiness that accompanies counterfactuals of this kind has
to be addressed as part of a more general analysis of identity counterfactuals, which is
beyond the scope of this thesis and is left for further research.66
And lastly, the meaning contributed by the impersonal use of du is given in (134).
(134) Jdu als F are GKg,w,c = Gen[x; ](F (x);G(x))
a. Speaker-oriented component:
λw.[F (cS)(w)→ Believew(cS, λw.NF,G(w)(〈cS, w〉))] & [¬F (cS)(w)→
Believew(cS, λw.∀w′ ∈ MaxSimF (cS),w[NF,G(w′)(〈cS, w〉)])]
b. Participant-oriented component:
λw.Believew(cS, all individuals that consider ?p should accept that p)
& Invite(cS, cA, consider ?p)






















66An interesting point is illustrated in (133-b), in which the speaker mixes first person singular
ich with the third person plural demonstrative denen (Engl. ‘those’, dat.) in the consequent of the
counterfactual. While denen could alternatively be substituted by mir (Engl. ‘me’, dat.), ich may not
be substituted by die (Engl. ‘those’ nom.) or sie (Engl. ‘they’).
67http://www.sport1.de/de/fussball/fussball_bundesliga/artikel_275528.html
Chapter 4. Accounting for the pragmatic effects of ich and du 287
(136) a. J(135)Kg,w,c =
∀w′[w ∼team,be-prepared-for-everything w′ →
∀x[team(x)(w′)&Nteam,be-prepared-for-everything(〈x,w′〉)(w′)→






λw.Believew(cS, all individuals that consider ?p should accept that p)
& Invite(cS, cA, consider ?p)
where p is the at-issue content of (135)
As for (131) above, only the second case of the speaker-oriented component applies,
and the content may be simplified accordingly.
In sum, it was proposed that the impersonal readings of ich, du, and man contribute
a free variable to the at-issue content of the sentence. Their main function, however, is
to contribute CI content which models the two pragmatic components at the heart of
the pragmatic effects observed with these pronouns: the speaker-oriented component
and the participant-oriented component.
4.5.5 A daring, pure CI alternative
As an alternative to the rather conservative account for the impersonal uses of ich, du,
and man proposed in the previous subsection, a more daring idea could be pursued. The
central aspect of this idea is to assume that in their impersonal uses, the pronouns ich,
du, and man trigger only their not-at-issue content. This implies that the impersonal
uses of the three pronouns are pure CI triggers like appositives and expressives. The
aim of this subsection is to briefly sketch this idea.
Regarding the truth-conditional content of the sentences containing ich, du, or man,
the following question immediately arises: What does the generic operator bind if the
pronouns do not contribute anything that could be bound? To answer this question,
the behavior of the generic operator Gen needs to be considered.
So far, no satisfactory, fully compositional account for generic sentences has been
proposed in the literature that can account for the distribution of the lexical material
given in a generic sentence into the restrictor and scope of Gen (cf. Krifka et al. 1995).
Given the behavior of the generic operator in the non-compositional accounts, however,
it seems that Gen can bind unfilled argument positions of properties in its scope, which
are connected syntactically to the material in its restrictor. Consider the relational
analysis in (137-b) for the sentence in (137-a) as proposed in Krifka et al. (1995).
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(137) a. A lion has a bushy tail.
b. Gen[x; ](lion(x); has-a-bushy-tail(x))
Since the indefinite expression in subject position is interpreted in the restrictor of Gen,
it cannot be given as an argument to the matrix predicate in the scope of the operator.
That is, the individual argument of the matrix predicate, λx.has-a-bushy-tail(x), stays
empty. For the analysis in (137-b) to arise, it has to be assumed that the λ-operator that
binds the variable in the argument position is discarded so that the generic operator















‘As a farmer, one has to milk one’s cows.’
In example (139), I encode the distribution of the lexical material in (138) in the
restrictor and the scope of Gen by different underlining: double underlining marks
material in the restrictor, single underlining marks material in the scope. Material
that is crossed out does not contribute at-issue content.
(139) Man kann als Bauer seine Kühe melken.
The single and double underlined material contains all of the descriptive content that
occurs in this sentence, and hence all of the descriptive material that is needed to
formalize the generalization expressed by that sentence. Therefore, in analogy to the
material in the scope of the generic operator, it could be argued that the empty argu-
ment positions of the property in the restrictor, als Bauer (Engl. ‘as a farmer’), can be
bound in a similar fashion by Gen. In other words, all argument positions that would
be filled by a variable contributed by man in the account proposed in the previous sub-
section can stay semantically unfilled. And precisely these unfilled argument positions
will be bound by Gen.
These assumptions about Gen suggest a rather unconventional reason for why per-
sonal pronouns in their impersonal uses behave like indefinites: the pronouns simply do
not contribute anything to the truth-conditions of their containing sentences. The ar-
gument positions that are syntactically filled by the personal and impersonal pronouns
in their impersonal uses stay unfilled at the at-issue level, and are then bound by the
generic operator. This predicts that the unfilled argument positions of the properties in
the restrictor of Gen are treated similarly to unbound variables of Heimian indefinites.
Whether this more radical account for the impersonal readings for ich and du is to
be preferred, or has to be discarded, depends on whether the view on the behavior of
the generic operator suggested above turns out to be tenable. This question is left for
further research, along with a more detailed proposal of this alternative account.
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4.6 The connection between the impersonal and
referential uses
As a reminder, the account proposed in Section 4.5 for the impersonal uses of ich and du
is a non-uniform account that assigns a different semantics to the referential uses and
the impersonal uses of these pronouns. For the referential use, I adopted a traditional
Kaplanian semantics, and I proposed that on the impersonal use, ich and du contribute
a free variable at the at-issue level and additional CI content at the not-at-issue level.
Given the identical form of the impersonal and referential uses, as well as their shared
morphosyntactic behavior, the question arises of how the meaning of the two uses relate
to each other. In other words, are the two uses linked, and if so, how?
The aim of this section is to briefly explore two possible ways the impersonal use
and the referential use might be linked: The first possibility is based on the idea that
the impersonal uses are the result of a pragmatic shift, i.e. there is a pragmatic process
that “derives” the impersonal reading from the referential reading. The second possible
way to link the two uses of ich and du involves the assumption of lexical ambiguity,
i.e. the lexicon of German contains two homophonic lexical items for each pronoun.
Together with sketches of how to spell out the two possibilies, I suggest promising
points of departure for a more in-depth investigation of these proposals, and I discuss
some of their disadvantages and possibly undesirable predictions. However, it has to
be stressed that the following discussion only provides a first look at this very complex
question.
The first option that the impersonal use is derived from the referential use by a
pragmatic shifting process can be made precise in at least two ways. Both involve the
same assumption that the lexically encoded meaning of the pronouns is the directly-
referential meaning contributed by the referential use. The meaning of the impersonal
use is not specified in the lexicon.
The first way to make the idea of a pragmatic shift more precise is to propose that it
infers the at-issue and CI content of sentences containing an impersonally interpreted
personal pronoun from the at-issue content of the sentence in which the pronoun is
interpreted referentially. That is, a pragmatic process 99K needs to be assumed which
performs a shift in conveyed content as given schematically in (140).68
(140) a. ich: φ[cS] 99K Gen[x; ]φ[x] + CI content (as proposed in Section 4.5)
b. du: φ[cA] 99K Gen[x; ]φ[x] + CI content (as proposed in Section 4.5)
An example of this type of pragmatic process, for instance, is the derivation of conver-
sational implicatures.
68The notation φ[x] is used to denote that the expression x occurs in the expression φ.
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The central argument against this version of a pragmatic shift for the impersonal
uses is that the process that is assumed to be performed by 99K in (140) is too specific
to be done by a general pragmatic process operating on sentences. In other words,
the intended output of the process, i.e. the meaning of the impersonal use, cannot be
plausibly construed as the result of a context dependent pragmatic process.
Furthermore, the process in (140) does not only derive additional pragmatically
inferred content, but changes part of the at-issue meaning of the input sentence. This
is, again, usually not assumed to be the case for pragmatic processes of this kind.
Lastly, Nunberg’s (1993) argument against a treatment of deferred ostension as a
pragmatic shifting process also applies to this case (cf. Section 2.5.1). The pragmatic
process in (140) sometimes has to generate plausible at-issue content from implausible































‘A community has to be willing to pay a certain price for its infrastructure.’69
The schemata given in (140) suggest that the at-issue content of (141), as well as the
CI-content triggered by ich are derived from the input proposition in (142).
(142) #As a community, I have to be willing to pay a certain price for the infrastruc-
ture.
The obvious pragmatic oddness of (142) arises from the speaker’s proposed status as
a community. If the meaning of (141) were derived from this at-issue content by a
general pragmatic process, it is unclear why the result of the process should be a
coherent generalization about communities. In addition, the implausibility of (142)
cannot be seen as the trigger of this pragmatic process since many examples for the
impersonal readings of ich and du can be plausibly interpreted as statements about
the speaker and the addressee (cf. Section 1.2).
The second option to connect the impersonal reading to the referential reading via
a pragmatic shifting process is to assume that pragmatic processes may apply during
semantic composition. That is, there is a pragmatic process which shifts the meaning
of the referentially used personal pronoun to the contribution of the impersonal use
before semantic composition rules combine the meaning contributed by the pronoun
with the rest of the sentence.
Two proposals of this kind can be found in the literature, and can be taken as
points of departure: (i) the general idea of “truth-conditional pragmatics” proposed in
69http://derstandard.at/plink/1226067142914?sap=2&_pid=11193953#pid11193953
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Recanati (2010), and (ii) the formal system for CI contents proposed in Potts (2005).
The upshot of the following discussion is that defining a shifting operator is possible,
but may ultimately be unsatisfactory.
Let us first take a look at Recanati (2010), who argues for a view on semantic com-
position which directly interacts with pragmatic processes. He calls this view “truth-
conditional pragmatics”. The central idea is that compositional rules do not necessarily
compose the literal meaning of two expressions. Certain pragmatic processes may act
on the literal meaning and shift it to a pragmatically inferred meaning before the
compositional rules apply. This is schematically represented in (143).70
(143) JαβKg,w,c = f(G1(JαKg,w,c),G2(JβKg,w,c))
where f is a semantic composition function corresponding to a composition
rule, and G1,G2 are pragmatic processes
Note that the variables used to represent the processes G1 and G2 are not present in
either the syntactic or the semantic representations of the string αβ; (143) should only
be read as an explication of Recanati’s idea.
Given this general schema of the effect of pragmatic processes on semantic com-
position, it could be assumed that the meaning contributed by ich and du in their
impersonal use is the result of some local pragmatic process which shifts the meaning
of the referential use to the meaning of the impersonal use. This shift is schematically
given in (144).
(144) There is a pragmatic process G imp which performs the following shift for Pron
∈ {ich, du}: G imp(JPronKg,w,c) = x + CI content (as proposed in Section 4.5)
A similar idea is proposed in a syntacticized fashion in Potts (2005). The following
proposal can be seen as a quasi-syntacticized version of the pragmatic shifting operator
G imp in (144). Note that Potts’ system can only be used to formalize the idea of a
pragmatic shifting process for the second variant of the proposal given in Section 4.5.5
since it does not capture linguistic expressions that simultaneously contribute content
to the at-issue and the CI dimension.71
To model the shift from the lexical meaning to the contribution of the impersonal
use, an operator Imp similar to Potts’ Comma-operator in (145) is introduced.
70The schema in (143) is adapted to the formalism used in this thesis. Recanati’s original formulation
is as follows:
(i) I(α̂β) = f(g1(I(α)), g2(I(β)))
where I is the interpretation function, g1, g2 are pragmatic processes, α̂β is the compound
string of α and β, and f is a semantic composition function
71As mentioned in Section 4.4, this restriction has been challenged by various researchers. Since the
formalization below is only proposed for expository purposes, I disregard this criticism.
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(145) Comma  λXλx.X(x) : 〈〈σa, ta〉, 〈σa, tc〉〉, where σ ∈ {e, s, t}
(Potts 2005:136)
(146) Imp  λx.λφ.comment(x)(φ) : 〈〈ea〉, 〈ta, tc〉〉
The Imp-operator defined in (146) takes the pronominal element as its first argument,
and returns a CI trigger which takes the at-issue content of the sentence as its argument,
and returns the CI content for the respective pronominal element. The “comment”-
function assigns the conjunction of the speaker-oriented component shared by ich, du,
and man, on the one hand, and the respective participant-oriented component for ich
and du, on the other hand, to the respective pronominal argument. The derivation of
the impersonal uses of ich and du in Potts’ system is illustrated in (147) and (148).








Note that the argument S : ta is the fully derived meaning of the generic sentence, as
proposed for the second version of the account in Section 4.5.
Amaral et al. (2007) discuss two problems for the Comma-operator. First, the
operator is motivated by phonetic considerations, i.e. comma intonation as observed
for appositives. However, there are appositives that are not uttered with clear comma
intonation, see (149-a), as well as comma intonation which does not mark linguistic















‘My brother, unfortunately, missed his plane.’
b. Ed, before he fled, was very secretive.
(Amaral et al. 2007:721)
Second, the definition of Comma in (145) runs into problems with topic-oriented ad-
verbs, like thoughtfully, which do not have the required types for Comma to shift their
content onto the CI dimension. See (150).
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(150) thoughtfully  λp.thoughtfully(p)(x1) : 〈〈sa, ta〉, 〈sa, ta〉〉
(adapted from Potts 2005:144)
Since the Comma-operator requires its first argument to be of type 〈σa, ta〉, with
σ ∈ {e, s, t}, and the adverb thoughtfully is of type 〈〈sa, ta〉, 〈sa, ta〉〉, the Comma-
operator cannot combine with it. Consequently, thoughtfully should not be able to
introduce CI-content.
The Imp-operator defined above does not run into these problems. Imp does not have
to deal with expressions of different types. Therefore, Amaral et al.’s (2007) second
problem does not arise for Imp. And while no strict criterion for the presence of Imp
can be given, (151) gives two necessary conditions for its presence.
(151) Necessary conditions for the use of Imp:
a. the first argument of type ea is not stressed
b. the at-issue content of the sentence does not express an episodic state-
ment
Regardless of the rather strong restrictions in (151), the use of Imp is quite obviously
not restricted enough. Any expression of type ea that occurs in a generic sentence, and
that obeys the first condition in (151) still counts as a valid argument for Imp. This
includes kind-denoting definite singular noun phrases in generic sentences.
(152) The lion is a dangerous animal.
To solve this problem of overgeneration, the application of Imp could/should be further
restricted to singular pronominal expressions only. This restriction would only capture
the behavior of languages like German, though, which allow impersonal readings for
first and second person singular pronouns. For languages like English that only have
an impersonal use for second person singular pronouns, the application of Imp would
need to be restricted even further. However, for both versions of the local pragmatic
shift option this is undesirable: introducing a general pragmatic shifting operator, and
restricting it ad hoc to one or two lexical items does not provide any substantial in-
sights on the connection between the referential use and the impersonal use of personal
pronouns. Nevertheless, I believe that the arguments given here do not suffice to dis-
card this option just yet. Further research on the nature of pragmatic processes and
their interaction with semantic composition, as well as analyses of other phenomena
for which referential and non-referential uses exist may still tip the scale in favor of an
underlying pragmatic shifting process.
The second alternative to link, or rather not to link the referential use to the imper-
sonal use is to assume that the two uses are the result of lexical ambiguity. That is,
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the German lexicon might contain two entries for the pronoun ich and two entries for
du, as specified in (153) and (154).
(153) a. JichrefKg,w,c = cS
b. JichimpKg,w,c = x + CI content
(154) a. JdurefKg,w,c = cA
b. JduimpKg,w,c = x + CI content
Malamud (2006, 2007) argues against assuming an account based on lexical ambiguity
for personal pronouns with impersonal uses. Her first argument is that the availabil-
ity of impersonal uses for second person singular pronouns is too cross-linguistically
widespread for it to be a lexical accident in all of these languages. Her second argument
is that since the pragmatic effects of the impersonal uses of second person singular pro-
nouns are strongly connected to the referential use, to assume some sort of connection
between the two uses seems to be more plausible than an account based on lexical
ambiguity.
While I basically agree with Malamud on these points, her second argument is, to
my mind, compatible with ichimp and duimp having derived diachronically from the
referential lexical entries. Or more generally, the second argument is compatible with
the two uses being two alternative meanings of polysemous lexical items. Malamud’s
first question of why this should have happened cross-linguistically in such a similar
and principled manner is not answered by these analyses. Hence, this argument could
be taken as a true counterargument for this view.
Given the outlines of the two options, the pragmatic shifting process or the lexical
ambiguity: How can one decide which of the two options seems more promising?
One argument in favor of the pragmatic shift is based on the fact that the morphosyn-
tactic behavior of the impersonal uses is the same as the morphosyntactic behavior of
the referential uses. Assuming an account based on lexical ambiguity would sever the
connection between morphosyntax and semantics that is assumed in most of the recent
literature on the syntax and semantics of personal pronouns (cf. Heim and Kratzer
1998; Harley and Ritter 2002; Kratzer 2009). On the ambiguity view, it could be
assumed that for the lexical items ichref and duref, the meaning is derived from, or con-
nected to the set of φ-features assumed in the literature. However, for morphosyntactic
reasons the same assumption has to be made again for ichimp and duimp. The crucial
difference would be, though, that this same set of φ-features may not contribute any
at-issue content, or trigger presuppositions on the truth-conditional meaning for ichimp
and duimp.
In contrast to the lexical ambiguity option, the option involving a pragmatic shifting
process allows for the meaning of the personal pronouns to be specified by their φ-
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feature sets before they are mapped onto the meaning that they contribute in the
impersonal uses. Hence, this story is compatible with the assumptions in the syntax-
semantics literature on pronouns.
Since a definitive answer for one or the other option requires a detailed discussion of
the basic architecture of the interpretational system, and possible interactions between
semantics and pragmatics as discussed in Recanati (2010), I leave a detailed discussion
of this issue for further research.
4.7 Summary
In Section 4.2, I critically evaluated and discarded the unified, purely semantic account
proposed in Section 2.5.3 in combination with the results of Chapter 3. It was concluded
that a semantically underspecified account of the form proposed in Section 2.5.3 makes
many undesirable predictions that can be traced back to the descriptive content that
is contributed as part of the meaning of the impersonal/referential uses. However, one
part of the motivation to introduce the underspecified, context-dependent descriptive
content in Chapter 2 was to capture the pragmatic effects for the impersonal uses. So,
for the remaining sections of this chapter I turned to examine the pragmatic effects in
greater detail.
As a starting point, I took the discussion of the pragmatic effects of the English
impersonal pronoun one in Moltmann (2006, 2010a,b). In Section 4.3, I summarized
Moltmann’s observations and her formal account for the meaning of one. In addition,
I discussed problems that arise for her proposal, and concluded that her insights on
the use of one, which carry over to impersonally used ich, du, and man, need to be
captured in a different manner.
In Section 4.5, I argued that the pragmatic effects of impersonally interpreted ich, du,
and man need to be analyzed as the result of not-at-issue content. I briefly discussed
traditional and more recent work on not-at-issue content in Section 4.4. The diagnostic
tests that were introduced there to argue that the speaker-oriented and the participant-
oriented component of ich, du, and man contribute CI content as described in Potts
(2005).
On the basis of this result, I proposed a novel account for the content of the speaker-
oriented and participant-oriented components in Section 4.5, which derives (i) the intu-
itions for the pragmatic effects of one and German man described in Moltmann (2006,
2010a,b) and Zifonun (2000), (ii) the invitational character of impersonal second person
singular pronouns described in Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990) and Malamud (2006, 2007),
and (iii) the distancing effect of German impersonally interpreted ich (cf. Section 1.4).
In addition, the same at-issue contribution iss assigned to impersonally used pronouns.
Consequently, the account makes the same predictions regarding the meaning of generic
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sentences containing these pronouns as the accounts proposed in Condoravdi (1989);
Chierchia (1995b); Malamud (2006, 2007); Moltmann (2006, 2010a,b).
Lastly, in Section 4.6, I discussed two possibilities of how the new two-dimensional
account for the meaning of impersonally interpreted personal pronouns can be linked
to a traditional, directly referential account for the referential uses of these pronouns. I
discussed and compared two options: a pragmatic shiftig process and lexical ambiguity.
No definitive decision for or against either option was made.
As a final side note and to connect the results of this chapter back to Chapter 1,
I suggest that the formalization of the impersonal uses of ich and du proposed in
Section 4.5 provides a new point of view on the intuitions behind the “Counterfactual
Hypothesis” discussed and discarded in Section 1.6.
The gist of the hypothesis was that sentences containing impersonal uses of singular
personal pronouns are underlyingly identity counterfactuals. Given the discussion of
generic sentences in Chapter 3 and the proposal from this chapter, this intuition seems
to be connected to the property of generic sentences to support inferences to appropriate
counterfactuals and to the pragmatic components of the impersonal uses. If sentences
containing impersonal uses of ich support inferences to appropriate counterfactuals,
they also support counterfactual inferences to the speaker (if the speaker may be as-
sumed to be relevantly non-exceptional regarding the content of the generalization).







































‘A farmer has to milk his cows. Therefore, if I, myself, were a farmer, I would
have to milk my cows.’
One result of Section 4.5 was that the speaker-oriented component of ich conveys
that the speaker is, or would be, a relevantly non-exceptional individual regarding the
generalization. That is, the speaker in fact communicates with the CI content of imper-
sonally used ich that she believes that she is relevantly non-exceptional. Therefore, in
combination the at-issue content and the CI content of sentences containing impersonal
uses of ich jointly communicate the content of the identity counterfactuals that were
taken as the basis for the “Counterfactual Hypothesis”.
Conclusion
Summary
The central topic of this thesis are the semantic and pragmatic aspects of the im-
personal uses of personal pronouns. In Chapters 1–4, I discussed both the empirical
picture that arises from the data, as well as formal analyses that try to account for these
observations in different ways. The investigations were conducted using the example
of German first and second person singular ich (Engl. ‘I’) and du (Engl. ‘you’). The
main results of this work are not specific for German, though. Hence, they should be
generalizable to impersonal uses found in other languages; results that were obtained
for the German pronouns were compared to previous work on English impersonally
used you throughout the thesis.
The line of argumentation and the core arguments of this thesis are best summarized
on the basis of examples (1) and (2) and their contexts.1
Context: “How much money does one give as a present at a wedding?” - The initial
question is whether 100 Euros is enough. One user argues that it is customary to adjust
the amount of money relative to the size and cost of the wedding party held by the



















































’I think this is an absolutely stupid argument! The bridal couple can’t expect
their guests to more or less pay the party! ’ 2
Context: During an interview, the coach of the German ice hockey national team
talks about the frequent and regular occurrence of situations in which weaker teams
beat stonger teams in professional sports. He argues that these situations will continue
1These are the first examples given in this thesis for the impersonal uses of ich and du, see examples





to happen, and cannot be prevented. He says that in a match, being the stronger team























’As a team your wish to win simply has to be greater than your opponent’s.’ 3
In Chapter 1, the morphosyntactic, semantic, and pragmatic behavior of the imper-
sonal uses as observable in the data were discussed. On the morphosyntactic level, it
was observed that the impersonal and referential uses of ich and du behave identically.
On the semantic level, though, the core observations were (i) that sentences containing
impersonally used ich or du need to be analyzed as generic sentences, and (ii) that
the impersonal uses of ich and du are truth-conditionally equivalent with the default
impersonal use of the dedicated impersonal pronoun man (Engl. ‘one’). Hence in their
impersonal uses, the three pronouns ich, du, and man can be substituted for each
other salva veritate. Examples (3) and (4) give the variants of (1) and (2) derivable by
substitution.
(3) a. Man kann doch als Brautpaar nicht von seinen Gästen erwarten, dass sie
einem quasi die Feier finanzieren.
b. Du kannst doch als Brautpaar nicht von deinen Gästen erwarten, dass sie
dir quasi die Feier finanzieren.
(4) a. Man muss als Mannschaft einfach mehr gewinnen wollen als der Gegner.
b. Ich muss als Mannschaft einfach mehr gewinnen wollen als der Gegner.
The main difference between the impersonal uses of the three pronouns lies in their
pragmatic effects. While all three pronouns share a speaker-oriented component, im-
personally used ich and du convey different, additional participant-oriented content,
which also has an influence on the pronouns’ preferred contexts of use.
In the last section of Chapter 1, I rejected an analysis of sentences containing im-
personally used personal pronouns as expressing counterfactual statements. The main
idea behind this analysis was that the following identity counterfactuals capture the
meaning that is expressed by (1) and (2).
(5) a. If I were a bridal couple, I could not expect my guests to pay for the party.
b. If you were a team, you would have to want to win more than your opponent.
The intuitive meaning of the examples in (1) and (2), however, differs one a crucial
respect from the identity counterfactuals above: (1) and (2) do not express specific




the referential and the impersonal uses, which is at the heart of this intuitively appealing
account, only pertains at the pragmatic level.
In Chapter 2, the truth-conditional equivalence between impersonally used ich, du,
and man was taken as the basis for a unified account that aims at capturing the
referential and the impersonal uses of personal pronouns. I followed previous literature
on impersonal pronouns and impersonal uses of personal pronouns in assuming that
the impersonal uses of ich and du are best analyzed as indefinite expressions. The
perceived link between the referential and impersonal uses was taken as motivation
to construct an underspecified semantics for ich and du that models the pronouns
in both uses as indefinite expressions. Further motivation for this unified account
came from Nunberg’s (1993) proposal for the meaning of personal pronouns, which
was formalized in Elbourne (2008). The core of the resulting analysis is that personal
pronouns are indefinite expressions that contribute a free individual variable that is
restricted by contextually determined descriptive content. For the impersonal uses, the
descriptive content is intended to model the underlying pragmatic link to the current
speaker and the current addressee, which is observable for the pragmatic effects. The
impersonal flavor is contributed by the generic operator Gen, which binds the free
variable contributed by the pronouns. For instance, the truth-conditions of (1) and (2)
are proposed to be (6-a) and (6-b), respectively.
(6) a. Gen [x; ](bridal-couple(x) & identifies-with(x)(cS);
can-not-expect-the-guests-to-pay-for-the-party(x))
b. Gen [x; ](team(x) & identifies-with(x)(cA);
has-to-want-to-win-more-than-the-opponent(x))
The referential use of ich and du, on the other hand, arises when the descriptive content
is set to the property of being identical to the current speaker or the current addressee,
and the free variable is existentially closed.
In the last section of Chapter 2, I discussed the problems that arise for this unified
account. The majority of the issues can be traced back to two aspects of the analysis:
(i) modelling the pragmatic effects as descriptive content at the truth-conditional level,
and (ii) modelling the referential uses as indefinite expressions. In addition, two issues
were identified that arise for the simple analysis of the intensional sentential contexts
found with the impersonal uses adopted in Chapter 2. The first issue concerns the
modal interpretation of Gen; one desideratum was to find an analysis that adequately
interacts with the meaning contributed by the personal pronouns. The second issue
concerns the behavior and interpretation of modals that co-occur with impersonally
interpreted personal pronouns. Both of these issues were addressed in Chapter 3.
In the first part of Chapter 3, three accounts for the semantics of Gen were intro-
duced, compared, and evaluated against a list of desiderata determined on the basis of
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the observations made in Chapter 2. As the semantic contribution of Gen, I adapted
the proposal put forth in Drewery (1998) to the formal framework used in this thesis.
Example (7) illustrates the resulting meaning proposed for a generic sentence.
(7) ∀w′[w ∼F,G w′ → ∀x[F (x)(w′) & NF,G(w′)(〈x,w′〉)→ G(x)(w′)]]
Regarding the behavior and interpretation of any modal verbs that are found in the
data, I argued that modals of these particular flavors, i.e. non-epistemic modals, cannot
act as binders for the free variable contributed by the impersonal uses. In fact, I
showed that they are always interpreted in the scope of Gen.4 In the remainder of
Chapter 3, I spelled out the details of this two-operator account by investigating the
interaction of the modal semantics for generic sentences in (7) and the meaning of
the co-occurring modals as proposed by Kratzer (1977, 1981a, 1991). One central
result of this investigation was that a simple combination of the two proposals does
not capture the intuitive truth-conditions of generic sentences containing non-epistemic
modal verbs. Crucially, the ordering source of the embedded modal depends on the
world of evaluation rather than the generically accessible worlds. To capture this
dependence, I formulated the following meaning postulates.
(8) a. ∀w′[w ∼F,G w′ → g(w) = g(w′)]
b. ∀w′[w ∼F,♦G w′ → g(w) = g(w′)]
At the beginning of Chapter 4, I combined the results from Chapters 2 and 3. The
resulting analyses for (1) and (2) are given in (9) and (10).
(9) ∀w′[w ∼bridal-couple & R(cS),♦expect-guests-to-pay-for-party w′ → ∀x[bridal-couple(x)(w′) &
R(cS)(x)(w
′) & Nbridal-couple & R(cS),♦expect-guests-to-pay-for-party(w
′)(〈x,w′〉)→
¬∃w′′ ∈ O(f, g, w′)[expect-the-guests-to-pay-for-party(x)(w′′)]]]
(10) ∀w′[w ∼team & R(cS),want-to-win-more-than-opponent w′ → ∀x[team(x)(w′) &
R(cA)(x)(w
′) & Nteam & R(cS),want-to-win-more-than-opponent(w
′)(〈x,w′〉)→
∀w′′ ∈ O(f, g, w′)[want-to-win-more-than-opponent(x)(w′′)]]]
Based on the discussion of the problematic aspects of the unified account at the end
of Chapter 2, the predictions of the combined account were determined. I concluded
that the assumption that these pronouns contribute descriptive content to the truth-
conditions of their containing sentences is at the heart of all problems that arise for the
account. Since the descriptive content is the core of the unified account (it links the
impersonal and the referential uses), I dropped the goal of proposing a unified account
for the two uses. Instead, I decided to focus on the pragmatic effects observed for the
4Note that this scope ordering was already implicitly assumed in the analysis given in (6).
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impersonal uses. Formally, the aim was to give an adequate account for the impersonal
uses that captures these effects.
Based on the discussion in Chapter 1 and observations in Moltmann (2010a,b) and
Zifonun (2000), I proposed that the impersonal uses of ich and du trigger conven-
tional implicatures that contribute not-at-issue content. This not-at-issue content then
induces the observable speaker-oriented and the participant-oriented effects. The no-
tion of not-at-issue content that is adopted is taken from the literature following Potts
(2005).
In the last part of Chapter 4, I proposed a novel indefinite account for the impersonal
uses of personal and impersonal pronouns. The contribution of the pronouns to the
truth-conditions of a sentence is assumed to be just a free individual variable. The
complexity of the meaning of the impersonal uses is found at the not-at-issue level. In
addition to the free variable, the impersonal uses contribute conventionally implicated
content. If this proposal is adopted, examples (1) and (2) are analyzed as (11) and
(12)—ignoring for the moment the results of Chapter 3 on the modal interpretation of
Gen.
(11) Gen[x; ](bridal-couple(x);¬♦expect-the-guests-to-pay-for-party(x)) (=p)
a. Speaker-oriented component:




Believew(cS, all individuals that consider ?p should accept that p &
there is an individual that does not accept that p)
(12) Gen[x; ](team(x);want-to-win-more-than-opponent(x)) (=p)
a. Speaker-oriented component:




Believew(cS, all individuals that consider ?p should accept that p) &
Invite(cS, cA, consider ?p)
Nothing more was said on the referential uses of ich and du. To account for them, I
adopted the traditional account in Kaplan (1978 [1989]); however, nothing hinges on
this choice.
In the final section of Chapter 4, two options for the connection between the referen-
tial uses and the impersonal uses were sketched, and their advantages and disadvantages
were addressed. Neither of the two options was defended conclusively in the end.
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Conclusions on a unified, underspecified account
Given the conclusion in Chapter 4 regarding the unified account proposed in Chapter
2, one might wonder whether a unified account can in principle be proposed that
adequately accounts for the referential and the impersonal uses of first and second
person singular pronouns. A partial answer to this question, I believe, is strongly
suggested by the problems and issues identified in Chapters 2 and 4: a unified indefinite
account based on semantic underspecification cannot capture the complex semantic
and pragmatic behavior of the referential and the impersonal readings of first and
second person singular pronouns. Specifically, any account that assigns descriptive
content to either the referential use or the impersonal use makes the same undesirable
predictions as the account proposed in Chapter 2. This also includes the account
proposed by Malamud (2006, 2007, 2012) for the impersonal reading of English second
person (singular) you.
Are there other possible unified accounts to pursue that are less problematic? A
first alternative option that one could pursue is an indefinite account in which the
pronouns contribute only a free variable to the truth-conditions of a sentence in both
the referential and the impersonal use. In this account, the referential use would have
to be modelled as in the extension of the system in Heim and Kratzer (1998) discussed
in Chapter 1: the potential values of the free variable contributed by referentially used
pronouns would be restricted by presuppositional person features to the current speaker
or the current addressee. For the impersonal uses, in turn, one would have to argue
that the person features do not restrict the possible values of the variable, but somehow
contribute their restriction to the CI content that is triggered by the pronouns.
Three arguments speak against this option. First, Kratzer (2009) already noted that
the extension of the account proposed for third person pronouns in Heim and Kratzer
(1998) to first and second person pronouns cannot capture their bound variable readings
in examples such as (13).
(13) I’m the only one around here who can take care of my children.
(Kratzer 2009:188)
The possessive my in the relative clause is interpreted as covarying with the alternatives
induced by only. Hence, the assumption that the referents of referentially used first
and second person singular pronouns are restricted by presuppositional features cannot
derive this variance; the features restrict the referent of I and my to the current speaker.
The second argument against this account is based on similar reasons to those that
were given for (13) above. Specifically, the semantic contribution of the presuppo-
sitional morphosyntactic features must not restrict the values of the variable in the
impersonal uses.
And lastly, the CI content that models the core of the pragmatic effects of the imper-
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sonal uses is only contributed in the impersonal use. It is never present in the referential
use. This type of optionality of occurrence on a not-at-issue level of meaning cannot be
captured by a semantic account that aims to derive the two uses via underspecification
on the truth-conditional level.
A second, entirely different route to account for the two uses in a unified manner—
which was discarded in Chapter 2 for various reasons—would be to start from an
underlying definite structure. However, in a definite account, it is hard, if not im-
possible, to capture the meaning of the impersonal uses. For instance, the definite
accounts proposed in Safir (2004) and Alonso-Ovalle (2000) need to find an alterna-
tive way to capture the effect of quasi-universal quantification over individuals. This
effect is usually captured by assuming that the generic operator binds the free variable
contributed by an indefinite noun phrase. This formal mechanism is not easily recon-
structed for definite expressions. Since Gen quantifies over possible worlds, a definite
description denotes only one individual per world. This is too weak to capture the
generality expressed by generic sentences. This conclusion is, of course, dependent on
the possible worlds semantics framework in the form adopted in this thesis. However,
a situation semantic framework such as the one adopted in Alonso-Ovalle (2000, 2002)
does not provide notable advantages. Proposing a unified, definite account is always
far from trivial—as the discussion of Alonso-Ovalle’s account in Chapter 2 shows. I
will not sketch any other possible unified accounts based on underspecification; any
other viable alternatives are left for further research.
But to sum up, the central problem that is faced by unified accounts is the task
of unifying two expressions that differ in all of their relevant semantic and pragmatic
aspects:
• referential use: a (directly) referential expression which, if at all, contributes only
presupposed descriptive content
• impersonal use: a generically quantified expression for which the core of the
contribution is conventionally implicated content
This discrepancy is the challenge that any unified account has to meet.
An entirely different alternative that could be pursued
The proposals presented in Chapters 2 and 4 do not preserve the one-to-one relation
between morphosyntactic form and meaning at the heart of most current work on the
semantics of personal pronouns. In one such line of research, it is proposed that the
meaning of personal pronouns is constructed from their morphosyntactic features (cf.
Harley and Ritter 2002; Kratzer 2009). For the final account in Chapter 4, this is a
necessary result of the assumptions (i) that the referential use of first and second person
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singular pronouns is directly referential, and (ii) that the impersonal use is independent
from the referential use, i.e. it is not a “special case” of this use.
To show that the two uses are truly independent, an analysis was discussed in Chapter
1 that leaves the semantics of the pronouns untouched, and assumes that the impersonal
uses arise from the other, co-occurring material: sentences containing first or second
person pronouns that appear to be used impersonally are counterfactual statements
about the current speaker or the current addressee, respectively. Even though this
account leaves the pronouns untouched, the account is ultimately undesirable since it
makes false predictions regarding the data.
As shown in Chapter 1, sentences containing impersonally used first and second
person singular pronouns are generic sentences. They express generalizations that
share all of the characteristic properties of “ordinary” generic sentences. From this
point of view, it seems to be a fair assumption that impersonally interpreted personal
pronouns are indefinite expressions that behave just like indefinite noun phrases in
generic sentences. However, instead of analyzing impersonally interpreted personal
pronouns as Heimian indefinites that introduce a new individual variable, a different
route could be pursued that is similar in spirit to the analysis as counterfactuals:
since the central requirement to derive a generic sentence meaning with quasi-universal
quantification over individuals is that the generic operator can bind some variable which
induces variation over individuals, one could ask which variables or parameters occur in
the standard accounts for referentially used first and second person singular pronouns,
and argue that Gen binds one of them.
In what follows, I briefly introduce and discuss the idea that Gen can bind the context
parameter proposed in Kaplan (1978 [1989]). To formalize this idea, assume that
the meaning for first and second person pronouns is the standard context-dependent,
directly referential meaning given in (14). Furthermore, the context parameter c is the
quintupel c = 〈cS, cA, cT , cL, cW 〉.
(14) a. Jich/IKc = cS
b. Jdu/youKc = cA
Since (unbound) referentially used first and second person singular pronouns in English
always denote the current speaker or addressee—even in the contents of reported speech
and attitude ascriptions—Kaplan argues that the context parameter is unshiftable, or
more generally unbindable. This assumption has been shown to be false in Schlenker
(2003), Anand and Nevins (2004), Anand (2006), and subsequent work for languages
other than English. It is, therefore, fair to assume that the impersonal uses arise from a
manipulation of the context parameter. This idea is briefly investigated and evaluated
in the following paragraphs.
Adopting an idea in Percus (2011), I introduce context variables into the formal
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system which may be manipulated by certain operators, similarly to explicit world
variables. In a system of this kind, it can be assumed that the impersonal interpreta-
tions arise when the generic operator Gen binds the context variable of the sentence.
This induces universal quantification over contexts and worlds.5 Quasi-universal quan-
tification over individuals is expressed indirectly by varying those context coordinates
that are relevant for the interpretation of a given indexical pronoun. Example (15)
provides the general schema underlying this idea.
(15) a. Gen[c; ](φ[cS];ψ[cS]) (impersonal 1st sg)
b. Gen[c; ](φ[cA];ψ[cA]) (impersonal 2nd sg)
For a more detailed analysis, the modal account proposed in Drewery (1998) could
be adapted to allow Gen to bind context variables. This adaptation leads to the two
schemata in (16-a) and (16-b) for (15-a) and (15-b), respectively.
(16) a. ∀w′[w′ ∼F,G w → ∀c′[F (c′S)(w′) & NF,G(w)(〈c′S, w′〉)→ G(c′S)(w′)]]
b. ∀w′[w′ ∼F,G w → ∀c′[F (c′A)(w′) & NF,G(w)(〈c′A, w′〉)→ G(c′A)(w′)]]
In the formulas in (16), the generic operator quantifies over all contexts c′ for which
the speaker-element c′S / the addressee-element c
′
A is a relevantly non-exceptional F
with respect to being G.
Since (16) simply extends the proposal for Gen in Drewery (1998) to be sensitive to
an additional type of bindable variable, this formal account derives all of the generaliza-
tions that are expressible with impersonally used first and second person pronouns, and
that have been derivable with the original account. The only additional requirement
that needs to be placed on the range of values for c′S and c
′
A is given in (17).
(17) a.
⋃
c′∈C{c′S} = {x : x ∈ De & x is animate}
b.
⋃
c′∈C{c′A} = {x : x ∈ De & x is animate}
That is, the sets of all potential speakers and addressees has to exhaust the subset of
the discourse domain that contains all animate individuals (cf. Chapter 1).
In an account along these lines, the meaning of ich and du does not vary for the
referential and impersonal uses. In fact, the distinction between the two uses is not
reflected in the pronominal meaning, at all. The distinction is the result of an ambiguity
of Gen.
Malamud (2006) discusses and dismisses a similar account to the one sketched above.
Based on her discussion, I briefly introduce four issues that arise for an analysis of the
impersonal uses in terms of quantification over contexts.
5In fact, since the context parameter contains the world of utterance as a coordinate, universal
quantification over contexts also induces universal quantification over worlds. Therefore, one could
assume that Gen always only quantifies over contexts.
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First—as stated above—one has to assume that the generic operator is ambiguous
between (i) the standard operator that binds world, individual, and situation variables,
and (ii) the operator formalized above, which also binds context variables. This ambi-
guity is crucial, and has to be explored in detail since first and second person singular






























‘You watch TV shows in the evening, don’t you?’
There are various possibilities to deal with this ambiguity. One possibility is to argue
that which variables are bound by the generic operator is determined contextually. An-
other possibility is to introduce an operator which abstracts over the context variable
to make it accessible to Gen—similar to operators that were proposed to account for
shifted indexicals or de se pronouns (cf. Percus 2011). As a result, Gen has to be as-
sumed to unselectively bind all of the variables abstracted over at sentence level. One
last possibility to account for the behavior of impersonal uses is to introduce features at
the level of morphosyntax to establish an agreement relation between Gen and imper-
sonally used personal pronouns. This agreement relation then triggers quantification
over contexts.6
A second issue for this type of account is that using the speaker and addressee co-
ordinates to capture quasi-universal quantification over individuals does not suffice to
derive the impersonal uses’ pragmatic effects. The main question that has to be an-
swered is: How can it be ensured that the pragmatic effects arise only when the speaker
and addressee coordinates are associated with a context variable that is bound by a
generic operator? For the account sketched above, the introduction of the additional
not-at-issue content in the impersonal use could be modelled by an operator that adds
the pragmatic components only in case the context variable is bound. This issue was
addressed in a similar form in the previous subsection, where I discussed an idea for
unifying the referential and impersonal uses in a different manner.
The third issue touches on the motivation behind Kaplanian contexts. By making the
context variables accessible to the generic operator Gen, the motivation behind contexts
as (potential) speech situations, in my opinion, is lost. Contrary to other operators that
have been proposed to act as context shifters, e.g. propositional attitudes and verbs of
saying, the meaning of Gen cannot be seen as involving speech situations of relevantly
non-exceptional individuals (cf. Malamud 2006). A possible reply to this worry is that
6D’Alessandro and Alexiadou (2002) propose a similar agreement mechanism for impersonal pro-
nouns.
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a similar operationalization of a parameter that intuitively models the connection of
an utterance to the discourse context has been implemented in the case of the variable
assignment g. The variable assignment is now standardly used to model abstraction
over individual variables, which is needed e.g. to account for variable binding (cf. Heim
and Kratzer 1998).
The fourth issue concerns a well-known problem that arises when modelling quantifi-
cational variability effects. In quantificational variability interpretations the adverbs
intuitively do not quantify over speech contexts, but over individuals (cf. Lewis 1975,
Malamud 2006). If adverbs of quantification were to quantify over contexts, though,
one may run into the same counting problems observed for situation based accounts: in
general, there is more than one potential speech context for each individual. In fact, if
the conceptual link to potential speech situations is given up, there are infinitely many
contexts containing the same “speaker” or “addressee” due to the unrestricted variation
over times, places, and worlds.
In contrast to these issues, an account based on quantification over contexts has the
advantage that reference to the utterance context is blocked. Hence, it is predicted
that no referential use of a first or second person pronoun should be able to co-occur
with the impersonal uses. As shown in the data discussion in Chapter 1, this prediction
is mostly borne out. But it is not a hard and fast rule—as one would expect given the
account sketched above—since possessives seem to be possible exceptions. Hence, the
predictions made by assuming quantification over contexts might be too strong, after
all.
A more detailed investigation of this alternative account, in addition to the decision
whether it is to be preferred over the account presented in Chapter 4 is left for further
research. I count it among the bigger open issues that remain.
Open issues and directions for further research
The discussions in the 1–4 and in the appendices left several issues unaddressed while
others could not be answered in a satisfactory manner. The following points illustrate
possibilities for further research. All of them cover either aspects of the impersonal
uses that were not addressed so far, or new directions regarding other topics broached
in this thesis.
First, research on the impersonal uses of personal pronouns would benefit immensely
from a detailed, cross-linguistic study of the semantic and pragmatic properties of
impersonally used pronouns in different languages. It was briefly mentioned in the
Introduction that the phenomenon of impersonally interpreted second person singu-
lar pronouns is attested for a large number of languages. A detailed comparison of
languages among and across language families would show which of the properties ob-
served for ich and du are idiosyncratic for German, and which are universal properties
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of impersonal uses. In addition, the interaction of impersonal uses with other phe-
nomena might provide further insights on the meaning components of these uses. For
these investigations I believe e.g. evidentials (cf. Rojas 2011), discourse particles (cf.
Appendix A2), and propositional attitudes to be of interest.
Second, I decided to leave aside impersonal uses that occur in interrogative and
imperative sentences in Chapter 1. The different, intensional sentential contexts as-
sociated with these two sentence types may reveal additional aspects for the German
data, as well as the impersonal uses in general.
Third, if it is assumed that the impersonal and referential uses of personal pronouns
do not arise from the same, underspecified meaning, the question arises how the two
uses are connected. At the end of Chapter 4, two possible solutions, i.e. a pragmatic
shifting process and lexical ambiguity, were briefly discussed as options to link the ref-
erential use with the impersonal use. A more detailed discussion of this issue, possibly
in connection with other phenomena showing different, apparently incompatible uses,
might provide new insights on the interplay between semantics and pragmatics. Three
of these types of expressions were mentioned in the Introduction: (i) demonstratives,
(ii) proper names, and (iii) impersonal pronouns.
Fourth, the supporting and blocking effects of co-occurring material have been left
aside so far. In Chapter 1, I argued that they should be seen as an issue for generic
sentences in general: the effect of additional frame-setting and qualifying material
seems to be connected to the question of when a sentence is interpreted as a generic or
an episodic statement. The choice between generic and episodic, in turn, is connected
to various grammatical factors, e.g. aspectual specification, as well as world knowledge.
I believe that this is an interesting, and as far as I am aware ill-understood topic.
Fifth, multiple occurrences of impersonally used ich, du, and man present a problem
for the accounts presented in Chapters 2 and 4 if no “global” process is assumed that
links all of the occurrences in the same sentence. Intuitively, every occurrence of a
given pronoun that is interpreted impersonally contributes the same variable. If this
synchronization at the formal level is not ensured, it is predicted that e.g. the second





















‘If a trader buys something, he can lay a claim on prepaid tax.’7
Furthermore, even if a sentence contains more than one occurrence of an impersonally























‘An artist has to be economical with his emotions.’8
One possible way to solve this issue is to treat only the first pronoun in a given sentence
as a true impersonal use, and analyze all further occurrences as bound pronouns similar
to Kratzer’s (2009) proposal for “fake indexicals”, cf. Chapter 1. If a similar feature
transmission procedure is assumed for bound “impersonal uses”, the features that are
inherited from original impersonal uses are not interpreted; these inherited features
would also only have an influence on the phonological form of the bound pronouns.
However, Kratzer (2009) does not discuss donkey or E-type pronouns, and if/how her
feature transimission procedure could be extended to these cases.
Sixth, various issues regarding the semantics of generic sentences and modals needed
to be left for further research that are independent from the discussion of the impersonal
uses. These were, among others, (i) the issue of contextual restrictions for the generic
operator Gen, (ii) the unavailability for the scope order Mod > Gen for non-epistemic
modal flavors, and (iii) the general question of conditional generic sentences.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the question of whether the generic operator can be
contextually restricted divides the field into two camps. One group of researchers argue
that the generic operator differs from nominal quantifiers with respect to contextual
restriction (cf. Condoravdi 1994; Krifka et al. 1995). In contrast, the other group tries
to show that contextual restriction is indeed possible (cf. Drewery 1998; Greenberg
2007). While discussing this literature, I briefly suggested that, pace Drewery and
Greenberg, true contextual restriction is unavailable, but that the generic operator
may be sensitive to frame setting in the previous discourse. The conditions on frame
setting, and the difference between bare plurals in frame set generic sentences in these
uses and Condoravdi’s third use (cf. Condoravdi 1994) are still to be investigated.
In Appendix A3, the question of conditional generics was briefly addressed. An
extension of the account for generic sentences with and without overt modals to condi-
tional generic sentences was proposed, and the connection between conditional generics,
doubly modalized generics, and quantified conditionals was highlighted. However, a
comprehensive account of conditional generics, as well as an evaluation of the proposed
extension still need to be worked out.
Seventh, the analysis of generic sentences that do not contain an overt modal, but
are interpreted like corresponding generic sentences containing an overt modal is still
an open question. The correspondence is illustrated in (21).
8http://www.france-delon.de/buch4.htm
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(21) a. Countries with common borders share their resources.
(Drewery 1998:93)
b. Countries with common borders must share their resources.
One interesting aspect of these sentences is that they can be used to enforce a rule or
to create new obligations for the addressee, as in (22).

















‘A good girl cleans up her room now.’
I believe that a detailed investigation of these uses will open up interesting connections
between the theory of speech acts (Austin 1962; Searle 1969) and the semantics of
modality, and will tie in with current discussions on this connection in Kaufmann
(2012) and Condoravdi and Lauer (2011).
Lastly, the investigation on the different functions of German nominal als-phrases
in Appendix A1 only touched upon the various issues that need to be explored to give a
comprehensive account of German als-phrases and English as-phrases. Further direc-
tions for research include a comparison of the behavior of als-phrases to the behavior
of adverbials and secondary predicates.
Appendix
A1 German nominal als-phrases
A1.1 Data discussion
In the data discussion on the impersonal uses of ich, du, and man in Chapter 1,
German nominal als-phrases were listed among optionally co-occurring material that
has a supporting effect on the availability of the impersonal uses. Their contribution to
the interpretation of generic sentences containing impersonally used personal pronouns
is a property that seems to specify for which group of individuals the general statement



































‘Bridal couples can’t expect their guests to more or less pay for the party!’1
In example (1), the als-phrase als Brautpaar (Engl. ‘as a bridal couple’) restricts the
generalization to bridal couples. That is, the denotation of impersonally used ich—
whatever it may be—seems to be connected to the denotation of the als-phrase. This
section of the Appendix investigates whether the als-phrase restricts the set of individ-
uals that are quasi-universally quantified over, or whether it simply makes explicit one
of the properties that individuals in this set share.
In the following subsections, I first provide an overview of the behavior of nominal als-
phrases based on recent descriptive analyses of German, specifically the work in Flaate
(2007) and Zifonun (1998). This discussion is supplemented by a comparison between
als-phrases and English as-phrases. Based on these results, I propose a simplified
semantics for German als-phrases, which is inspired by the analyses for English as-
phrases in Jäger (2001, 2003) and Szabo (2003), but which does not aim to capture
all aspects of als-phrases.2 Furthermore, I will provide a first descriptive analysis of
1http://www.urbia.de/archiv/forum/th-2142726/Wieviel-Geld-zur-Hochzeit-
schenken.html
2Formal semantic analyses of English as-phrases can be divided into three classes: (i) analyses as
term restrictors (Landman89), (ii) analyses as additional predication (Jäger 2001, 2003; Szabo 2003),
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the interaction of als-phrases with quantificational expressions, and of their behavior
in generic sentences.
German nominal als-phrases consist of the expression als followed by either a bare
noun or full noun phrase, the “nominal complement” of als, which can be additionally




























‘as a/the (small) cat (that gets petted)’
In the descriptive literature, a number of functions and uses of German nominal als-
phrases are distinguished which motivate various syntactic and/or semantic classifica-
tions (cf. Flaate 2007 for an overview). Zifonun (1998) and Flaate (2007), for instance,
distinguish four uses of nominal als-phrases:
1. a “use” in which the als-phrase is selected by the main predicate in the sentence
2. an adnominal use
3. a use in which the als-phrase behaves like a verb-modifying adverbial5
4. a use in which the als-phrase behaves like a sentence adverbial
Flaate (2007) and Zifonun (1998) motivate their three classes of non-argument uses
by syntactic, as well as semantic considerations, some of which will be addressed below.












‘Peter regards Maria as his friend.’
There is a number of verbs in German that select for a nominal als-phrase as a comple-
ment, e.g. bezeichnen (Engl. ‘refer’), gelten (Engl. ‘be regarded’), dienen (Engl. ‘serve’),
and halten (Engl. ‘perceive’). Note that many of the corresponding English verbs also
select for as-phrases.
and (iii) mixed analyses (Asher 2006). I will not present these accounts and their predictions for
German als-phrases in detail since this goes beyond the scope of this thesis.
3There is no consensus in the literature with respect to the word class of als in nominal als-phrases.
The two most prominent positions are (i) that als is a special kind of preposition, or (ii) that it is a
complementizer on the phrasal level (cf. Zifonun 1998 and Flaate 2007).
4Als also functions as a complementizer, and as the German counterpart of the English comparative
than. Whether the other functions of als and the als taking nominal complements are two uses of the
same lexical item, or distinct lexical elements will not be discussed at this point, and is left for further
research.
5Zifonun (1998) calls this the use as “verbbezogenes Adverbial”.
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For the second class, two subclasses of adnominal uses need to be distinguished. The
































‘Peter’s reputation as a hard-working farmer is known everywhere.’
In (4-a), the als-phrase is immediately adjacent to its “associated noun phrase”, Peter,
and both form a constituent.6 In this configuration, the als-phrase attributes the
property denoted by the nominal complement to the “associated individual” referred
to by the associated noun phrase. For instance, (4-a) conveys that Peter is a hard-
working farmer. In (4-b), in contrast, the als-phrase is not immediately adjacent to
its associated noun phrase, Peter, but to the noun Ruf (Engl. ‘reputation’). The
associated noun phrase and the als-phrase both modify the noun phrase of which Ruf
is the head. In this case, the property denoted by the nominal complement of als
cannot be attributed directly to the associated individual. The relation between the
als-phrase and the associated individual is mediated by the noun Ruf. For (4-b) this
means that it is not claimed that Peter is a hard-working farmer, only that he has
a reputation for being one—which may be based on misconceptions. The difference
between (4-a) and (4-b) is also reflected in the English translations. In the following
discussion, the second adnominal use is left aside since this type of als-phrases is, as
far as I know, not found with the impersonal uses of ich, du, and man.
In the third and fourth class, the als-phrases are neither selected for by the matrix
predicate, nor necessarily directly adjacent to their associated noun phrases. Hence,
these als-phrases and their associated noun phrases do not form a constituent. The
third and fourth class are illustrated in (5). Both examples are ambiguous between the
verb-modifying adverbial-like use and the sentential adverbial-like use although there is


























Both examples: ‘As a farmer, Peter earns 50.000 euros.’
In the verb-modifying adverbial-like use, both sentences can be paraphrased as in (6).
6For V2 languages like German, placement in front of the finite verb in matrix clauses is a traditional
constituency test.
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(6) In seinem Job als Bauer verdient Peter 50.000 Euro.
‘In his job as a farmer, Peter earns 50.000 euros.’
Example (7) paraphrases the sentence adverbial-like use.
(7) Da Peter Bauer ist, verdient er 50.000 Euro.
‘Because Peter is a farmer, he earns 50.000 euros.’
In matrix clauses, adnominal and adverbial als-phrases can be distinguished in sur-
face form in case the associated noun phrase stands in front of the finite verb in Vor-
feld position. If the associated noun phrase occurs after the finite verb (i.e. in the

















‘This year Peter as a farmer earns 50.000 euros.’
In (8), the associated noun phrase Peter and the als-phrase are placed after the fi-
nite verb but adjacent to each other. Therefore, the surface form of the sentence is
compatible with the als-phrase being used both adnominally or like an adverbial.
Even though in (3)–(8) the associated noun phrases are always the subject, als-
phrases can take any nominal constituent in the same clause as its associated noun
phrase. Als-phrases are restricted neither with respect to the type of nominal con-
stituent they associate with, nor with respect to the syntactic function of that con-








































‘For Susanne, as the boss, sincere friendliness, true love for the job, and a
cooperative working environment are very important.’7
An association between an als-phrase and a nominal expression is marked morpho-
logically: the nominal complement and the associated nominal expression usually agree
in number and case, although case agreement seems to be less strict (cf. Flaate 2007).
In (10), the nominal complement of the als-phrase, seine Freunde, is marked as plural
and accusative. Therefore, only the direct object of einladen (Engl. ‘to invite’), i.e.
Maria und Paul, can be the associated nominal expression.
7http://www.wannenkopfhuette.de/huette/die-guten-geister-hoch-oben-aufm-berg.html
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(10) Peter lädt Maria und Paul als seine Freunde ein.
Peter invites Maria and Paul as his friends.acc-pl
‘Peter invites Maria and Paul as his friends.’
Whenever the nominal complement is morphologically ambiguous, the als-phrase can in
principle be associated with either of the different nominal constituents in the sentence














Available: ‘As students, they met him.’ (subject)
Available: ‘They met him as a student.’ (object)
(Flaate 2007:63)
So far, the adnominal use and the two adverbial-like uses have only been distinguished
by their syntactic properties. Their syntactic differences, though, also result in different
semantic behavior. For instance, (i) they interact differently with verbs that express
a change of location or state, (ii) they interact differently with intensional sentential
operators, and (iii) they differ in their ability to “rescue” contradictory sentences.



























‘Yesterday at five PM, Boris Becker, the first German champion of Wim-



























‘Yesterday at five PM, Boris Becker left the Centre Court as the first
German champion of Wimbledon.’ (Zifonun 1998:4)
In (12-b), the als-phrase, als erster deutscher Wimbledon-Sieger, is in an adverbial
position, and the predicate expressed by the als-phrase, i.e. ‘being the first German
champion of Wimbledon’, is connected to the event of leaving the Centre Court. It
is understood that Boris Becker’s becoming the first German champion of Wimbledon
happened between his stepping onto the Centre Court and leaving it at five. No such
connection is necessarily understood for (12-a) with the adnominally used als-phrase.
That is, Boris Becker’s becoming the first German champion may have happened at
an earlier time.
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The second point above concerns the interaction of als-phrases with intensional sen-
tential operators in the same clause. Consider the examples in (13), which illustrate






























In general, (13-a) and (13-b) are ambiguous. In the first reading, the als-phrase is
interpreted as restricting the meaning of the subjunctive: The predication ‘Peter is
a farmer’ expressed by the als-phrase and its associated nominal expression is added
as an assumption to ‘Peter would earn 50.000 euros’ to express the meaning of the





















‘If Peter were a farmer, he would earn 50.000 euros.’
In the second reading, ‘Peter is a farmer’ is not interpreted as an assumption under
which the rest of the sentence is evaluated, but as an actual fact about Peter. This
reading can be paraphrased as in (15).
(15) Peter, who is a farmer, would earn 50.000 euros.
Sentences containing adnominally used and adverbial-like uses of als-phrases differ with
respect to which of these two types of readings are understood when they are uttered
out-of-the-blue: for adnominal als-phrases, the preferred interpretation is outside the
scope of the subjunctive, whereas for adverbial als-phrases, the preferred interpretation
is as a restriction on the subjunctive.8
The sentential context, the discourse context, and prior knowledge about the asso-
ciated individual can affect which of the two readings is understood. For instance, if it
is known that the als-phrase cannot apply to the associated individual, the restrictive

































8The native speakers that I consulted accepted the adnominal use of als-phrases in the restrictive
reading when only the adnominal use was presented, and they were asked whether they could interpret
the sentence in this fashion. When they were presented both options, i.e. the als-phrase in adnominal
and in adverbial position, they consistently preferred the als-phrase in adverbial position.
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In (16), both sentences are interpreted as ‘If Peter were a woman, he would look
like his sister’ since the non-restrictive reading would convey that Peter is a woman.
In contrast, if it is known or suggested that the nominal complement applies to the

































Both preferred: ‘Peter, who is a man, would earn 5.000 euros more.’
Since Peter is assumed to be a man, both sentences are interpreted non-restrictively.
German als-phrases share the possibility to restrict the subjunctive with English
as-phrases. Consider the following example and its paraphrase from Stump (1985).
(18) a. As a blonde, Mary might look something like Jane.
b. If she were a blonde, Mary might look something like Jane.
(Stump 1985:88)
The subjunctive is not the only intensional operator for which the adnominal use and
adverbial-like uses show different restriction behavior. The examples in (19) and (20)


































































Note that when co-occurring with wollen, the adnominal uses are invariably non-
restrictive while the adverbial-like uses are always interpreted restrictively. No ambigu-
ity arises as in the case of the subjunctive. This suggests that the observed interaction
also depends on the different intensional operators.
Another interesting semantic property, first observed for English as-phrases, also
distinguishes adnominal and adverbial als-phrases. For English, it is observed that as-
9Note that it is perceived as pragmatically odd, and sometimes outright false to encode an actual,
known fact as a hypothetical assumption in subjunctive conditionals. Hypothetically assuming a fact
suggests that it is still possible that it does not actually hold.
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phrases can be used to “rescue” contradictory sentences or texts of the form in (21-a)
(cf. Landman 1989, Jäger 2001, 2003, Szabo 2003, Asher 2006).
(21) a. #Peter earns 50.000 euros, but he doesn’t earn 50.000 euros.
b. Peter as a judge earns 50.000 euros, but he as a janitor doesn’t earn 50.000
euros.
The as-phrases in the “rescued” example (21-b) relativize the incompatible properties
ascribed to Peter, i.e. earning 50.000 euros and not earning 50.000 euros, to two
different roles, i.e. jobs, performed by Peter. By this relativization, the contradiction
arising in (21-a) is obviated.

















































































‘As a judge, Peter earns 50.000 euros, but as a janitor he doesn’t earn
50.000 euros.’
Adnominally used als-phrases as in (23), on the other hand, only marginally improve






























‘Peter as a judge earns 50.000 euros, but he as a janitor doesn’t earn 50.000
euros.’
The cases in which adnominal and adverbial-like uses show different semantic behav-
ior do not provide a means, though, to tell apart Zifonun’s verb-modifying adverbial
use from the sentence adverbial use. However, all the classes differ in their behavior
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with respect to (sentential) negation, nicht (Engl. ‘not’). Als-phrases in adnominal
position are always outside the scope of negation. For instance, in (24) only Peter’s















‘Peter, a farmer, does not earn 50.000 euros.’
The two adverbial-like uses differ with respect to whether they may occur in the scope of














































‘As a farmer, Peter does not earn 50.000 euros.’
When the als-phrase is in preverbal position, whether or not it is interpreted outside
the scope of negation depends on the specific stress pattern that is used. If (25-a) is
read with neutral stress, only Peter’s earning 50.000 euros is negated; that Peter is
a farmer is not denied. In contrast, if the nominal complement and the negation are
stressed with a bridge contour, the als-phrase is interpreted in the scope of negation,
and it is also denied that Peter is a farmer. The interpretation of (25-a) can be either of
the two adverbial-like uses. If Bauer is stressed, the verb-modifying adverbial-like use
is preferred; if it is not stressed, i.e. with neutral intonation, the sentence adverbial-like
use is preferred. Example (25-b), in contrast, can only be interpreted as the negation
scoping over the als-phrase. The sentence states that Peter earns 50.000 euros, but
not as a farmer. Note, however, that it is not explicitly denied that Peter is a farmer.
If Peter has two jobs, for example, it is expressed that this particular income is not
related to his job as a farmer. For this sentence, the only possible interpretation for the
als-phrase is the verb-modifying adverbial-like use. Example (25-c) is again interpreted
with the als-phrase outside the scope of negation. As for example (25-a), only Peter’s
earning 50.000 euros is negated, and also depending on whether Bauer is stressed,
either of the two adverbial- like uses are understood.
Zifonun (1998) observes that the alternation between the use as a verb-modifying
adverbial and as a sentence adverbial illustrated in (25-b) and (25-c) (when Bauer is
unstressed) is also observable for some adverbs in German, e.g. sicher (Engl. ‘securely,
certainly’). Sicher can be interpreted as a manner adverbial, meaning ‘securely’, and
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alternatively as a sentence adverbial, meaning ‘certainly’ or ‘it is certain, that’. De-
pending on the relative position of the adverbial regarding sentential negation, one of


















‘Certainly, he does not talk.’ (sentence adverbial)
(adapted from Zifonun 1998:14)
In general, the observations made for adverbial als-phrases with an unstressed nominal
complement above can be summed up as: (i) als-phrases that occupy the preverbal
position in matrix clauses are interpreted like a sentence adverbial, (ii) in embedded
clauses and in postverbal position in matrix clauses, als-phrases are ambiguous between
the sentence adverbial and verb-modifying adverbial use, and (iii) only verb-modifying
adverbial-like uses can occur in the scope of negation. Any als-phrase in an adver-
bial position is usually interpreted as a verb-modifying adverbial-like use when the
nominal complement is stressed. In ambiguous positions, the discourse context and
the sentential context (e.g. the co-occurring predicate) help to disambiguate the use
of the als-phrases. For instance, if (27) is uttered out-of-the-blue, the verb-modifying
















Preferred: ‘When she was a child, she was not exceptionally pretty.’(sentence)
Dispreferred: ‘In her role as a child, she was not exceptionally pretty.’ (verb-
modifying)
(Zifonun 1998:14)
In an appropriate context, e.g. if the topic of conversation is a play in which the
associated individual performed, the dispreferred reading may become the preferred
one.
To sum up, three uses of als-phrases need to be distinguished: (i) the adnominal
use, (ii) an adverbial use with verb-modifying function, and (iii) an adverbial use with
a function like a sentence adverbial. These uses can be distinguished with respect to
their preferred syntactic positions and their interactions with co-occurring material.
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A1.2 The semantic contribution of als-phrases
Abstracting from the position-specific differences discussed in the previous subsection,
Zifonun (1998) argues for a common functional core for all non-argument uses of Ger-
man als-phrases. She suggests that als-phrases have a predicational structure, and
their central function is to attribute the property denoted by the nominal complement
to the referent of their associated noun phrase. Any additional contributions that affect
or interact with other material in the sentence differ for each of the three uses.
In adnominal position, an als-phrase only characterizes the referent of its associated
noun phrase further. Zifonun compares the contribution of this use to the contribu-
tion of non-restrictive relative clauses, but adds that adnominal als-phrases have an
additional property: they mark the property denoted by their nominal complement as





































Both sentences in (28) state that Herr Schulze is an experienced teacher, and that he
knows certain things of interest. In addition, only the adnominally used als-phrase also
signals that Herr Schulze’s being a teacher are the speaker’s grounds for assuming that
he has that knowledge.
For the verb-modifying adverbial-like use, Zifonun argues that in addition to con-
tributing the common core meaning, the als-phrase modifies the denotation of the verb
phrase: the als-phrase further specifies the role or function of the associated noun













‘She went to Africa (in her job) as development worker.’
(Zifonun 1998:14)
Zifonun sees the observation discussed in the previous subsection, i.e. with verbs denot-
ing a change of state, als-phrases are associated with only one of the states, as evidence
for the argument status of the als-phrases in this use. Hence, in principle, one should
be able to find sentences containing two als-phrases that are each associated with one
of the two states of a change of state verb. This is illustrated in (30).























‘He entered the court as the favorite, and left it as the winner.’
Zifonun argues that in general, the verb-modifying adverbial-like uses specify or qualify
a participant in the event described by the predicate.
In the sentence adverbial use, in contrast, the als-phrase modifies the whole sentence.
It introduces a frame, condition, or setting in which the sentence is interpreted. Specif-
ically, Zifonun observes that the predication expressed by the als-phrase may stand
in a temporal, causal, or conditional relation to the matrix predicate. Which of these






























‘When/because she was a development worker, she went to Africa.’
(temporal or causal)
(Zifonun 1998:14)
The conditional relation is exemplified by those examples in which an als-phrase inter-

















‘If Peter were a woman, he would look like his sister.’ (conditional)
Based on this data discussion, I now present a first, very simplified semantic analysis
for als-phrases, which is designed to capture only the predicational core of the three
uses and their presuppositional behavior.
Building on Zifonun’s analysis, Flaate (2007) analyzes adnominal and adverbial als-
phrases as predicational phrases which either adjoin to the associated noun phrase or








The silent PRO in subject position is controlled by the associated noun phrase, which
creates a referential dependency between the two expressions (cf. Chierchia 1989).
As a starting point, I adopt Flaate’s syntactic structure in (34), and as a first step
into the direction of a formal analysis of als-phrases, I suggest that they contribute
properties. This captures Zifonun’s proposal for the common functional core of the
non-argument uses, and predicts that an als-phrase like als Bauer is interpreted as in
(35).
(35) Jals BauerKc,g = λx.λw.farmer(x)(w)
For this predicational meaning to arise on the basis of the syntactic structure above,
three basic assumptions are needed.
First, the nominal complement is a bare noun:10
(36) JBauerKc,g = λx.λw.farmer(x)(w)
Second, als is interpreted in analogy to the analysis of the copula in Heim and Kratzer
(1998). Specifically, als is an identity function on properties, see (37).
(37) JalsKc,g = λP〈e,st〉.P
This is in line with the work in Stump (1985) and Jäger (2001, 2003), who assume that
English as and the copula have the same predicational function.
Third, PRO is interpreted as a variable which is obligatorily bound by a silent oper-
ator, Opi (cf. Chierchia 1989).
10For the sake of simplicity, I leave aside nominal complements which are full noun phrases with
determiners. In the data presented in Chapter 1 for the impersonal uses of German personal pronouns,
the als-phrases nearly exclusively have bare nouns as nominal complements.







The tree structure in (38) corresponds to the PredP node in the structure in (34)
proposed by Flaate (2007). Based on Anand’s (2006) discussion of the analysis of PRO
defended in Chierchia (1989), I adopt the following denotation for the PredP node in
(38) built from Opi and its complement α, which is reminiscent of the rule of predicate
abstraction proposed in Heim and Kratzer (1998).
(39) J[PredPOpi α]Kc,g = λx.JαKg[i/x]
Combining the three assumptions, the meaning of the als-phrase, als Bauer, yields
the predicational meaning proposed in (35). Note that without further assumptions,
this proposal only works for adverbial als-phrases that are adjacent to their associated
nominal expressions.
It is already clear from the data discussion and the summary of Zifonun’s observations
above that als contributes a more complex meaning than the identity function proposed
in (37). Further considerations will help to provide a clearer picture: Jäger (2001,
2003) argues that English as-phrases are presupposition triggers. The content of the
presupposition is that the property denoted by the nominal complement of as holds
for the associated individual in the world of evaluation. This claim is supported by the
behavior of the as-phrases in the following examples.
(40) a. John as a judge is corrupt.  John is a judge.
b. It is not the case that John as a judge is corrupt.  John is a judge.
c. It is not the case that John as a judge is corrupt since he is not a judge.
6 John is a judge.
(Jäger 2001:10)
The truth of the proposition expressed by John is a judge in the world of evaluation
is not affected under sentential negation. In fact, John is a judge has to be explicitly
negated to deny John’s being a judge. The predication expressed by the as-phrase also
“escapes” from the antecedent of a conditional. Consider (41).
(41) If John as a judge is corrupt, he is a friend of the Mafia.  John is a judge.
The behavior of German als-phrases in their adnominal and adverbial uses mirrors
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the behavior of as-phrases in this respect. First, even in the verb-modifying adverbial
use, sentential negation does not deny that the predication expressed by the als-phrase
holds of the associated individual. Those cases in which negation immediately precedes
the als-phrase have to be classified as constituent negation. Second, als-phrases in the






























‘If Peter as a farmer earns 50.000 euros, he can afford to go on a nice vacation.’
Hence, German als-phrases also seem to be presupposition triggers which presuppose
that the associated individual has the property denoted by the als-phrase in the actual
world.
Jäger (2001, 2003) connects the restrictive behavior of as-phrases with respect to
the subjunctive to their presuppositional behavior and analyzes it as intermediate ac-
commodation of the presupposed content in the restrictor of the subjunctive operator
(cf. van der Sandt 1992 for presupposition accommodation in DRT). The same analysis
can be adopted to account for the corresponding cases involving German als-phrases.
Furthermore, I argue that intermediate accommodation can be used to model all
non-causal sentence adverbial-like uses of German als-phrases. The temporal readings
exemplified in (43) can be analyzed by intermediate accommodation of the presuppo-















‘When she was a child, she was not exceptionally pretty.’ (temporal)
(Zifonun 1998:14)
This analysis correctly captures that the temporal adverbial interpretation for als-
phrases only arises when the co-occurring predicate is in past tense. In general, the
temporal and conditional readings of als-phrases used like sentence adverbials only
arise through an interaction of the als-phrase with an operator. If no operator is
present, only a “causal” connection between the als-phrase and the matrix predication















11For reasons of space, the debate in the literature whether past tense is best modelled with quanti-
fiers over times or with pronoun-like expressions will not be summarized at this point. See Enç (1981,
1986) for the latter view, and Ogihara (2003) for arguments against Enç.
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‘As a child, she is not exceptionally pretty.’ (causal)
Hence, the default connection between an als-phrase, used like a sentence adverbial,
and the co-occurring matrix predicate seems to be Zifonun’s “causal” reading.12 This
cannot be a true causal link, however, since such a relation would be too strong. For
example, it cannot reasonably be assumed that being a child causes someone to not be
exceptionally pretty. Instead, the als-phrase predication and the matrix predication
seem to be connected via the relation of “defeasible inference” (cf. Asher and Lascarides
2003). Rather informally, this relation can be defined as in (45).
(45) Two sentences A and B stand in the relation of defeasible inference iff A
“normally” entails B.
That is, if A is true then under “normal circumstances”B is also true. For the sentence
in (44), this means that the sentence adverbial-like use of the als-phrase conveys that
children are normally not exceptionally pretty. In connection with the girl’s being
a child, which is established by the presupposition of als, the apparent “causal” link
between the girls being a child and not being exceptionally pretty can be derived.
In the conditional and temporal readings, i.e. when the presupposition of the als-
phrase is accommodated in the restrictor of an operator, als-phrases seem to lose this




















‘When she was a child with red hair, Elisabeth was exceptionally pretty because
of that.’
(temporal and causal; adapted from Zifonun 1998:15)
Note, however, that the relation of defeasible inference seems to hold only between
a part of the als-phrase, mit roten Haaren (Engl. ‘with red hair’), and the matrix
predication. This suggests that the link is not hard-wired in the denotation of als.
Adnominally used als-phrases also convey a connection of defeasible inference be-
















‘As a child, Maria is not exceptionally pretty.’
In the verb-modifying adverbial use, whether a connection of defeasible inference is
12Note that as soon as the als-phrase in (44) is read in its verb-modifying adverbial-like use, i.e. ‘in
her role as a child’ (assuming such a role is salient), a “temporal” interpretation is available in which
the matrix predicate is restricted to those times when the associated individual plays the role.
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understood depends on the given matrix predicate, the discourse context, and world
knowledge. Example (48) does not convey that farmers usually earn 50.000 euros
since the context makes another, conflicting rule explicit, and states that Peter is an
exception to it.














‘As a farmer, Peter earns 50.000 euros.’
In (49), a connection between being a senior physician and attending conferences is
communicated. This is supported by the set up in the scenario.















‘As a senior physician, Peter attends many medical conferences.’
These examples suggest as well that the defeasible inference relation is not lexically
encoded in the entry for als, but that the link arises pragmatically. However, a detailed
investigation of the defeasible inference relation that is communicated by als-phrases
and as-phrases is beyond the scope of this thesis, and has to be left for further research.
The two properties of als-phrases that need to be accounted for by a full analysis of
als-phrases are:
1. Jäger’s observation that an als-phrase triggers the presupposition that the asso-
ciated individual has the property expressed by the als-phrase in the world of
evaluation.
2. The predication expressed by als-phrases is pragmatically linked with the matrix
predication via a relation of defeasible inference.
The proposal sketched above in (37)–(39) captures neither of the two desiderata. To
capture the behavior of als-phrases as presupposition triggers, I suggest the formaliza-
tion in (50).
(50) JalsKc,g,w = λP〈e,st〉.λx.λw′ : P (x)(w). P (x)(w′)
For the reasons given above, the connection of defeasible inference communicated by
als is neither added as a presupposition, nor as part of the truth-conditional meaning
of als.
For the formalization in (50), it seems at least pragmatically illicit that als presup-
poses what it asserts. However, the proposed meaning does not yet take into account
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the varying behavior regarding the semantic contribution of als depending on its syn-
tactic position. Hence, it might be the case that the presupposed content and the
truth-conditional content of (50) are never actually presupposed and asserted simulta-
neously.
With respect to the topic of position-dependent interpretation, Maienborn (2001)
makes a similar observation for German adverbial locative expressions. These expres-
sions also have a different semantic function depending on their syntactic position.
To capture their behavior, Maienborn proposes that different syntactic positions make
available different compositional variants of modification. Working in event semantics,
she argues that the different variants of modification associate the argument of locative
expressions with different aspects of the matrix event. Maienborn’s analysis seems to
be a promising starting point for the variable aspect of the meaning of als. For reasons
of space, this investigation needs to be left for further research.
A1.3 Als-phrases and quantificational operators
In this last subsection, I take a look at the behavior of als-phrases with associated
plural definite noun phrases, quantifying noun phrases, and in generic sentences, to get
a feel for their interaction with nominal expressions other than pronouns and proper
names, which both have specific, singular reference.
For plural definite noun phrases, als-phrases attribute their property to the entire
plurality of individuals. This is illustrated in (51).















‘As sociable animals, the dogs play with each other.’
The sentence in (51) describes a specific situation in which the entire plurality of dogs
do not play by themselves. In a different scenario, in which only three dogs play with
each other, and one dog plays alone, example (51) could not be used. That is, als
gesellige Tiere (Engl. ‘as sociable animals’) does not restrict the set of salient dogs to
those that are sociable, but expresses that the dogs in the context are sociable animals,
and it is implied that sociable animals usually play with each other.
For nominal quantifiers, the als-phrase attributes its property to all individuals in































































‘As sociable animals, few dogs play alone.’
In the examples above, it is stated that all, most, many, or few dogs play with each other
and that they are all sociable animals. In addition, being sociable is again conveyed to
defeasibly entail that one does not play alone. Crucially, the sentences in (52) neither
express that all, most, many, or few of the salient dogs are sociable animals and play
alone, nor that all, most, many, or few of the salient sociable dogs play alone.
This observation suggests that als-phrases do not restrict nominal quantifiers. This
claim is further supported by examples like (53).
(53) ??Als Bernhardiner wiegen die meisten Hunde über 100 Kilo.
as Saint-Bernard weigh the most dogs over 100 kilos
‘As St. Bernards, most dogs weigh over 100 kilos.’
Example (53) cannot be understood as expressing that most dogs that are St. Bernards
weigh more than 100 kilos. The only interpretation for this sentence is the odd claim
that dogs are St. Bernards, and that therefore, most of them weigh more than 100
kilos.
The behavior of als-phrases with respect to nominal quantifiers contrasts with the
restricting behavior observed with als-phrases and intensional operators. For the im-
personal uses of personal pronouns, especially the interaction of als-phrases with the
generic operator Gen is of interest. Gen is analyzed in the recent literature as con-
tributing universal quantification over worlds and the set of individuals in these worlds
that have the “right” properties (cf. Chapter 3). Therefore, Gen could in principle
pattern like nominal quantifiers or intensional operators with respect to als-phrases.
For ordinary generic sentences with indefinite singular or bare plural subjects, the
adnominal use of the als-phrases in (54-a) and (55-a) is odd, but not entirely un-







































































The following example shows that neither adnominal nor adverbial als-phrases are
able to further restrict the set of individuals for which the generalization is stated, i.e.
the set of dogs.










































The als-phrase, als Terrier, in (56) can only be understood as conveying that dogs
in general are Terriers. Therefore, the generic operator Gen seems to pattern with
nominal quantifiers with respect to the universal quantification over individuals: the
als-phrase attributes its property to all elements in each set of individuals with the
right properties in the generically accessible worlds. The sentences in (54) and (55) are
acceptable since the als-phrase conveys that dogs in general are mammals—a biological
fact—, that mammals normally bear live young—another biological fact—, and that
consequently dogs bear live young.
Generic sentences that contain impersonally used ich, du, or man show a strict
contrast regarding adnominal and adverbial-like uses of als-phrases. If man is used as
the associated nominal expression, als-phrases are ungrammatical in their adnominal

























‘As a farmer, one milks one’s cows.’ ≈ ‘A farmer milks his cows.’
For the impersonal readings of ich and du, adnominal als-phrases force the pronouns
to be interpreted in their referential use. When the pronouns co-occur with adverbial-
like uses of als-phrases, in contrast, the impersonal reading is supported (cf. Chapter













Unavailable: ‘A farmer milks his cows.’














Available: ‘A farmer milks his cows.’













Unavailable: ‘A farmer milks his cows.’













Available: ‘A farmer milks his cows.’
Available: ‘As a famer, you (the addressee) milk your cows.’
Note that the translations given for the examples in (57-b), (58-b), and (59-b) suggest
that the als-phrases “restrict” the set of individuals contributed by ich, du, and man
to those individuals that have the property denoted by the nominal complement of als.
This apparent difference between the restriction behavior of als-phrases in ordinary
generic sentences and that in generic sentences containing ich, du, or man may be a
result of the meaning of impersonally used ich, du, and man. That is, the interaction
between the als-phrases and the three pronouns may provide further insights into the
interpretation of these pronouns. Since the three pronouns are truth-conditionally
equivalent (cf. Chapter 1), I illustrate this argument by example of impersonal man.
There are (at least) two possible analyses for the semantic contribution of man and
its interaction with als Bauer (Engl. ‘as a farmer’) in (57-b). First, it could be assumed
that man always contributes a variable ranging over the set of all (animate) individuals
that serves as the domain for the universal quantifier over individuals contributed by the
generic operator. In this case, the als-phrase needs to restrict the set of all individuals to
the subset expressed by its nominal complement so that the meaning that is intuitively
understood can be derived. The second possibility is to assume that the domain of
the variable contributed by man is underspecified, and is only per default fixed as the
set of animate individuals. In this case, the als-phrase does not restrict a given set
of individuals, but makes the domain of quantification explicit. In other words, the
speaker may use an als-phrase to explicitly fix the domain to a specific set.
Given the observations so far, I argue that the second option fits better with the
behavior of als-phrases in ordinary generic sentences, and should therefore be adopted
if the proposal in Chapter 4 is to be extended with a detailed account of als-phrases.
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A2 On the connection between pragmatic effects
and German discourse particles
A2.1 Preliminaries
Discourse particles are a class of lexical elements which co-occur frequently with the
impersonal uses of German first and second person singular pronouns ich and du.13
In Chapter 1, it was determined that discourse particles are not necessary for the
impersonal readings to arise, but that their presence has a supporting effect on the
availability of these readings. Furthermore, it was argued that their presence may—to
a certain degree—be taken as pointers towards the make-up of the discourse context.
The aim of the following discussion is to determine whether the pragmatic function
of discourse particles can indeed be employed as a diagnostic tool on the contexts
provided by the real life data collected from the internet.
The assumption that I start out with is that particles provide reliable pointers with
respect to the make-up of the discourse context. If this assumption turns out to be
correct, discourse particles could be used as a diagnostic tool to gain a better sense of
the contextual preferences of the impersonal readings on the basis of bigger collections
of real life data.
In the data discussion in Chapter 1, it was observed that the impersonal uses of ich
and du show a general preference regarding specific co-occurring particles: impersonally
used ich seems to prefer doch while impersonally used du prefers ja. This distribution
is illustrated in (60).
Context: Discussion about a news item: a 10-year-old Belgian girl is pregnant. The























































‘Sure, but parents have to notice if their child already wonders about such
things.’14
13German is a rich particle language. Particles exist that may be used to express agreement,
disagreement, surprise, interest, strengthening, reservation, and other speaker attitudes relative to the
propositional content of the utterance, but also convey speaker-beliefs and -expectations regarding the
epistemic state of the addressee.
14http://de.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20070928054833AAl2RG0
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Does this intuitive preference constitute a strict correspondence between discourse par-
ticles and impersonal uses? The actual distribution of particles in the data is not as
clear cut as in (60). The particles that most frequently co-occur with the impersonally
used ich in the data collection are both doch and ja. But other particles can also be
found with the impersonal use of ich although infrequently, e.g. wohl, halt, and auch.
Similarly, the particles that are most frequently found with the impersonal use of du are
doch and ja (sometimes in clusters with other particles), but there are other particles
like wohl and various other particles that also co-occur less frequently.
Since the data used in this thesis was not collected in such a way that the co-
occurrence frequencies can be taken to represent the actual co-occurrence frequencies
(cf. Introduction), one can only conclude from the attested combinations that there
are no exclusive particle-pronoun combinations; the impersonal readings of ich and
du share most of the co-occurring discourse particles even though they differ in their
preferred discourse contexts (cf. Chapter 1).
A possible reason for this discrepancy may be that the pragmatic functions performed
by the particles “fit” the preferred contexts of ich and du in different ways.
Before discussing discourse particles in general, and the relevant German discourse
particles that co-occur with the impersonal readings of ich and du in particular, I briefly
summarize the pragmatic restrictions for the two pronouns determined in Chapter 1.15
The impersonal use of du appeals to the addressee’s empathy, which creates closeness
between the speaker and the addressee. Impersonally used du has a slight preference
for “positive contexts”, i.e. contexts in which the speaker can assume that the opinion
he expresses is not in conflict with the opinions and actions of other people in the
context. The pragmatic effect of creating closeness between speaker and addressee
also supports the use of impersonally interpreted du in a subset of “negative contexts”,
though. Negative contexts are discourse contexts in which the statement expressed by
the speaker’s utterance is in conflict with the opinions or actions of another individual
in the context (not necessarily another discourse participant). In a negative context,
the appeal to the addressee’s empathy can be used to strengthen an attempt to change
the addressee’s opinion—if he is the one contesting the validity of the utterance.
In contrast to the impersonal use of du, the impersonal use of ich has a distancing
effect. The speaker does not try to appeal to the addressee or any other discourse
participant, but expresses that he fully supports the content of the generalization even
though the validity is not universally accepted. The impersonal use of ich therefore
has a strong preference for negative contexts. Example (60) illustrates the impersonal
uses of ich and du in negative contexts.
15For further details and more examples, see the data discussion in Chapter 1.
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A2.2 (German) discourse particles and their contexts of use
Discourse particles and their unique, pragmatic function have frequently been the center
of discussion in the recent formal semantic and pragmatic literature (cf. Zimmermann
2011a).16 Zimmermann (2011a) describes the central function common to all particles
as “fitting the content of a sentence to the context of speech”. The pragmatic fitting
procedures that are employed to integrate the sentence content into the discourse con-
text seem to be unique for each individual particle. In this respect, discourse particles
do not constitute a uniform class, but rather a general purpose collection. The following
list of particles and their functions, taken from the literature, illustrate this point.
• Dutch toch reminds the addressee of some old information (cf. Zeevat 2000).
• English man has two uses, depending on the syntactic position. In the first use,
it expresses speaker attitudes, and in the second use, it additionally intensifies a
gradable predicate in its containing sentence (cf. McCready 2009).
• Japanese yo marks hearer-new information (cf. McCready 2007).
• German ruhig adds a flavor of reassurance (cf. Schwager 2010).
There is no consensus in the literature with respect to the formal analysis of the
pragmatic contribution of discourse particles in general. While it is agreed on that
particles contribute not-at-issue content (cf. Potts 2005, Simons et al. 2011), the specific
variant of not-at-issue content that the various particles contribute seems to vary with
the different particles. Given the diversity of functions already exemplified above, this
is not particularly surprising: it seems that the analyses of the individual particles need
to be as diverse as the functions they perform.
However, even for many individual particles, various different analyses have been
suggested in the literature already. For instance, for the German particle doch, at least
three different proposals exist: (i) doch is said to contribute presupposed content, (ii) it
is said to trigger a conventional implicature, and (iii) it acts like a speech act operator
(cf. Egg 2010; Grosz 2014; Zimmermann 2011a, among others).
For reasons of space, the discussion in this part of the appendix is restricted to the
German particles doch and ja. As noted in the previous subsection, they most fre-
quently co-occur with the impersonal readings of ich and du in the data collection.17
The conclusion regarding the viability of discourse particles as a diagnostic tool does
not hinge on any specific formal analysis. Therefore, I forego a detailed discussion of
16For an overview of the morphosyntactic characteristics of discourse particles on the basis of Ger-
man particles see Lindner (1991) and Gutzmann (2008).
17German has stressed and unstressed variants of doch and ja which some researchers analyze as
distinct particles and others as focus variants of the same lexical elements. Only the unstressed
variants co-occur with the impersonal readings of ich and du. For this reason, I leave the stressed
variants aside in this discussion.
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the various analyses for the two particles, and give only a general, descriptive charac-
terization of their contributions.
Like all discourse particles, doch and ja comment on the propositional content p
of their containing utterance (cf. Zimmermann 2011a). However, even the specific
contributions of doch and ja seem to be similar to each other. The two particles are
both analyzed as connecting the propositional content p to the common ground that
was built up in the course of the conversation.
(61) Common ground:
The common ground for a context is the set of all propositions that the dis-
course participants in that context mutually and publicly agree to treat as true
for the purposes of the conversation (cf. Stalnaker 1978).
Doch signals that the propositional content p is old information which is (maybe indi-
rectly) in conflict with the propositional content of another utterance in the discourse.
Specifically, it expresses that there is a proposition q in the common ground that is
incompatible with p. Additionally, doch signals that the speaker believes that the ad-
dressee is not aware of or does not entertain p, and that the speaker considers p to be











‘But, Max is at sea.’
Propositional content: ‘Max is at sea.’
(Zimmermann 2011a:2013)
Ja marks the propositional content p as old or known information, i.e. p is in the
common ground. It signals that p is evident to the speaker, and that the addressee is











‘As you know, Max is at sea.’
Propositional content: ‘Max is at sea.’
(Zimmermann 2011a:2013)
Given the specific pragmatic contributions of the two particles, it is expected that
some contexts are more compatible with the pragmatic function of some particles than
others. In other words, it is expected that there are contexts for which the use of a
given particle results in pragmatic oddness.
Zimmermann (2011a) argues that the “illicit contexts of use” for doch and ja can
be directly deduced from their pragmatic function. Since both particles interact with
the common ground, those discourse contexts are expected to be incompatible with
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the function of doch and ja for which the particles’ comments are in conflict with the
common ground. For doch, the illicit contexts are those in which the speaker knows
that the addressee already actively entertains p. This is illustrated in (64).











B: ‘You’re off? But there’s beer.’
(Zimmermann 2011a:2018)
In (64), A communicates that he is aware that there is beer. Hence, the use of doch in
B’s answer is odd since it signals that B thinks that A is unaware of the beer.
Ja, on the other hand, is incompatible with contexts in which the speaker is breaking
news, answers a question, or makes a correction, i.e. when it is clear that p is not part
of the common ground, see (65)











‘I have a daughter, y’know.’
(Zimmermann 2011a:2017)
At first blush, the pragmatic oddness resulting from the use of particles in illicit
contexts seems to be clear enough to be used as a diagnostic tool to determine the
make-up of discourse contexts. However, Zimmermann (2011a) adds an important
caveat to his observation on illicit contexts: The use of particles in illict contexts does
not always result in pragmatic oddness. The mismatch between particles and contexts
can be used to induce secondary pragmatic effects such as paralinguistic meaning (e.g.













In (66), the particle ja assists in expressing the speaker’s surprise at the presence of the
addressee. An utterance of this kind most naturally occurs as an immediate reaction
to the speaker noticing that the addressee is back. Hence, the propositional content of
the utterance, ‘the addressee is back’, cannot be assumed to be part of the common
ground—it is news to the speaker. So, according to the considerations above, the most
natural context of use for (66) is an illicit discourse context for ja.
This observation suggests that the contextual restrictions on particles based on their
pragmatic contribution depend on other pragmatic considerations as well. Hence, the
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presence of a discourse particle cannot be used as a definitive diagnostic tool for the
context in which the sentence is uttered. The presence alone does not povide enough
information to infer a specific contextual make-up. So in some sense, the requirements
that particles place on their contexts of use are only general preferences, which may be
violated to achieve further pragmatic effects.
Other than the use of a particle in an illicit context, the unexpected absence of a
particle is also sometimes argued to produce a clear-cut effect. Can this effect be used
to identify the make-up of the context?
Zeevat (2000) states that omitting a particle that fits the utterance context results in
a pragmatically infelicitous utterance. He suggests that particles mark “non-standard
assertions”. For example, German doch and ja both mark re-asserted material, i.e.
propositions that are already part of the common ground. By omitting either doch or
ja where it is needed, Zeevat suggests, the speaker fails to correctly flag his utterance
as a non-standard assertion, and his utterance is perceived as infelicitous.
Zeevat’s motivation for this analysis is the observation that re-uttering material from
the common ground, as well as uttering something which is in conflict with a proposition
in the common ground violates preconditions for felicitous assertions (cf. Searle 1969;
Stalnaker 1978).18 This is illustrated for ja in (67).



















‘Let’s visit Peter. (As you know,) he is at home.’
(adapted from Zeevat 2000:75)
Since the proposition that Peter is at home is in the common ground in (67), asserting
the second sentence without marking it as old information results in pragmatic oddness.
By using ja, the speaker flags his utterance, and no oddness arises.
Given Zeevat’s analysis of the function of discourse particles, one could conclude that
a particle has to be used whenever it can be used. However, omitting a particle even
though it could have been used does not always result in pragmatic infelicity as in (67).
An utterance for which the truth of its content has been established at some point in
the past (i.e. its content is technically part of the common ground), but which the
addressee may have forgotten (e.g. given his behavior) does not necessarily constitute
18Zeevat (2000) adopts Stalnaker’s (1978) view on assertions. Stalnaker proposes “rules and prin-
ciples of assertion” based on “presupposed material” which are related to the conditions proposed
by Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) for felicitous assertions: “To assert something incompatible with
what is presupposed is self-defeating. [...] And to assert something which is already presupposed is to
attempt to do something that is already done.” (Stalnaker 1978:88f). The term “being presupposed”
in Stalnaker’s view on presuppositions is equivalent to “being inside the common ground”, as adopted
in this discussion.
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a failed or defective assertion if it is not marked by appropriate particles. Example (68)
illustrates a case where doch and ja are in fact dispreferred contrary to expectations.
Context: The addressee is an amnesiac and believes that she has never been to
Paris. But in fact, she has been to Paris with the speaker, who “reminds” her of the

















‘You’ve (?ja/?doch/∅) already been to Paris.’
(adapted from Grosz 2014:4)
Given the context in (68), the proposition that the addressee has already been to Paris
is established in the common ground—assuming that no propositions can be deleted
from it. Thus, the use of ja or doch is expected to be preferred, but is dispreferred
since it suggests that the speaker expects the addressee to remember the trip (if nothing
else).
To account for (68), one could argue that mutual knowledge of the addressee’s am-
nesia may induce a public retraction of all of her previous beliefs, i.e. a revision of the
common ground. This would re-attribute the status of new information to the content
of Du warst in Paris (Engl. ‘You’ve been to Paris’). However, there are similar cases
where it is not made explicit whether the addressee (i) actually forgot a particular fact,
(ii) is merely unaware of it, or (iii) intentionally ignores it. Consider (69).
Context: Peter and Paul both were guests at Hein’s party where Hein announced
that he decided to become a vegetarian. Two weeks later, Peter, who is a big fan of
meat, is planning his traditional barbeque. He tells Paul excitedly about how much he
is looking forward to hanging out with him and Hein, drinking beer, eating burgers,
sausages, and other awesome stuff. He then asks Paul whether Hein would be willing
to bring one kilo of sausages this time. At this point, Paul interrupts Peter, and















Paul: ‘Hein is (ja/doch/∅) a vegetarian now.’
Whether Paul feels that he reminds Peter, or tells Peter of Hein’s vegetarianism depends
solely on Paul’s assumption about Peter’s knowledge state. If Paul assumes that Peter
is ignoring Hein’s new conviction, or that it has temporarily slipped Peter’s mind, he
will use ja or doch. If he assumes that Peter actually forgot about Hein’s new dietary
preferences (Peter could have been really drunk at Hein’s party), he could leave out the
particles altogether. To assume revision of the common ground, which involves Peter’s
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public beliefs, on the basis of Paul’s assumptions about Peter’s beliefs would be too
strong in this case.
Note that (68) and (69) share the property that the propositional content of the
utterances has not been explicitly established in the course of the ongoing conversation.
This might also set these two examples apart from other examples above.
In sum, the discussion above suggests that absence of a particle only allows inferences
as to the make-up of the context if mutual knowledge about the knowledge states of the
discourse participants can be assumed. The presence of a particle only allows similar
inferences if it is not used to convey secondary pragmatic effects.
A2.3 Particles and data from the internet
Examples (68) and (69) suggest that the use of doch and ja may depend on, and
communicate something about the speaker’s assumptions regarding the addressee’s
knowledge state. In most recent literature on the contribution of doch and ja, the
domain of operation for doch and ja is replaced by some weaker, more nuanced notion
(cf. Grosz 2014; Karagjosova 2004; Kaufmann and Schwager 2010; Zimmermann 2011a).
Grosz (2014) follows Kratzer and Matthewson (2009) in discarding the common
ground as the domain which doch and ja make reference to. Kratzer and Matthewson
substitute “being in the common ground” with the notion of “being established”. Grosz
states that for doch, the speaker needs to be able to take the propositional content p
to be established even if p conflicts with the addressee’s opinions—which the speaker
judges as wrong—, or if the addressee is unaware of or has forgotten that p (Grosz
2014:fn1). This new notion of being established covers the amnesia and the barbeque
example, but does not take into account the particles’ dependence on the speaker’s
assumptions about the addressee’s belief state, as observed above. If propositional
content has not been established explicitly in a conversation, the speaker’s decision to
use a particle seems to depend on his assumptions about the addressee’s knowledge
state rather than the established beliefs of the addressee. In the special case when two
or more discourse participants interact who do not share a history of communication,
the discrepancies between the addressee’s actual beliefs and the speaker’s assumptions
about the addressee’s beliefs may be considerable. Contexts of this kind are interesting
test cases for any analysis of discourse particles.
For data taken from the internet, e.g. from forum discussions, comments on newspa-
per articles, or blog posts, it is more or less the norm that the discourse participants
have no previous knowledge about each other and each other’s beliefs. That is, the
use of linguistic expressions which depend on the level of common ground or public
beliefs should strictly not occur, or if it does, it is necessarily based on guesswork. For
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instance, whether a speaker uses doch or ja seems to depend on which beliefs he is
willing to ascribe to the other discourse participants.
For cautious speakers who do not want to ascribe beliefs to other discourse partici-
pants without sufficient evidence, doch and ja are expected to occur only in two kinds
of utterances: (i) those which express propositions that are “truths that are generally
accepted”, and (ii) propositions which directly take up, or reply to a previous utterance
of another participant. Therefore in this type of data, the absence of a particle does
not allow automatic inferences on the make-up of the context of use, since a speaker
may simply have decided not to make the necessary assumptions.
A different, more general consideration, which also suggests that discourse particles
that are used in written data taken from the internet need to be handeled with care,
is that discourse particles are predominantly found in spoken language. Even though
some of the collected examples may be considered close to spoken German, the style of
German found in forum discussions, transcribed interviews, and user comments can be
expected to be a mix between written and spoken German. Since the use of discourse
particles is less frequent in written German, and signals a colloquial register, the use
of particles in these texts also depends on the speaker’s choices in matters of register
and style.19
So in sum, the presence or absence of a specific discourse particle in an example taken
from the internet may depend on (at least) three different points of consideration:
• the explicit discourse context
• the speaker’s assumptions about the established facts, which involves the other
participants’ beliefs
• the register chosen by the speaker and stylistic reasons
A2.4 Discourse particles and impersonal ich
Even though the previous subsections suggest that particles cannot be used as an
automatic diagnostic tool on the discourse contexts of data taken from the internet,
they can be used to infer a general tendency with respect to the contexts of use of
impersonally used ich and du. This investigation, however, needs to be performed for
one example at a time to control for the different confounding aspects discussed above.
For those examples that feature a particle, it first has to be determined whether the
particle is used in a regular manner, or to derive secondary pragmatic effects. If the lat-
ter is the case, the particle can be discarded as not commenting on the actual discourse
context. If the particle is used in a regular manner, it has to be determined to which
19This is not to say that discourse particles are never found in non-colloquial written German. In
literary texts, for example, particles may be used as a stylistic device to indicate free indirect discourse,
i.e. reports of speech or thought of protagonists of a narration (cf. Eckardt to appear). Even in this
function, they are, however, strongly connected to spoken language.
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part of the context the particle relates. As a second step, it can be checked whether
the particle’s contribution supports the intuition regarding the preferred contexts of
use for the impersonally used personal pronoun.
For those examples which do not contain a particle, it can be tested whether adding
different particles either results in pragmatic oddness, or assists in deriving secondary
pragmatic effects. If this is the case, the discourse context counts as an illicit context
for the particle, whoch allows to infer properties of the make-up of the context.
In this subsection, I use the general strategy described above on the data collected
for the impersonal use of first person singular ich to answer the following question: Do
the particles doch and ja, which co-occur with the impersonal reading of ich in the
collected data, support the intuition that the impersonal use of ich prefers negative
contexts?
First, let us consider the general compatibility of doch and ja with negative contexts.
Doch is a perfect fit for negative contexts because it conveys that the propositional
content of its containing utterance is in conflict with another proposition in the context.
This suggests that it should be possible to felicitously insert doch in all of the examples
featuring the impersonal use of ich.
In contrast to doch, ja seems to fit less well with the negative context requirement
of the impersonal reading of ich: it marks the proposition denoted by the containing
utterance as addressee-old information, but does not point out an existing conflict like
doch. This, per se, does not mean that ja is incompatible with negative contexts.
However, there could be a reason to assume that ja never occurs in negative contexts.
From the description of the contribution of doch and ja given above, one might conclude
that doch and ja share the same component that issues a reminder, but that doch
additionally signals a possible conflict, i.e. that ‘doch = ja + contrast’ (cf. Grosz 2014).
If this is the case, one could argue that via some principle of “maximize pragmatic fit”
the use of ja signals that there is no conflict in the context—otherwise the speaker
would have used doch.20
As Kaufmann and Schwager (2010) point out, the distribution of ja and doch across
clause types suggests that the relation between the contributions of doch and ja is more
complicated than ‘doch = ja + contrast’. If doch were a more specific version of ja,
one would expect ja to be grammatical in the same environments as doch. This is not
the case, though, since only doch, but not ja, can occur in imperatives. Consequently,
the presence of ja does not necessarily signal that there is no conflicting proposition in
the context. This, in turn, suggests that in principle, ja is compatible with negative
contexts.
20An argument along these lines is made in Grosz (2014). Grosz analyzes the contribution of doch
and ja as presuppositions, and argues that by Heim’s rule of “Maximize Presupposition” (Heim 1991)
always the most specific particle needs to be used.
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Consider the following specific occurrences of doch and ja in (70) and (71).
Context: “How much money do you give as a present at a wedding?” - The initial
question is whether 100 euros is enough. One user argues that it is customary to adjust
the amount of money relative to the size and cost of the wedding party held by the
bridal couple. The utterance responds to a post by another user who says that the
guests have to adjust the given sum to the size and style of the wedding party chosen



















































‘I think this is an absolutely stupid argument! The bridal couple can’t expect
their guests to more or less pay the party!’21
The speaker of (70) infers from the post to which she responds that the other user
thinks that a bridal couple can in fact expect their guests to cover the party expenses.
This implicit conflict constitutes the negative context for the impersonal use of ich.
The particle doch can be analyzed as making this conflict explicit.
Context: Discussion on whether someone who wants to sell an iphone with iOS
jailbreak has to describe in detail what an iOS jailbreak means for the functionality of
the iphone.22 The example is uttered in a direct answer to the comment: ‘The seller is
not responsible for what the buyer knows or doesn’t know about the device he is buying.
He only has to describe what he is selling.’ The speaker forcefully argues against the
point of view of this other user, saying that the buyer should not be required to do



























‘As the buyer in question, one doesn’t really have an idea what the full conse-
quences of this are.’23
The conflict between these opposing points of view constitute the negative context.
21http://www.urbia.de/archiv/forum/th-2142726/Wieviel-Geld-zur-Hochzeit-
schenken.html
22An iOS jailbreak is a modification of the operating system on an Apple device which is performed
to get rid of the restrictions and limitations imposed by Apple, and to give complete control to the




But, what is the function of ja in this example? One pointer towards an answer can be
found in Eckardt (to appear), who discusses the rhetorical function of ja. She argues
that one reason to utter a sentence marked by ja is to use it as a part of a “wider
rhetorical structure, for instance as evidence in favor of another claim” (Eckardt to
appear:9). Consider example (72).
Context: A and B know that Peter always visits his mother on a Monday evening.






























‘That’s impossible! As you know, it’s Monday!’
In B’s answer, both doch and ja are equally good. Doch could be used to state that its
being Monday is in conflict with A’s utterance that Peter is on a date, which implies
that Peter is not visiting his mother contrary to habit. In contrast, ja could be used
to mark the second sentence of B’s utterance as an (uncontroversial) elaboration on
the first part of the utterance. That is, the reason for why B does not believe that A’s
utterance is true, as implied by Eckardt’s observation.
For the use of ja in (71), a similar explanation can be given. The speaker motivates
her conflicting opinion by uttering (71), and ja signals that she expects the reason
expressed by her statement to be easily accepted by the other discourse participants.24
So, even though doch and ja can in principle co-occur with the impersonal use of
ich, the use of ja seems to underlie certain restrictions: while doch may be inserted in
all examples of the impersonal use of ich, inserting ja may result in pragmatic oddness.
This prediction is borne out. Consider example (73).
Context: A soccer team often performed badly in away games because the players





























A: ‘If a team wants to win, it has to enter the field motivated.’25
Under the assumption that the team under discussion indeed wanted to win the away
games, the team repeatedly acted in conflict with the consequent, ‘The team has to
24I thank Magdalena Kaufmann (p.c.) for pointing this out to me.
25Adapted from http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article532778/Schlechte_Argumente
_fuer_den_Aufnahmeantrag_an_die_G_14.html
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enter the field motivated’. This constitutes the preferred negative context for the im-
personal reading of ich. When the particle doch is inserted in the consequent, the
example improves, and sounds more natural. In contrast, inserting ja results in prag-
matic oddness.
The observations in this subsection are in line with the analysis put forth in Chapter
1 that there is a principled connection between impersonally used ich and negative
contexts. Determining the exact connection between the impersonal uses of ich and du
and their preferred contexts of use, though, will have to be left for further research. A
possible point of departure could be to investigate the connection between the contex-
tual preferences and the analysis of the pragmatic components of the impersonal uses
of ich and du in Chapter 4. According to this account impersonally used ich and du
contribute not-at-issue meaning, not unlike particles, from which the preferred contexts
can be inferred in the same way that Zimmermann (2011a) infers the illicit contexts
for German discourse particles. A second possibility is to determine how the different
not-at-issue contents of the impersonal uses and the discourse particles interact.
A3 Impersonal readings and conditional generics
A3.1 Preliminaries
In Chapter 3, where the intensional sentential context for impersonally used ich, du, and
man were discussed, examples of these pronouns in conditionals have been left aside.
The main reasons for this decision were that conditionals introduce new theoretical
issues with respect to the interaction of overt and covert operators, and the restricting
behavior of if -clauses. The aim of this part of the appendix is to discuss these issues.
The different types of conditional generic sentences found with impersonally used ich,
du, and man are illustrated in (74)–(79).26






























‘If a cat is chased by dogs all the time, it prefers to get away.’27
26Conditional generic sentences in general are discussed e.g. in Carlson (1977), Farkas and Sugioka







































‘If a woman drinks the same amount as a man, she afterwards has a blood
alcohol level that is a fifth higher.’28
In addition to this kind of conditional generic sentences, conditional generic sen-
tences that contain the same overt modal elements that are observed for non-conditional
generic sentences with impersonally used ich and du can be observed. The four ex-
amples in (76)–(79) illustrate all combinations of necessity and possibility modals with
















































































‘If you, a cat, did something bad then see to it very fast that it looks as though











































‘If one is logged in as an administrator, one can always post a comment.’32
To give an adequate analysis of sentences like (74)–(79), the following questions need
to be answered:
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• If there are two (or more) operators present in the sentence, which operator is
restricted by the if -clause?
In connection with these two questions, I briefly discuss the connection of condi-
tional generic sentences to quantified conditionals, for which similar questions have
been investigated in the literature, and try to adapt these solutions. Furthermore, I
discuss how the formalization for the two-operator account proposed in Chapter 3 can
be extended to the conditional generic sentences found in the data. The discussion of
the interaction between the generic operator and co-occurring modals also draws on
observations regarding doubly modalized conditionals in Frank (1996).
A3.2 A modal account for conditionals
Before discussing conditional generic sentences in particular, I first introduce ordinary
conditional sentences in English and German, and discuss their modal analysis proposed
in Kratzer (1981a, 1986, 1991).
The linguistic form of conditional sentences in English and German involve a biclausal
structure, i.e. an “antecedent clause” marked with if/wenn and a “consequent clause”
in some cases (optionally) marked by then/dann.















‘If Hans loses then he will be fired.’
In the literature, four classes of conditionals are distinguished (cf. von Fintel 2011):
(i) indicative conditionals, (ii) subjunctive conditionals, (iii) factual conditionals, and
(iv) relevance conditionals.33 These four classes are grouped together based on (i) mor-
phological considerations involving the specific expression of tense, aspect, and mood,
(ii) semantic-pragmatic considerations of truth/falsity of the antecedent, and (iii) the
perceived connection between the antecedent and the consequent clauses. The follow-
ing discussion is restricted to indicative and subjunctive conditionals since impersonally
interpreted personal pronouns do not occur in factual conditionals and relevance con-
ditionals.
Morphologically, indicative conditionals differ from subjunctive conditionals in the
morphological marking of tense, mood, and aspect. In the case of indicative con-
ditionals, verbal mood is indicative, and no restriction is placed on tense marking.
Subjunctive conditionals in English are marked by would in the consequent, and in
33von Fintel (2011) groups counterfactual conditionals with subjunctive conditionals based on their
similar morphological marking.
Appendix 347
most cases “subjunctive mood” in the antecedent which is indistinguishable from plu-
perfect tense. In German, subjunctive conditionals are marked by verbs or auxiliaries
in Konjunktiv II.
(82) a. If John lost, he was fired. (indicative)




































‘If Hans had lost, then he would have been fired.’ (subjunctive)
The shared intuition regarding the meaning of both indicative and subjunctive condi-
tional sentences is that they express conditionalized statements: a conditional sentence
conveys that the consequent clause is true under the condition that the antecedent
clause is true. For example (82-a), the content of John was fired is true under the
condition that the content of John lost is true; similarly for (82-b) and (83).
Indicative and subjunctive conditionals differ in the type of dependence that holds
between the truth of the consequent and the truth of the antecedent. This is illustrated
relative to the following scenario.
Scenario: The last piece of cake has vanished over night. Peter is the only person
with access to the cake for whom it can be expected that he would eat it.
(84) a. If Peter didn’t eat the cake, someone else did.
b. If Peter hadn’t eaten the cake, someone else would have.
In this scenario, the indicative conditional in (84-a) is true: the cake is gone, so someone
must have eaten it. The subjunctive conditional in (84-b), however, is intuitively false
since it is not necessarily the case—and nothing in the scenario suggests that it should
be otherwise—that someone else would have eaten the cake.
Another difference between the indicative and subjunctive variants is whether the
assumption in the antecedent, e.g. that Peter ate the cake in (84), is seen as established
or not. For indicative conditionals, the truth/falsity of the antecedent is an open
issue. In contrast, the content of the antecedent of subjunctive conditionals may be
established as false.34
34Even though one could argue that for the subclass of counterfactual conditionals the antecedents
are presupposed to be false, this is not true for subjunctive conditionals in general. A counter-example
to this claim is given in (i).
(i) If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown just exactly those symptoms which he does
in fact show.
(cf. Anderson 1951)
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Regardless of the morphological and semantic differences between indicative and
subjunctive conditionals, a general modal account for both types is proposed in Kratzer
(1981a, 1986, 1991).
Based on an observation for adverbs of quantification in Lewis (1975), Kratzer (1981a,
1986, 1989) assumes that if -clauses have no conditional meaning of their own. Rather,
the function of if -clauses is to restrict specific kinds of operators co-occurring in the





























































‘Most students pass the exam, if they study.’
In light of this view on the function and meaning of if -clauses, indicative and subjunc-
tive conditionals with the surface form ‘if p, then q ’ both share the following tripartite
structure.
(86) Operator (if-clause; matrix clause)
This tripartite structure is a special case of the general tripartite structure found with
quantificational expressions in natural language (cf. Partee 1992), see (87).
(87) Operator (restrictor; scope)
The difference between indicative and subjunctive conditionals boils down to the
difference between the operators that occur in the two types of conditionals. To account
for this difference, Kratzer extends her semantic analysis for modals, and assumes that
the proposition expressed by the if -clause restricts the quantificational domain of a
modal operator. For instance, in case an if -clause restricts a modal as in (85-a),
it is used to narrow down the set of accessible worlds to those worlds in which the
proposition expressed by the if -clause holds.
In Kratzer (1981a), the interpretational rule for conditional sentences of the form ‘if
α, then modal . . . ’ in (88) is proposed.36
35The older, opposing view that if is a logical operator which introduces the conditional meaning
is defended in a recent paper by Gillies (2010).
36Note that Kratzer’s (1981a) interpretational rule is non-compositional. A syntacticized, composi-
tional semantics for conditional sentences based on Kratzer’s account is, for example, proposed in von
Fintel and Iatridou (2005) and von Fintel and Heim (2011).
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(88) a. The first part of the utterance requires one, and only one, modal base and
one, and only one, ordering source to be correct.
b. If f is the modal base and g the ordering source for the first part of the
utterance, then f is the modal base and g the ordering source for the
second part of the utterance. f is that function from possible worlds to
sets of propositions, such that for any world w, f+(w) = f(w) ∪ {p}.
(Kratzer 1981a:68)
The second part of the rule in (88-b) states that the proposition denoted by the if -
clause is added to the set of propositions in the modal base f. This effectively reduces
the worlds picked by the modal base to those worlds in which the antecedent is true.
The resulting set of worlds is then ordered with respect to the ordering source g. In the
notation introduced in Chapter 3, necessity and possibility modals that are restricted
by an if -clause denoting a proposition p are formalized as in (89).
(89) a. ∀w′ ∈ O(f ∩ p, g, w)[q(w′)]
b. ∃w′ ∈ O(f ∩ p, g, w)[q(w′)]
The notation f ∩ p denotes the restriction of the modal base f with the proposition p
as defined in (90).
(90) f ∩ p = λw.[f(w) ∪ {p}]
In German and English indicative conditionals, the operators that are predominantly
found are adverbs of quantification and modals. For bare indicative conditionals, i.e.
indicative conditionals that contain no overt operator, Kratzer argues for the presence
of a covert operator, which is then restricted by the if -clause. She suggests two types of
covert modal operators that occur in bare indicative conditionals: (i) a covert epistemic
necessity modal and (ii) a covert frequency adverbial, which is similar in meaning to
usually or always. Both options are illustrated in (91).37
(91) a. If he left by noon, he is home by now. (epistemic necessity)
b. If he leaves work on time, he has dinner with his family.
(generic frequency)
(von Fintel 2011:1525)

























‘If he left at noon, he is already home right now.’ (epistemic necessity)
37The possibility that a vare indicative conditional contains a covert generic frequency adverbial is
mostly ignored in the recent literature. An alternative interpretation of the example in (91) is to say
that the if -clause restricts the generic operator Gen. See below.



























‘If he stops working in time, he has dinner with his family.’
(generic frequency)
To account for subjunctive conditionals, Kratzer’s account cannot be extended as
easily. Since subjunctive conditionals may express counterfactual statements where
the antecedent is known to be false in the world of evaluation, adding the antecedent
to a circumstantial or an epistemic modal base in both cases problematic.
In the literature, the two most prominent proposals for the meaning of subjunc-
tive conditionals are the two variants of “ordering semantics” proposed by Stalnaker
(1975 [1999]) and Lewis (1975), and the two variants of “premise semantics” proposed
by Kratzer (1977) and Veltman (1976), and subsequent work based on any of these
proposals.
In ordering semantics, the relevant accessible worlds for subjunctive conditionals are
those that are most similar to the world of evaluation in which the antecedent holds:38
subjunctive conditionals express that in all of the worlds in which the proposition
denoted by the antecedent is true, and that are most similar to the world of evaluation,
the consequent is true. For a subjunctive conditional of the form ‘if p then q’, the set
of maximally similar p-worlds accessible from w is denoted by MaxSimp,w. Hence, the
meaning proposed for subjunctive conditionals in ordering semantics is as in (93).39
(93) ∀w′ ∈ MaxSimp,w[q(w′)]
In a series of papers, Kratzer develops her premise semantics for subjunctive condition-
als (Kratzer 1977, 1981b, 1989, 2005). Her main aim is to solve the problems that arise
when a set of premises is updated for counterfactual reasoning since the antecedent
is usually inconsistent with the given premise set. The central idea is to start with
a complete description of the world of evaluation given by a special operator for sub-
junctive conditionals (e.g. English would), and to then accommodate the antecedent of
the subjunctive conditional, which may conflict with parts of this description. Specifi-
cally, removing all propositions that stand in conflict with the antecedent. The worlds
in which all of the propositions in the derived set hold are the relevant, accessible
worlds.40
38The difference between the accounts in Lewis (1975) and Stalnaker (1975 [1999]) is that Stal-
naker assumes that for counterfactuals only one most similar world exists whereas Lewis argues that
counterfactuals, like indicative conditionals, are evaluated relative to a set of accessible worlds.
39The notation MaxSimw is intended to denote the set of maximally similar worlds to the world of
evaluation w.
40Lewis (1981) shows that ordering semantics and premise semantics as proposed by Kratzer are
equivalent. This discussion and Kratzer’s specific formalization will not be taken up, and reviewed at
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In sum, in Kratzer’s modal account for conditionals, indicative and subjunctive con-
ditionals are treated uniformly, based on the assumption that if -clauses always restrict
overt or covert co-occurring operators. The differences between indicative and sub-
junctive conditionals is attributed to the different kinds of operators that are assumed
to occur in the two types of conditionals.
A3.3 Analyses of conditional generic sentences
As far as I know, conditional generic sentences have not been studied as intensively as
other types of generic sentences or conditional sentences. Discussions can be found in
Carlson (1979), Farkas and Sugioka (1983), ter Meulen (1986), and Krifka et al. (1995)
at various levels of detail.41
Carlson (1979) argues that conditional generic sentences with bare plural subjects
are equivalent to sentences in which the bare plural is restricted by a corresponding
relative clause. That is, (94-a) is assumed to be equivalent to (94-b).
(94) a. Donkeys are stubborn if they have green eyes.
b. Donkeys that have green eyes are subborn.
Farkas and Sugioka (1983) point out that the correspondence between (94-a) and (94-b)
is not observed for generic sentences in general. In conjoined conditional generic sen-
tences in which the second conjunct contains an anaphoric pronoun that co-refers with
the subject of the first conjunct, the substitution does not succeed. This is illustrated
in (95).
(95) a. Donkeys are stubborn, if they have green eyes, and they are stupid, if they
have brown eyes.
b. #Donkeys that have green eyes are stubborn and they are stupid, if they
have brown eyes.
Alice ter Meulen (1986) discusses Farkas and Sugioka’s observation, and argues that
the non-well-formedness of (95-b) results from constraints on anaphoric reference: in
contrast to if -clauses, relative clauses as syntactic parts of noun phrases are visible to
anaphoric reference. Since the relative clause and the second if -clause in (95-b) are
inconsistent, (95-b) is not semantically well-formed. Hence, (95) does not constitute
an observation about conditional generic sentences as such. If the second conjunct in
(95-a) is replaced by a different continuation, the if -clause can again be substituted by
a corresponding relative clause, see (96).
this point since the question regarding an adequate analysis for subjunctive conditionals is orthogonal
to the discussion about conditional generic sentences.
41For details on modality and genericity see Chapter 3.
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(96) a. Donkeys are stubborn, if they have green eyes, and they get worse, if you
beat them.
b. Donkeys that have green eyes are stubborn and they get worse, if you beat
them.
For conditional generic sentences, ter Meulen (1986) proposes that the if -clause
restricts the situations and individuals that are generalized over. A schematic repre-
sentation of the proposed underlying structure for conditional generic sentences of the
form ‘F s are Gs, if they are Ks ’ is given in (97).42
(97) Gen(F & K;G)
The analysis for conditional generic sentences proposed in Krifka et al. (1995) agrees
with ter Meulen’s (1986) analysis in two points: (i) conditional generic sentences con-
tain a covert generic operator Gen, and (ii) the if -clause is interpreted in the restrictor
of Gen. For instance, the conditional generic sentence in (98-a), is formalized as (98-b).
(98) a. A cat is infertile if it is tricolored.
b. Gen[x; ](x is a cat & x is tricolored;x is infertile)
(Krifka et al. 1995:33)
In the rest of this subsection, I combine ter Meulen’s (1986) and Krifka et al.’s (1995)
proposal with Drewery’s (1998) account, and discuss issues that arise for this proposal.
A naive combination of the three accounts predicts that the interpretation for condi-
tional generics of the form ‘F s are Gs, if they are Ks ’, i.e. containing no overt modal,
is as in (99).43
(99) ∀w′[w ∼F&K,G w′ →
∀x[F (x)(w′) & K(x)(w′) & NF&K,G(〈x,w′〉)(w′)→ G(x)(w′)]]
For (98-a), the following truth-conditions are proposed.
(100) ∀w′[w ∼cat & tricolored,infertile w′ → ∀x[cat(x)(w′) & tricolored(x)(w′) &
Ncat & tricolored,infertile(〈x,w′〉)(w′)→ infertile(x)(w′)]]
The assumption that if -clauses always restrict the generic operator defended in ter
Meulen (1986) and Krifka et al. (1995) predicts that the property K in (99) that is
contributed by the predicate in the if -clause has the same effect on the meaning of the
42Working in an entirely different framework, i.e. situation semantics in the system of Barwise and
Perry (1983), ter Meulen does not subscribe to any of the particulars implied by a modal interpretation
of the formula in (97) as proposed below. For her original account see ter Meulen (1986).
43For the remainder of this section, I adopt the proposal for the interpretation of the generic operator
in Drewery (1998) adapted in Section 3.3.
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generic sentence as other modifiers that restrict the subject property F , e.g. adjectives
and relative clauses.
This prediction is not borne out, though (pace ter Meulen’s 1986 re-interpretation
of Farkas and Sugioka’s 1983 counterexample). While for some conditional generic
sentences, the substitution does not seem to result in a change in truth-conditions, for
other conditional generic sentences, substituting the if -clause with a restrictive relative
















































‘A saver who invests his money in government stocks loses buying power.’
Intuitively, the conditional generic sentence in (101-a) still talks about savers in general,
whereas the generic sentence containing the relative clause in (101-b) exclusively talks
about savers that invest in government bonds. In addition, substituting the wenn-
clause in (101-a) with the restrictive relative clause in (101-b) seems to have two effects:
First, the direct link between investing in government stocks and losing buying power
is lost. That is, in (101-b), losing buying power is conveyed to happen for savers that
buy government stocks in general, but buying government stocks is not necessarily
seen as the grounds for losing buying power. The second effect is that the wenn-
clause in (101-a) does not convey anything about whether savers that will lose buying
power if they buy government stocks have already bought these government stocks. In
contrast, the relative clause in (101-b) states a generalization about those savers that
in fact bought government stocks.
Analogous considerations regarding the behavior of if -clauses can be found in the
literature on quantified conditionals (cf. von Fintel and Iatridou 2002; Geurts 2004;
Huitink 2008). The central problem discussed for quantified conditionals is whether an
if -clause in a conditional containing a nominal quantifier can, or should be analyzed
as restricting the nominal quantifier (cf. von Fintel and Iatridou 2002; Geurts 2004;
Huitink 2008; Klinedinst 2011). The data that is considered regarding this question
are sentence pairs such as in (102)—just as in the discussion about conditional generic
44Note that for impersonally interpreted pronouns, restrictive relative clauses need to be placed
inside the co-occurring als-phrase. Cf. Appendix A1.
45Taken from an article dated May 17, 2011 in http://www.daserste.de/plusminus/ (unavailable)
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sentences above, it is tested whether the if -clause can be substituted by a corresponding
relative clause.
(102) a. Every student will succeed if he studies hard. ≈
b. Every student who studies hard will succeed.
(von Fintel and Iatridou 2002:1)
In earlier literature on quantified conditionals (cf. Higginbotham 1986), it is argued
that quantified conditionals are always equivalent to the corresponding sentences in
which the domain of the nominal quantifier is restricted by a relative clause. This
apparent correspondence between sentence pairs such as in (102) has been contested
on the basis of quantified conditionals with non-universal nominal quantifiers.
(103) a. Most students but not all will succeed if they study hard. 6≈
b. Most students but not all who study hard will succeed.
(von Fintel and Iatridou 2002:11)
The sentences in (103-a) and (103-b) do not express the same truth-conditions. Exam-
ple (103-a) is true in a scenario in which most students will succeed, but these are in
fact all of the students that study hard. In this scenario, (103-b) is false, however.
To account for the contrast in (102) and (103), von Fintel and Iatridou (2002) propose
that quantified conditionals need to be assigned the general structure in (104).
(104) Quantifierx [Rx]Restrictor [ifw pw,x qw,x]Scope
(von Fintel and Iatridou 2002:10)
In other words, von Fintel and Iatridou argue that if -clauses never restrict nominal
quantifiers.46
Given this general structure, the problem posed by quantified conditionals can be
compared to the problem posed by conditional generic sentences. In fact, the account
proposed for quantified conditionals in von Fintel and Iatridou (2002) is reminiscent of
the account proposed for conditional generic sentences in Farkas and Sugioka (1983).
Farkas and Sugioka’s (1983) account differs from the accounts in ter Meulen (1986)
and Krifka et al. (1995) in various points. In addition to following Carlson (1977,
1979) in interpreting indefinite noun phrases in generic sentences as kind denoting
expressions, they assume that a covert adverbial generally is present, which quantifies
over an object-level variable. The domain of quantification is restricted to members
46von Fintel and Iatridou (2002) argue that if -clauses always have an element of “iffiness”, i.e. they
express that the content of the if -clause is in question. Since this is not observed for restrictive
relative clauses, von Fintel and Iatridou’s observation can be interpreted as follows: if an if -clause
is paraphrased by a restrictive relative clause, the paraphrase always loses some of the information
contributed by the if -clause.
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of the kind-entity denoted by the subject. The simple generic sentence in (105-a) is
assigned the truth-conditions in (105-b).
(105) a. Dogs are intelligent.
b. G((intelligent(xo))(xo : λzo.R(zo, dk)))
(Farkas and Sugioka 1983:249f)
The operator G represents the covert adverbial generally, xo, zo are object-level vari-
ables, and dk is the kind-individual denoted by dogs. The relation R relates kind- and
object-level entities iff the object-level entity is a member of the kind-entity (cf. Carl-
son 1977). In sum, the formula in (105-b) states that generally, individuals that are
members of the kind dog are intelligent.
When a generic sentence contains an if -clause, Farkas and Sugioka assume that the
scope of the G-operator contains a conditional of the form ‘if p then q’, written as
‘p c q’. The connector ‘c’ is defined as a modification of material implication:
(106) p c q is true iff whenever p is true, q is true
in case p is false, by some pragmatic priciple, the situation is seen as irrelevant
for determining the truth-value of the implication
In Farkas and Sugioka’s account, (107-a) is analyzed as in (107-b).
(107) a. Dogs are intelligent, if they have blue eyes.
b. G((blue eyes(xo) c intelligent(xo))(xo : λzo.R(zo, dk)))
(Farkas and Sugioka 1983:250)
This proposal for conditional generic sentences can be translated into the form proposed
by Krifka et al. (1995) if the following assumptions are made: (i) G is interpreted as
Gen, (ii) the domain restriction on xo is interpreted as the restrictor of Gen, (iii)
instead of denoting a kind-entity, the indefinite noun phrase contributes a property,
and (iv) the conditional expression ‘p c q’ is interpreted as an indicative conditional as
introduced above—written here as (p; q). Given these assumptions, the translation
of (107-b) comes out as (108).
(108) Gen[x; ](dog(x);(blue-eyes(x); intelligent(x))
The proposal in (108) is close to the proposal from von Fintel and Iatridou (2002)
in (104). Given the similar considerations regarding the possibility to paraphrase the
if -clause with a relative clause, this similarity seems to suggest that (104) and (108)
are on the right track.
However, von Fintel and Iatridou’s proposal in (104) is criticized in Geurts (2004) and
Huitink (2008). Huitink argues that for if -clauses that occur in quantified condition-
als, two types—restrictive and non-restrictive if -clauses—need to be distinguished. Re-
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strictive if -clauses can be paraphrased by restrictive relative clauses; for non-restrictive
if -clauses, this option is unavailable.
To capture both types of if -clauses, one has to allow for variability in their analysis:
sometimes if -clauses need to be analyzed as modifying a nominal quantifier, as for
(109), and sometimes as restricting a covert operator in the scope of the nominal
quantifier, as for (103).
(109) a. Most letters are answered if they are shorter than 5 pages. ≈
b. Most letters that are shorter than 5 pages are answered.
(Huitink 2008:189)
This means that only non-restrictive if -clauses should be analyzed as proposed by von
Fintel and Iatridou (2002) in (104).
Huitink’s (2008) observation for quantified conditionals also has an effect on the
analysis of conditional generic sentences since it can be replicated for these sentences.
In example (101), the if -clause is non-restrictive. Hence, substitution with a restrictive
























‘If one has a hamster, one has to take care of him.’
The wenn-clause in example (110) restricts the set of people for whom the general rule
is stated to those people that have a hamster. Hence, a paraphrase with a restric-
tive relative clause should be possible. However, in absence of a suitable als-phrase,
impersonally used personal and impersonal pronouns can only be restricted with a
wenn-clause; relative clauses are not an option. The if -clause in example (110) can be



















‘As a hamster owner, one has to take care of one’s hamster.’
The discussion in this subsection suggests that two formalizations for conditional
generic sentences are needed depending on the type of if -clause. The formalization
in (112) (repeated from above) captures conditional generic sentences with restrictive
if -clauses.
(112) ∀w′[w ∼F&K,G w′ →
∀x[F (x)(w′) & K(x)(w′) & NF&K,G(w)(〈x,w′〉)→ G(x)(w′)]]
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For conditional generic sentences with non-restrictive if -clauses, I assume that the if -
clause restricts an additional covert epistemic necessity operator in the scope of the
generic operator.47 I propose the truth-conditions in (113).
(113) ∀w′[w ∼F,(K;G) w′ → ∀x[F (x)(w′) & NF,(K;G)(〈x,w′〉)(w′)→
∀w′′ ∈ O(f ∩K(x), g, w′)[G(x)(w′′)]]]
The notation (K;G), which was also used above, formalizes the meaning of an indica-
tive conditional for which K(x) is the antecedent proposition and G(x) the consequent
proposition, i.e. it is to be read as an abbreviation for the formula in (114).48
(114) ∀w′′ ∈ O(f ∩K(x), g, w′)[G(x)(w′′)]
For conditional generic sentences that contain an overt modal element in the con-
sequent, as illustrated in (76)–(79), additional considerations are needed, which are
briefly addressed in the following subsection.
A3.4 Conditional generic sentences and overt modals
Conditional generic sentences containing overt modals are, as far as I am aware, even
less well studied than “bare” conditional generic sentences. Of those authors cited in
the previous subsection, only Krifka et al. (1995) consider additional modal elements
in the consequent of a conditional generic sentence.
In example (115-a) taken from Krifka et al., the conditional generic sentence contains
the overt modal should.
(115) a. If hei can’t afford to rent an entire house, then a new faculty memberi
should rent a simple room to save money.
b. Gen(¬♦x affords to rent an entire house & x is a new faculty member ;
x should rent a simple room to save money)
(Krifka et al. 1995:107)
In the formalization in (115-b) that is attributed to Heim (1988 [1982]), the modal is
interpreted in the scope of the generic operator. The if -clause is interpreted in the
restrictor of Gen.
Heim’s analysis is compatible with the results on generic sentences containing overt
modals in Chapter 3. There, it was observed that the generic operator Gen always
scopes over co-occurring non-epistemic modals. Since the function of if -clauses is to
restrict operators, the interaction between Gen and an overt modal in the consequent
47As discussed in Section 3.5, epistemic modals show both relative scope orderings with the generic
operator.
48Note that the variable x in (114) is free, but since (114) is part of (113), x will be bound by the
universal quantifier over individual variables that is introduced by Gen.
358 A3 Impersonal readings and conditional generics
of a conditional generic sentences is in fact expected to shows the same restrictions as
in the non-conditional cases. These considerations are taken as the point of departure
for this last subsection.
While Heim’s analysis of (115-a) seems to capture the meaning of (115-a), two as-
pects of these types of examples need to be investigated further: First, as shown in the
previous subsection, if -clauses do not always restrict the generic operator. For these
cases, it needs to be determined whether the if -clauses restrict the overt modals in the
consequents of the conditional generic sentences, or whether the presence of another
convert modal needs to be assumed. The second consideration concerns the interpre-
tation of the overt modals in those cases in which the if -clause restricts the generic
operator.
In the following discussion, I address both points of consideration starting with the
cases in which the if -clause restricts the generic operator: in examples like (116), the
restriction that is added to the generic operator also seems to be inherited by the overt































‘If a team wants to win, they also have to enter the field motivated.’49
If the wenn-clause in (116) restricts only the generic operator, the meaning of the
sentence should be paraphrasable as (117-a). However, the paraphrase that intuitively
reflects the meaning of (116) is the one in (117-b).
(117) a. For all teams that want to win and that are non-exceptional with respect
to the obligation to enter the field motivated, it is the case that they
have to enter the field motivated.
b. For all teams that want to win and that are non-exceptional with respect
to the obligation to enter the field motivated, it is the case that if they
want to win, they have to enter the field motivated.
That is, the obligation to enter the field motivated is also conditionalized to those cases
in which the non-exceptional teams want to win.
How can this be adequately captured? A similar problem is addressed in the liter-
ature for conditional sentences that involve two or more modal operators, e.g. in the
work on doubly modalized conditional sentences in Frank (1996), Geurts (2004), and
Zvolensky (2002).




analysis of deontic conditionals. She argues that Kratzer’s account as it is does not
adequately capture indicative deontic conditionals. Kratzer’s proposal predicts that
the if -clause in (118) should restrict the overt deontic modal must.
(118) If Peter drinks Pepsi, then he must drink Pepsi.
This, however, predicts that (118) should express the tautology that is schematically
given in (119).
(119) (p; p)
where p is the proposition denoted by Peter drinks Pepsi
On the basis of these types of examples, Frank argues that Kratzer’s (1981a) account
for indicative conditionals is too restrictive. That is, Kratzer’s rule of interpretation
in (88) (see above) suggests that as soon as an overt modal is present in the conse-
quent of a conditional, the presence of an additional covert modal that is restricted
by the if -clause is excluded. Frank argues that this view on conditionals as involving
at most one operator that is restricted by the if -clause does not only lead to prob-
lems for indicative deontic conditionals in (118), but also for overtly doubly modalized
conditional sentences. The interpretation of two overt modals should not be combined
to give one single modal base and one single ordering source. Instead, Frank argues,
multiple modals need to be interpreted independently and in succession, as suggested
by their surface order. For instance, the examples in (120) need to be interpreted with
two modals that are stacked in surface order.
(120) a. If Max stays with his Grandma, he might be allowed to take the dog
for a walk.
 ‘if p then ♦♦q’
b. If Max stays with his Grandma, he might have to take the dog for a
walk.
 ‘if p then ♦q’
(Frank 1996:49)
Regarding the interaction of the two modals in (120), Frank proposes that the embed-
ded modal is interpreted relative to the higher modal. In particular, the modal base
of the embedded modal is interpreted as anaphoric to the modal base of the higher
modal. For the examples in (120), she proposes the following interpretation in (121).50
50Frank (1996) originally gives the semantic contribution of a modal in the notation, which I trans-











where f is an epistemic modal base, g a deontic ordering source, and
f+ = f ∪ p
(Frank 1996:50)
I now return to the formalization of conditional generic sentences with overt modal
elements in the consequent clauses, and try to combine the insights in Frank (1996)
with the proposal for “bare” conditional generic sentences from the previous subsection.
Examples (122) and (123) give the proposals for the two alternative interpretations for
conditional generic sentences with overt modals—depending on the type of if -clause.
In (122), the if -clause restricts the generic operator Gen, and the modal is interpreted
in the scope of Gen.
(122) a. ∀w′[w ∼F&K,G w′ → ∀x[F (x)(w′) &K(x)(w′) &NF&K,G(〈x,w′〉)(w′)→
∀w′′ ∈ O(f, g, w′)[G(x)(w′′)]]]
b. ∀w′[w ∼F&K,♦G w′ → ∀x[F (x)(w′) &K(x)(w′) &NF&K,♦G(〈x,w′〉)(w′)→
∃w′′ ∈ O(f, g, w′)[G(x)(w′′)]]]
The formalization in (123) assumes that the if -clause restricts the overt modal in the
consequent of the conditional.
(123) a. ∀w′[w ∼F,(K;G) w′ → ∀x[F (x)(w′) & NF,(K;G)(〈x,w′〉)(w′)→
∀w′′ ∈ O(f ∩K(x), g, w′)[G(x)(w′′)]]]
b. ∀w′[w ∼F,♦(K;G) w′ → ∀x[F (x)(w′) & NF,♦(K;G)(〈x,w′〉)(w′)→
∃w′′ ∈ O(f ∩K(x), g, w′)[G(x)(w′′)]]]
In Chapter 3, meaning postulates were proposed to capture that overt non-epistemic
modals in generic sentences depend on the world of evaluation even though they are
interpreted in the scope of Gen. The adaptation of the original formulation given in
Chapter 3 to fit the second formalization in (123) is given in (124).
(124) a. ∀w′[w ∼F,(K;G) w′ → g(w) = g(w′)]
b. ∀w′[w ∼F,♦(K;G) w′ → g(w) = g(w′)]
For the first interpretation of conditional generic sentences in (122), the observation
that the if -clause also has an effect on the embedded modal needs to be captured in
addition to the dependence on the world of evaluation. Based on Frank’s (1996) pro-
posal above, I propose the adapted meaning postulates in (125) for the formalizations
in (122).
(125) a. ∀w′[w ∼F&K,G w′ → g(w) = g(w′) &
∀x[〈x,w′〉 ∈ NF&K,G(w′)→ [λw′.K(x)(w′′)] ∈ f(w′)]]
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b. ∀w′[w ∼F&K,♦G w′ → g(w) = g(w′) &
∀x[〈x,w′〉 ∈ NF&K,G(w′)→ [λw′.K(x)(w′′)] ∈ f(w′)]]
So in sum in this part of the appendix, formalizations for the interpretations of
conditional generic sentences with and without overt modals were proposed. Both
proposals depend on the restrictive behavior of if -clauses argued for by Kratzer (1981a,
1986, 1989). Furtermore, the similarities between if -clauses in quantified conditionals
and in conditional generic sentences were determined: if -clauses sometimes seem to
restict the higher scoping generic operator, and sometimes the lower scoping overt
modal. Two formalizations for these two distinct possibilities were proposed.
The account presented in this subsection opens up further questions regarding the
formalization of conditional generic sentences, which, for reasons of space, will have to
stay unanswered at the moment, though.
• Can it be derived from the lexical material occurring in the sentence which of the
two interpretational variants of conditional generic sentences is needed?
• Do the two interpretations adequately capture the data? To give an answer
to this question, more data needs to be considered in detail, and it needs to
be determined what it means for an individual to be relevantly non-exceptional
relative to a conditional property.
• How many covert operators—in addition to Gen—may be assumed to occur in
conditional generic sentences?
The last question is connected to Frank’s (1996) treatment of deontic conditionals.
Frank extends her analysis of conditionals containing two or more overt modals to
deontic conditionals containing a single modal. Her central idea is that whenever
a conditional contains an overt deontic modal in the consequent, a covert epistemic
modal has to be assumed which has scope over the deontic modal. The modal base
of the lower overt modal is again assumed to be anaphoric to the modal base of the
higher covert modal. This accounts for the problematic example in (118) since instead
of the tautologous meaning in (119), it is formalized as in (126).
(126) epistemic(p;deonticp)
where p is the proposition denoted by Peter drinks Pepsi
For further details of this account, see Frank (1996).51
A detailed discussion of these issues requires detailed investigations regarding the
parallel between conditional generics and quantified conditionals, on the one hand, and
conditional generics and doubly modalized conditionals, on the other hand. These in-
vestigations are beyond the scope of this thesis, and have to be left for further research.
51The proposal in Frank (1996) is criticized in Zvolensky (2002), who argues against adopting a
Kratzerian account for indicative deontic conditionals in general. For details cf. Zvolensky (2002).
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